JIRÁSEK, Michal, Matthias GLASER and Josef WINDSPERGER. Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control. In 8th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks. 2018.
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Basic information
Original name Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control
Authors JIRÁSEK, Michal (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Matthias GLASER (40 Austria) and Josef WINDSPERGER (40 Austria).
Edition 8th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks, 2018.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Presentations at conferences
Field of Study 50204 Business and management
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14560/18:00104582
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Keywords in English governance form; franchising; environmental uncertainty; transaction cost theory; adaptation; control
Tags International impact
Changed by Changed by: Ing. Michal Jirásek, Ph.D., učo 348079. Changed: 2/4/2019 12:50.
Abstract
This study provides a new explanation of the ownership structure of franchise firms by highlighting that there is a trade-off between adaptation and control under increasing uncertainty. Franchising networks are formed to reduce transaction costs by combining franchisee outlets (as adaptation mechanism) to increase local responsiveness and company-owned outlets (as a control mechanism) to increase central coordination. Franchisors use more local responsiveness stemming from a lower proportion of company owned outlets (PCO) to access the local profit opportunities under low to moderate environmental uncertainty and more central control by a higher PCO under a high environmental uncertainty to better coordinate interdependent local market outlets. Hence the franchisor has to find an optimal PCO by balancing the PCO decreasing effect of higher local adaptation with the PCO increasing effect of higher central coordination under increasing uncertainty. We argue that, under low to moderate degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the information and search cost savings exceed the higher coordination and control costs under lower PCO, and, under a high degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the higher coordination and control cost savings exceed the higher information and search costs under higher PCO. Therefore, there is a U-shaped relationship between PCO and environmental uncertainty. Data from Swiss and German franchise systems provide support of this hypothesis.
Links
MUNI/A/0920/2017, interní kód MUName: Důsledky zpětné vazby na výkonnost na individuální a podnikové úrovni
Investor: Masaryk University, Category A
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