It Ought To Be therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of so-called Moralistic Fallacy

ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš and Iva SVAČINOVÁ. It Ought To Be therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of so-called Moralistic Fallacy. In Oswald, S. & Maillat, D. Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation: Volume II, Fribourg 2017. London: College Publications, 2018, p. 597-614. ISBN 978-1-84890-284-8.

Basic information

• Original name: It Ought To Be therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of so-called Moralistic Fallacy
• Authors: ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution) and Iva SVAČINOVÁ (203 Czech Republic).
• Edition: London, Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation: Volume II, Fribourg 2017, p. 597-614, 18 pp. 2018.
• Publisher: College Publications

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Proceedings paper
• Field of Study: 60302 Ethics
• Country of publisher: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• Publication form: printed version "print"
• RIV identification code: RIV/00216224:14560/18:00103563
• Organization unit: Faculty of Economics and Administration
• ISBN: 978-1-84890-284-8
• Keywords in English: argument scheme; moralistic fallacy; ought-is inference; pragma-dialectics
• Tags: International impact, Reviewed

Abstract

The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in the same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of a practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions, we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where the ought-is relation is argumentatively considered as a relation between propositions in reason and standpoint.