Does the neuroscience command us to be utilitarian?

KRCHŇÁK, Daniel. Does the neuroscience command us to be utilitarian? In Unseld Lectures 2018, 7.6.2018, Universität Tübingen. 2018.

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TY  - CONF
ID  - 1422886
AU  - Krchňák, Daniel
PY  - 2018
TI  - Does the neuroscience command us to be utilitarian?
KW  - utilitarianism
KW  - neuroscience
KW  - brain hemisphere
KW  - Joshua Green
KW  - Iain McGilchrist
KW  - trolleyology
N2  - In my paper I will debate an influential neuroethical theory: the dual-process theory of moral judgment. I will briefly sketch its main ideas and present various sources of evidence for its two main contentions, namely that a utilitarian judgment is lead by a slow, reflective, deliberative cognitive process (System 2), whereas a deontological judgment is driven by a fast, automatic and emotion-based process (System 1). Then I will show that virtually all sources of evidence are in some way problematic. Moreover we have some evidence that utilitarian judgment is at least sometimes a result of automatic reactions (e.g. Kahane et al., 2012, Tremoliere, Bonnefon, 2014, Białek, De Neys, 2017) and there is also evidence that a deontological judgment could be led by deliberation (e.g. Moore, Clark, Kane, 2008, Kahane et al., 2012, Sylvia et al., 2013, Baron, Gürçay, 2017). We also have reasons to be cautious about the explanatory power of “trolleyological” methodological paradigms which the most studies employ. I conclude that the original strong contention of dual-process theory of moral judgment should be abandoned in favor of a much more fine-grained account. Afterwards I will argue that such a fine-grained alternative can be found in Ian McGilchrist's (2009) theory of brain asymmetry. I will sketch the differences between both hemispheres from the point of view of this theory and point out that the author assumes utilitarianism to be bound more with the modus operandi of the left hemisphere. I will show how the description of left-hemispheric functioning fits with concrete assertions from the point of view of dual-process theory about the sort of cognitive processes that back utilitarian thought. Then I will point to some specific neuroscientific evidence (eg. Moll et al., 2002, Knoch et al., 2006, Steckler et al., 2017) which supports the converging intuitions of McGilchrist and Greene. I will close with a suggestion to reevaluate the status of neuroscientific support for the utilitarian position.
ER  -

Basic information
Original name	Does the neuroscience command us to be utilitarian?
Name in Czech	Velí nám neurověda být utilitaristy?
Authors	KRCHŇÁK, Daniel (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition	Unseld Lectures 2018, 7.6.2018, Universität Tübingen, 2018.

Other information
Original language	English
Type of outcome	Presentations at conferences
Field of Study	60302 Ethics
Country of publisher	Germany
Confidentiality degree	is not subject to a state or trade secret
RIV identification code	RIV/00216224:14210/18:00103179
Organization unit	Faculty of Arts
Keywords in English	utilitarianism; neuroscience; brain hemisphere; Joshua Green; Iain McGilchrist; trolleyology
Tags	rivok
Tags	International impact, Reviewed
Changed by	Changed by: Mgr. Igor Hlaváč, učo 342491. Changed: 14/3/2019 08:29.

Abstract

In my paper I will debate an influential neuroethical theory: the dual-process theory of moral judgment. I will briefly sketch its main ideas and present various sources of evidence for its two main contentions, namely that a utilitarian judgment is lead by a slow, reflective, deliberative cognitive process (System 2), whereas a deontological judgment is driven by a fast, automatic and emotion-based process (System 1). Then I will show that virtually all sources of evidence are in some way problematic. Moreover we have some evidence that utilitarian judgment is at least sometimes a result of automatic reactions (e.g. Kahane et al., 2012, Tremoliere, Bonnefon, 2014, Białek, De Neys, 2017) and there is also evidence that a deontological judgment could be led by deliberation (e.g. Moore, Clark, Kane, 2008, Kahane et al., 2012, Sylvia et al., 2013, Baron, Gürçay, 2017). We also have reasons to be cautious about the explanatory power of “trolleyological” methodological paradigms which the most studies employ. I conclude that the original strong contention of dual-process theory of moral judgment should be abandoned in favor of a much more fine-grained account. Afterwards I will argue that such a fine-grained alternative can be found in Ian McGilchrist's (2009) theory of brain asymmetry. I will sketch the differences between both hemispheres from the point of view of this theory and point out that the author assumes utilitarianism to be bound more with the modus operandi of the left hemisphere. I will show how the description of left-hemispheric functioning fits with concrete assertions from the point of view of dual-process theory about the sort of cognitive processes that back utilitarian thought. Then I will point to some specific neuroscientific evidence (eg. Moll et al., 2002, Knoch et al., 2006, Steckler et al., 2017) which supports the converging intuitions of McGilchrist and Greene. I will close with a suggestion to reevaluate the status of neuroscientific support for the utilitarian position.

Links
MUNI/A/0963/2017, interní kód MU	Name: Cesty k soudobé filozofii
MUNI/A/0963/2017, interní kód MU	Investor: Masaryk University, Category A

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Does the neuroscience command us to be utilitarian?

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