Articles	
  
Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils:	
  Forms,	
  Rationales	
  and	
  Impact	
  of	
  
Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  in	
  Europe	
  
	
  
By	
  David	
  Kosař∗
Abstract	
  
	
  
A	
  few	
  years	
  ago,	
  judicial	
  councils	
  composed	
  primarily	
  of	
  judges	
  were	
  viewed	
  as	
  a	
  panacea	
  
for	
  virtually	
  all	
  problems	
  of	
  court	
  administration	
  in	
  Europe.	
  The	
  burgeoning	
  literature	
  on	
  
judicial	
  councils	
  has	
  shown	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  necessarily	
  the	
  case.	
  This	
  article	
  builds	
  on	
  this	
  
literature,	
  but	
  it	
  argues	
  that	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  is	
  much	
  broader	
  phenomenon	
  than	
  
judicial	
   councils	
   and	
   may	
   also	
   take	
   different	
   forms.	
   Therefore,	
   it	
   is	
   high	
   time	
   to	
   look	
  
beyond	
   judicial	
   councils	
   and	
   to	
   view	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   as	
   a	
   much	
   more	
   complex	
  
network	
  of	
  actors	
  and	
  bodies	
  with	
  different	
  levels	
  of	
  participation	
  of	
  judges.	
  To	
  that	
  end	
  
this	
  article	
  conceptualizes	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  and	
  identifies	
  crucial	
  actors	
  within	
  the	
  
judiciary	
   who	
   may	
   engage	
   in	
   judicial	
   governance	
   (such	
   as	
   judicial	
   councils,	
   judicial	
  
appointment	
   commissions,	
   promotion	
   committees,	
   court	
   presidents	
   and	
   disciplinary	
  
panels).	
  Subsequently,	
  it	
  shows	
  that	
  both	
  the	
  forms,	
  rationales,	
  and	
  effects	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐
governance	
   have	
   varied	
   across	
   Europe.	
   Finally,	
   this	
   article	
   argues	
   that	
  it	
   is	
   necessary	
   to	
  
take	
  into	
  account	
  the	
  liquid	
  nature	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  and	
   its	
  responsiveness	
  to	
  
political,	
  social,	
  and	
  cultural	
  changes.	
  Moreover,	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  is	
  not	
  
necessarily	
   a	
   panacea,	
   as	
   it	
   may	
   lead	
   to	
   political	
   contestation	
   and	
   the	
   creation	
   of	
   new	
  
channels	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  	
  
	
  
	
   	
  
∗	
  David	
  Kosař	
  is	
  the	
  Director	
  of	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Studies	
  Institute	
  (JUSTIN)	
  at	
  the	
  Law	
  Faculty	
  of	
  Masaryk	
  University,	
  
Brno.	
   Email:	
   david.kosar@law.muni.cz.	
   The	
   research	
   leading	
   to	
   this	
   article	
   has	
   received	
   funding	
   from	
   the	
  
European	
  Research	
  Council	
  (ERC)	
  under	
  the	
  European	
  Union’s	
  Horizon	
  2020	
  research	
  and	
  innovation	
  programme	
  
(grant	
  no.	
  678375-­‐JUDI-­‐ARCH-­‐ERC-­‐2015-­‐STG).	
  
1568	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
A.	
  Introduction	
  	
  
	
  
A	
  decade	
  ago,	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Europe	
  was	
  a	
  subject	
  of	
  discussions	
  
among	
  judges	
  within	
  judicial	
  associations	
  and	
  transnational	
  judicial	
  communities,
1
	
  at	
  the	
  
Venice	
  Commission,
2
	
  and	
  among	
  a	
  few	
  connoisseurs	
  in	
  academia.
3
	
  The	
  accession	
  of	
  the	
  
Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   European	
   countries	
   to	
   the	
   European	
   Union	
   had	
   been	
   completed,	
  
judicial	
  councils	
  had	
  been	
  established,	
  and	
  the	
  future	
  looked	
  bright	
  and	
  shiny.	
  Fast	
  forward	
  
to	
   2018.	
   Judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   is	
   challenged	
   in	
   several	
   EU	
   Member	
   States,	
   it	
   fills	
   the	
  
pages	
  of	
  major	
  newspapers,
4
	
  and	
  virtually	
  every	
  supranational	
  organization	
  has	
  a	
  project	
  
or	
  two	
  on	
  this	
  topic.
5
	
  Even	
  both	
  European	
  supranational	
  courts	
  have	
  become	
  increasingly	
  
entangled	
  in	
  this	
  area.
	
  6
	
  
	
  
1
	
  The	
  Consultative	
  Council	
  of	
  European	
  Judges	
  (Conseil	
  consultatif	
  de	
  juges	
  européens,	
  hereinafter	
  also	
  “CCJE”)	
  
and	
  the	
  European	
  Network	
  for	
  the	
  Councils	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  (hereinafter	
  also	
  “ENCJ”)	
  have	
  been	
  particularly	
  active	
  
in	
  this	
  area.	
  	
  
2
	
  The	
  number	
  of	
  the	
  Venice	
  Commission’s	
  Opinions	
  concerning	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  is	
  so	
  high	
  that	
  I	
  cannot	
  
enumerate	
   them	
   here.	
   For	
   a	
   broader	
   understanding	
   of	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   the	
   Venice	
   Commission	
   in	
   this	
   area,	
   see	
  
Maartje	
   De	
   Visser,	
   A	
   Critical	
   Assessment	
   of	
   the	
   Role	
   of	
   the	
   Venice	
   Commission	
   in	
   Processes	
   of	
   Domestic	
  
Constitutional	
   Reform.	
   63(4)	
   AMERICAN	
   JOURNAL	
   OF	
   COMPARATIVE	
   LAW	
   963–1008	
   (2015);	
   and	
   Valentina	
   Volpe,	
  
Drafting	
   Counter-­‐majoritarian	
   Democracy.	
   The	
   Venice	
   Commission’s	
   Constitutional	
   Assistance,	
   76(4)	
   HEIDELBERG	
  
JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  LAW	
  811–843	
  (2016).	
  
3
	
  For	
  rare	
  exceptions	
  of	
  scholars	
  who	
  engaged	
  with	
  this	
  topic	
  much	
  earlier,	
  see	
  THIERRY	
   S.	
   RENOUX,	
   LES	
   CONSEILS	
  
SUPERIEURS	
   DE	
   LA	
   MAGISTRATURE	
   EN	
   EUROPE	
   (1999);	
   CARLO	
   GUARNIERI	
   &	
   PATRIZIA	
   PEDERZOLI,	
   THE	
   POWER	
   OF	
   JUDGES:	
   A	
  
COMPARATIVE	
  STUDY	
  OF	
  COURTS	
  AND	
  DEMOCRACY	
  (2002);	
  and	
  Wim	
  Voermans	
  &	
  Pim	
  Albers,	
  Councils	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  in	
  
EU	
  Countries,	
  EUROPEAN	
  COMMISSION	
  FOR	
  THE	
  EFFICIENCY	
  OF	
  JUSTICE,	
  CEPEJ	
  (2003).	
  
4
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Christian	
  Davis,	
  Polish	
  MPs	
  pass	
  judicial	
  bills	
  amid	
  accusations	
  of	
  threat	
  to	
  democracy,	
  THE	
  GUARDIAN	
  (Dec	
  
8,	
   2017),	
   https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/08/polish-­‐mps-­‐pass-­‐supreme-­‐court-­‐bill-­‐criticised-­‐as-­‐
grave-­‐threat;	
  Patrick	
  Kingsley,	
  After	
  Viktor	
  Orban’s	
  Victory,	
  Hungary’s	
  Judges	
  Start	
  to	
  Tumble,	
  THE	
  NEW	
  YORK	
  TIMES	
  
(May	
   1,2018),	
   https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/world/europe/hungary-­‐viktor-­‐orban-­‐judges.html;;	
   James	
  
Shotter	
  &	
  Evon	
  Huber,	
  Poland’s	
  top	
  court	
  steps	
  up	
  its	
  challenge	
  to	
  judges	
  being	
  ‘purged’,	
  FINANCIAL	
  TIMES	
  (Aug	
  2,	
  
2018),	
   https://www.ft.com/content/7965ad18-­‐9658-­‐11e8-­‐b67b-­‐b8205561c3fe;	
   and	
   Benjamin	
   Novak	
   &	
   Patrick	
  
Kingsley,	
  Hungary	
  Creates	
  New	
  Court	
  System,	
  Cementing	
  Leader’s	
  Control	
  of	
  Judiciary,	
  THE	
  NEW	
  YORK	
  TIMES	
  (Dec	
  
12,	
  2018),	
  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/world/europe/hungary-­‐courts.html.	
  
5
	
   See	
   e.g.	
   the	
   projects	
   of	
   the	
   Organization	
   for	
   the	
   Security	
   and	
   Cooperation	
   in	
   Europe	
  
(https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/expert-­‐judicial-­‐self-­‐governance-­‐vnodic00667),	
  the	
  European	
  Committee	
  on	
  Legal	
  
Co-­‐operation(https://www.coe.int/en/web/cdcj/co-­‐operation-­‐projects/judicial-­‐self-­‐governance-­‐training-­‐
azerbaijan);	
   and	
   the	
   International	
   Commission	
   of	
   Jurists	
   (https://www.icj.org/new-­‐icj-­‐report-­‐analyses-­‐the-­‐
transition-­‐to-­‐judicial-­‐self-­‐governance-­‐in-­‐serbia/).	
  See	
  also	
  projects	
  of	
  the	
  CCJE	
  and	
  ENCJ.	
  
6
	
  See	
  Başak	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Stewart	
  Cunningham,	
  Judicial	
  Self	
  Government	
  and	
  the	
  sui	
  generis	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Court	
  of	
  
Human	
  Rights,	
  in	
  this	
  issue;	
  and	
  Christoph	
  Krenn,	
  Governing	
  the	
  European	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice:	
  Self-­‐governance	
  as	
  a	
  
Model	
  for	
  Success,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1569	
  
	
  	
  
In	
  fact,	
  the	
  last	
  two	
  years	
  have	
  been	
  particularly	
  eventful.	
  Law	
  and	
  Justice,	
  the	
  ruling	
  party	
  
in	
  Poland,	
  announced	
  and	
  implemented	
  controversial	
  reforms	
  of	
  the	
  Polish	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  
and	
   the	
   National	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Judiciary.
7
	
   The	
   Court	
   of	
   Justice	
   stepped	
   boldly	
   into	
   the	
  
debate	
  in	
  the	
  “Portuguese	
  Judges”	
  case	
  (Associação	
  Sindical	
  dos	
  Juízes	
  Portugueses),	
  when	
  
it	
  held	
  for	
  the	
  first	
  time	
  that	
  domestic	
  judicial	
  design	
  is	
  within	
  its	
  purview.
8
	
  Soon	
  after	
  the	
  
“Portuguese	
  Judges”	
  case,	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  engaged	
  with	
  the	
  abovementioned	
  Polish	
  
judicial	
   reforms	
   –	
   it	
   decided	
   the	
   Celmer	
   case
9
	
   and	
   ordered	
   Poland	
   to	
   suspend	
   the	
  
application	
  of	
  the	
  provisions	
  relating	
  to	
  the	
  lowering	
  of	
  the	
  retirement	
  age	
  for	
  Supreme	
  
Court	
  judges.
10
	
  The	
  ECtHR	
  did	
  not	
  lag	
  behind.	
  While	
  it	
  has	
  engaged	
  with	
  domestic	
  judicial	
  
design	
   for	
   much	
   longer
11
	
   than	
   the	
   CJEU,	
   its	
   two	
   recent	
   Grand	
   Chamber	
   judgments	
   in	
  
Denisov	
  v.	
  Ukraine
12
	
  and	
  Ramos	
  Nunes	
  de	
  Carvalho	
  e	
  Sá	
  v	
  Portugal
13
	
  have	
  raised	
  the	
  stakes	
  
to	
  a	
  whole	
  new	
  level.	
  
	
  
While	
  most	
  eyes	
  are	
  now	
  watching	
  Poland	
  and	
  the	
  response	
  of	
  both	
  supranational	
  courts	
  
to	
   developments	
   therein,	
   judicial	
   reforms	
   have	
   taken	
   place	
   in	
   other	
   jurisdictions	
   too.	
  
Romania
14
	
  and	
  Turkey
15
	
  adopted	
  controversial	
  reforms	
  affecting	
  the	
  composition	
  of	
  judicial	
  
7
	
  See	
  Anna	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  The	
  Rise	
  and	
  Fall	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Poland:	
  On	
  Judicial	
  Reform	
  Reversing	
  
Democratic	
  Transition,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
8
	
  ECJ,	
  27	
  February	
  2018,	
  Case	
  C-­‐64/16	
  Associação	
  Sindical	
  dos	
  Juízes	
  Portugueses.	
  For	
  further	
  details	
  see	
  Matteo	
  
Bonelli	
  &	
  Monica	
  Claes,	
  Judicial	
  serendipity:	
  how	
  Portuguese	
  judges	
  came	
  to	
  the	
  rescue	
  of	
  the	
  Polish	
  judiciary:	
  ECJ	
  
27	
  February	
  2018,	
  Case	
  C-­‐64/16,	
  Associação	
  Sindical	
  dos	
  Juízes	
  Portugueses,	
  14(3)	
  EUROPEAN	
  CONSTITUTIONAL	
  LAW	
  
REVIEW	
  622–643	
  (2018).	
  
9
	
  Case	
  C-­‐216/18	
  PPU,	
  Reference	
  for	
  a	
  preliminary	
  ruling	
  from	
  the	
  High	
  Court	
  (Ireland)	
  made	
  on	
  27	
  March	
  2018	
  —	
  
Minister	
  for	
  Justice	
  and	
  Equality	
  v	
  LM.	
  For	
  an	
  in-­‐depth	
  discussion	
  of	
  this	
  judgment,	
  see	
  a	
  symposium	
  on	
  VefBlog	
  at	
  
https://verfassungsblog.de/category/focus/after-­‐celmer-­‐focus/.	
  
10
	
  Interim	
  Order	
  of	
  the	
  Vice-­‐President	
  of	
  the	
  ECJ	
  in	
  Case	
  C-­‐619/18	
  R	
  Commission	
  v	
  Poland,	
  19	
  October	
  2018.	
  
11
	
   See	
   David	
   Kosař	
   &	
   Lucas	
   Lixinski,	
   Domestic	
   Judicial	
   Design	
   by	
   International	
   Human	
   Rights	
   Courts,	
   109(4)	
  
AMERICAN	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  LAW	
  713–760	
  (2015).	
  
12
	
   Denisov	
   v	
  Ukraine,	
   EUR.	
   CT.	
   H.	
   R.	
   (Judgment	
   of	
   25	
   September	
   2018,	
   app.	
   no.	
   76639/11)	
   (concerning	
   the	
  
president	
  of	
  the	
  influential	
  Kyiv	
  Administrative	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeal).	
  
13
	
  Ramos	
  Nunes	
  de	
  Carvalho	
  e	
  Sá	
  v	
  Portugal,	
  EUR.	
  CT.	
  H.	
  R.	
  (Judgment	
  of	
  6	
  November	
  2018,	
  apps.	
  nos.	
  55391/13,	
  
57728/13	
  and	
  74041/13)	
  (concerning	
  the	
  disciplining	
  of	
  a	
  judge	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  instance	
  court,	
  the	
  composition	
  of	
  the	
  
Portuguese	
  High	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary,	
  and	
  the	
  powers	
  of	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  of	
  Portugal).	
  	
  
14
	
   See	
   Venice	
   Commission,	
   Romania.	
   Preliminary	
   Opinion	
   on	
   Draft	
   Amendments	
   to	
   Law	
   no.	
   303/2004	
   on	
   the	
  
Statute	
   of	
   Judges	
   and	
   Prosecutors,	
   Law	
   no.	
   304/2004	
   on	
   Judicial	
   Organization,	
   and	
   Law	
   no.	
   317/2004	
   on	
   the	
  
Superior	
  Council	
  for	
  Magistracy,	
  CDL-­‐PI(2018)007	
  of	
  13	
  July	
  2018;	
  and	
  Bianca	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  Romania:	
  Perils	
  of	
  a	
  
“Perfect	
  Euro-­‐Model”	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Council,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
1570	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
councils	
   and	
   other	
   aspects	
   of	
   judicial	
   governance.	
   Viktor	
   Orbán’s	
   regime	
   in	
   Hungary	
  
witnessed	
  a	
  brief	
  revolt	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  the	
  National	
  Judicial	
  Council,
16
	
  but	
  it	
  soon	
  recovered	
  
and	
   adopted	
   a	
   complete	
   overhaul	
   of	
   the	
   administrative	
   judiciary	
   that	
   cements	
   Viktor	
  
Orbán’s	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.
17
	
  	
  Other	
  reforms	
  are	
  in	
  the	
  pipeline.	
  The	
  Dáil,	
  the	
  lower	
  
chamber	
  of	
  the	
  Irish	
  parliament,	
  passed	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Appointments	
  Commission	
  Bill	
  in	
  the	
  
most	
   dramatic	
   fashion.
18
	
   The	
   coalition	
   agreement	
   between	
   the	
   leaders	
   of	
   the	
   Lega	
   and	
  
Movimento	
   Cinque	
   Stelle	
   parties	
   who	
   will	
   run	
   Italy	
   for	
   its	
   next	
   legislative	
   period	
   also	
  
promises	
   reform	
   of	
   the	
   elections	
   for	
   members	
   of	
   the	
   Italian	
   judicial	
   council	
   (Consiglio	
  
Superiore	
  della	
  Magistratura).
19
	
  
	
  
Why	
   is	
   it	
   important	
   to	
   analyze	
   this	
   development	
   so	
   thoroughly?	
   If	
   anything,	
   the	
   recent	
  
judicial	
   reforms	
   in	
   Hungary,	
   Poland,	
   and	
   Turkey	
   show	
   that	
   authoritarian	
   and	
   populist	
  
political	
  leaders	
  care	
  about	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies.
20
	
  Therefore,	
  we	
  
should	
   care	
   as	
   well.	
   If	
   we	
   want	
   to	
   prevent	
   (or	
   at	
   least	
   slow	
   down)	
   the	
   capture	
   of	
   the	
  
judiciary	
   by	
   authoritarian	
   leaders	
   and	
   limit	
   the	
   damage	
   caused	
   by	
   populist	
   regimes,	
   we	
  
need	
  to	
  know	
  how	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  work,	
  why	
  they	
  were	
  established,	
  what	
  
effects	
   they	
   have	
   brought	
   about,	
   why	
   they	
   are	
   challenged,	
   and	
   where	
   the	
   potential	
  
channels	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  via	
  these	
  bodies	
  lie.	
  
	
  
The	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  judicial	
  (self-­‐)governance	
  is	
  in	
  constant	
  flux	
  in	
  many	
  jurisdictions	
  
presents	
  a	
  big	
  challenge	
  for	
  this	
  special	
  issue,	
  but	
  each	
  contribution	
  is	
  well	
  embedded	
  in	
  
the	
  broader	
  societal	
  and	
  historical	
  context,	
  and	
  thus	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  will	
  remain	
  a	
  key	
  
reference	
  for	
  quite	
  some	
  time.	
  This	
  article	
  of	
  course	
  cannot	
  do	
  justice	
  to	
  the	
  richness	
  of	
  19	
  
contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue.	
  It	
  merely	
  reflects	
  on	
  some	
  common	
  themes	
  regarding	
  
the	
  forms,	
  rationales,	
  and	
  effects	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Europe.	
  Along	
  the	
  way,	
  it	
  
identifies	
  emerging	
  trends	
  and	
  suggests	
  avenues	
  for	
  further	
  research.	
  
15
	
  Başak	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Betül	
  Durmuş,	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  as	
  Experimental	
  Constitutional	
  Politics:	
  The	
  Case	
  of	
  Turkey,	
  
in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
16
	
  See	
  Kingsley,	
  supra	
  note	
  4.	
  
17
	
  See	
  Novak	
  &	
  Kingsley,	
  supra	
  note	
  4.	
  
18
	
  See	
  Michael	
  O’Regan,	
  Judicial	
  appointments	
  Bill	
  passes	
  in	
  Dáil	
  and	
  now	
  goes	
  to	
  Seanad,	
  THE	
  IRISH	
  TIMES	
  (May	
  31,	
  
2018),	
   https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/judicial-­‐appointments-­‐bill-­‐passes-­‐in-­‐d%C3%A1il-­‐
and-­‐now-­‐goes-­‐to-­‐seanad-­‐1.3515540?mode=amp.	
  
19
	
  Maximilian	
  Steinbeis,	
  Festa	
  della	
  Repubblica,	
  VERFASSUNGSBLOG,	
  (Jun	
  2,	
  2018),	
  https://verfassungsblog.de/festa-­‐
della-­‐repubblica/.	
  
20
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7;	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15;	
  and	
  David	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Katarína	
  Šipulová,	
  The	
  
Strasbourg	
  Court	
  Meets	
  Abusive	
  Constitutionalism:	
  Baka	
  v.	
  Hungary	
  and	
  the	
  Rule	
  of	
  Law,	
  10	
  HAGUE	
  JOURNAL	
  ON	
  THE	
  
RULE	
  OF	
  LAW	
  83	
  (2018).	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1571	
  
	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  argument	
  of	
  this	
  article	
  is	
  three-­‐fold.	
  First,	
  it	
  argues	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  high	
  time	
  to	
  look	
  beyond	
  
judicial	
  councils	
  and	
  to	
  study	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  holistically.	
  
This	
   requires	
   focusing	
   on	
   de	
   facto	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance,	
   the	
   identification	
   of	
   other	
  
actors	
   within	
   the	
   judiciary	
   who	
   may	
   engage	
   in	
   judicial	
   governance	
   (such	
   as	
   judicial	
  
appointment	
   commissions,	
   promotion	
   committees,	
   court	
   presidents	
   and	
   disciplinary	
  
panels),	
   and	
   broadening	
   the	
   studied	
   spheres	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance.	
   Second,	
   it	
   is	
  
necessary	
   to	
   take	
   into	
   account	
   the	
   liquid	
   nature	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   and	
   its	
  
responsiveness	
  to	
  political,	
  social,	
  and	
  cultural	
  changes.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  is	
  crucial	
  to	
  acknowledge	
  
that	
   the	
   rise	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   is	
   not	
   necessarily	
   a	
   panacea,	
   as	
   it	
   may	
   lead	
   to	
  
political	
  contestation	
  and	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  new	
  channels	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  order	
  to	
  make	
  sense	
  of	
  these	
  arguments,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  important	
  to	
  clarify	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  
special	
  issue.	
  It	
  deliberately	
  adopts	
  a	
  broad	
  definition	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.
21
	
  For	
  the	
  
purposes	
  of	
  this	
  special	
  issue,	
  “judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body”	
  includes	
  any	
  institution	
  (in	
  
which	
  a	
  judge	
  or	
  judges	
  sit)	
  that	
  has	
  some	
  powers	
  regarding	
  court	
  administration	
  and/or	
  
judicial	
  careers.	
  More	
  precisely,	
  a	
  “judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body”	
  is	
  a	
  body	
  with	
  at	
  least	
  
one	
  judge	
  whose	
  primary	
  function,	
  entrenched	
  in	
  a	
  legal	
  norm,	
  is	
  to	
  (a)	
  decide	
  about	
  issues	
  
regarding	
  court	
  administration	
  and/or	
  the	
  career	
  of	
  a	
  judge,	
  and/or	
  (b)	
  advise	
  those	
  who	
  
decide	
  about	
  such	
  issues.	
  This	
  definition	
  thus	
  includes	
  not	
  only	
  judicial	
  councils,	
  but	
  also	
  
court	
   presidents,	
   the	
   Court	
   Service,	
   specialized	
   domestic	
   judicial	
   appointment	
  
commissions,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  Article	
  255	
  TFEU	
  Panel	
  for	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  
judges	
  and	
  the	
  Committee	
  of	
  Ministers	
  (CM)	
  Advisory	
  Panel	
  of	
  Experts	
  on	
  Candidates	
  for	
  
Election	
  as	
  Judge	
  to	
  the	
  ECtHR.
22
	
  At	
  the	
  same	
  time,	
  owing	
  to	
  limited	
  space	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  
focuses	
  only	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  regarding	
  ordinary	
  courts	
  and	
  ordinary	
  judges,	
  and	
  
leaves	
   aside	
   administrative	
   and	
   special	
   tribunals,	
   specialized	
   constitutional	
   courts,
23
	
   and	
  
public	
  prosecutors.
24
	
  
21
	
  Note	
  that,	
  on	
  reflection,	
  I	
  simply	
  prefer	
  the	
  term	
  governance	
  to	
  government	
  as	
  the	
  former	
  is	
  better	
  for	
  studying	
  
judiciaries	
  beyond	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  signifies	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  meaning	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government,	
  referring	
  to	
  new	
  
processes	
  of	
  governing	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  changed	
  conditions	
  of	
  ordered	
  rule,	
  and	
  new	
  methods	
  by	
  which	
  society	
  is	
  
governed.	
  Due	
  to	
  the	
  limited	
  space,	
  I	
  cannot	
  engage	
  with	
  this	
  conceptual	
  debate	
  here.	
  Importantly,	
  I	
  did	
  not	
  
impose	
  this	
  view	
  on	
  the	
  contributors	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  (some	
  of	
  them	
  use	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance,	
  while	
  others	
  
prefer	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  or	
  even	
  use	
  both	
  terms).	
  Please	
  keep	
  this	
  in	
  mind	
  when	
  reading	
  this	
  special	
  issue.	
  	
  
22
	
  See	
  Part	
  C	
  for	
  further	
  details.	
  
23
	
  I	
  am	
  aware	
  that	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  at	
  these	
  courts	
  raises	
  different	
  issues	
  and	
  often	
  differs	
  significantly	
  
from	
  the	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  of	
  ordinary	
  courts.	
  But	
  these	
  differences	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  abused,	
  see	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  
the	
  new	
  parallel	
  system	
  of	
  specialized	
  administrative	
  courts	
  in	
  Hungary	
  (analyzed	
  by	
  Novak	
  &	
  Kingsley,	
  supra	
  note	
  
4).	
  
24
	
  Even	
  though,	
  as	
  you	
  will	
  see	
  below,	
  especially	
  the	
  Mediterranean	
  jurisdictions	
  consider	
  prosecutors	
  on	
  par	
  with	
  
judges	
  and	
  often	
  involve	
  both	
  groups	
  in	
  joint	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies.	
  
1572	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
	
  
Such	
  a	
  broad	
  definition	
  has	
  several	
  advantages.
25
	
  However,	
  I	
  am	
  also	
  aware	
  that	
  our	
  broad	
  
definition	
  of	
  “judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body”	
  adopts	
  a	
  particular	
  take	
  on	
  several	
  contested	
  
issues.	
  It	
  is	
  for	
  instance	
  clear	
  that	
  our	
  definition	
  treats	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  
of	
  degree	
  rather	
  than	
  a	
  binary	
  variable.	
  Therefore,	
  for	
  us	
  it	
  is	
  still	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
when	
  judges	
  have	
  parity
26
	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  (such	
  as	
  judicial	
  councils)	
  or	
  
are	
   even	
   in	
   the	
   minority,
27
	
   when	
   prosecutors	
   sit	
   on	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies	
   as	
  
well,
28
	
  when	
  a	
  lay	
  member	
  or	
  the	
  head	
  of	
  state	
  presides	
  over	
  the	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
body,
29
	
   when	
   judges	
   themselves	
   do	
   not	
   elect	
   judicial	
   members	
   to	
   the	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   body	
   and	
   judicial	
   members	
   are	
   thus	
   not	
   truly	
   “representatives”	
   of	
   judges,
30
	
  
when	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   is	
   dominated	
   by	
   court	
   presidents	
   at	
   the	
   expense	
   of	
   rank-­‐
and-­‐file	
  judges,
31
	
  and	
  when	
  senior	
  judges	
  (or	
  apex	
  court	
  judges)	
  have	
  the	
  upper	
  hand	
  on	
  
the	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body	
  and	
  thus	
  this	
  body	
  does	
  not	
  proportionally	
  represent	
  all	
  
tiers	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  	
  
	
  
More	
   controversially,	
   even	
   if	
   judges	
   from	
   other	
   jurisdictions	
   sit	
   on	
   the	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
  body,	
  we	
  still	
  treat	
  it	
  as	
  a	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body.	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  
ECtHR	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU	
  because,	
  technically	
  speaking,	
  active	
  CJEU	
  judges	
  do	
  not	
  sit	
  on	
   the	
  
Article	
  255	
  TFEU	
  Panel.	
  Similarly,	
  the	
  relevant	
  resolution	
  of	
  the	
  Committee	
  of	
  Ministers	
  
makes	
   clear	
   that	
   only	
   former	
   international	
   judges	
   can	
   sit	
   on	
   the	
   CM	
   Advisory	
   Panel	
   of	
  
Experts	
  on	
  Candidates	
  for	
  Election	
  as	
  Judge	
  to	
  the	
  ECtHR.
32
	
  Hence,	
  one	
  may	
  argue	
  that	
  
these	
  two	
  panels	
  are	
  not	
  examples	
  of	
  “judicial	
  self-­‐governance”.	
  However,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  fine	
  
line	
   between	
   “judicial	
   self-­‐governance”	
   and	
   “judicial	
   governance”	
   at	
   the	
   ECtHR	
   and	
   the	
  
25
	
  See	
  Part	
  C.	
  
26
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  and	
  the	
  de	
  iure	
  also	
  in	
  Slovakia.	
  
27
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Spain	
  and	
  France,	
  and	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Appointments	
  Advisory	
  Board	
  in	
  Ireland.	
  
28
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Italy,	
  France,	
  and	
  Romania.	
  
29
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Italy	
  and	
  Turkey.	
  
30
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Poland	
  and	
  Spain.	
  
31
	
  This	
   was	
   the	
   case	
   in	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Slovak	
   Republic	
   between	
   2003	
   and	
   2014	
   (see	
  Samuel	
   Spáč,	
  
Katarína	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Marína	
  Urbániková,
	
  
Capturing	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  from	
  Inside:	
  The	
  Story	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  
in	
  Slovakia,	
  in	
  this	
  issue).	
  See	
  also	
  Ireland,	
  where	
  court	
  presidents	
  are	
  the	
  only	
  representatives	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  on	
  
the	
  Judicial	
  Appointments	
  Advisory	
  Board	
  (see	
  Patrick	
  O’Brien,	
  Never	
  let	
  a	
  Crisis	
  go	
  to	
  Waste:	
  Politics,	
  Personality	
  
and	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Ireland,	
  in	
  this	
  issue).	
  
32
	
  See	
  para.	
  2	
  of	
  Resolution	
  CM/Res(2010)26	
  on	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  an	
  Advisory	
  Panel	
  of	
  Experts	
  on	
  Candidates	
  
for	
  Election	
  as	
  Judge	
  to	
  the	
  European	
  Court	
  of	
  Human	
  Rights	
  (2010).
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1573	
  
	
  	
  
CJEU.	
  Both	
  expert	
  panels	
  often	
  include	
  former	
  ECtHR	
  and	
  CJEU	
  judges	
  and	
  other	
  “friends”	
  
of	
  these	
  two	
  courts.	
  Moreover,	
  the	
  CJEU’s	
  and	
  ECtHR’s	
  presidents	
  have	
  a	
  major	
  say	
  in	
  the	
  
composition	
  of	
  these	
  two	
  panels.	
  The	
  CJEU	
  President	
  selects	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  the	
  members	
  
of	
  the	
  Article	
  255	
  TFEU	
  panel	
  and	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  President	
  selects	
  all	
  the	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  CM	
  
Panel.	
   Therefore,	
   we	
   include	
   these	
   two	
   bodies	
   in	
   our	
   analysis	
   as	
   well.	
   Not	
   everyone	
  
agrees
33
	
  with	
  this	
  approach,	
  but	
  we	
  at	
  least	
  know	
  on	
  what	
  we	
  disagree.
34
	
  
	
  
This	
   article	
   will	
   proceed	
   as	
   follows.	
   Part	
   B	
   situates	
   the	
   special	
   issue	
   in	
   the	
   existing	
  
literature,	
   explains	
   its	
   structure,	
   and	
   briefly	
   summarizes	
   individual	
   contributions.	
   Part	
   C	
  
maps	
  the	
  common	
  themes	
  that	
  have	
  emerged	
  from	
  the	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  
and	
   problematizes	
   the	
   forms	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   in	
   Europe.	
   Part	
   D	
   analyzes	
   the	
  
rationales	
  behind	
  the	
  rise	
  and	
  fall	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Europe.	
  Part	
  E	
  zeroes	
  in	
  on	
  
the	
  effects	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  on	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  courts,	
  judicial	
  independence	
  
and	
  accountability,	
  and	
  on	
  transparency	
  and	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  Part	
  F	
  concludes.	
  
	
  
B.	
  Setting	
  the	
  Scene	
  
	
  
The	
  power	
  of	
  courts	
  has	
  increased	
  worldwide	
  at	
  an	
  unprecedented	
  pace.	
  At	
  the	
  same	
  time,	
  
there	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  parallel	
  rise	
  in	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  In	
  Europe,	
  this	
  has	
  happened	
  on	
  
both	
   national	
   and	
   supranational	
   levels.	
   On	
   the	
   national	
   level,	
   many	
   European	
   countries	
  
have	
   introduced	
   judicial	
   councils	
   either	
   voluntarily	
   (France,
35
	
   Italy,
36
	
   the	
   Netherlands,
37
	
  
Portugal,
38
	
   Spain,
39
	
   and	
   Turkey
40
)	
   or	
   under	
   pressure	
   from	
   the	
   European	
   Union	
   and	
   the	
  
33
	
   Actually,	
   several	
   contributions	
   to	
   this	
   special	
   issue	
   show	
   that	
   domestic	
   understanding	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
  can	
  be	
  much	
  narrower.	
  
34
	
  I	
  did	
  not	
  impose	
  this	
  view	
  on	
  the	
  contributors	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  nor	
  do	
  I	
  want	
  to	
  do	
  so	
  on	
  the	
  readers.	
  
35
	
  Antoine	
  Vauchez,	
  The	
  Strange	
  Non-­‐Death	
  of	
  Statism:	
  Tracing	
  The	
  Ever	
  Protracted	
  Rise	
  of	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  
France,	
  In	
  this	
  issue;	
  Antoine	
  Garapon	
  &	
  Harold	
  Epineuse,	
  Judicial	
  Independence	
  in	
  France,	
  in	
  JUDICIAL	
  INDEPENDENCE	
  
IN	
  TRANSITION	
  273,	
  285–286	
  (Anja	
  Seibert-­‐Fohr	
  ed.,	
  2012).	
  
36
	
  See	
  Simone	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Davide	
  Paris,	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Italy:	
  Merits,	
  Limits	
  and	
  the	
  Reality	
  of	
  an	
  
Export	
  Model,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
37
	
  See	
  Elaine	
  Mak,	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands:	
  Demarcating	
  Autonomy,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  However,	
  
note	
  that	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  cannot	
  be	
  easily	
  squeezed	
  into	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  model	
  –	
  it	
  introduced	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  
the	
  Judiciary,	
  but	
  powers	
  concerning	
  appointing,	
  promoting	
  and	
  disciplining	
  judges	
  do	
  not	
  lie	
  with	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  
the	
  Judiciary,	
  but	
  sometimes	
  with	
  the	
  government,	
  sometimes	
  with	
  the	
  judiciary	
  authorities,	
  and	
  sometimes	
  they	
  
are	
  shared.	
  
38
	
  Ramos	
  Nunes	
  de	
  Carvalho	
  e	
  Sá	
  v	
  Portugal,	
  supra	
  note	
  13;	
  and	
  especially	
  concurring	
  opinion	
  of	
  Judge	
  Pinto	
  de	
  
Albuquerque	
  therein.	
  
39
	
  See	
  Aida	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  Judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  and	
  judicial	
  independence:	
  the	
  political	
  capture	
  of	
  the	
  General	
  
Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  in	
  Spain,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  	
  
1574	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
Council	
  of	
  Europe	
  during	
  the	
  accession	
  process	
  (all	
  post-­‐communist	
  states	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  
Eastern	
  Europe
41
	
  except	
  for	
  Czechia
42
).	
  Other	
  countries	
  have	
  opted	
  for	
  the	
  Court	
  Service	
  
systems,	
   often	
   combined	
   with	
   a	
   special	
   body	
   for	
   judicial	
   appointments	
   (Denmark,	
  
Ireland,
43
	
  and	
  Scotland).	
  Even	
  in	
  the	
  countries	
  where	
  political	
  branches	
  still	
  have	
  the	
  major	
  
say	
   (Austria,	
   Czechia,
44
	
   and	
   Germany
45
),	
   the	
   power	
   of	
   judges	
   in	
   judicial	
   governance	
   has	
  
increased	
  gradually.	
  On	
  the	
  supranational	
  level,	
  the	
  expert	
  element	
  was	
  also	
  introduced,	
  
namely	
   the	
   Article	
   255	
   TFEU	
   Panel	
   for	
   appointments	
   to	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Justice	
   of	
   the	
  
European	
  Union	
  (hereinafter	
  the	
  “CJEU”)
46
	
  and	
  the	
  Committee	
  of	
  Ministers	
  Advisory	
  Panel	
  
of	
   Experts	
   on	
   Candidates	
   for	
   Election	
   as	
   Judge	
   to	
   the	
   European	
   Court	
   of	
   Human	
   Rights	
  
(hereinafter	
  the	
  “ECtHR”).
47
	
  	
  
	
  
While	
   the	
   unprecedented	
   rise	
   of	
   the	
   decision-­‐making	
   power	
   of	
   courts	
   has	
   been	
  
exhaustively	
  addressed	
  in	
  the	
  literature,	
  the	
  increasing	
  power	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  selecting	
  their	
  
peers	
  and	
  in	
  court	
  administration	
  more	
  generally	
  has	
  attracted	
  far	
  less	
  attention	
  so	
  far.	
  
This	
  is	
  so	
  despite	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  and	
  other	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
bodies	
  is	
  difficult	
  to	
  overlook.	
  The	
  huge	
  policy	
  implications	
  of	
  this	
  phenomenon	
  are	
  also	
  
beyond	
  doubt,	
  as	
  evidenced	
  by	
  a	
  plethora	
  of	
  European	
  policymaking	
  bodies	
  involved	
  in	
  
this	
   area	
   -­‐	
   not	
   only	
   the	
   European	
   Network	
   of	
   Councils	
   for	
   the	
   Judiciary	
   and	
   the	
  
Consultative	
   Council	
   of	
   European	
   Judges,	
   but	
   the	
   Venice	
   Commission	
   and	
   the	
   European	
  
Commission	
  have	
  also	
  issued	
  numerous	
  guidelines	
  and	
  developed	
  good	
  practices	
  regarding	
  
judicial	
  councils.
48
	
  	
  
	
  
40
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
41
	
  See	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  supra	
  note	
  14;	
  Matej	
  Avbelj,	
  Contextual	
  Analysis	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Governance	
  in	
  Slovenia,	
  in	
  this	
  
issue;	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7;	
  and	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
42
	
   For	
   explanation	
   why	
   Czechia	
   is	
   a	
   “black	
   sheep”,	
   see	
   Adam	
   Blisa,	
   Tereza	
   Papoušková	
   &	
   Marína	
   Urbániková,	
  
Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
43
	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
44
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
45
	
   See	
   Fabian	
   Wittreck,	
   German	
   Judicial	
   Self-­‐Government:	
   Institutions	
   and	
   constraints	
   of	
   self-­‐government	
   in	
  
Germany,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
46
	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
47
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
48
	
  The	
  vast	
  number	
  of	
  these	
  guidelines	
  and	
  policies	
  cannot	
  be	
  addressed	
  here.	
  See	
  the	
  individual	
  contributions	
  to	
  
this	
  special	
  issue.	
  See	
  also	
  note	
  2.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1575	
  
	
  	
  
Legal	
   scholars	
   have	
   somewhat	
   lagged	
   behind	
   these	
   developments.	
   To	
   be	
   sure,	
   the	
  
literature	
   on	
   judicial	
   independence
49
	
   and	
   judicial	
   reforms
50
	
   more	
   generally	
   has	
   often	
  
touched	
   upon	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   issues.	
   Another	
   important	
   strand	
   of	
   research	
  
concerning	
   the	
   selection	
   of	
   judges	
   has	
   also	
   acknowledged	
   a	
   growing	
   role	
   of	
   judges	
   in	
  
selecting	
  their	
  peers.
51
	
  There	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  small	
  but	
  burgeoning	
  scholarly	
  literature	
  on	
  judicial	
  
councils,
52
	
   and	
   an	
   even	
   smaller	
   set	
   of	
   studies	
   on	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   Chief	
   Justices	
   and	
   court	
  
presidents	
   more	
   generally.
53
	
   However,	
   a	
   holistic	
   view	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   on	
   the	
  
domestic	
  level	
  has	
  been	
  missing.	
  
	
  
There	
   is	
   even	
   less	
   on	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   at	
   supranational	
   and	
   international	
   courts,	
  
despite	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  these	
  courts	
  have	
  far	
  more	
  autonomy	
  in	
  court	
  administration,	
  given	
  
the	
  fact	
  that	
  they	
  adopt	
  their	
  statutes	
  by	
  themselves	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  face	
  a	
  powerful	
  
executive	
  and	
  legislature.	
  Only	
  a	
  few	
  studies	
  have	
  analyzed	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  the	
  Article	
  
255	
  Panel,	
  which	
  plays	
  a	
  key	
  role	
  in	
  screening	
  new	
  ECJ	
  judges.	
  Some	
  commentators	
  think	
  
49
	
   The	
   literature	
   on	
   judicial	
   independence	
   is	
   so	
   numerous	
   that	
   it	
   cannot	
   be	
   addressed	
   here.	
   For	
   recent	
  
contributions	
   to	
   this	
   literature	
   that	
   devoted	
   significant	
   attention	
   to	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance,	
   see	
   in	
   particular	
  
POPOVA,	
   POLITICIZED	
   JUSTICE	
   IN	
   EMERGING	
   DEMOCRACIES:	
   A	
   STUDY	
   OF	
   COURTS	
   IN	
   RUSSIA	
   AND	
   UKRAINE	
   (2012);	
   and	
   ANJA	
  
SEIBERT-­‐FOHR	
  (ed.),	
  JUDICIAL	
  INDEPENDENCE	
  IN	
  TRANSITION	
  (2012).	
  
50
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  DANIELA	
  PIANA,	
  JUDICIAL	
  ACCOUNTABILITIES	
  IN	
  NEW	
  EUROPE:	
  FROM	
  RULE	
  OF	
  LAW	
  TO	
  QUALITY	
  OF	
  JUSTICE	
  (2010);	
  
MARIA	
  POPOVA,	
  POLITICIZED	
  JUSTICE	
  IN	
  EMERGING	
  DEMOCRACIES:	
  A	
  STUDY	
  OF	
  COURTS	
  IN	
  RUSSIA	
  AND	
  UKRAINE	
  (2012);	
  Ramona	
  
Coman,	
   Quo	
   Vadis	
   Judicial	
   Reforms?	
   The	
   Quest	
   for	
   Judicial	
   Independence	
   in	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   Europe,	
   66	
  
EUROPE-­‐ASIA	
  STUDIES	
  892	
  (2014).	
  
51
	
   For	
   an	
   overview	
   of	
   this	
   literature,	
   see	
   Samuel	
   Spáč,	
   Recruiting	
   European	
   judges	
   in	
   the	
   age	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐	
  
government,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
52
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Nuno	
  Garoupa	
  &	
  Tom	
  Ginsburg,	
  Guarding	
  the	
  Guardians:	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
  and	
  Judicial	
  Independence,	
  
57	
   AM.	
   J.	
   OF	
   COMP.	
   LAW	
   103	
   (2009);	
   Nuno	
   Garoupa	
   &	
   Tom	
   Ginsburg,	
   The	
   Comparative	
   Law	
   and	
   Economics	
   of	
  
Judicial	
   Councils,	
   27	
   BERKELEY	
   JOURNAL	
   OF	
   INTERNATIONAL	
   LAW	
   53	
   (2009);	
   Michal	
   Bobek	
   &	
   David	
   Kosař,	
   Global	
  
Solutions,	
  Local	
  Damages:	
  A	
  Critical	
  Study	
  in	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  15(7)	
  GERMAN	
   L.J.	
  
1257–1292	
  (2014);	
  Andrea	
  Pozas-­‐Loyo	
  &	
  Julio	
  Ríos-­‐Figueroa,	
  The	
  Politics	
  of	
  Amendment	
  Processes:	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  
Influence	
  in	
  the	
  Design	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Councils,	
  89(7)	
  TEXAS	
  LAW	
  REVIEW	
  1807–1833	
  (2011);	
  Matthew	
  C.	
  Ingram,	
  Crafting	
  
Courts	
  in	
  New	
  Democracies:	
  Ideology	
  and	
  Judicial	
  Council	
  Reforms	
  in	
  Three	
  Mexican	
  States,	
  44(4)	
  COMPARATIVE	
  
POLITICS	
  439–358	
  (2012);	
  Cristina	
  E.	
  Parau,	
  Explaining	
  judiciary	
  governance	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe:	
  external	
  
incentives,	
  transnational	
  elites	
  and	
  Parliament	
  inaction,	
  67	
  EUROPE-­‐ASIA	
  STUDIES	
  409	
  (2015);	
  DAVID	
  KOSAŘ,	
  PERILS	
  OF	
  
JUDICIAL	
  SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT	
  IN	
  TRANSITIONAL	
  SOCIETIES	
  (2016);	
  Denis	
  Preshova,	
  Ivan	
  Damjanovski	
  &	
  Zoran	
  Nechev,	
  The	
  
Effectiveness	
   of	
   the	
   'European	
   Model'	
   of	
   Judicial	
   Independence	
   in	
   the	
   Western	
   Balkans:	
   Judicial	
   Councils	
   as	
   a	
  
Solution	
  or	
  a	
  New	
  Cause	
  of	
  Concern	
  for	
  Judicial	
  Reforms,	
  2017(1)	
  CLEER	
   PAPERS	
  (2017);	
  and	
  Pablo	
  José	
  Castillo	
  
Ortiz,	
  Councils	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  and	
  Judges’	
  Perceptions	
  of	
  Respect	
  to	
  Their	
  Independence	
  in	
  Europe,	
  9(2)	
  HAGUE	
  
JOURNAL	
  ON	
  THE	
  RULE	
  OF	
  LAW	
  315–336	
  (2017);	
  Peter	
  H.	
  Solomon,	
  Transparency	
  in	
  the	
  Work	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Councils:	
  The	
  
Experience	
  of	
  (East)	
  European	
  Countries,	
  45	
  REVIEW	
  OF	
  CENTRAL	
  AND	
  EAST	
  EUROPEAN	
  LAW	
  (2018).	
  See	
  also	
  note	
  3.	
  
53
	
  For	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  this	
  literature,	
  see	
  Adam	
  Blisa	
  &	
  David	
  Kosař,	
  Court	
  Presidents:	
  The	
  Missing	
  Piece	
  in	
  the	
  
Puzzle	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Governance,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
1576	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
that	
  this	
  Panel	
  could	
  be	
  seen	
  “as	
  a	
  germ	
  of	
  a	
  council	
  of	
  judiciary	
  within	
  the	
  Union”
54
	
  or	
  
“some	
  embryonic	
  form	
  of	
  unintended	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government”,
55
	
  or	
  at	
  least	
  suggest	
  that	
  
there	
   is	
   the	
   potential	
   for	
   a	
   “subtle	
   move”	
   in	
   the	
   direction	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance.
56
	
  
Marc	
  van	
  der	
  Woude’s	
  recent	
  proposal	
  goes	
  even	
  further	
  and	
  proposes	
  a	
  European	
  Council	
  
of	
  the	
  Judiciary.
57
	
  However,	
  EU	
  law	
  scholars	
  rarely	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  CJEU	
  President	
  
and	
  other	
  forms	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  The	
  same	
  applies	
  to	
  the	
  ECtHR
58
	
  and	
  other	
  
international	
  courts.
59
	
  There	
  are	
  some	
  studies	
  on	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  their	
  judges,
60
	
  but	
  not	
  
much	
  beyond	
  that.
61
	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  sum,	
  despite	
  the	
  growing	
  body	
  of	
  literature,	
  there	
  are	
  still	
  very	
  few	
  in-­‐depth	
  studies	
  on	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  and	
  their	
  interaction	
  with	
  other	
  actors.	
  Moreover,	
  from	
  the	
  
conceptual	
  point	
  of	
  view,	
  the	
  current	
  scholarly	
  debate	
  zeroes	
  in	
  on	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  strong	
  
judicial	
   councils	
   advocated	
   by	
   the	
   EU	
   and	
   the	
   Council	
   of	
   Europe	
   in	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
  
Europe,	
  and	
  to	
  a	
  great	
  extent	
  overlooks	
  other	
  forms	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  such	
  as	
  a	
  
moderate	
  judicial	
  council	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  and	
  the	
  Court	
  Service	
  in	
  Ireland.	
  The	
  rise	
  of	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  within	
  the	
  traditional	
  executive	
  systems	
  of	
  court	
  administration	
  in	
  
Germany	
   and	
   Czechia	
   attracted	
   even	
   less	
   attention.	
   Therefore,	
   we	
   still	
   lack	
   a	
  
comprehensive	
   conceptual	
   understanding	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   in	
   both	
   “new”	
   and	
  
“old”	
   EU	
   Member	
   States	
   and	
   its	
   dynamics	
   over	
   time.	
   We	
   know	
   even	
   less	
   about	
   the	
  
54
	
   Jean-­‐Marc	
   Sauvé,	
   Selecting	
   the	
   European	
   Union’s	
   Judges:	
   The	
   Practice	
   of	
   the	
   Article	
   255	
   Panel,	
   in	
   SELECTING	
  
EUROPE´S	
  JUDGES	
  78	
  (Michal	
  Bobek	
  ed.,	
  2015).	
  Even	
  though	
  from	
  the	
  conceptual	
  point	
  of	
  view	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  example	
  of	
  
judicial	
  government	
  rather	
  than	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government,	
  since	
  no	
  CJEU	
  judge	
  sits	
  on	
  the	
  Art.	
  255	
  TFEU	
  Panel.	
  
55
	
  Alberto	
  Alemanno,	
  How	
  Transparent	
  is	
  Transparent	
  Enough?	
  Balancing	
  Access	
  to	
  Information	
  versus	
  Privacy	
  in	
  
European	
  Judicial	
  Selections,	
  in	
  SELECTING	
  EUROPE´S	
  JUDGES	
  204	
  (Michal	
  Bobek	
  ed.,	
  2015).	
  
56
	
   Tomas	
   Dumbrovský,	
   Bilyana	
   Petkova	
   &	
   Marijn	
   Van	
   der	
   Sluis,	
   Judicial	
   appointments:	
   the	
   article	
   255	
   TFEU	
  
advisory	
  panel	
  and	
  selection	
  procedures	
  in	
  the	
  Member	
  States,	
  51	
  COMMON	
  MARKET	
  LAW	
  REVIEW	
  455	
  (2014).	
  
57
	
  Marc	
  van	
  der	
  Woude,	
  Towards	
  a	
  European	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary:	
  Some	
  Reflections	
  on	
  the	
  Administration	
  of	
  
the	
  EU	
  Courts,	
  in	
  DEMOCRACY	
  AND	
  RULE	
  OF	
  LAW	
  IN	
  THE	
  EUROPEAN	
  UNION.	
  ESSAYS	
  IN	
  HONOUR	
  OF	
  JAPP	
  W.	
  DE	
  ZWAAN	
  63	
  (Flora	
  
A.N.J.	
  Goudappel	
  &	
  Ernst	
  M.	
  H.	
  Hirsch	
  Ballin	
  eds.,	
  2016).	
  
58
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningha,	
  supra	
  note	
  6;	
  and	
  MICHAL	
  BOBEK	
  (ed.),	
  SELECTING	
  EUROPE´S	
  JUDGES:	
  A	
  CRITICAL	
  REVIEW	
  OF	
  THE	
  
APPOINTMENT	
  PROCEDURES	
  TO	
  THE	
  EUROPEAN	
  COURTS	
  (2015).	
  
59
	
  See	
  Nino	
  Tsereteli	
  &	
  Hubert	
  Smekal,	
  The	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  at	
  the	
  International	
  Level:	
  A	
  New	
  Research	
  
Agenda,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
60
	
  For	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  the	
  literature,	
  see	
  ibid.	
  
61
	
  For	
  a	
  rare	
  exception,	
  see	
  Jeffrey	
  L.	
  Dunoff	
  &	
  Mark	
  A.	
  Pollack,	
  International	
  Judicial	
  Practices:	
  Opening	
  the	
  ‘Black	
  
Box’	
  of	
  International	
  Courts,	
  MICHIGAN	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  LAW	
  (forthcoming).	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1577	
  
	
  	
  
rationales	
  behind	
  the	
  rise	
  and	
  fall	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies
62
	
  and	
  about	
  the	
  effects	
  
of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.
63
	
  
	
  
One	
  may	
  object	
  that	
  the	
  rise	
  and	
  fall	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  has	
  little	
  bearing	
  on	
  the	
  
greater	
  scheme	
  of	
  things,	
  especially	
  in	
  comparison	
  to	
  attacks	
  on	
  constitutional	
  courts	
  and	
  
open	
   assaults	
   on	
   the	
   judiciary	
   such	
   as	
   criminal	
   prosecution	
   of	
   “recalcitrant”	
   judges,
64
	
  
reducing	
  the	
  retirement	
  age	
  of	
  judges,
65
	
  or	
  jurisdiction	
  stripping.
66
	
  However,	
  as	
  I	
  argued	
  
earlier,	
  the	
  recent	
  judicial	
  reforms	
  in	
  Hungary,	
  Poland,	
  and	
  Turkey	
  show	
  that	
  authoritarian	
  
and	
  populist	
  political	
  leaders	
  care	
  about	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  and	
  
thus	
  we	
  should	
  care	
  as	
  well.
67
	
  Similarly,	
  one	
  often	
  hears	
  at	
  the	
  European	
  level	
  recently	
  that	
  
it	
   is	
   all	
   about	
   the	
   individuals	
   and	
   the	
   institutional	
   design	
   does	
   not	
   matter.	
   Yet	
   several	
  
contributions	
   to	
   this	
   special	
   issue	
   show	
   that	
   institutions	
   actually	
   matter.	
   Therefore,	
   we	
  
need	
  to	
  know	
  how	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  work,	
  why	
  they	
  were	
  established,	
  what	
  
effects	
   they	
   have	
   brought	
   about,	
   why	
   they	
   are	
   challenged,	
   and	
   where	
   the	
   potential	
  
channels	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  via	
  these	
  bodies	
  lie.	
  
	
  
This	
   special	
   issue	
   aims	
   to	
   fill	
   these	
   gaps	
   and	
   addresses	
   the	
   implications	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
  for	
  the	
  “new”	
  and	
  “old”	
  EU	
  member	
  states,	
  for	
  Turkey,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  for	
  the	
  CJEU	
  
and	
   the	
   ECtHR.	
   I	
   am	
   aware	
   of	
   the	
   pitfalls	
   of	
   studying	
   governance	
   of	
   the	
   two	
   European	
  
transnational
68
	
   courts	
   and	
   governance	
   of	
   domestic	
   judiciaries	
   together.
69
	
   Yet	
   both	
  
62
	
  See	
  Part	
  D	
  of	
  this	
  article.	
  
63
	
  See	
  Part	
  E	
  of	
  this	
  article.	
  For	
  exceptions,	
  see	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  52;	
  Castillo	
  Ortiz,	
  supra	
  note	
  52;	
  and	
  Solomon,	
  
supra	
  note	
  52.	
  
64
	
   See	
  Çalı	
   &	
   Durmuş,	
   supra	
   note	
  15;	
   and	
   Tom	
   Ruys	
   &	
   Emre	
   Turkut,	
  Turkey’s	
   Post-­‐Coup	
   ‘Purification	
   Process’:	
  
Collective	
  Dismissals	
  of	
  Public	
  Servants	
  under	
  the	
  European	
  Convention	
  on	
  Human	
  Rights,	
  18(3)	
  HUMAN	
  RIGHTS	
  LAW	
  
REVIEW	
  539–565	
  (2018).	
  
65
	
   See	
   the	
   deleterious	
   impact	
   of	
   these	
   mechanisms	
   in	
   Poland	
   (Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
   supra	
   note	
   7)	
   and	
   Hungary	
  
(Uladzislau	
   Belavusau,	
   On	
   Age	
   Discrimination	
   and	
   Beating	
   Dead	
   Dogs:	
   Commission	
   v.	
   Hungary,	
   50(4)	
   COMMON	
  
MARKET	
   LAW	
   REVIEW	
   1145–1160	
   (2013);	
   Tomás	
   Gyulavári	
   &	
   Nikolett	
   Hős,	
   Retirement	
   of	
   Hungarian	
   Judges,	
   Age	
  
Discrimination	
  and	
  Judicial	
  Independence:	
  A	
  Tale	
  of	
  Two	
  Courts,	
  42(3)	
  INDUSTRIAL	
   LAW	
   JOURNAL	
  289–297	
  (2013);	
  
Gábor	
   Halmai,	
   The	
   early	
   retirement	
   age	
   of	
   the	
   Hungarian	
   judges,	
   in	
   EU	
   LAW	
   STORIES:	
   CONTEXTUAL	
   AND	
   CRITICAL	
  
HISTORIES	
  OF	
  EUROPEAN	
  JURISPRUDENCE	
  471-­‐488	
  (Fernanda	
  Nicola	
  &	
  Bill	
  Davies	
  eds.,	
  2017).	
  
66
	
  For	
  instance,	
  after	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  Viktor	
  Orbán	
  in	
  Hungary,	
  the	
  Hungarian	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  was	
  early	
  on	
  stripped	
  
of	
  its	
  power	
  to	
  exercise	
  constitutional	
  review	
  over	
  budgetary	
  and	
  tax	
  issues.	
  See	
  Michaela	
  Hailbronner,	
  How	
  Can	
  
a	
   Democratic	
   Constitution	
   Survive	
   an	
   Autocratic	
   Majority?	
   A	
   Report	
   on	
   the	
   Presentations	
   on	
   the	
   Judiciary,	
  
VERFASSUNGSBLOG	
   (Dec.	
   8,	
   2018),	
   https://verfassungsblog.de/how-­‐can-­‐a-­‐democratic-­‐constitution-­‐survive-­‐an-­‐
autocratic-­‐majority-­‐a-­‐report-­‐on-­‐the-­‐presentations-­‐on-­‐the-­‐judiciary/.	
  
67
	
  See	
  supra	
  notes	
  8-­‐10.	
  
68
	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  avoid	
  lengthy	
  conceptual	
  debate,	
  I	
  am	
  using	
  the	
  term	
  “transnational	
  courts”	
  so	
  as	
  to	
  cover	
  both	
  the	
  
ECtHR	
  (which	
  is	
  an	
  international	
  court)	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU	
  (which	
  is	
  often	
  treated	
  as	
  a	
  supranational	
  court	
  sui	
  generis).	
  
1578	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
theoretically	
  and	
  empirically	
  there	
  is	
  much	
  to	
  gain	
  from	
  comparisons	
  between	
  these	
  two	
  
levels.
70
	
  Moreover,	
  the	
  CJEU	
  and	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  have	
  been	
  an	
  integral	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  
legal	
  space,	
  as	
  the	
  current	
  cases	
  concerning	
  the	
  Polish	
  and	
  Hungarian	
  judiciaries	
  show,
71
	
  
and	
   their	
   governance	
   might	
   be	
   used	
   (and	
   perhaps	
   even	
   misused)	
   as	
   a	
   template	
   on	
   the	
  
domestic	
  level.	
  Therefore,	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  zeroes	
  in	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  not	
  only	
  in	
  
12	
   domestic	
   European	
   jurisdictions	
   (Czechia,	
   France,	
   Germany,	
   Ireland,	
   Italy,	
   the	
  
Netherlands,	
   Poland,	
   Romania,	
   Slovakia,	
   Slovenia,	
   Spain,	
   and	
   Turkey),	
   but	
   also	
   at	
   the	
  
European	
  Court	
  of	
  Human	
  Rights	
  and	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Union.	
  	
  
	
  
Apart	
  from	
  the	
  introductory	
  article	
  you	
  are	
  reading,	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  consists	
  of	
  two	
  parts:	
  
the	
  abovementioned	
  14	
  case	
  studies	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  individual	
  jurisdictions	
  
and	
   5	
   cross-­‐cutting	
   articles	
   that	
   address	
   common	
   themes	
   that	
   have	
   emerged	
   from	
   the	
  
contributions	
  on	
  individual	
  jurisdictions.	
  Each	
  case	
  study	
  discusses	
  the	
  forms,	
  rationales,	
  
and	
  impact	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  jurisdiction.	
  The	
  horizontal	
  articles	
  analyze	
  
the	
  role	
  of	
  court	
  presidents,	
  selection	
  of	
  judges,	
  the	
  specifics	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  of	
  
international	
  courts,	
  the	
  motivation	
  of	
  individual	
  judges	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  act	
  as	
  a	
  group,	
  and	
  
the	
  impact	
  of	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  judicial	
  council	
  on	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  courts.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  what	
  follows	
  you	
  will	
  find	
  a	
  brief	
  summary	
  of	
  each	
  contribution,	
  but	
  I	
  invite	
  you	
  to	
  read	
  
all	
  of	
  the	
  articles	
  themselves,	
  as	
  I	
  sincerely	
  believe	
  that	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  understand	
  how	
  the	
  
judiciary	
  operates	
  in	
  a	
  particular	
  jurisdiction	
  one	
  must	
  dig	
  more	
  deeply	
  into	
  the	
  minds	
  of	
  
lawyers,	
  and	
  particularly	
  those	
  of	
  legal	
  thinkers,	
  in	
  those	
  legal	
  systems	
  to	
  see	
  how	
  each	
  of	
  
them	
  understands	
  their	
  judiciary	
  and	
  its	
  place	
  within	
  their	
  legal	
  systems.	
  Only	
  then	
  may	
  we	
  
‘try	
  to	
  understand	
  the	
  other	
  legal	
  system[s]	
  on	
  [their]	
  own	
  terms’.
72
	
  
	
  
The	
  special	
  issue	
  part	
  focusing	
  on	
  case	
  studies	
  starts	
  with	
  the	
  early	
  birds	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐
governance	
   –	
   France,	
   Italy,	
   and	
   Turkey.	
   Antoine	
   Vauchez
73
	
   carefully	
   traces	
   how	
   judicial	
  
self-­‐governance	
  fares	
  in	
  the	
  country	
  where	
  the	
  fear	
  of	
  the	
  “gouvernement	
  des	
  juges”	
  has	
  
haunted	
   the	
   political	
   imagination	
   for	
   more	
   than	
   two	
   centuries.	
   He	
   shows	
   that	
   judicial	
  
69
	
  It	
  is	
  obvious	
  that	
  the	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  entire	
  judiciary	
  raises	
  different	
  issues	
  than	
  governance	
  of	
  a	
  single	
  court	
  
(and	
  vice	
  versa).	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6;	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6;	
  Tsereteli	
  &	
  Smekal,	
  supra	
  note	
  52.	
  See	
  
also	
  Part	
  C	
  of	
  this	
  article.	
  
70
	
  On	
  reflection,	
  it	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  great	
  to	
  include	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  an	
  article	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  of	
  
domestic	
  constitutional	
  courts,	
  which	
  might	
  be	
  closer	
  to	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  of	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU	
  than	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  of	
  the	
  general	
  judiciary.	
  However,	
  it	
  is	
  for	
  other	
  researchers	
  to	
  fill	
  this	
  gap.	
  
71
	
  See	
  supra	
  note	
  20.	
  
72
	
  William	
  Ewald,	
  The	
  Jurisprudential	
  Approach	
  to	
  Comparative	
  Law:	
  A	
  Field	
  Guide	
  to	
  “Rats”,	
  46	
  AM.	
  J	
  OF	
  COMP.	
  L.	
  
701	
  (1998).	
  
73
	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1579	
  
	
  	
  
governance	
   à	
   la	
   française	
   aims	
   at	
   striking	
   a	
   balance	
   between	
   an	
   unacceptable	
   judicial	
  
subordination	
  to	
  politics	
  and	
  an	
  equally	
  unacceptable	
  corporatism.	
  Despite	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  
this	
   balance	
   changes	
   over	
   time,	
   the	
   Conseil	
   supérieur	
   de	
   la	
   magistrature	
   has	
   so	
   far	
   not	
  
managed	
   to	
   erode	
   the	
   historical	
   duopole	
   mode	
   of	
   judicial	
   governance	
   relying	
   on	
   senior	
  
magistrates	
  and	
  high	
  civil	
  servants	
  from	
  the	
  Chancellerie	
  (the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice).	
  	
  
	
  
Simone	
  Benvenuti	
  and	
  Davide	
  Paris
74
	
  show	
  how	
  the	
  Consiglio	
  Superiore	
  della	
  Magistratura,	
  
arguably	
  the	
  best	
  Italian	
  institutional	
  export	
  product,	
  operates	
  in	
  its	
  original	
  setting.	
  They	
  
argue	
   that	
   the	
   success	
   of	
   the	
   Italian	
   judicial	
   council	
   model	
   has	
   depended	
   on	
   many	
  
endogenous	
  and	
  exogenous	
  factors.	
  In	
  fact,	
  it	
  took	
  15	
  years	
  to	
  free	
  the	
  appointment	
  of	
  
judges	
   from	
   the	
   influence	
   of	
   the	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice,	
   and	
   more	
   than	
   three	
   decades	
   to	
  
loosen	
  the	
  grip	
  of	
  senior	
  judges	
  and	
  improve	
  the	
  internal	
  independence	
  of	
  Italian	
  judges.	
  
However,	
  this	
  came	
  at	
  the	
  price	
  of	
  creating	
  another	
  potentially	
  dangerous	
  body	
  –	
  judicial	
  
associations	
  (the	
  so-­‐called	
  correnti)	
  who	
  now	
  play	
  an	
  unprecedented	
  role	
  in	
  Italian	
  judicial	
  
governance.	
  	
  
	
  
Başak	
  Çalı	
  and	
  Betül	
  Durmuş
75
	
  provide	
  a	
  fascinating	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  judicial	
  
self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Turkey,	
  which	
  experimented	
  with	
  diverse	
  forms	
  of	
  judicial	
  governance	
  
ranging	
  from	
  no	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance,	
  a	
  co-­‐option	
  judicial	
  council	
  model,	
  a	
  hierarchical	
  
judicial	
   council	
   model,	
   the	
   executive	
   controlled	
   judicial	
   council	
   model	
   and	
   a	
   pluralist	
  
judicial	
  council	
  model.	
  All	
  of	
  these	
  changes	
  were	
  driven	
  by	
  domestic	
  causes	
  and	
  should	
  be	
  
seen	
  as	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  larger	
  trajectory	
  of	
  constitutional	
  politics,	
  marked	
  by	
  contestation	
  with	
  
regard	
   to	
   the	
   appropriate	
   role	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   in	
   the	
   Turkish	
   political	
   context.	
   This	
  
difference	
   of	
   opinion	
   deepened	
   after	
   the	
   gradual	
   entrenchment	
   of	
   a	
   competitive	
  
authoritarian	
   form	
   of	
   governance	
   under	
   the	
   rule	
   of	
   the	
   Justice	
   and	
   Development	
   Party	
  
(AKP)	
  and	
  reached	
  its	
  climax	
  after	
  the	
  failed	
  coup	
  attempt	
  in	
  2016.	
  As	
  a	
  direct	
  response	
  to	
  
the	
   failed	
   coup,	
   the	
   AKP	
   not	
   only	
   curbed	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance,	
   but	
   also	
   purged	
   one	
  
quarter	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   on	
   the	
   grounds	
   that	
   they	
   had	
   links	
   to	
   the	
   Fetullahist	
   Terrorist	
  
Organization.	
  
	
  
Most	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   European	
   countries	
   established	
   high	
   councils	
   for	
   the	
   judiciary	
  
during	
  the	
  accession	
  process	
  to	
  the	
  European	
  Union.	
  Both	
  Slovakia	
  and	
  Romania	
  are	
  prime	
  
examples	
   that	
   closely	
   followed	
   the	
   Euro-­‐Model	
   of	
   judicial	
   council,	
   advocated	
   by	
   the	
  
European	
  Commission	
  and	
  the	
  Council	
  of	
  Europe.	
  However,	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  two	
  countries	
  
has	
   struggled	
   to	
   cope	
   with	
   the	
   new	
   model.	
   Bianca	
   Selejan-­‐Guțan
76
	
   explains	
   that	
   the	
  
Superior	
  Council	
  of	
  Magistracy	
  strengthened	
  corporatist	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  Romanian	
  judiciary	
  
74
	
  See	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36.	
  
75
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
76
	
  See	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  supra	
  note	
  14.	
  
1580	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
with	
  all	
  the	
  accompanying	
  negative	
  effects	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  transparency	
  and	
  minimal	
  
accountability.	
  Yet	
  she	
  argues	
  provocatively	
  that,	
  given	
  the	
  high	
  level	
  of	
  corruption	
  that	
  
plagues	
  Romanian	
  society	
  and	
  the	
  culture	
  of	
  obedience	
  within	
  the	
  Romanian	
  judiciary,	
  this	
  
is	
  a	
  “lesser	
  evil”.	
  Samuel	
  Spáč,	
  Katarína	
  Šipulová,	
  and	
  Marína	
  Urbániková
77
	
  provide	
  a	
  more	
  
skeptical	
  picture	
  about	
  the	
  Slovak	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  as	
  they	
  conclude	
  that,	
  with	
  the	
  
help	
  of	
  politicians,	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Slovak	
  Republic	
  was	
  hijacked	
  by	
  judges	
  who	
  
used	
   their	
   powers	
   to	
   capture	
   the	
   judiciary	
   from	
   inside.	
   These	
   judges	
   have	
   used	
   their	
  
powers	
  in	
  such	
  a	
  manner	
  that	
  helped	
  them	
  to	
  protect	
  their	
  interests.	
  Yet	
  the	
  increasing	
  
transparency	
  of	
  the	
  Slovak	
  judicial	
  governance	
  shows	
  signs	
  of	
  hope.	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  next	
  group	
  of	
  cases	
  include	
  jurisdictions	
  that	
  have	
  recently	
  moved	
  from	
  the	
  traditional	
  
model	
  of	
  judicial	
  governance	
  with	
  the	
  central	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice,	
  but	
  have	
  not	
  
embraced	
   the	
   idea	
   of	
   a	
   strong	
   judicial	
   council	
   based	
   on	
   the	
   Euro-­‐template.	
   Aida	
   Torres	
  
Pérez
78
	
  shows	
  how	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judicial	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  General	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  
by	
  politicians	
  and	
  the	
  Council’s	
  internal	
  practices	
  led	
  to	
  its	
  politicization,	
  which	
  has	
  in	
  turn	
  
contributed	
  to	
  undermining	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  the	
  Spanish	
  judiciary.	
  	
  
	
  
Elaine	
   Mak
79
	
   explains	
   how	
   the	
   new	
   public	
   management	
   theories	
   of	
   governance	
  
transformed	
   the	
   Dutch	
   judiciary	
   institutionally	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   mentally.	
   The	
   Netherlands	
  
abandoned	
  the	
  original	
  flat	
  organizational	
  structure	
  for	
  a	
  centralized	
  and	
  more	
  hierarchical	
  
management,	
   with	
   the	
   key	
   role	
   of	
   the	
   Council	
   for	
   the	
   Judiciary	
   and	
   the	
   Management	
  
Boards.	
   However,	
   the	
   new	
   more	
   “business	
   like”	
   approach	
   to	
   judicial	
   governance,	
   which	
  
praises	
  efficiency,	
  effectiveness,	
  and	
  client-­‐oriented	
  mindset,	
  has	
  sometimes	
  collided	
  with	
  
the	
   traditional	
   rule	
   of	
   law	
   of	
   values.	
   This	
   in	
   turn	
   led	
   to	
   occasional	
   skirmishes,	
   revolving	
  
around	
  claims	
  of	
  autonomy,	
  between	
  judges	
  and	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  
between	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  and	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  and	
  Security.	
  	
  
	
  
But	
  these	
  skirmishes	
  are	
  incomparable	
  to	
  the	
  frontal	
  assault	
  on	
  the	
  judicial	
  branch	
  and	
  the	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Poland,	
  as	
  Anna	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon
80
	
  attests.	
  The	
  2017	
  package	
  of	
  
judicial	
  reforms	
  pushed	
  by	
  the	
  Law	
  and	
  Justice	
  Party	
  through	
  Sejm	
  not	
  only	
  altered	
  the	
  
mode	
   of	
   electing	
   its	
   judicial	
   members	
   of	
   the	
   National	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Judiciary,	
   but	
   also	
  
concentrated	
   the	
   power	
   over	
   the	
   judiciary	
   in	
   the	
   hands	
   of	
   the	
   executive	
   branch.	
   This	
  
77
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
78
	
  See	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39.	
  	
  
79
	
  See	
  Mak,	
  supra	
  note	
  37.	
  However,	
  note	
  that	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  cannot	
  be	
  easily	
  squeezed	
  into	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  
model	
  –	
  it	
  introduced	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary,	
  but	
  powers	
  concerning	
  appointing,	
  promoting	
  and	
  disciplining	
  
judges	
  do	
  not	
  lie	
  with	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary,	
  but	
  sometimes	
  with	
  the	
  government,	
  sometimes	
  with	
  the	
  
judiciary	
  authorities,	
  and	
  sometimes	
  they	
  are	
  shared.	
  
80
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1581	
  
	
  	
  
allowed	
   the	
   Polish	
   political	
   leaders	
   to	
   replace	
   important	
   court	
   presidents	
   and	
   pack	
   the	
  
Supreme	
   Court.	
   The	
   remaining	
   two	
   jurisdictions	
   in	
   this	
   group	
   show	
   that	
   in	
   smaller	
  
countries	
  personal	
  relations	
  and	
  informal	
  networks	
  play	
  a	
  more	
  important	
  role	
  than	
  the	
  
institutional	
  design.	
  
	
  
Patrick	
  O’Brien
81
	
  argues	
  that	
  judicial	
  independence	
  and	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Ireland	
  
depend	
   on	
   the	
   support	
   of	
   politicians	
   and	
   a	
   culture	
   of	
   mutual	
   respect.	
   If	
   personal	
  
relationships	
   break	
   down	
   (as	
   they	
   did	
   between	
   2011	
   and	
   2013),	
   essential	
   relationships	
  
between	
   government	
   and	
   the	
   judiciary	
   can	
   be	
   difficult	
   to	
   operate.	
   He	
   also	
   shows	
   that	
  
politicians	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  court	
  presidents	
  value	
  the	
  potential	
  for	
  patronage	
  involved	
  in	
  judicial	
  
appointments	
  and	
  thus	
  have	
  been	
  unwilling	
  to	
  relinquish	
  control	
  in	
  that	
  area.	
  He	
  concludes	
  
that	
  to	
  understand	
  the	
  recent	
  debates	
  about	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Appointments	
  Commission	
  and	
  
the	
  Judicial	
  Council,	
  getting	
  the	
  politics	
  right	
  is	
  a	
  key.	
  	
  
	
  
Matej	
  Avbelj
82
	
  exposes	
  the	
  significant	
  gap	
  between	
  the	
  Slovenian	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
in	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  the	
  way	
  it	
  is	
  conducted	
  in	
  practice.	
  He	
  demonstrates	
  how	
  the	
  remnants	
  of	
  
the	
  communist	
  totalitarian	
  past	
  and	
  the	
  dense	
  formal	
  and	
  informal	
  networks	
  in	
  a	
  relatively	
  
small	
   Slovenian	
   legal	
   and	
   political	
   community	
   have	
   been	
   used	
   to	
   manipulate	
   the	
   legal	
  
system	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  so	
  as	
  to	
  detract	
  from	
  rather	
  than	
  to	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  
values	
  associated	
  with	
  the	
  judiciary	
  in	
  a	
  well-­‐functioning	
  constitutional	
  democracy.	
  
	
  
The	
   remaining	
   two	
   domestic	
   jurisdictions	
   represent	
   the	
   “black	
   sheep”	
   that	
   have	
   so	
   far	
  
resisted	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
   any	
   form	
   of	
   a	
   judicial	
   council.	
   Contrary	
   to	
   general	
   wisdom,	
  
both	
   Germany	
   and	
   Czechia	
   show	
   a	
   significant	
   dose	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance.	
   Fabian	
  
Wittreck
83
	
   rebuts	
   the	
   myth	
   that	
   Germany	
   is	
   a	
   persistent	
   objector	
   to	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance.	
  In	
  fact,	
  German	
  court	
  administration	
  features	
  as	
  many	
  as	
  eight	
  judicial	
  self-­‐
governance	
  bodies.	
  These	
  bodies	
  range	
  from	
  Presidia,	
  councils	
  of	
  judges	
  (Richterräte),	
  two	
  
judicial	
  appointment	
  committees	
  and	
  court	
  presidents	
  to	
  service	
  courts,	
  penal	
  courts,	
  and	
  
civil	
   courts	
   deciding	
   on	
   the	
   civil	
   liability	
   of	
   judges.	
   Germany	
   thus	
   advances	
   a	
   different	
  
conception	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance,	
  which	
  reflects	
  the	
  prevailing	
  German	
  understanding	
  
of	
  democratic	
  legitimacy	
  and	
  separation	
  of	
  powers.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
   a	
   similar	
   vein,	
   Adam	
   Blisa,	
   Tereza	
   Papoušková,	
   and	
   Marína	
   Urbániková
84
	
   argue	
   that	
  
judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   cannot	
   be	
   conflated	
   with	
   judicial	
   councils	
   as	
   Czech	
   judges	
   have	
  
81
	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  	
  
82
	
  See	
  Avbelj,	
  supra	
  note	
  41.	
  
83
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
84
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
1582	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
their	
   say	
   in	
   many	
   issues	
   of	
   judicial	
   governance.	
   They	
   show	
   how	
   Czech	
   court	
   presidents	
  
have	
  gradually	
  managed	
  to	
  erode	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  became	
  
key	
   players	
   in	
   court	
   administration.	
   However,	
   this	
   comes	
   at	
   a	
   price	
   –	
   the	
   Czech	
   judicial	
  
(self-­‐)governance	
  is	
  opaque	
  and	
  rests	
  on	
  the	
  fragile	
  balance	
  between	
  the	
  court	
  presidents	
  
and	
  the	
  political	
  actors.	
  
	
  
Finally,	
  the	
  last	
  two	
  case	
  studies	
  analyze	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  at	
  the	
  European	
  Court	
  of	
  
Human	
  Rights	
  and	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice.	
  Başak	
  Çalı	
  and	
  Stewart	
  Cunningham
85
	
  show	
  that	
  the	
  
scope	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   at	
   the	
   ECtHR	
   is	
   highly	
   variable.	
   While	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   at	
   the	
   point	
   of	
   judicial	
   selection	
   is	
   at	
   best	
   ‘embryonic’,	
   since	
   this	
   process	
  
continues	
  to	
  favor	
  the	
  primacy	
  of	
  the	
  Parliamentary	
  Assembly	
  of	
  the	
  Council	
  of	
  Europe,	
  
sitting	
   ECtHR	
   judges,	
   once	
   elected,	
   enjoy	
   unbounded	
   powers	
   with	
   respect	
   to	
   the	
  
management	
  of	
  the	
  ECtHR’s	
  judicial	
  activities.	
  In	
  particular,	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  as	
  
well	
  as	
  Section	
  Presidents,	
  alongside	
  the	
  Jurisconsult	
  and	
  the	
  Registry,	
  exercise	
  judicial	
  self-­‐
governance	
  in	
  managing	
  the	
  Court’s	
  work	
  and	
  giving	
  it	
  jurisprudential	
  direction.	
  Başak	
  and	
  
Stewart’s	
   central	
   argument	
   is	
   twofold.	
   First,	
   in	
   terms	
   of	
   values,	
   they	
   suggest	
   that	
   the	
  
current	
   practices	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   at	
   the	
   ECtHR	
   are	
   better	
   at	
   promoting	
  
legitimacy	
  and	
  judicial	
  independence	
  but	
  far	
  weaker	
  on	
  transparency	
  and	
  accountability.	
  
Second,	
  the	
  differences	
  in	
  reach	
  and	
  form	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  at	
  the	
  pre-­‐	
  and	
  post-­‐
election	
  processes	
  strike	
  a	
  careful	
  balance	
  in	
  respecting	
  the	
  separation	
  of	
  powers	
  and	
  the	
  
democratic	
  principle,	
  but	
  this	
  balance	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  taken	
  for	
  granted.	
  	
  
	
  
Christoph	
  Krenn
86
	
  then	
  traces	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  model	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  
Justice	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Union,	
  which	
  builds	
  heavily	
  on	
  the	
  International	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  
template.	
   He	
   argues	
   that	
   this	
   has	
   led	
   to	
   communal	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance,	
   which	
   has	
  
fostered	
  professionalism	
  and	
  strengthened	
  the	
  loyalty	
  of	
  the	
  CJEU’s	
  judges	
  and	
  advocates	
  
general	
  towards	
  the	
  institution.	
  However,	
  two	
  challenges	
  to	
  this	
  governance	
  loom	
  large	
  –	
  
the	
  growth	
  of	
  the	
  CJEU	
  (and	
  especially	
  the	
  effective	
  inclusion	
  of	
  the	
  General	
  Court	
  in	
  the	
  
CJEU’s	
  governance	
  structure)	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU’s	
  controversial	
  active	
  participation	
  in	
  the	
  EU’s	
  
legislative	
  process.	
  	
  
	
  
After	
   these	
   rich	
   case	
   studies	
   on	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   in	
   particular	
   jurisdictions,	
   this	
  
special	
   issue	
   picks	
   up	
   important	
   horizontal	
   issues	
   that	
   run	
   through	
   most	
   of	
   the	
  
contributions.	
  Adam	
  Blisa	
  and	
  David	
  Kosař
87
	
  argue	
  that	
  court	
  presidents	
  are	
  a	
  missing	
  piece	
  
in	
  judicial	
  governance.	
  They	
  conceptualize	
  the	
  powers	
  of	
  court	
  presidents,	
  create	
  the	
  Court	
  
Presidents	
   Power	
   Index,	
   and	
   identify	
   the	
   contingent	
   circumstances	
   that	
   affect	
   to	
   what	
  
85
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
86
	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
87
	
  See	
  Blisa	
  &	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  53.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1583	
  
	
  	
  
extent	
  court	
  presidents	
  may	
  exploit	
  their	
  powers	
  in	
  practice.	
  Based	
  on	
  these	
  insights	
  they	
  
also	
  question	
  the	
  widely	
  held	
  opinion	
  that	
  the	
  Western	
  and	
  the	
  Eastern	
  Europe	
  view	
  the	
  
roles	
   of	
   court	
   presidents	
   differently.	
   In	
   fact,	
   powers	
   of	
   court	
   presidents	
   diverge	
  
significantly	
  both	
  within	
  the	
  Western	
  Europe	
  and	
  within	
  the	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  and	
  hence	
  it	
  is	
  
difficult	
  to	
  draw	
  the	
  easy	
  line	
  along	
  the	
  West/East	
  axis	
  on	
  this	
  ground.	
  	
  
	
  
Samuel	
  Spáč
88
	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  the	
  age	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  and	
  
tracks	
  down	
  the	
  increasing	
  involvement	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  selecting	
  their	
  peers.	
  To	
  explain	
  the	
  
latter	
  phenomenon	
  he	
  suggests	
  viewing	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  recruiting	
  judges	
  as	
  a	
  funnel,	
  which	
  
consists	
  of	
  four	
  stages,	
  where	
  candidates	
  are	
  gradually	
  eliminated	
  until	
  only	
  one	
  or	
  a	
  few	
  
remain.	
  Then	
  he	
  argues	
  that	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  analyze	
  judicial	
  recruitment	
  and	
  its	
  consequences	
  
we	
  need	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  understand	
  the	
  formal	
  rules	
  and	
  identify	
  the	
  actors	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  
process,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  study	
  their	
  preferences	
  and	
  pay	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  stages	
  of	
  the	
  process	
  
in	
  which	
  they	
  shape	
  the	
  recruitment.	
  Only	
  then	
  can	
  we	
  reveal	
  the	
  real	
  influence	
  of	
  judicial	
  
self-­‐governance	
  on	
  the	
  composition	
  of	
  the	
  domestic	
  bench.	
  
	
  
Marína	
   Urbániková	
   and	
   Katarína	
   Šipulová
89
	
   draw	
   a	
   novel	
   concept	
   map	
   of	
   factors	
  
influencing	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  the	
  judiciary	
  and	
  offer	
  a	
  unique	
  view	
  on	
  the	
  relationship	
  
between	
  judicial	
  councils	
  and	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  courts	
  on	
  their	
  own.	
  They	
  
raise	
  doubts	
  about	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  to	
  enhance	
  confidence	
  in	
  courts,	
  since	
  the	
  
EU	
  countries	
  without	
  judicial	
  councils	
  are	
  better	
  off	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  public	
  confidence.	
  More	
  
specifically,	
   they	
   conclude	
   that	
   the	
   existence	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils	
   does	
   not	
   make	
   a	
  
difference	
  regarding	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  the	
  judiciary	
  in	
  the	
  new	
  EU	
  member	
  states,	
  while	
  
in	
  the	
  old	
  EU	
  member	
  states	
  judicial	
  systems	
  with	
  judicial	
  councils	
  enjoy	
  lower	
  levels	
  of	
  
public	
  confidence	
  than	
  the	
  ones	
  without	
  them.	
  This	
  does	
  not	
  necessarily	
  mean	
  that	
  the	
  
existence	
   of	
   a	
   judicial	
   council	
   is	
   to	
   be	
   blamed	
   for	
   lower	
   public	
   confidence.	
   Instead,	
   the	
  
authors	
   argue	
   that	
   judicial	
   councils	
   have	
   only	
   limited	
   power	
   to	
   deal	
   with	
   the	
   structural	
  
causes	
   of	
   low	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   courts,	
   which	
   often	
   has	
   deeper	
   cultural	
   and	
   societal	
  
roots.	
  
	
  
The	
   remaining	
   two	
   articles	
   focus	
   on	
   international	
   courts.	
   Hubert	
   Smekal	
   and	
   Nino	
  
Tsereteli
90
	
  draw	
  attention	
  to	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  at	
  the	
  international	
  level	
  and	
  provide	
  
a	
   unique	
   analysis	
   of	
   the	
   selection,	
   promotion,	
   and	
   removal	
   of	
   judges	
   of	
   as	
   many	
   as	
   24	
  
international	
   courts.	
   They	
   show	
   that	
   while	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   manifests	
   itself	
  
relatively	
   strongly	
   in	
   the	
   promotion	
   and	
   removal	
   of	
   international	
   judges,	
   it	
   is	
   limited	
   in	
  
88
	
  Spáč,	
  supra	
  note	
  51.	
  
89
	
  See	
  Marína	
  Urbániková	
  &	
  Katarína	
  Šipulová,
	
  
Failed	
  Expectations:	
  Does	
  the	
  Establishment	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
  
Enhance	
  Confidence	
  in	
  Courts?,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
90
	
  See	
  Tsereteli	
  &	
  Smekal,	
  supra	
  note	
  52.	
  
1584	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
their	
   selection.	
   However,	
   sitting	
   judges	
   of	
   some	
   international	
   courts	
   have	
   become	
  
increasingly	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  expert	
  bodies	
  that	
  decide	
  or	
  advise	
  on	
  selecting	
  new	
  judges,	
  
and	
  thus	
  we	
  can	
  witness	
  the	
  gradual	
  rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  even	
  in	
  this	
  area.	
  	
  
	
  
Finally,	
  Shai	
  Dothan
91
	
  moves	
  from	
  the	
  institutional	
  design	
  issues	
  to	
  the	
  actual	
  behavior	
  of	
  
judges	
  on	
  the	
  international	
  bench.	
  He	
  shows	
  that	
  the	
  states’	
  influence	
  on	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  
international	
  judges	
  raises	
  the	
  concern	
  that	
  judges	
  are	
  biased	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  their	
  home	
  states.	
  
He	
  argues	
  that	
  this	
  concern	
  cannot	
  be	
  refuted	
  merely	
  by	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  international	
  
courts	
   usually	
   sit	
   in	
   large	
   and	
   diverse	
   panels,	
   since	
   judges	
   may	
   start	
   forming	
   coalitions	
  
among	
  themselves,	
  giving	
  judges	
  with	
  national	
  biases	
  a	
  practical	
  opportunity	
  to	
  change	
  the	
  
results	
  of	
  cases.	
  Building	
  on	
  insights	
  from	
  the	
  judicial	
  behavior	
  literature	
  he	
  analyzes	
  how	
  
international	
   judges	
   act	
   together	
   as	
   a	
   group	
   and	
   eventually	
   concludes	
   that	
   one	
   way	
   of	
  
limiting	
  the	
  national	
  bias	
  of	
  international	
  judges	
  is	
  to	
  increase	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  (e.g.	
  
by	
  allowing	
  judges	
  or	
  presidents	
  of	
  international	
  courts	
  to	
  have	
  greater	
  influence	
  on	
  the	
  
appointment	
  of	
  their	
  future	
  peers).	
  
C.	
  Forms	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  
	
  
Based	
  on	
  the	
  insights	
  from	
  the	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue,	
  this	
  Part	
  problematizes	
  
the	
  forms	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Europe.	
  More	
  specifically,	
  it	
  argues	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  high	
  
time	
  to	
  look	
  beyond	
  judicial	
  councils	
  and	
  study	
  and	
  to	
  view	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  as	
  a	
  
much	
  more	
  complex	
  network	
  of	
  actors	
  and	
  bodies	
  with	
  different	
  levels	
  of	
  participation	
  of	
  
judges.	
   This	
   requires	
   focusing	
   on	
   de	
   facto	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance,	
   the	
   identification	
   of	
  
other	
  actors	
  within	
  the	
  judiciary	
  who	
  may	
  engage	
  in	
  judicial	
  governance	
  (such	
  as	
  judicial	
  
appointments	
   commissions,	
   promotion	
   committees,	
   and	
   court	
   presidents),	
   taking	
   into	
  
account	
  the	
  liquid	
  nature	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance,	
  and	
  acknowledgment	
  of	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  
the	
  rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  may	
  lead	
  to	
  political	
  contestation	
  and	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  
new	
   channels	
   of	
   politicization	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary.	
   Subsequently,	
   it	
   identifies	
   dimensions	
   of	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  that	
  should	
  allow	
  us	
  to	
  see	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  more	
  sharply	
  in	
  
future.	
  
	
  
I.	
  From	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
  to	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  Bodies	
  
	
   	
  
As	
  mentioned	
  above,	
  the	
  existing	
  literature	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  suffers	
  from	
  several	
  
limits.	
   First,	
   it	
   focuses	
   predominantly	
   on	
   judicial	
   councils	
   and	
   neglects	
   other	
   forms	
   of	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Courts	
  Service
92
	
  or	
  specialized	
  judicial	
  appointments	
  
91
	
  Shai	
  Dothan,	
  The	
  Motivations	
  of	
  Individual	
  Judges	
  and	
  How	
  They	
  Act	
  as	
  a	
  Group,	
  in	
  this	
  issue.	
  
92
	
  See	
  the	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  Service	
  in	
  Ireland	
  (in	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31).	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1585	
  
	
  	
  
bodies.
93
	
  A	
  related	
  problem	
  is	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  too	
  much	
  emphasis	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
bodies	
  operating	
  at	
  national	
  level.	
  Virtually	
  all	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  show	
  that	
  
we	
  also	
  need	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  operating	
  at	
  each	
  court	
  such	
  as	
  
court	
   presidents,
94
	
   management	
   boards,
95
	
   personnel	
   councils,
96
	
   judicial	
   boards,
97
	
   and	
  
presidia	
  (Präsidien).
98
	
  
	
  
The	
  second	
  drawback	
  of	
  the	
  existing	
  literature	
  is	
  that	
  it	
  attempts	
  to	
  squeeze	
  all	
  forms	
  of	
  
JSG	
  into	
  the	
  existing	
  “models”	
  (such	
  as	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  model,	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  
model,	
  and	
  the	
  Court	
  Service	
  model)
99
	
  of	
  court	
  administration	
  that	
  do	
  not	
  do	
  justice	
  to	
  the	
  
richness	
  and	
  diversity	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  Moreover,	
  this	
  approach	
  overlooks	
  the	
  
fact	
  that	
  in	
  many	
  countries	
  there	
  are	
  several	
  JSG	
  bodies	
  (such	
  as	
  the	
  Court	
  Service	
  coupled	
  
with	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Appointments	
   Advisory	
   Board	
   and	
   court	
   presidents,
100
	
   judicial	
   council	
  
coupled	
   with	
   national	
   selection	
   committee	
   and	
   court	
   presidents,
101
	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
  
coupled	
  with	
  court	
  presidents,
102
	
  or	
  court	
  presidents	
  coupled	
  with	
  judicial	
  boards
103
).	
  From	
  
the	
   conceptual	
   point	
   of	
   view,	
   it	
   is	
   critical	
   to	
   acknowledge	
   this	
   fact	
   and	
   understand	
   the	
  
dynamics	
  between	
  these	
  bodies	
  and	
  their	
  personal	
  overlaps	
  rather	
  than	
  trying	
  to	
  put	
  each	
  
judicial	
  system	
  under	
  the	
  rubric	
  of	
  a	
  certain	
  ideal	
  model.	
  
	
  
93
	
   See	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Appointments	
   Advisory	
   Board	
   in	
   Ireland	
   (in	
   O’Brien,	
   supra	
   note	
   31),	
   or	
   Präsidialräte	
   and	
  
Richterwahlausschüsse	
  in	
  Germany	
  (in	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45).	
  However,	
  note	
  that	
  selection	
  of	
  the	
  CJEU’s	
  and	
  
ECtHR’s	
  judges	
  
94
	
  See	
  Blisa	
  &	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  53.	
  
95
	
  See	
  Mak,	
  supra	
  note	
  37.	
  
96
	
  See	
  Avbelj,	
  supra	
  note	
  41.	
  
97
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
98
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
99
	
  I	
  should	
  acknowledge	
  that	
  I	
  myself	
  contributed	
  to	
  this	
  simplification.	
  See	
  Bobek	
  &	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  52.	
  	
  
100
	
  See	
  the	
  situation	
  in	
  Ireland	
  analyzed	
  in	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  	
  
101
	
  See	
  Mak,	
  supra	
  note	
  37.	
  	
  
102
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  the	
  situation	
  in	
  Slovakia	
  dealt	
  with	
  in	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
103
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  the	
  situation	
  in	
  Czechia	
  analyzed	
  in	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
1586	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
The	
   other	
   drawbacks	
   are	
   also	
   well	
   known.	
   Most	
   of	
   the	
   literature	
   written	
   in	
   English
104
	
  
focuses	
  on	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  which	
  frames	
  the	
  debate	
  and	
  
gives	
  it	
  (owing	
  to	
  the	
  specifics	
  of	
  post-­‐communist	
  judiciaries)	
  a	
  peculiar	
  shape.	
  Moreover,	
  a	
  
significant	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  guidelines	
  and	
  scholarship	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  suffers	
  
from	
  normative	
  bias,	
  as	
  many	
  scholars	
  and	
  policymakers	
  have	
  presumed	
  that	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  
judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   is	
   a	
   one-­‐way	
   path	
   and	
   an	
   unquestionable	
   good.	
   However,	
   the	
  
developments	
  in	
  Hungary	
  (where	
  Viktor	
  Orbán	
  created	
  the	
  brand	
  new	
  National	
  Office	
  for	
  
the	
  Judiciary,	
  chaired	
  by	
  his	
  loyal	
  supporter	
  Tünde	
  Handó,	
  and	
  hollowed	
  out	
  the	
  powers	
  of	
  
the	
  existing	
  the	
  National	
  Judicial	
  Council
105
)	
  and	
  Poland	
  (where	
  Jaroslav	
  Kaczyński	
  packed	
  
the	
  National	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  with	
  his	
  supporters	
  and	
  even	
  threatened	
  to	
  revert	
  to	
  
the	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice	
   model
106
)	
   show	
   that	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   can	
   be	
   reduced	
   and	
  
even	
  abused	
  to	
  the	
  detriment	
  of	
  individual	
  judges.
107
	
  This	
  brings	
  us	
  to	
  the	
  final	
  limit	
  of	
  the	
  
existing	
   literature,	
   which	
   is	
   the	
   static	
   view	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance.	
   Even	
   if	
   we	
   leave	
  
aside	
  Poland,	
  where	
  one	
  judicial	
  reform	
  follows	
  the	
  other,	
  virtually	
  every	
  contribution	
  to	
  
this	
   special	
   issue	
   shows	
   that	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   has	
   developed	
   over	
   time.	
   Some	
  
countries	
  even	
  modified	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  back	
  and	
  forth	
  several	
  times.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  order	
  to	
  avoid	
  these	
  drawbacks,	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  deliberately	
  adopts	
  a	
  broad	
  definition	
  
of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  For	
  its	
  purposes,	
  “judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body”	
  is	
  a	
  body	
  with	
  
at	
  least	
  one	
  judge	
  whose	
  primary	
  function,	
  entrenched	
  in	
  a	
  legal	
  norm,	
  is	
  to	
  (a)	
  decide	
  
about	
  issues	
  regarding	
  court	
  administration	
  and/or	
  the	
  career	
  of	
  a	
  judge,	
  and/or	
  (b)	
  advise	
  
those	
  who	
  decide	
  about	
  such	
  issues.
108
	
  	
  
	
  
Such	
  broad	
  definition	
  has	
  several	
  advantages.	
  First,	
  it	
  includes	
  not	
  only	
  judicial	
  councils,	
  
but	
   also	
   judicial	
   appointments	
   commissions	
   and	
   similar	
   bodies,	
   the	
   Court	
   Service,	
   court	
  
presidents,	
  Supreme	
  Courts	
  (if	
  vested	
  with	
  court	
  administration),	
  management	
  boards	
  or	
  
104
	
  There	
  is	
  of	
  course	
  relevant	
  literature	
  in	
  local	
  languages	
  (see	
  e.g.	
  DANIELA	
  PIANA	
  &	
  ANTOINE	
  VAUCHEZ,	
  IL	
  CONSIGLIO	
  
SUPERIORE	
   DELLA	
   MAGISTRATURA	
   142	
   et	
   seq.	
   (2012);	
   ERIK	
   LÁŠTIC	
   &	
   SAMUEL	
   SPÁČ	
   (EDS.),	
   NEDOTKUNTEĽNÍ?	
   POLITIKA	
  
SUDCOVSKÝCH	
  KARIÉR	
  NA	
  SLOVENSKU	
  V	
  ROKOCH	
  1993	
  –	
  2015	
  (2018);	
  FABIAN	
  WITTRECK,	
  DIE	
  VERWALTUNG	
  DER	
  DRITTEN	
  GEWALT	
  
(2006);	
  and	
  LEA	
  C.	
  FAISSNER,	
  DIE	
  GERICHTSVERWALTUNG	
  DER	
  ORDENTLICHEN	
  GERICHTSBARKEIT	
  IN	
  FRANKREICH	
  UND	
  DEUTSCHLAND	
  
251	
  et	
  seq.	
  (2018),	
  but	
  it	
  is	
  to	
  a	
  large	
  extent	
  not	
  accessible	
  to	
  English	
  speaking	
  readers.	
  
105
	
   See	
   Kosař	
   &	
   Šipulová,	
   supra	
   note	
   20;	
   and	
   Benjamin	
   Novak,	
   Two	
   Hungarian	
   law	
   school	
   professors	
   discuss	
  
Hungary’s	
   deteriorating	
   political	
   and	
   legal	
   culture,	
   THE	
   BUDAPEST	
   BEACON	
   (Apr.	
   6,	
   2018),	
  
https://budapestbeacon.com/two-­‐hungarian-­‐law-­‐school-­‐professors-­‐discuss-­‐hungarys-­‐deteriorating-­‐political-­‐and-­‐
legal-­‐culture/?_sf_s=fleck.	
  
106
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
107
	
  The	
  recent	
  reports	
  that	
  in	
  Hungary	
  and	
  Poland	
  “disloyal”	
  judges	
  are	
  increasingly	
  threatened	
  with	
  disciplinary	
  
sanctions	
  confirm	
  it.	
  See	
  Hailbronner,	
  supra	
  note	
  66.	
  	
  
108
	
  See	
  also	
  supra	
  notes	
  21-­‐23.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1587	
  
	
  	
  
judicial	
  boards	
  at	
  each	
  court,	
  Präsidia	
  in	
  Germany,	
  commissions	
  d’avancément	
  in	
  France,	
  as	
  
well	
   as	
   the	
   Article	
   255	
   TFEU	
   Panel	
   for	
   selection	
   of	
   Court	
   of	
   Justice	
   judges	
   and	
   the	
   CM	
  
Advisory	
  Panel	
  of	
  Experts	
  on	
  Candidates	
  for	
  Election	
  as	
  Judge	
  to	
  the	
  ECtHR.	
  This	
  in	
  turn	
  
gives	
  a	
  more	
  accurate	
  picture	
  of	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  each	
  jurisdiction	
  
than	
   the	
   traditional	
   focus	
   on	
   judicial	
   councils.	
   In	
   fact,	
   it	
   makes	
   clear	
   that	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
  cannot	
  be	
  conflated	
  with	
  judicial	
  councils	
  (and	
  vice	
  versa).	
  Second,	
  it	
  exposes	
  
personal	
   overlaps	
   between	
   various	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies.	
   For	
   instance,	
   court	
  
presidents	
  are	
  themselves	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies,	
  but	
  they	
  may	
  often	
  also	
  sit	
  on	
  
judicial	
   councils	
   or	
   selection	
   and	
   promotion	
   committees.	
   This	
   “judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
  
nesting”	
  cannot	
  be	
  addressed	
  here,	
  but	
  should	
  be	
  the	
  subject	
  of	
  future	
  research.	
  
	
  
Third,	
  it	
  allows	
  us	
  to	
  see	
  the	
  actual	
  role	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  the	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  rather	
  
than	
  the	
  role	
  assigned	
  to	
  them	
  on	
  paper.	
  In	
  fact,	
  it	
  fully	
  exposes	
  that	
   the	
  reality	
  defies	
  
traditional	
  models	
  of	
  court	
  administration.	
  For	
  instance,	
  Başak	
  Çalı	
  and	
  Betül	
  Durmuş	
  show	
  
that	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  (1971-­‐2010)	
  and	
  later	
  on	
  the	
  Presidential	
  administration	
  (2017-­‐
now)	
  can	
  be	
  dominant	
  even	
  under	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  model.
109
	
  Similarly,	
  a	
  theoretically	
  
strong	
   Slovenian	
   judicial	
   council	
   is	
   rather	
   weak	
   and	
   the	
   real	
   decisions	
   regarding	
   judicial	
  
governance	
  are	
  made	
  elsewhere.
110
	
  Conversely,	
  German	
  and	
  Czech	
  contributions	
  rebut	
  the	
  
myth	
  that	
  Czechia	
  and	
  Germany	
  are	
  persistent	
  objectors	
  to	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  In	
  fact,	
  
Czech	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  German	
  judges,	
  each	
  group	
  in	
  its	
  own	
  way,	
  have	
  been	
  very	
  influential	
  in	
  
governing	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  despite	
  the	
  nominally	
  prevailing	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  model.	
  German	
  
judges	
   sit	
   on	
   eight	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies	
   that	
   have	
   significant	
   say	
   in	
   the	
  
appointment	
  and	
  promotion	
  of	
  judges,	
  case	
  assignment,	
  the	
  disciplining	
  of	
  judges	
  as	
  well	
  
as	
   in	
   many	
   other	
   issues	
   of	
   judicial	
   governance.
111
	
   The	
   Czech	
   version	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   is	
   more	
   fragile	
   since	
   it	
   relies	
   primarily	
   on	
   Czech	
   court	
   presidents,	
   who	
  
managed	
   to	
   erode	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   the	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice	
   and	
   became	
   key	
   players	
   in	
   court	
  
administration.
112
	
   Contrary	
   to	
   general	
   wisdom,	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   can	
   actually	
   be	
  
practiced	
  at	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice.	
  For	
  instance,	
  the	
  most	
  powerful	
  public	
  servants	
  within	
  
the	
   Austrian	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice	
   (so	
   called	
   "Sektionschefs",	
   heads	
   of	
   large	
   departments	
  
within	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice)	
  are	
  actually	
  judges	
  temporarily	
  assigned	
  to	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  
Justice.
113
	
  	
  
	
  
109
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
110
	
  Avbelj,	
  supra	
  note	
  41.	
  
111
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
112
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
113
	
  I	
  am	
  grateful	
  to	
  Markus	
  Vašek	
  for	
  this	
  insight.	
  
1588	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
Other	
   contributions	
   also	
   expose	
   gaps	
   between	
   de	
   iure	
   and	
   de	
   facto	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance.	
  In	
  Slovakia,	
  the	
  constitutional	
  design	
  of	
  its	
  judicial	
  council	
  supposes	
  a	
  parity	
  of	
  
judges	
   elected	
   by	
   their	
   peers	
   with	
   non-­‐judicial	
   members	
   appointed/elected	
   by	
   political	
  
actors,	
   but	
   in	
   practice	
   judges	
   have	
   always	
   had	
   a	
   majority	
   on	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
  
Slovak	
  Republic,	
  since	
  political	
  actors	
  decided	
  to	
  nominate	
  judges	
  as	
  their	
  candidates.
114
	
  
Among	
  the	
  many	
  repercussions	
  of	
  this	
  development	
  are	
  the	
  collision	
  between	
  “political”	
  
judicial	
  members	
  and	
  “judicial”	
  judicial	
  members	
  on	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  and	
  the	
  gradual	
  
rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  associations.	
  
	
  
Due	
  to	
  our	
  broad	
  definition,	
  even	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  at	
  the	
  CJEU	
  and	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  can	
  
be	
  seen	
  in	
  a	
  different	
  light.	
  If	
  we	
  go	
  beyond	
  the	
  Article	
  255	
  Panel	
  and	
  take	
  into	
  account	
  the	
  
role	
  of	
  the	
  CJEU’s	
  president,	
  who	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  strongest	
  court	
  presidents	
  in	
  Europe,
115
	
  the	
  
significant	
   financial
116
	
   and	
   administrative
117
	
   autonomy	
   of	
   the	
   CJEU,	
   and	
   a	
   de	
   facto	
  
legislative	
  role	
  in	
  regulating	
  its	
  own	
  affairs,
118
	
  then	
  we	
  realize	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  just	
  “some	
  
embryonic	
   form”	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐government”
119
	
   or	
   a	
   “subtle	
   move”	
   in	
   the	
   direction	
   of	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance.
120
	
  It	
  is	
  rather	
  a	
  different	
  type	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  than	
  the	
  
one	
  we	
  associate	
  with	
  judicial	
  councils.	
  Similarly,	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  has	
  relatively	
  weak	
  levels	
  of	
  
judicial	
  influence	
  on	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judges,	
  it	
  enjoys	
  a	
  high	
  degree	
  of	
  control	
  over	
  court	
  
administration,
121
	
  and	
  the	
  ECtHR’s	
  President	
  also	
  wields	
  significant	
  powers,	
  albeit	
  not	
  as	
  
strong	
  as	
  his	
  CJEU	
  counterpart.
122
	
  	
  
	
  
These	
  findings	
  confirm	
  that	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  is	
  a	
  far	
  more	
  complex	
  phenomenon	
  
than	
  judicial	
  councils	
  and	
  there	
  might	
  be	
  significant	
  dissonance	
  between	
  de	
  iure	
  and	
  de	
  
114
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
115
	
  Blisa	
  &	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  53.	
  
116
	
   But	
   see	
   Christoph	
   Krenn,	
   The	
   European	
   Court	
   of	
   Justice's	
   Financial	
   Accountability.	
   How	
   the	
   European	
  
Parliament	
  Incites	
  and	
  Monitors	
  Judicial	
  Reform	
  through	
  the	
  Budgetary	
  Process,	
  13	
  EUROPEAN	
  CONST.	
  LAW	
  R.,	
  253	
  
(2017)	
  (who	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  European	
  Parliament	
  checks	
  for	
  CJEU’s	
  mismanagement	
  and	
  gives	
  political	
  guidance	
  
on	
  broader	
  issues	
  of	
  CJEU’s	
  administration	
  through	
  the	
  EU’s	
  budgetary	
  process).	
  	
  
117
	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
118
	
  On	
  the	
  regulatory	
  self-­‐governance	
  of	
  the	
  CJEU,	
  see	
  Part	
  C.II	
  below.	
  
119
	
  Alemanno,	
  supra	
  note	
  55.	
  
120
	
  Dumbrovský,	
  Petkova	
  &	
  Van	
  der	
  Sluis,	
  supra	
  note	
  56.	
  
121
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
122
	
  See	
  Blisa	
  &	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  53.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1589	
  
	
  	
  
facto	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  It	
  goes	
  without	
  saying	
  that	
  de	
  facto	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
matters	
   more,	
   but	
   in	
   order	
   to	
   know	
   more	
   about	
   it	
   we	
   need	
   to	
   go	
   beyond	
   the	
   de	
   iure	
  
composition	
   and	
   formal	
   powers	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies.	
   To	
   be	
   sure,	
   it	
   is	
  
important	
  to	
  know	
  whether	
  judges	
  have	
  a	
  majority,
123
	
  parity
124
	
  or	
  minority
125
	
  in	
  judicial	
  
councils	
  and	
  other	
  collective	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies,	
  and	
  who	
  nominates	
  the	
  other	
  
members.	
   However,	
   it	
   is	
   also	
   necessary	
   to	
   ask	
   further	
   and	
   examine	
   other	
   factors	
   that	
  
shape	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies:	
  who	
  are	
  the	
  “other	
  members”	
  of	
  these	
  bodies,	
  who	
  
selects	
   the	
   judicial	
   members	
   and	
   from	
   which	
   echelons	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   do	
   these	
   judges	
  
come,	
  who	
  presides	
  over	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies,	
  what	
  tiers	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  we	
  are	
  
talking	
  about,	
  and	
  what	
  are	
  their	
  informal	
  relations.	
  
	
  
For	
  instance,	
  judges	
  and	
  prosecutors	
  are	
  indistinguishable	
  in	
  France,	
  Italy,	
  Romania,	
  and	
  
Turkey,	
  but	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  world	
  of	
  difference	
  between	
  them	
  and	
  the	
  roles	
  of	
  court	
  prosecutors	
  
in	
  these	
  countries.
126
	
  Polish,	
  Spanish,	
  and	
  Turkish	
  contributions	
  show	
  that	
  when	
  politicians	
  
can	
   select	
   the	
   judicial	
   members	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils,	
   that	
   inevitably	
   leads	
   to	
   the	
  
politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary,
127
	
  or	
  at	
  least	
  to	
  the	
  perception	
  of	
  “distance”	
  between	
  judges	
  
and	
   the	
   judicial	
   council.
128
	
   However,	
   even	
   if	
   judges	
   can	
   elect	
   their	
   representatives,	
   that	
  
does	
  not	
  mean	
  that	
  political	
  ties	
  do	
  not	
  matter.	
  In	
  France	
  and	
  Italy,	
  judicial	
  associations,	
  
often	
  associated	
  with	
  a	
  certain	
  political	
  party	
  or	
  at	
  least	
  a	
  certain	
  worldview,	
  actually	
  have	
  
a	
  major	
  say	
  on	
  who	
  sits	
  on	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  and	
  how	
  these	
  bodies	
  decide	
  
important	
  issues.
129
	
  Slovakia	
  then	
  serves	
  as	
  a	
  cautionary	
  tale,	
  as	
  it	
  shows	
  that	
  the	
  judicial	
  
council	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  captured	
  from	
  inside	
  by	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  factions	
  within	
  the	
  judiciary.
130
	
  
	
  
123
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Italy,	
  Romania,	
  and	
  de	
  facto	
  also	
  in	
  Slovakia.	
  
124
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  (however,	
  the	
  judicial	
  member	
  who	
  is	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  Dutch	
  
judicial	
  council	
  has	
  a	
  casting	
  vote)	
  and	
  de	
  iure	
  also	
  in	
  Slovakia.	
  
125
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Spain	
  and	
  France,	
  and	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Appointments	
  Advisory	
  Board	
  in	
  Ireland.	
  
126
	
   See	
   Vauchez,	
   supra	
   note	
   35;	
   Benvenuti	
   &	
   Paris,	
   supra	
   note	
   36;	
   Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
   supra	
   note	
   14;	
   and	
   Çalı	
   &	
  
Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
127
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7;	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39;	
  and	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
128
	
  See	
  Mak,	
  supra	
  note	
  37.	
  	
  
129
	
  See	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35;	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36.	
  Judicial	
  associations	
  are	
  also	
  strong	
  in	
  Slovakia	
  
and	
  Spain	
  (Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31;	
  and	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39).	
  
130
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
1590	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
Who	
   presides	
   over	
   the	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   body	
   is	
   equally	
   important.	
   For	
   instance,	
  
some	
  judicial	
  councils	
  are	
  chaired	
  by	
  the	
  head	
  of	
  state,
131
	
  while	
  in	
  other	
  jurisdictions	
  the	
  
chair	
  is	
  usually	
  a	
  lower	
  court	
  judge,
132
	
  a	
  former	
  court	
  president,
133
	
  or	
  the	
  Chief	
  Justice	
  who	
  
presided
134
	
  or	
  presides
135
	
  over	
  the	
  judicial	
  council.	
  Interestingly,	
  the	
  dual	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Chief	
  
Justice	
   (in	
   particular	
   the	
   presidency	
   of	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   and	
   the	
   chairmanship	
   of	
   the	
  
judicial	
   council)	
   has	
   become	
   increasingly	
   problematic,	
   in	
   both	
   Eastern	
   and	
   Western	
  
Europe.	
  The	
  Slovak	
  contribution	
  explains	
  how	
  this	
  dual	
  role,	
  which	
  concentrated	
  too	
  much	
  
power	
  in	
  the	
  hands	
  of	
  one	
  person,	
  contributed	
  to	
  the	
  capture	
  of	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  
Slovak	
  Republic	
  and	
  selective	
  disciplinary	
  motions	
  against	
  judges	
  who	
  dared	
  to	
  criticize	
  the	
  
Chief	
  Justice.
136
	
  One	
  may	
  object	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  peculiar	
  personal	
  characteristic	
  of	
  
the	
  Slovak	
  Chief	
  Justice,	
  Štefan	
  Harabin.	
  However,	
  the	
  recent	
  Grand	
  Chamber	
  judgment	
  of	
  
the	
  ECtHR	
  in	
  Ramos	
  Nunes	
  de	
  Carvalho	
  e	
  Sá	
  v	
  Portugal	
  fully	
  reveals	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  actually	
  a	
  
structural	
   problem.
137
	
   Therefore,	
   it	
   comes	
   as	
   no	
   surprise	
   that	
   several	
   countries	
   have	
  
divided	
   these	
   two	
   roles	
   and	
   vested	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
   chairmanship	
   in	
   someone	
   other	
  
than	
  the	
  Chief	
  Justice.
138
	
  	
  
	
  
Similarly,	
  it	
  matters	
  who	
  are	
  the	
  judicial	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies.	
  In	
  
some	
   countries	
   lower	
   court	
   judges	
   dominate	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies,
139
	
   while	
  
elsewhere	
   apex	
   court	
   judges
140
	
   or	
   court	
   presidents
141
	
   have	
   a	
   major	
   say.	
   We	
   may	
   then	
  
131
	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Italy.	
  Until	
  the	
  2008,	
  the	
  head	
  of	
  state	
  chaired	
  also	
  the	
  French	
  judicial	
  council.	
  
132
	
  See	
  Bogdan	
  Iancu,	
  Perils	
  of	
  Sloganised	
  Constitutional	
  Concepts,	
  Notably	
  that	
  of	
  ‘Judicial	
  Independence’,	
  13(3)	
  
EUROPEAN	
  CONST.	
  LAW	
  R.	
  582,	
  593	
  (2017)	
  (explaining	
  that	
  Romanian	
  judicial	
  council’s	
  “three	
  ex	
  officio	
  members	
  
(Minister	
   of	
   Justice,	
   President	
   of	
   the	
   High	
   Court	
   of	
   Cassation	
   and	
   Justice,	
   Prosecutor	
   General	
   of	
   the	
   General	
  
Prosecutor’s	
  Office	
  attached	
  to	
  the	
  High	
  Court	
  of	
  Cassation	
  and	
  Justice)	
  have	
  no	
  right	
  to	
  vote	
  in	
  the	
  two	
  sections,	
  
which	
  serve	
  as	
  first	
  instance	
  disciplinary	
  courts	
  for	
  judges	
  and	
  prosecutors,	
  respectively.”).	
  
133
	
  This	
  is	
  currently	
  the	
  situation	
  at	
  the	
  Dutch	
  judicial	
  council.	
  
134
	
  This	
  was	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Slovakia	
  until	
  the	
  2014	
  reform.	
  
135
	
  The	
  Chief	
  Justice	
  chairs,	
  among	
  others,	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  France	
  and	
  Spain.	
  	
  
136
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
137
	
  See	
  Ramos	
  Nunes	
  de	
  Carvalho	
  e	
  Sá	
  v	
  Portugal,	
  supra	
  note	
  13;	
  and	
  especially	
  concurring	
  opinion	
  of	
  Judge	
  Pinto	
  
de	
  Albuquerque	
  therein.	
  
138
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
139
	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Italy	
  and	
  Romania.	
  
140
	
  The	
  best	
  example	
  is	
  the	
  Turkish	
  judicial	
  council	
  during	
  its	
  hierarchical	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  period	
  (1961-­‐
2010)	
  and	
  the	
  Romanian	
  judicial	
  council	
  between	
  1991	
  and	
  2003.	
  For	
  further	
  details	
  see	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  
note	
  15;	
  and	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  supra	
  note	
  14.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1591	
  
	
  	
  
speak	
  of	
  hierarchical	
  and	
  non-­‐hierarchical	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies,
142
	
  depending	
  on	
  
the	
  composition	
  of	
  the	
  “judicial	
  element”	
  of	
  these	
  bodies.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  is	
  important	
  to	
  know	
  
over	
  which	
  tiers	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  each	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governing	
  body	
  rules.	
  For	
  instance,	
  while	
  
in	
  some	
  countries	
  judicial	
  councils	
  decide	
  on	
  matters	
  of	
  judicial	
  governance	
  at	
  all	
  tiers	
  of	
  
the	
  judiciary,
143
	
  in	
  other	
  jurisdictions	
  a	
  judicial	
  council	
  has	
  no	
  say	
  over	
  issues	
  concerning	
  
the	
  Supreme	
  Court.
144
	
  
	
  
This	
   wide	
   variety	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies	
   in	
   Europe,	
   in	
   terms	
   of	
   both	
   their	
  
composition	
   and	
   their	
   powers,	
   is	
   actually	
   consequential	
   and	
   can	
   guide	
   our	
   debates	
   on	
  
constitutional	
   resilience.
145
	
   The	
   standard	
   approach	
   to	
   constitutional	
   resilience	
   of	
   the	
  
judiciary	
  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	
  political	
  attacks,	
  prompted	
  primarily	
  by	
  the	
  events	
  involving	
  the	
  judiciary	
  
in	
  Hungary	
  and	
  Poland,	
  is	
  to	
  increase	
  and	
  entrench	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  Based	
  on	
  the	
  
insights	
  from	
  the	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue,	
  I	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  caution	
  against	
  such	
  
rosy	
  view	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  	
  
	
  
First,	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  competences,	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  thumb	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  more	
  power	
  a	
  given	
  judicial	
  
self-­‐governance	
  body	
  has,	
  the	
  more	
  attention	
  it	
  attracts	
  from	
  politicians.	
  Politicians	
  usually	
  
do	
  not	
  care	
  about	
  Judicial	
  Academies	
  or	
  less	
  influential	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  such	
  
as	
  judicial	
  boards	
  in	
  Czechia	
  or	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Appointments	
  Advisory	
  Board	
  in	
  Ireland.	
  These	
  
bodies	
   often	
   operate	
   below	
   their	
   radar.	
   However,	
   politicians	
   care	
   about	
   strong	
   judicial	
  
councils	
  and	
  powerful	
  court	
  presidents.	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  the	
  diffusion	
  of	
  powers	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  
judicial	
   governance	
   among	
   different	
   bodies,	
   perhaps	
   even	
   with	
   a	
   different	
   composition,	
  
might	
   be	
   a	
   better	
   solution	
   than	
   the	
   creation	
   of	
   the	
   strong	
   judicial	
   council,	
   which	
  
concentrates	
  virtually	
  all	
  powers	
  into	
  one	
  institution,	
  because	
  the	
  former	
  solution	
  is	
  more	
  
resistant	
  to	
  capture.	
  	
  
	
  
Second,	
   the	
   creation	
   of	
   the	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   body	
   does	
   not	
   make	
   the	
   power	
  
disappear	
   or	
   the	
   dangers	
   evaporate.	
   Power	
   is	
   just	
   transferred	
   to	
   other	
   hands	
   and	
   new	
  
channels	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  are	
  created.
146
	
  These	
  channels	
  differ	
  from	
  one	
  
141
	
  This	
  was	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Slovak	
  judicial	
  council	
  until	
  2014.	
  
142
	
  See	
  also	
  Garoupa	
  &	
  Ginsburg,	
  supra	
  note	
  52;	
  and	
  Carlo	
  Guarnieri,	
  Judicial	
  Independence	
  in	
  Europe:	
  Threat	
  or	
  
Resource	
  for	
  Democracy?,	
  49(3)	
  REPRESENTATION	
  –	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  REPRESENTATIVE	
  DEMOCRACY	
  347,	
  348	
  (2013).	
  
143
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Poland,	
  Romania	
  and	
  Slovakia.	
  
144
	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Netherlands.	
  
145
	
   See	
   the	
   ongoing	
   symposium	
   on	
   constitutional	
   resilience	
   at	
   Verfassungsblog	
   (Christoph	
   Grabenwarter,	
  
Constitutional	
  Resilience,	
  VERFASSUNGSBLOG	
  (Dec	
  6,	
  2018),	
  https://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-­‐resilience/).	
  
146
	
  See	
  also	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45	
  (arguing	
  that	
  “The	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  self-­‐government	
  merely	
  shift	
  the	
  dangers	
  
for	
  individual	
  judicial	
  independence	
  by	
  shifting	
  power.”).	
  
1592	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
jurisdiction	
  to	
  another.	
  The	
  Slovak	
  judiciary	
  was	
  politicized	
  through	
  the	
  dominant	
  role	
  of	
  
the	
  Chief	
  Justice	
  in	
  the	
  judicial	
  council.
147
	
  The	
  Polish	
  judiciary	
  has	
  recently	
  been	
  politicized	
  
not	
   only	
   by	
   the	
   Minister	
   of	
   Justice,	
   but	
   also	
   through	
   court	
   presidents	
   and	
   the	
   new	
  
members	
  of	
  the	
  National	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  elected	
  by	
  the	
  parliamentary	
  majority.
148
	
  
In	
  France	
  and	
  Italy,	
  the	
  major	
  channels	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  are	
  arguably	
  not	
  the	
  
non-­‐judicial	
  members	
  of	
  their	
  judicial	
  councils,	
  but	
  judicial	
  associations.
149
	
  In	
  Germany,	
  the	
  
main	
   channel	
   of	
   politicization	
   are	
   the	
   promotion	
   committees.
150
	
   In	
   Hungary,	
   the	
   major	
  
channel	
  of	
  politicization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  is	
  the	
  new	
  National	
  Office	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary.
151
	
  In	
  
Spain	
   and	
   Turkey,	
   politicization	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   has	
   flourished	
   due	
   to	
   the	
   (s)election	
   of	
  
judicial	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  by	
  political	
  branches.	
  The	
  difference	
  is	
  that	
  while	
  
the	
   Spanish	
   judicial	
   council	
   has	
   been	
   captured	
   by	
   political	
   parties,
152
	
   in	
   Turkey	
   it	
   is	
   the	
  
presidential	
  administration	
  that	
  currently	
  has	
  the	
  major	
  grip	
  over	
  the	
  judicial	
  council.
153
	
  In	
  
Ukraine,	
   the	
   main	
   threat	
   arguably	
   comes	
   from	
   prosecutors	
   who	
   sit	
   on	
   the	
   judicial	
  
council.
154
	
  Prosecutors	
  have	
  a	
  strong	
  position	
  also	
  in	
  the	
  Romanian	
  judicial	
  system.
155
	
  In	
  
fact,	
  tinkering	
  with	
  their	
  independence	
  could	
  be	
  more	
  attractive	
  than	
  trying	
  to	
  influence	
  
judges,	
  simply	
  because	
  the	
  latter	
  would	
  arouse	
  a	
  lot	
  more	
  opposition.
156
	
  
	
  
Third,	
  the	
  Slovak	
  case	
  study	
  shows	
  that	
  judicial	
  councils	
  can	
  be	
  captured	
  not	
  only	
  from	
  the	
  
outside,	
   but	
   also	
   from	
   the	
   inside.
157
	
   Unfortunately	
   the	
   Polish	
   scenario	
   attests	
   that	
  
147
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
148
	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
149
	
  See	
  Guarnieri,	
  supra	
  note	
  142;	
  and	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36	
  (on	
  correnti	
  in	
  Italy);	
  and	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  
note	
  35	
  (on	
  judicial	
  associations	
  in	
  France).	
  
150
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
151
	
  See	
  note	
  105.	
  
152
	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39.	
  
153
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
154
	
  Denisov	
  v	
  Ukraine,	
  supra	
  note	
  12.	
  
155
	
  See	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  supra	
  note	
  14.	
  	
  
156
	
  See	
  Anne	
  van	
  Aaken,	
  Lars	
  P.	
  Feld	
  &	
  Stefan	
  Voigt,	
  Do	
  Independent	
  Prosecutors	
  Deter	
  Political	
  Corruption?	
  An	
  
Empirical	
  Evaluation	
  Across	
  78	
  Countries,	
  12(1)	
  AMERICAN	
  LAW	
  AND	
  ECONOMICS	
  REVIEW,	
  204-­‐244	
  (2010);	
  and	
  Stefan	
  
Voigt	
   &	
   Alexander	
   J.	
   Wulf,	
   What	
   makes	
   prosecutors	
   independent?	
   Analysing	
   the	
   institutional	
   determinants	
   of	
  
prosecutorial	
  independence,	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INSTITUTIONAL	
  ECONOMICS,	
  1-­‐22	
  (2017).	
  
157
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1593	
  
	
  	
  
politicians	
  always	
  find	
  some	
  judges	
  who	
  are	
  willing	
  to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  them,	
  no	
  matter	
  how	
  
obvious	
  the	
  intentions	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  reform	
  are.
158
	
  As	
  I	
  argued	
  elsewhere,	
  the	
  wide	
  role	
  of	
  
the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  in	
  judicial	
  governance	
  may	
  sometimes	
  be	
  a	
  lesser	
  evil,	
  since	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  
“the	
  devil	
  we	
  know”,	
  Minister’s	
  abuses	
  are	
  more	
  visible,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  easier	
  to	
  mobilize	
  people	
  
against	
  them.
159
	
  	
  
	
  
Finally,	
  one	
  should	
  not	
  forget	
  informal	
  networks	
  that	
  may	
  capture	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
bodies.	
  While	
  Tünde	
  Handó’s	
  proximity	
  to	
  Viktor	
  Orbán	
  is	
  well-­‐known,
160
	
  to	
  uncover	
  such	
  
informal	
   relations	
   in	
   other	
   jurisdictions	
   might	
   be	
   extremely	
   difficult,	
   yet	
   crucial.	
   For	
  
instance,	
  in	
  Slovenia	
  one	
  can	
  hardly	
  assess	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  without	
  
knowing	
  the	
  dense	
  web	
  of	
  informal	
  networks	
  that	
  made	
  important	
  decisions	
  outside	
  the	
  
judicial	
  council.
161
	
  In	
  France,	
  Italy,	
  and	
  Spain	
  it	
  is	
  crucial	
  to	
  know	
  who	
  belongs	
  to	
  which	
  
judicial	
   association.
162
	
   In	
   Czechia	
   court	
   presidents	
   created	
   several	
   informal	
   groups	
   that	
  
have	
  a	
  major	
  say	
  in	
  key	
  areas	
  of	
  judicial	
  governance.
163
	
  Shai	
  Dothan	
  shows	
  that	
  informal	
  
coalitions	
   may	
   emerge	
   also	
   among	
   judges	
   of	
   the	
   ECtHR.
164
	
   Samuel	
   Spáč	
   then	
   carefully	
  
analyzes	
  how	
  informal	
  networks	
  may	
  affect	
  different	
  stages	
  of	
  recruitment	
  of	
  judges.
165
	
  
Fortunately,	
   recent	
   scholarship	
   has	
   made	
   significant	
   progress	
   in	
   conceptualizing	
   and	
  
analyzing	
  such	
  informal	
  networks
166
	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  high	
  time	
  to	
  apply	
  these	
  insights	
  to	
  European	
  
judiciaries	
  as	
  well.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
158
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
159
	
  See	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  52.	
  Note	
  that	
  Hungarian	
  judges	
  often	
  refer	
  to	
  the	
  period	
  between	
  1990	
  and	
  1996,	
  when	
  
the	
   court	
   administration	
   was	
   the	
   responsibility	
   of	
   the	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice	
   as	
   to	
   the	
   „golden	
   era“	
  
(https://budapestbeacon.com/two-­‐hungarian-­‐law-­‐school-­‐professors-­‐discuss-­‐hungarys-­‐deteriorating-­‐political-­‐and-­‐
legal-­‐culture/?_sf_s=fleck)	
  
160
	
  See	
  supra	
  note	
  105.	
  
161
	
  See	
  Avbelj,	
  supra	
  note	
  41.	
  
162
	
  See	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35;	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36;	
  and	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39).	
  
163
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
164
	
  See	
  Dothan,	
  supra	
  note	
  91.	
  
165
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  supra	
  note	
  51.	
  
166
	
   See	
   Björn	
   Dressel,	
   Raul	
   Sanchez-­‐Urribarri	
   &	
   Alexander	
   Stroh,	
   The	
   Informal	
   Dimension	
   of	
   Judicial	
   Politics:	
   A	
  
Relational	
  Perspective,	
  13	
  ANNUAL	
  REVIEW	
  OF	
  LAW	
  AND	
  SOCIAL	
  SCIENCE	
  413	
  (2017);	
  and	
  the	
  special	
  issue	
  on	
  ‘Courts	
  
and	
  Informal	
  Networks’	
  in	
  Volume	
  39(5)	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  POLITICAL	
  SCIENCE	
  REVIEW	
  (2018).	
  
1594	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
II.	
  From	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  Bodies	
  to	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  
	
  
Most	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   studies	
   focus	
   on	
   the	
   bodies	
   involved	
   in	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance.	
  This	
  special	
  issue	
  follows	
  this	
  approach	
  and	
  the	
  case	
  studies	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  Part	
  C.I	
  
of	
   this	
   article	
   are	
   framed	
   around	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies.	
   However,	
   several	
  
contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  invite	
  more	
  thorough	
  thinking	
  about	
  the	
  dimensions	
  of	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance.
167
	
  The	
  major	
  advantage	
  of	
  this	
  approach	
  is	
  that	
  while	
  judiical	
  self-­‐
governance	
  bodies	
  either	
  exist	
  or	
  do	
  not	
  exist	
  (hence	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  binary	
  variable),	
  judicial	
  self-­‐
governance	
  is	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  scale	
  and	
  also	
  encompasses	
  informal	
  judicial	
  actors,	
  which	
  in	
  
turn	
  allows	
  us	
  to	
  better	
  analyze	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  control	
  judges	
  can	
  exercise	
  over	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  
	
  
Until	
  recently,	
  most	
  studies	
  focused	
  primarily	
  on	
  personal	
  self-­‐governance,	
  which	
  concerns	
  
judicial	
   careers	
   (namely	
   issues	
   of	
   selection,	
   promotion,	
   and	
   disciplining	
   of	
   judges)	
   and	
  
administrative	
  self-­‐governance,	
  which	
  covers	
  issues	
  such	
  as	
  panel	
  composition	
  and	
  case	
  
assignment.	
   The	
   rise	
   of	
   specialized	
   judicial	
   academies	
   and	
   involvement	
   of	
   judges	
   in	
  
educating	
   their	
   peers	
   (i.e.	
   education	
   self-­‐governance)	
   are	
   also	
   well	
   documented.
168
	
  
Virtually	
  every	
  case	
  study	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  discusses	
  these	
  dimensions	
  as	
  well.	
  	
  
	
  
But	
   some	
   contributions	
   go	
   beyond	
   that	
   and	
   provide	
   interesting	
   insights	
   about	
   other	
  
dimensions	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  For	
  instance,	
  the	
  Czech	
  and	
  German	
  contributions	
  
raise	
  important	
  issues	
  regarding	
  digital	
  self-­‐governance.	
  Fabian	
  Wittreck	
  explains	
  that	
  the	
  
electronic	
  file	
  and	
  other	
  measures	
  of	
  digitization	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  may	
  profoundly	
  change	
  
the	
   working-­‐place	
   of	
   judges.
169
	
   Authors	
   of	
   the	
   Czech	
   case	
   study	
   concur.
170
	
   However,	
  
challenges	
  in	
  digital	
  self-­‐governance	
  may	
  also	
  take	
  other	
  forms.	
  For	
  instance,	
  Czech	
  judges	
  
have	
  had	
  trouble	
  searching	
  for	
  information	
  online	
  as	
  the	
  Czech	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  blocks	
  
many	
  websites	
  on	
  computers	
  in	
  the	
  court	
  buildings	
  on	
  dubious	
  grounds.	
  	
  
	
  
Participation	
   in	
   the	
   budget	
   negotiation	
   and	
   discretion	
   regarding	
   the	
   distribution	
   of	
   the	
  
court	
  budgets	
  is	
  perhaps	
  even	
  more	
  important,	
  as	
  budget	
  cuts	
  are	
  a	
  subtle	
  but	
  effective	
  
tool	
   for	
   shaping	
   the	
   judiciary,	
   in	
   both	
   good
171
	
   and	
   bad
172
	
   ways.	
   Hence,	
   financial	
   self-­‐
167
	
  I	
  leave	
  aside	
  the	
  abstract	
  conceptual	
  disputes	
  regarding	
  term	
  governance.	
  Governance,	
  much	
  like	
  government,	
  
is	
   notoriously	
   difficult	
   to	
   define	
   as	
   it	
   has	
   at	
   least	
   four	
   meanings	
   in	
   the	
   literature:	
   a	
   structure,	
   a	
   process,	
   a	
  
mechanism	
   and	
   a	
   strategy	
   (see	
   David	
   Levi-­‐Faur,	
   From	
   “Big	
   Government”	
   to	
   “Big	
   Governance”?,	
   in	
   THE	
   OXFORD	
  
HANDBOOK	
  OF	
  GOVERNANCE	
  3-­‐18	
  (David	
  Levi-­‐Faur,	
  2012)).	
  	
  
168
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  CRISTINA	
   DALLARA	
   &	
   DANIELA	
   PIANA,	
  NETWORKING	
  THE	
   RULE	
   OF	
   LAW:	
   HOW	
   CHANGE	
   AGENTS	
   RESHAPE	
   JUDICIAL	
  
GOVERNANCE	
  IN	
  THE	
  EU	
  87–110	
  (2016).	
  
169
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
170
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
171
	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1595	
  
	
  	
  
governance	
   comes	
   to	
   the	
   fore.	
   Both	
   transnational	
   courts	
   also	
   exhibit	
   significant	
   ethical	
  
self-­‐governance	
  via	
  their	
  rules	
  of	
  procedure	
  or	
  court	
  statutes.
173
	
  More	
  recently,	
  the	
  CJEU	
  
adopted	
   its	
   Code	
   of	
   Conduct	
   in	
   2007
174
	
   and	
   revised	
   it	
   in	
   2016.
175
	
   Similarly,	
   in	
   2008	
   the	
  
ECtHR	
   adopted	
   the	
   Resolution	
   on	
   Judicial	
   Ethics	
   that	
   imposes	
   only	
   ‘soft’	
   standards	
   for	
  
judicial	
  behavior.
176
	
  On	
  the	
  domestic	
  level,	
  judicial	
  councils	
  often	
  take	
  the	
  lead	
  in	
  judicial	
  
ethics.	
  For	
  instance,	
  the	
  French	
  judicial	
  council	
  responded	
  to	
  the	
  judicial	
  scandals	
  in	
  the	
  
early	
   2000s	
   by	
   adopting	
   the	
   ethical	
   rules	
   (Recueil	
   des	
   obligations	
   déontologiques	
   du	
  
magistrat),	
   which	
   provide	
   guidelines	
   on	
   what	
   “normal	
   professional	
   behavior”	
   of	
   French	
  
judges	
  is.
177
	
  	
  
	
  
Several	
  contributions	
  have	
  also	
  shown	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  information	
  self-­‐governance.	
  For	
  
instance,	
   in	
   Czechia	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   and	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Administrative	
   Court	
   have	
  
initiated	
   the	
   publication	
   of	
   all	
   judgments	
   online.
178
	
   Slovakia	
   went	
   even	
   further	
   and	
  
provides	
  a	
  significant	
  amount	
  of	
  information	
  about	
  the	
  activity	
  of	
  individual	
  judges
179
	
  as	
  
well	
  as	
  about	
  individual	
  candidates	
  for	
  a	
  judicial	
  position.
180
	
  The	
  other	
  contributions	
  show	
  
that	
   information	
   self-­‐governance	
   covers	
   a	
   wide	
   set	
   of	
   issues,	
   and	
   that	
   the	
   approach	
   of	
  
European	
   jurisdictions	
   varies	
   a	
   lot	
   in	
   this	
   respect.	
   Therefore,	
   this	
   dimension	
   of	
   self-­‐
governance	
   is	
   particularly	
   apt	
   for	
   further	
   research.	
   Moreover,	
   in	
   future	
   the	
   GDPR	
  
implementation	
  can	
  become	
  a	
  major	
  issue	
  as	
  well.	
  
	
  
Judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  at	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU	
  also	
  provides	
  a	
  novel	
  conceptual	
  insight	
  
as	
  one	
  specific	
  dimension	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  that	
  is	
  not	
  so	
  visible	
  at	
  the	
  domestic	
  
level	
  emerges	
  at	
  the	
  supranational	
  level	
  –	
  regulatory	
  self-­‐governance.	
  By	
  regulatory	
  self-­‐
governance	
  I	
  mean	
  the	
  unique	
  power	
  of	
  the	
  ECtHR’s	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU’s	
  judges	
  to	
  determine	
  
172
	
  Financial	
  pressure	
  can	
  be	
  easily	
  abused,	
  for	
  instance	
  against	
  a	
  critical	
  court	
  president	
  and	
  “her”	
  court.	
  
173
	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6;	
  and	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
174
	
  Code	
  of	
  Conduct	
  [2007]	
  OJ	
  C223/1.	
  
175
	
  Code	
  of	
  Conduct	
  for	
  Members	
  and	
  former	
  Members	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Union	
  [2016]	
  OJ	
  
C483/1.	
  For	
  more	
  details	
  see	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
176
	
   European	
   Court	
   of	
   Human	
   Rights,	
   Resolution	
   on	
   Judicial	
   Ethics,	
   23	
   June	
   2008,	
  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Resolution_Judicial_Ethics_ENG.pdf.	
   For	
   more	
   details	
   see	
   Çalı	
   &	
  
Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
177
	
  See	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  
178
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
179
	
  Note	
  that,	
  for	
  instance,	
  in	
  Slovakia	
  such	
  information	
  is	
  available	
  through	
  the	
  website	
  https://otvorenesudy.sk/.	
  	
  
180
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
1596	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
the	
   primary	
   rules	
   regarding	
   their	
   organization	
   (such	
   as	
   organization	
   of	
   sessions	
   and	
  
deliberations,	
   setting	
   up	
   sections	
   and	
   chambers,	
   and	
   determining	
   case	
   allocation)	
   and	
  
procedure	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  to	
  regulate	
  matters	
  regarding	
  the	
  judicial	
  careers	
  of	
  their	
  members	
  
(such	
  as	
  disciplining	
  and	
  removal	
  of	
  judges,	
  election	
  of	
  the	
  court	
  presidents	
  and	
  section	
  
presidents	
  etc.).
181
	
  	
  
	
  
In	
   contrast	
   to	
   domestic	
   courts,	
   where	
   these	
   primary	
   rules	
   are	
   determined	
   by	
   the	
  
legislature	
  (typically	
  in	
  the	
  Law	
  on	
  Courts),	
  at	
  the	
  transnational	
  level	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  and	
  the	
  
CJEU	
   themselves	
   who	
   play	
   the	
   major	
   role	
   in	
   formulating	
   the	
   rules	
   that	
   govern	
   their	
  
activities.	
   They	
   do	
   so	
   via	
   the	
   adoption	
   of	
   the	
   court’	
   statutes,	
   rules	
   of	
   procedure,	
  
regulations,	
   and	
   guidelines	
   governing	
   the	
   functioning	
   of	
   their	
   courts	
   and/or	
   behavior	
   of	
  
judges.
182
	
   This	
   unprecedented	
   autonomy	
   results	
   from	
   the	
   lack	
   of	
   classical	
   tripartite	
  
separation	
  of	
  powers	
  at	
  the	
  Council	
  of	
  Europe
183
	
  and	
  a	
  peculiar	
  separation	
  of	
  powers	
  in	
  the	
  
European	
   Union.
184
	
   What	
   is	
   crucial	
   for	
   the	
   conceptual	
   understanding	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   is	
   that	
   in	
   some	
   jurisdictions	
   judges	
   are	
   not	
   only	
   granted	
   administrative,	
  
financial	
  and	
  ethical	
  self-­‐governance,	
  but	
  are	
  also	
  vested	
  with	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  determine	
  the	
  
very	
   scope	
   of	
   their	
   powers	
   in	
   these	
   areas.	
   Moreover,	
   regulatory	
   self-­‐governance	
   gives	
  
transnational	
   courts	
   a	
   competitive	
   edge	
   in	
   judicial	
   reform	
   processes,	
   for	
   example,	
   by	
  
proposing	
  treaty	
  amendments	
  or	
  commenting	
  on	
  governmental	
  initiatives.
185
	
  
	
  
Based	
   on	
   these	
   insights,	
   I	
   suggest	
   unpacking	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   into	
   smaller	
   units.	
  
This	
  would	
  allow	
  us	
  to	
  study	
  in	
  which	
  areas	
  judges	
  have	
  their	
  say	
  and	
  to	
  what	
  extent.	
  This	
  
is	
   in	
   the	
   end	
   more	
   important	
   than	
   knowing	
   via	
   which	
   body	
   judges	
   could	
   influence	
  
governance.	
   The	
   conceptual	
   map	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   that	
   follows	
   includes	
   8	
  
components:	
   personal	
   self-­‐governance,	
   administrative	
   self-­‐governance,	
   financial	
   self-­‐
governance,	
   educational	
   self-­‐governance,	
   information	
   self-­‐governance,	
   ethical	
   self-­‐
governance,	
  digital	
  self-­‐governance,	
  and	
  regulatory	
  self-­‐governance.	
  It	
  is	
  by	
  no	
  means	
  an	
  
exhaustive	
  list,
186
	
  	
  
181
	
  I	
  am	
  grateful	
  for	
  this	
  suggestion	
  to	
  Hubert	
  Smekal	
  and	
  Nino	
  Tsereteli.	
  
182
	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6;	
  and	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
183
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
184
	
  Note	
  that	
  the	
  situation	
  in	
  the	
  European	
  Union	
  is	
  different	
  from	
  the	
  Council	
  of	
  Europe	
  in	
  many	
  aspects,	
  as	
  the	
  
European	
   Commission	
   and	
   especially	
   the	
   European	
   Parliament	
   do	
   play	
   a	
   role	
   in	
   shaping	
   the	
   CJEU,	
   albeit	
   by	
  
different	
  means	
  and	
  less	
  visibly	
  than	
  the	
  domestic	
  political	
  branches.	
  See	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  6;	
  and	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  
note	
  116.	
  
185
	
  Ibid.	
  
186
	
  One	
  can	
  also	
  think	
  of	
  other	
  dimensions	
  such	
  as	
  media	
  self-­‐governance	
  that	
  would,	
  among	
  other	
  things,	
  include	
  
hiring	
  spokespersons,	
  handling	
  social	
  media,	
  and	
  having	
  its	
  own	
  channels	
  of	
  medialization	
  (such	
  as	
  TV	
  channels,	
  
radio	
  channels	
  or	
  own	
  journals).	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1597	
  
	
  	
  
	
  
Table	
  1:	
  Dimensions	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance:	
  a	
  concept	
  map.	
  
	
  
JUDICIAL	
  SELF-­‐
GOVERNANCE	
  
Personal	
  
selection	
  of	
  judges;	
  promotion;	
  disciplining;	
  
impeachment;	
  relocation/reassignment;	
  
salaries	
  and	
  non-­‐monetary	
  benefits	
  of	
  judges	
  
Administrative	
  
work	
  schedules;	
  composition	
  of	
  panels;	
  initial	
  
case	
  assignment;	
  case	
  reassignment;	
  case	
  load	
  
quotas;	
  court	
  performance	
  evaluation;	
  case	
  
flow;	
  setting	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  judges	
  per	
  court;	
  
setting	
  the	
  number	
  &	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  hiring	
  law	
  
clerks;	
  setting	
  the	
  number	
  &	
  the	
  process	
  
of	
  judicial	
  personnel;	
  transfer	
  of	
  jurisdiction;	
  
processing	
  complaints	
  
Financial	
  
setting	
  of	
  the	
  budget	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary;	
  setting	
  
the	
  budgets	
  of	
  individual	
  courts;	
  allocation	
  of	
  
budget	
  within	
  courts;	
  non-­‐monetary	
  support	
  
for	
  courts	
  (law	
  clerks)	
  
Educational	
  
training	
  of	
  judicial	
  candidates;	
  training	
  of	
  
judges;	
  organizing	
  conferences;	
  attending	
  
conferences;	
  funding	
  of	
  further	
  education;	
  
compulsory	
  education	
  
Ethical	
   judicial	
  ethics	
  &	
  codes	
  of	
  conduct	
  
Information	
  
transparency	
  mechanisms;	
  recording	
  trials;	
  
publishing	
  judgments;	
  financial	
  disclosure;	
  
protection	
  of	
  personal	
  data	
  (GDPR	
  
implementation)	
  
Digital	
  
administration	
  of	
  the	
  files	
  and	
  judgments	
  (data	
  
storage,	
  clouds,	
  servers);	
  access	
  to	
  Internet;	
  
online	
  search	
  engines;	
  e-­‐justice	
  
Regulatory	
   rules	
  of	
  procedure;	
  court	
  statute	
  
	
  
Source:	
  author.	
  
1598	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
	
  
This	
   conceptual	
   map	
   is	
   by	
   no	
   means	
   an	
   exhaustive	
   list	
   of	
   spheres	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance,
187
	
  but	
  it	
  could	
  guide	
  future	
  research	
  in	
  this	
  area	
  in	
  several	
  ways.	
  It	
  could	
  lead	
  
to	
   a	
   better	
   understanding	
   of	
   where	
   we	
   stand	
   regarding	
   the	
   scope	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   in	
   each	
   jurisdiction.	
   Later	
   on,	
   it	
   would	
   allow	
   us	
   to	
   develop	
   ideal	
   types	
   of	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  and	
  the	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  index	
  that	
  would	
  reflect	
  changes	
  
over	
  time.
188
	
  It	
  should	
  also	
  force	
  us	
  to	
  rethink	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  normative	
  terms,	
  
as	
   normative	
   foundations	
   for	
   digital	
   self-­‐governance	
   are	
   quite	
   different	
   from	
   normative	
  
foundations	
  of	
  personal	
  or	
  financial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  
	
  
D.	
  Rationales	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  
	
  
Judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   may	
   be	
   introduced,	
   changed,	
   and	
   removed	
   for	
   several	
   reasons.	
  
The	
   ruling	
   elites	
   might	
   want	
   to	
   entrench	
   their	
   influence	
   within	
   the	
   judiciary.	
   The	
   key	
  
stakeholders	
  may	
  also	
  believe	
  that	
  such	
  solution	
  will	
  increase	
  judicial	
  independence,	
  the	
  
accountability	
   of	
   judges,	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   the	
   courts,	
   the	
   quality	
   of	
   justice,	
   or	
   the	
  
efficiency	
   of	
   the	
   judicial	
   system.	
   Sometimes	
   politicians	
   might	
   just	
   want	
   to	
   get	
   rid	
   of	
  
cumbersome	
   and	
   time-­‐consuming	
   tasks	
   that	
   are	
   below	
   the	
   radar	
   of	
   their	
   political	
  
constituencies	
  and	
  the	
  electorate.	
  Or	
  the	
  rise	
  and	
  fall	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  may	
  be	
  
just	
   a	
   historical	
   coincidence,	
   a	
   response	
   to	
   exogenous	
   changes	
   in	
   the	
   legal	
   and	
   political	
  
complex,	
   the	
   endeavor	
   of	
   a	
   few	
   influential	
   individuals	
   or	
   transnational	
   networks,	
   the	
  
pressure	
  from	
  the	
  European	
  Union	
  and	
  the	
  Council	
  of	
  Europe,	
  a	
  side-­‐effect	
  of	
  a	
  different	
  
reform	
  project,	
  or	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  an	
  incremental	
  drifting	
  of	
  power.	
  	
  
	
  
We	
  need	
  to	
  know	
  what	
  the	
  motivation	
  behind	
  the	
  rise	
  and	
  fall	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
is.	
   If	
   anything,	
   it	
   is	
   necessary	
   for	
   the	
   evaluation	
   of	
   the	
   functioning	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
  bodies	
  such	
  as	
  judicial	
  councils	
  and	
  judicial	
  appointments	
  commissions.	
  If	
  we	
  
do	
  not	
  know	
  why	
  they	
  were	
  introduced	
  and	
  what	
  was	
  expected	
  from	
  them,	
  we	
  can	
  hardly	
  
assess	
  whether	
  they	
  met	
  these	
  expectations,	
  in	
  what	
  they	
  succeeded,	
  and	
  in	
  what	
  they	
  
failed.	
   From	
   a	
   democratic	
   perspective,	
   we	
   also	
   need	
   to	
   hold	
   these	
   bodies	
   to	
   account,	
  
which	
  is	
  again	
  a	
  daunting	
  task	
  if	
  we	
  do	
  not	
  know	
  for	
  what	
  they	
  should	
  be	
  held	
  to	
  account	
  
and	
  according	
  to	
  which	
  standards.	
  Finally,	
  from	
  a	
  broader	
  sociological	
  perspective
189
	
  we	
  
187
	
  It	
  merely	
  reflects	
  the	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue.	
  One	
  can	
  also	
  think	
  of	
  other	
  dimensions	
  such	
  as	
  media	
  
self-­‐governance	
  that	
  would,	
  among	
  other	
  things,	
  include	
  hiring	
  spokespersons,	
  handling	
  social	
  media,	
  and	
  having	
  
its	
  own	
  channels	
  of	
  medialization	
  (such	
  as	
  TV	
  channels,	
  radio	
  channels	
  or	
  own	
  journals).	
  
188
	
  We	
  have	
  tried	
  to	
  develop	
  such	
  categorization	
  and	
  index	
  regarding	
  court	
  presidents;	
  See	
  Blisa	
  &	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  
note	
  53.	
  
189
	
  Interestingly,	
  the	
  sociology	
  of	
  professions	
  has	
  not	
  rigorously	
  studied	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  so	
  far.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1599	
  
	
  	
  
should	
  be	
  curious	
  how	
  such	
  an	
  important	
  socio-­‐legal	
  phenomenon	
  came	
  into	
  being	
  and	
  
the	
  driving	
  force	
  behind	
  it.
190
	
  	
  
	
  
Unfortunately,	
  the	
  rationales	
  of	
  JSG	
  have	
  been	
  undertheorized.	
  To	
  be	
  sure,	
  the	
  growing	
  
scholarship	
  on	
  judicial	
  councils	
  has	
  produced	
  several	
  theories	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  two-­‐wave-­‐theory	
  
of	
   judicial	
   councils,	
   the	
   external	
   incentives	
   theory	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils,	
   the	
   transnational	
  
networks	
   theory	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils,	
   and	
   the	
   dormancy	
   of	
   domestic	
   parliaments	
   in	
  
introducing	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  CEE.
191
	
  However,	
  the	
  existing	
  theories	
  are	
  limited	
  in	
  several	
  
ways.	
  First,	
  they	
  tend	
  to	
  apply	
  only	
  to	
  judicial	
  councils.	
  Second,	
  they	
  are	
  developed	
  against	
  
the	
  backdrop	
  of	
  experiences	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  which	
  has	
  a	
  peculiar	
  historical	
  
and	
  political	
  trajectory.	
  In	
  contrast,	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Western	
  Europe	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  at	
  
both	
   European	
   supranational	
   courts	
   has	
   escaped	
   theorizing	
   so	
   far.	
   Third,	
   the	
   existing	
  
theories	
   tend	
   to	
   treat	
   the	
   rise	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   as	
   a	
   one-­‐way	
   path	
   (with	
  
occasional	
  bumps	
  on	
  the	
  road)	
  and	
  overlook	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  counterreforms,	
  pushback,	
  
backlash,	
   and	
   even	
   rejection	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   and	
   the	
   return	
   to	
   the	
   previous	
  
“executive	
   mode”	
   of	
   judicial	
   governance.	
   Fourth,	
   these	
   theories	
   usually	
   focus	
   on	
   why	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  is	
  introduced,	
  but	
  less	
  on	
  why	
  it	
  is	
  modified	
  or	
  even	
  removed.	
  
	
  
For	
   instance,	
   Daniela	
   Piana	
   has	
   developed	
   a	
   “two-­‐wave-­‐theory”	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils	
   that	
  
builds	
  on	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  waves	
  of	
  judicial	
  reforms	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  
Europe:	
  the	
  “transition	
  wave”	
  that	
  took	
  place	
  immediately	
  after	
  the	
  democratic	
  revolution	
  
(i.e.	
  between	
  1989	
  and	
  1997),	
  and	
  the	
  “pre-­‐accession”	
  wave	
  that	
  covered	
  reforms	
  adopted	
  
during	
   the	
   pre-­‐accession	
   period	
   (i.e.	
   between	
   1998	
   and	
   2006).	
   Piana	
   argues	
   that	
   those	
  
actors	
  who	
  emerged	
  as	
  winners	
  from	
  the	
  first	
  wave	
  of	
  reforms	
  (the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  or	
  
the	
  judicial	
  council)	
  were	
  better	
  placed	
  in	
  the	
  second	
  wave	
  and	
  exploited	
  the	
  opportunities	
  
provided	
   by	
   the	
   European	
   Union	
   to	
   entrench	
   existing	
   domestic	
   allocations	
   of	
   power.
192
	
  
Other	
   scholars	
   have	
   stressed	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   external	
   incentives	
   such	
   as	
   EU	
   Accession	
  
conditionalities	
   (external	
   incentives	
   theory	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils),	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   the	
  
transnational	
  “epistemic	
  communities”	
  of	
  judges,	
  scholars,	
  and	
  legal	
  experts	
  (transnational	
  
networks	
   theory	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils)
193
	
   or	
   the	
   dormancy	
   of	
   domestic	
   parliaments
194
	
   in	
  
introducing	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe.	
  	
  
190
	
  See	
  Pierre	
  Bourdieu,	
  The	
  Force	
  of	
  Law:	
  Toward	
  a	
  Sociology	
  of	
  the	
  Juridical	
  Field,	
  38	
  HASTINGS	
  L.J.	
  814	
  (1987);	
  
and	
   Yves	
   Dezalay	
   &	
   Mikael	
   Rask	
   Madsen,	
   The	
   Force	
   of	
   Law	
   and	
   Lawyers:	
   Pierre	
   Bourdieu	
   and	
   the	
   Reflexive	
  
Sociology	
  of	
  Law,	
  8	
  ANNUAL	
  REVIEW	
  OF	
  LAW	
  AND	
  SOCIAL	
  SCIENCE	
  433	
  (2012).	
  
191
	
  See	
  more	
  below.	
  
192
	
  Daniela	
  Piana,	
  The	
  Power	
  Knocks	
  at	
  the	
  Courts’	
  Back	
  Door	
  –	
  Two	
  Waves	
  of	
  Postcommunist	
  Judicial	
  Reforms,	
  42	
  
COMPARATIVE	
  POLITICAL	
  STUDIES	
  816	
  (2009);	
  or	
  Piana,	
  supra	
  note	
  50,	
  at	
  162–165.	
  
193
	
  See	
  Dallara	
  &	
  Piana,	
  supra	
  note	
  168.	
  
1600	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
	
  
Even	
  if	
  we	
  limit	
  our	
  analysis	
  to	
  rationales	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  
we	
  can	
  see	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  these	
  predictive	
  theories.	
  Czechia	
  actually	
  defies	
  all	
  four	
  theories.	
  
When	
  we	
  look	
  at	
  recent	
  developments	
  in	
  Hungary	
  and	
  Poland,	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  
third	
  wave,	
  and	
  the	
  two-­‐wave	
  theory	
  should	
  be	
  modified	
  accordingly.	
  Likewise,	
  domestic	
  
parliaments	
   are	
   no	
   longer	
   dormant,	
   and	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   external	
   incentives	
   for	
   Central	
   and	
  
Eastern	
  European	
  countries	
  do	
  not	
  play	
  as	
  significant	
  a	
  role	
  as	
  originally	
  thought.
195
	
  
	
  
The	
  case	
  studies	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  do	
  not	
  provide	
  any	
  grand	
  theories.	
  They	
  provide	
  a	
  
more	
   sober	
   assessment	
   of	
   rationales	
   of	
   why	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies	
   came	
   into	
  
being.	
  In	
  most	
  countries	
  the	
  major	
  rationale	
  behind	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  new	
  judicial	
  self-­‐
governing	
   bodies	
   was	
   to	
   protect	
   judicial	
   independence	
   and	
   guarantee	
   separation	
   of	
  
powers.
196
	
   Only	
   in	
   few	
   countries,	
   the	
   establishment	
   of	
   major	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
  
bodies	
   was	
   motivated	
   by	
   improving	
   other	
   values	
   such	
   as	
   judicial	
   accountability	
   or	
  
effectiveness	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.
197
	
  
	
  
However,	
   that	
   does	
   not	
   mean	
   that	
   politics	
   do	
   not	
   play	
   a	
   role	
   in	
   shaping	
   JSG.	
   On	
   the	
  
contrary,	
  virtually	
  all	
  case	
  studies	
  show	
  that	
  the	
  foundations	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  are	
  
political.	
   In	
   many	
   countries,	
   judicial	
   councils	
   were	
   established	
   in	
   the	
   wake	
   of	
  
authoritarian
198
	
   and	
   totalitarian	
   regimes.
199
	
   Başak	
   Çalı	
   and	
   Betül	
   Durmuş	
   show	
   that	
   the	
  
development	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Turkey	
  has	
  also	
  been	
  a	
  response	
  to	
  changing	
  
political	
   conditions.
200
	
   In	
   Ireland,	
   political	
   crises	
   also	
   serve	
   as	
   the	
   main	
   driving	
   force	
   of	
  
judicial	
  reforms	
  touching	
  upon	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  The	
  French	
  and	
  Italian	
  case	
  studies	
  
then	
  show	
  how	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  these	
  countries	
  has	
  been	
  shaped	
  by	
  high-­‐profile	
  
judicial	
  scandals.
201
	
  Even	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands,	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  has	
  
194
	
  See	
  Cristina	
  E.	
  Parau,	
  The	
  Dormancy	
  of	
  Parliaments:	
  The	
  Invisible	
  Cause	
  of	
  Judiciary	
  Empowerment	
  in	
  Central	
  
and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  49	
  REPRESENTATION	
  –	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  REPRESENTATIVE	
  DEMOCRACY	
  267	
  (2013).	
  
195
	
  Or	
  more	
  precisely,	
  these	
  external	
  incentives	
  are	
  of	
  a	
  short-­‐term	
  nature.	
  Once	
  the	
  CEE	
  country	
  joins	
  the	
  EU,	
  the	
  
incentives	
  for	
  CEE	
  countries	
  to	
  keep	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governing	
  bodies	
  meeting	
  the	
  EU	
  standards	
  are	
  much	
  weaker.	
  
196
	
  This	
  article	
  cannot	
  do	
  justice	
  to	
  historical	
  trajectories	
  in	
  all	
  14	
  jurisdictions.	
  For	
  a	
  brief	
  analysis	
  see	
  Table	
  1	
  in	
  
Urbániková	
  &	
  Šipulová,	
  supra	
  note	
  89.	
  
197
	
  The	
  Dutch	
  judicial	
  council	
  is	
  a	
  rare	
  example	
  (ibid.).	
  
198
	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Spanish	
  and	
  Portuguese	
  judicial	
  councils.	
  
199
	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Italian	
  judicial	
  council	
  and	
  virtually	
  all	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  the	
  post-­‐communist	
  countries	
  in	
  
Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe.	
  
200
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1601	
  
	
  	
  
been	
   driven	
   by	
   political	
   demands	
   to	
   improve	
   the	
   management	
   of	
   the	
   Dutch	
   courts	
   and	
  
increasing	
  the	
  efficiency	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  
	
  
Politics	
  was	
  also	
  behind	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  expert	
  panels	
  at	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU,	
  as	
  
both	
  of	
  them	
  responded	
  to	
  the	
  enlargement	
  of	
  the	
  respective	
  Court	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  
screen	
   newly	
   arriving	
   judges	
   from	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   Europe.
202
	
   Politics	
   also	
   help	
   to	
  
explain	
  the	
  resistance	
  to	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  Germany	
  and	
  Czechia.	
  On	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  both	
  
case	
  studies
203
	
  one	
  may	
  of	
  course	
  argue	
  that	
  judicial	
  councils	
  are	
  not	
  needed,	
  as	
  there	
  is	
  
enough	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   anyway.
204
	
   However,	
   in	
   Czechia	
   the	
   rise	
   of	
   court	
  
presidents,	
  the	
  key	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body,	
  also	
  has	
  political	
  roots.	
  This	
  results	
  from	
  
the	
   high	
   turnover	
   of	
   Czech	
   ministers	
   of	
   justice,	
   the	
   Ministry’s	
   personal	
   misery,	
   and	
   the	
  
gradual	
  overall	
  demise	
  of	
  the	
  influence	
  and	
  gravitas	
  of	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  in	
  the	
  Czech	
  
political	
   system.	
   Germany’s	
   resistance	
   to	
   judicial	
   councils	
   is	
   based	
   on	
   a	
   peculiar	
  
understanding	
  of	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  democracy	
  and	
  separation	
  of	
  powers,	
  which	
  is	
  deeply	
  
embedded	
  among	
  the	
  traditional	
  German	
  political	
  parties.
205
	
  However,	
  this	
  might	
  change	
  
in	
  the	
  near	
  future	
  for	
  two	
  interrelated	
  reasons:	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  new	
  political	
  parties
206
	
  and	
  the	
  
pressing	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  prepared	
  to	
  respond	
  “to	
  the	
  kind	
  of	
  challenges	
  Polish	
  and	
  Hungarian	
  
institutions	
   have	
   confronted	
   in	
   recent	
   years”.
207
	
   The	
   proposal	
   by	
   die	
   Linke	
   in	
   2013	
   to	
  
amend	
  the	
  Basic	
  Law	
  with	
  a	
  clause	
  providing	
  for	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  failed	
  to	
  attract	
  
sufficient	
  support,	
  but	
  there	
  are	
  growing	
  calls	
  in	
  Germany
208
	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  in	
  other	
  established	
  
201
	
  See	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36;	
  and	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  See	
  also	
  Simone	
  Benvenuti,	
  The	
  Politics	
  of	
  
Judicial	
  Accountability	
  in	
  Italy:	
  Shifting	
  the	
  Balance,	
  14(2)	
  EUROPEAN	
  CONST.	
  LAW	
  R.,	
  369–393	
  (2018)	
  
202
	
   See	
   Çalı	
   &	
   Cunningham,	
   supra	
   note	
   6;	
   Bobek,	
   supra	
   note	
   58;	
   and	
   Mitchel	
   de	
   S-­‐O-­‐l'E	
   Lasser,	
   Judicial	
  
Appointments,	
  Judicial	
  Independence	
  and	
  the	
  European	
  High	
  Courts,	
  in	
  THE	
  TRANSFORMATION	
  OR	
  RECONSTITUTION	
  OF	
  
EUROPE:	
   THE	
   CRITICAL	
   LEGAL	
   STUDIES	
   PERSPECTIVE	
   ON	
   THE	
   ROLE	
   OF	
   THE	
   COURTS	
   IN	
   THE	
   EUROPEAN	
   UNION	
  121-­‐150	
  (Tamara	
  
Perišin	
  &	
  Siniša	
  Rodin	
  eds.,	
  2018).	
  
203
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45;	
  and	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
204
	
  See	
  supra	
  Part	
  C.I.	
  
205
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
206
	
  The	
  German	
  judiciary	
  has	
  been	
  afraid	
  that	
  with	
  unknown	
  political	
  parties	
  coming	
  to	
  power	
  their	
  independence	
  
might	
  be	
  in	
  danger,	
  and	
  that	
  might	
  be	
  the	
  reason	
  why	
  some	
  judges	
  regard	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  
as	
  tempting.	
  
207
	
  Hailbronner,	
  supra	
  note	
  66.	
  
208
	
  Ibid.	
  
1602	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
European	
  democracies	
  to	
  conduct	
  a	
  “judicial	
  stress	
  test”
209
	
  and	
  entrench	
  or	
  even	
  increase	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  
	
  
That	
   brings	
   me	
   to	
   a	
   related	
   theme	
   –	
   it	
   is	
   not	
   only	
   the	
   establishment	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   bodies,	
   but	
   also	
   their	
   modification	
   that	
   is	
   often	
   driven	
   by	
   political	
  
determinants.	
  Just	
  think	
  of	
  the	
  changing	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  presidency	
  and	
  the	
  failed	
  coup	
  d’état	
  
in	
   Turkey
210
	
   and	
   the	
   rise	
   of	
   populist	
   political	
   leaders	
   in	
   Hungary
211
	
   and	
   Poland,
212
	
   all	
   of	
  
which	
   were	
   discussed	
   above.	
   In	
   France,	
   modifications	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
  
responded	
  to	
  the	
  judicial	
  scandals	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  2000s.
213
	
  Similarly,	
  the	
  Italian	
  parliament	
  
also	
  reacted	
  to	
  the	
  scandals	
  within	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  The	
  same	
  applies	
  to	
  Ireland,	
  where	
  a	
  crisis	
  
of	
  relations	
  between	
  judges	
  and	
  the	
  political	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  resulting	
  political	
  row	
  framed	
  
the	
  debate	
  regarding	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  As	
  O’Brien	
  puts	
  it,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  understand	
  
judicial	
   governance	
   in	
   Ireland	
   and	
   its	
   reform,	
   “getting	
   the	
   politics	
   right	
   is	
   key”.
214
	
   This	
  
statement	
  applies	
  to	
  all	
  jurisdictions	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue.	
  
	
  
Future	
  research	
  should	
  acknowledge	
  this	
  dynamic	
  and	
  its	
  repercussions.	
  For	
  instance,	
  the	
  
case	
  studies	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  show	
  that	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  one-­‐
way	
  street	
  and	
  many	
  countries	
  have	
  actually	
  decreased	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  recently.	
  
More	
  importantly,	
  this	
  happened	
  not	
  only	
  in	
  Hungary,
215
	
  Poland,
216
	
  and	
  Turkey,
217
	
  but	
  also	
  
in	
  France.
218
	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  quite	
  a	
  few	
  judicial	
  councils	
  do	
  not	
  meet	
  the	
  standards	
  required	
  by	
  
the	
   international	
   soft	
   law	
   on	
   judicial	
   governance,	
   which	
   is	
   increasingly	
   read	
   into	
   the	
  
European	
   Convention	
   on	
   Human	
   Rights	
   by	
   the	
   ECtHR.
219
	
   We	
   also	
   need	
   to	
   distinguish	
  
209	
  
Eirik	
   Holmøyvik	
   &	
   Anne	
   Sanders,	
   A	
  Stress	
   Test	
   for	
   Europe’s	
   Judiciaries,	
   VERFASSUNGSBLOG	
   (Aug.	
   23,	
   2017),	
  
https://verfassungsblog.de/a-­‐stress-­‐test-­‐for-­‐europes-­‐judiciaries/.	
  
210
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
211
	
  See	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Šipulová,	
  supra	
  note	
  20;	
  and	
  literature	
  in	
  supra	
  notes	
  4,	
  65	
  and	
  105.	
  
212
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
213
	
  See	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  
214
	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  However,	
  this	
  might	
  change,	
  if	
  the	
  Irisih	
  Parliament	
  adopts	
  the	
  Judicial	
  council	
  Bill.	
  
215
	
  See	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Šipulová,	
  supra	
  note	
  20;	
  and	
  literature	
  in	
  supra	
  notes	
  4,	
  65	
  and	
  105.	
  
216
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
217
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
218
	
  See	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  
219
	
  See	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Lixinski,	
  supra	
  note	
  11.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1603	
  
	
  	
  
between	
   various	
   forms	
   of	
   resistance	
   to	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance.	
   Here	
   the	
  
conceptualization	
   of	
   resistance	
   to	
   international	
   courts,	
   which	
   distinguishes	
   between	
  
backlash,	
   pushback,	
   and	
   withdrawal	
   (exit),	
   is	
   particularly	
   helpful.
220
	
   While	
   the	
   French	
  
change	
   of	
   the	
   composition	
   of	
   the	
   Conseil	
   supérieur	
   de	
   la	
   magistrature	
   in	
   2008	
   implies	
  
pushback,
221
	
   the	
   significant	
   institutional	
   reforms	
   in	
   Hungary	
   (in	
   2011),	
   Poland	
   (in	
   2017),	
  
and	
  Turkey	
  (in	
  2017)	
  qualify	
  as	
  a	
  backlash	
  against	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.
222
	
  And	
  if	
  Polish	
  
political	
   leaders	
   implement	
   their	
   threat	
   to	
   return	
   to	
   the	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice	
   model	
   of	
  
judicial	
   governance	
   and	
   abolish	
   the	
   National	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Judiciary	
   altogether,	
   such	
  
reform	
  would	
  fall	
  into	
  the	
  category	
  of	
  exit	
  from	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  Finally,	
  we	
  also	
  
need	
  to	
  learn	
  more	
  about	
  the	
  reasons	
  behind	
  the	
  fall	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  in	
  Central	
  
and	
   Eastern	
   Europe	
   and	
   the	
   motivations	
   of	
   the	
   politicians	
   who	
   executed	
   it.	
   A	
   careful	
  
analysis	
   of	
   the	
   Polish	
   scenario	
   by	
   Anna	
   Śledzińska-­‐Simon	
   is	
   a	
   promising	
   start	
   of	
   this	
  
endeavor.
223
	
  
	
  
E.	
  Effects	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Governance	
  
	
  
Analyzing	
   the	
   effects	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   is	
   a	
   daunting	
   task	
   for	
   at	
   least	
   three	
  
reasons.	
   It	
   is	
   extremely	
   difficult	
   to	
   isolate	
   these	
   effects	
   from	
   other	
   social,	
   political,	
  
economic,	
   judicial,	
   and	
   historical	
   factors	
   even	
   if	
   one	
   compares	
   two	
   countries	
   that	
   are	
  
closest	
  to	
  the	
  natural	
  experiment	
  we	
  can	
  get.
224
	
  Just	
  think	
  of	
  the	
  political	
  turmoil	
  in	
  Poland	
  
and	
   Romania	
   or	
   the	
   changing	
   role	
   of	
   the	
   presidency	
   in	
   Turkey,	
   all	
   of	
   which	
   have	
   had	
  
serious	
  repercussions	
  for	
  their	
  respective	
  judicial	
  councils.	
  Sometimes	
  even	
  unique	
  events	
  
such	
   as	
   the	
   failed	
   coup	
   d’état	
   in	
   Turkey	
   can	
   make	
   a	
   difference.
225
	
   In	
   social	
   science	
  
terminology,	
  there	
  are	
  simply	
  too	
  many	
  independent	
  variables.	
  Hence,	
  do	
  not	
  expect	
  any	
  
causal	
  claims	
  or	
  predictive	
  theories	
  here.	
  Second,	
  even	
  if	
  we	
  agree	
  on	
  the	
  effects	
  on	
  what	
  
values	
  we	
  want	
  to	
  focus	
  on,	
  the	
  dependent	
  variables	
  defy	
  easy	
  definitions.	
  As	
  the	
  readers	
  
of	
  this	
  journal	
  know	
  very	
  well,	
  we	
  are	
  not	
  even	
  close	
  to	
  generally	
  accepted	
  definitions	
  of	
  
key	
   values	
   such	
   as	
   judicial	
   independence	
   and	
   judicial	
   accountability,	
   not	
   to	
   speak	
   of	
  
220
	
  See	
  Mikael	
  Rask	
  Madsen,	
  Pola	
  Cebulak	
  &	
  Micha	
  Weibuch,	
  Backlash	
  Against	
  International	
  Courts:	
  Explaining	
  the	
  
Forms	
   and	
   Patterns	
   of	
   Resistance	
   to	
   International	
   Courts,	
   14(2)	
   INTERNATIONAL	
   JOURNAL	
   OF	
   LAW	
   IN	
   CONTEXT	
   197	
  
(2018).	
  
221
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7;	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15;	
  and	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Šipulová,	
  supra	
  note	
  20.	
  
222
	
  See	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7;	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15;	
  and	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Šipulová,	
  supra	
  note	
  20.	
  
223
	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
224
	
  See	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  52	
  (comparing	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  judicial	
  council	
  in	
  Slovakia	
  on	
  judicial	
  accountability	
  with	
  the	
  
functioning	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  ministry	
  of	
  justice	
  model	
  of	
  court	
  administration).	
  	
  
225
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
1604	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
confidence	
   in	
   and	
   transparency	
   and	
   legitimacy	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary.	
   Third,	
   many	
   values	
   are	
  
actually	
  interdependent	
  and	
  thus	
  cannot	
  be	
  easily	
  disentangled.	
  	
  
	
  
An	
  article	
  on	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  on	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  
courts	
  exemplifies	
  all	
  these	
  issue.	
  Marína	
  Urbániková	
  and	
  Katarína	
  Šipulová	
  grapple	
  with	
  
the	
   conceptual	
   disagreement	
   regarding	
   public	
   confidence	
   and	
   define	
   its	
   three	
   levels	
  
(individual,	
  institutional	
  and	
  cultural),	
  painstakingly	
  identify	
  the	
  factors	
  that	
  may	
  influence	
  
public	
  confidence	
  in	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  and	
  acknowledge	
  that	
  the	
  establishment	
  and	
  reforms	
  of	
  
judicial	
   councils	
   usually	
   relate	
   public	
   confidence	
   to	
   some	
   other	
   value:	
   most	
   frequently	
  
these	
   are	
   independence	
   (Netherlands,	
   Poland,	
   Italy,	
   Hungary,	
   Ireland),	
   accountability	
  
(Netherlands),	
  and	
  the	
  perception	
  of	
  the	
  effectiveness	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  system	
  (Netherlands,	
  
Poland,	
   Hungary,	
   France,	
   Ireland).
226
	
   Only	
   then	
   can	
   they	
   study	
   the	
   effects	
   of	
   judicial	
  
councils	
  on	
  public	
  confidence.	
  	
  
	
  
They	
  are	
  careful	
  not	
  to	
  make	
  any	
  causal	
  claims,	
  but	
  their	
  findings	
  provide	
  a	
  lot	
  of	
  food	
  for	
  
thought	
  as	
  they	
  show	
  that	
  the	
  EU	
  countries	
  without	
  judicial	
  councils	
  are	
  in	
  general	
  better	
  
off	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  public	
  confidence.	
  More	
  specifically,	
  they	
  conclude	
  that	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  
judicial	
  councils	
  does	
  not	
  make	
  a	
  difference	
  regarding	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  the	
  judiciary	
  in	
  
the	
   new	
   EU	
   member	
   states,	
   while	
   in	
   the	
   old	
   EU	
   member	
   states	
   judicial	
   systems	
   with	
  
judicial	
  councils	
  enjoy	
  lower	
  levels	
  of	
  public	
  confidence	
  than	
  the	
  ones	
  without	
  them.
227
	
  In	
  
other	
  words,	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  to	
  enhance	
  confidence	
  in	
  courts	
  is	
  limited.	
  	
  This	
  
does	
  not	
  necessarily	
  mean	
  that	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  a	
  judicial	
  council	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  blamed	
  for	
  lower	
  
public	
  confidence.	
  They	
  merely	
  argue	
  that	
  judicial	
  councils	
  have	
  only	
  limited	
  power	
  to	
  deal	
  
with	
   the	
   structural	
   causes	
   of	
   low	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   courts,	
   which	
   often	
   has	
   deeper	
  
cultural	
  and	
  societal	
  roots	
  
	
  
Marína	
  Urbániková	
  and	
  Katarína	
  Šipulová	
  also	
  summarize	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  on	
  
judicial	
   independence,	
   which	
   is	
   closely	
   related	
   to	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   courts.
228
	
   In	
  
Romania,	
   according	
   Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
   “was	
   not	
   sufficient	
   for	
   protecting	
  
the	
  true	
  independence	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary”.
229
	
  Regarding	
  Slovenia,	
  Matej	
  Avbelj	
  concludes	
  that	
  
the	
  judicial	
  council	
  has	
  had	
  a	
  limited	
  impact	
  on	
  independence,	
  and	
  there	
  have	
  even	
  been	
  
cases	
  in	
  which	
  its	
  (in)action	
  negatively	
  affected	
  it.
230
	
  Slovakia	
  serves	
  as	
  a	
  cautionary	
  tale	
  
regarding	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  council	
  on	
  judicial	
  independence.	
  
226
	
  See	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  89.	
  
227
	
  Ibid.	
  
228
	
  Ibid.	
  
229
	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  supra	
  note	
  14.	
  
230
	
  Avbelj,	
  supra	
  note	
  41.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1605	
  
	
  	
  
While	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Slovak	
   Republic	
   arguably	
   increased	
   the	
   institutional	
  
independence	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  it	
  failed	
  to	
  secure	
  the	
  independence	
  of	
  individual	
  judges.
231
	
  
In	
  fact,	
  Slovak	
  judges	
  faced	
  more	
  reprisals	
  from	
  their	
  colleagues	
  who	
  captured	
  the	
  judicial	
  
council	
  than	
  from	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  before	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  council.
232
	
  	
  
	
  
Judicial	
   councils	
   in	
   Spain	
   and	
   Turkey	
   also	
   failed	
   to	
   deliver	
   judicial	
   independence.	
   Aida	
  
Torres	
   Pérez	
   argues	
   that	
   in	
   Spain	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
   has	
   been	
   captured	
   by	
   politicians,	
  
which	
  in	
  turn	
  prevents	
  it	
  “from	
  fulfilling	
  its	
  goal	
  and	
  has	
  contributed	
  to	
  undermining	
  public	
  
confidence	
  in	
  the	
  judiciary	
  as	
  a	
  whole”.
233
	
  This	
  in	
  line	
  with	
  the	
  empirical	
  data	
  that	
  show	
  
that	
  a	
  shocking	
  36	
  %	
  of	
  Spanish	
  judges	
  think	
  that	
  the	
  Spanish	
  Consejo	
  General	
  del	
  Poder	
  
Judicial	
  disrespect	
  their	
  independence.
234
	
  In	
  Turkey,	
  according	
  to	
  Çalı	
  and	
  Durmuş,	
  it	
  has	
  
been	
  “suspect,	
  whether	
  the	
  different	
  forms	
  of	
  JSG	
  have	
  promoted	
  judicial	
  independence,	
  
given	
  the	
  highly	
  politicized	
  conditions	
  that	
  led	
  to	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  JSG	
  reforms”.
235
	
  	
  
	
  
Judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  France,	
  Italy,	
  and	
  Poland	
  show	
  mixed	
  results.	
  Although	
  they	
  helped	
  to	
  
secure	
   independence,	
   other	
   problems	
   arose.	
   Vauchez	
   concludes	
   that	
   even	
   though	
   the	
  
judicial	
   council	
   in	
   France	
   “has	
   undoubtedly	
   gained	
   competences	
   and	
   institutional	
  
autonomy,	
   it	
   remains	
   firmly	
   embedded	
   in	
   a	
   dense	
   web	
   of	
   links	
   and	
   dependences	
   that	
  
secure	
  its	
  integration	
  within	
  the	
  body	
  of	
  the	
  State”.
236
	
  Similarly,	
  Benvenuti	
  and	
  Paris	
  claim	
  
that	
   in	
   Italy	
   the	
   High	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Judiciary	
   played	
   a	
   crucial	
   role	
   in	
   securing	
   the	
  
independence	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   from	
   the	
   executive	
   power,	
   but	
   this	
   does	
   not	
   apply	
   to	
  
internal	
   independence.
237
	
   Finally,	
   the	
   Polish	
   case	
   is	
   a	
   sad	
   story.	
   Śledzińska-­‐Simon	
   shows	
  
that	
  the	
  Polish	
  Judicial	
  Council	
  in	
  general	
  succeeded	
  as	
  a	
  guarantor	
  of	
  independence,	
  but	
  it	
  
did	
  not	
  prevent	
  the	
  Law	
  and	
  Justice	
  regime	
  from	
  pushing	
  through	
  its	
  2017	
  judicial	
  reform,	
  
which	
   allowed	
   it	
   to	
   pack	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
   with	
   its	
   protégés	
   and	
   turn	
   it	
   against	
  
“recalcitrant”	
  judges.
238
	
  
	
  
231
	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
232
	
  Ibid.	
  See	
  also	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  52	
  
233
	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39.	
  
234
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Castillo	
  Ortiz,	
  supra	
  note	
  52,	
  at	
  317	
  and	
  327-­‐328.	
  
235
	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Durmuş,	
  supra	
  note	
  15.	
  
236
	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  
237
	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36.	
  
238
	
  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	
  supra	
  note	
  7.	
  
1606	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
In	
  countries	
  without	
  judicial	
  councils	
  or	
  the	
  court	
  service,	
  this	
  assessment	
  is	
  also	
  complex.	
  
Fabian	
   Wittreck	
   shows	
   that	
   German	
   ministers	
   rarely	
   endangered	
   individual	
   judicial	
  
independence,	
   while	
   judicial	
   self-­‐government	
   bodies,	
   such	
   as	
   presidia	
   and	
   court	
  
presidents,	
   have	
   in	
   some	
   cases	
   infringed	
   the	
   rights	
   of	
   individual	
   judges.
239
	
   According	
   to	
  
him,	
  “[t]he	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  [judicial]	
  self-­‐government	
  merely	
  shift	
  the	
  dangers	
  for	
  individual	
  
judicial	
  independence	
  by	
  shifting	
  power”.
240
	
  At	
  the	
  moment,	
  the	
  major	
  danger	
  in	
  Germany	
  
lies	
  in	
  promotion	
  of	
  judges.
241
	
  In	
  Czechia	
  court	
  presidents	
  evolved	
  into	
  guardians	
  against	
  
executive	
  interferences	
  with	
  judicial	
  independence,	
  but	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
  sufficient	
  
safeguards	
  they	
  also	
  present	
  a	
  threat	
  to	
  the	
  independence	
  of	
  rank-­‐and-­‐file	
  judges.
242
	
  The	
  
“buffer”	
   between	
   court	
   presidents	
   and	
   rank-­‐and-­‐file	
   judges,	
   which	
   in	
   Germany	
   is	
  
represented	
  in	
  particular	
  by	
  presidia	
  and	
  service	
  courts,	
  simply	
  does	
  not	
  exist	
  in	
  Czechia.	
  
	
  
We	
   know	
   much	
   less	
   about	
   the	
   impact	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   on	
   other	
   values.	
  
Regarding	
   legitimacy,	
   strong	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies	
   insulated	
   from	
   the	
   elected	
  
branches	
   of	
   government	
   inevitably	
   reduce	
   the	
   democratic	
   legitimacy	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary.
243
	
  
However,	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  has	
  its	
  legal	
  and	
  social	
  dimensions,
244
	
  which	
  should	
  be	
  
studied	
  in	
  more	
  detail	
  in	
  future.
245
	
  Legitimacy	
  warrants	
  attention	
  on	
  its	
  own,	
  especially	
  at	
  
the	
  supranational	
  level,	
  since	
  legitimacy	
  was	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  principal	
  reasons	
  used	
  to	
  justify	
  
the	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   reforms	
   at	
   the	
   ECtHR,	
   particularly	
   with	
   regard	
   to	
   judicial	
  
selection.
246
	
  
	
  
239
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
240
	
  Ibid.	
  
241
	
  Ibid.	
  
242
	
  See	
  Blisa,	
  Papoušková	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  42.	
  
243
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
244
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Peter	
  G.	
  Stillman,	
  The	
  Concept	
  of	
  Legitimacy,	
  7(1)	
  POLITY	
  32–56	
  (1974);	
  Mark	
  C.	
  Suchman,	
  Managing	
  
Legitimacy:	
  Strategic	
  and	
  Institutional	
  Approaches,	
  20(3)	
  THE	
  ACADEMY	
  OF	
  MANAGEMENT	
  REVIEW	
  571–610	
  (1995);	
  and	
  
Ian	
  Hurd,	
  Legitimacy	
  and	
  Authority	
  in	
  International	
  Politics,	
  53(2)	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  ORGANIZATION	
  379–408	
  (1999).	
  
245
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  James	
  L.	
  Gibson,	
  Gregory	
  A.	
  Caldiera	
  &	
  Vanessa	
  A.	
  Baird,	
  On	
  the	
  Legitimacy	
  of	
  National	
  High	
  Courts,	
  
92(2)	
  THE	
  AMERICAN	
  POLITICAL	
  SCIENCE	
  REVIEW	
  343–358	
  (1998);	
  Sidney	
  W.	
  Richards,	
  Survey	
  article:	
  the	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  
Supreme	
  Courts	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  globalization,	
  4(3)	
  UTRECHT	
  LAW	
  REVIEW	
  104–127	
  (2008);	
  Yuval	
  Shany,	
  Assessing	
  
the	
  Effectiveness	
  of	
  International	
  Courts:	
  A	
  goal-­‐based	
  approach,	
  106(2)	
  AMERICAN	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  LAW	
  
225–270	
   (2012);	
   Başak	
   Çalı,	
   Anne	
   Koch	
   &	
   Nicola	
   Bruch,	
   The	
   Legitimacy	
   of	
   Human	
   Rights	
   Courts,	
   A	
   Grounded	
  
Interpretivist	
  Analysis	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Court	
  of	
  Human	
  Rights,	
  35(4)	
  HUMAN	
  RIGHTS	
  QUARTERLY	
  955–984	
  (2013).	
  
246
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1607	
  
	
  	
  
Information	
  about	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  on	
  judicial	
  accountability	
  is	
  
also	
  scarce,	
  and	
  thus	
  it	
  is	
  difficult	
  to	
  deduce	
  a	
  clear	
  pattern.	
  This	
  is	
  again	
  partly	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  
significant	
  disagreement	
  among	
  European	
  scholars,	
  judges,	
  and	
  policymakers	
  regarding	
  the	
  
concept	
  of	
  judicial	
  accountability	
  itself.
247
	
  With	
  this	
  huge	
  caveat	
  in	
  mind,	
  we	
  can	
  still	
  see	
  
that	
   the	
   majority	
   of	
   contributions	
   do	
   not	
   support	
   the	
   view	
   that	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
  
bodies	
  increase	
  judicial	
  accountability.	
  Some	
  case	
  studies	
  suggest	
  the	
  contrary.	
  Regarding	
  
Italy,	
  Benvenuti	
  and	
  Paris	
  conclude	
  that	
  in	
  contrast	
  to	
  securing	
  the	
  independence	
  of	
  the	
  
judiciary,	
   “the	
   Italian	
   model	
   of	
   JSG	
   has	
   been	
   far	
   less	
   effective	
   in	
   making	
   the	
   judiciary	
  
accountable.”
248
	
  Other	
  contributions	
  claim	
  that	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  did	
  not	
  change	
  the	
  
current	
   levels	
   of	
   judicial	
   accountability.	
   For	
   instance,	
   Patrick	
   O’Brien	
   suggests	
   that	
   in	
  
Ireland	
  “lines	
  of	
  accountability	
  for	
  the	
  [Court]	
  Service	
  through	
  the	
  Minister	
  for	
  Justice	
  and	
  
the	
   parliamentary	
   committee	
   system	
   remained	
   intact.”
249
	
   Slovakia	
   then	
   serves	
   as	
   a	
  
cautionary	
  tale	
  since	
  the	
  Slovak	
  judicial	
  elite,	
  and	
  especially	
  Chief	
  Justice	
  Harabin,	
  abused	
  
accountability	
   mechanisms	
   in	
   order	
   to	
   reward	
   his	
   allies	
   (through	
   salary	
   bonuses	
   and	
  
promotion)	
  and	
  to	
  punish	
  their	
  critics	
  (via	
  disciplinary	
  motions).
250
	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  assessment	
  of	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  on	
  accountability	
  is	
  even	
  more	
  
difficult	
   at	
   the	
   supranational	
   level.	
   Christoph	
   Krenn	
   argues	
   that	
   the	
   individual	
  
accountability	
   of	
   CJEU	
   members	
   is	
   regulated	
   in-­‐house,	
   while	
   the	
   institutional	
  
accountability	
  is	
  secured	
  primarily	
  by	
  the	
  European	
  Parliament	
  through	
  the	
  EU’s	
  budgetary	
  
process.
251
	
   Accountability	
   is	
   even	
   more	
   limited	
   at	
   the	
   Strasbourg	
   Court,	
   on	
   both	
   the	
  
institutional	
  and	
  individual	
  levels.
252
	
  In	
  sum,	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  practices	
  at	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  
247
	
  See	
  Samuel	
  Spáč	
  and	
  David	
  Kosař,	
  Conceptualization(s)	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Independence	
  and	
  Judicial	
  Accountability	
  by	
  
the	
  European	
  Network	
  of	
  Councils	
  for	
  the	
  Judiciary:	
  Two	
  Steps	
  Forward,	
  One	
  Step	
  Back,	
  9(3)	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  JOURNAL	
  
OF	
   COURT	
   ADMINISTRATION	
   (2018	
   forthcoming);	
   and	
   other	
   contributions	
   to	
   this	
   special	
   issue	
   that	
   discusses	
   the	
  
ENCJ’s	
  method	
  of	
  assessment	
  of	
  judicial	
  independence	
  and	
  accountability.	
  See	
  also	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  52;	
  and	
  
Benvenuti,	
  supra	
  note	
  201.	
  	
  
248
	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36.	
  
249
	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  However,	
  this	
  might	
  change,	
  if	
  the	
  Irisih	
  Parliament	
  adopts	
  the	
  Judicial	
  council	
  Bill.	
  
250
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
251
	
  In	
  detail,	
  Krenn,	
  supra	
  note	
  116.	
  
252
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
1608	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
clearly	
   prioritize	
   judicial	
   independence	
   at	
   the	
   expense	
   of	
   accountability,
253
	
   which	
   fully	
  
accords	
  with	
  the	
  institutional	
  setup	
  and	
  the	
  “judicial	
  trilemma”	
  theory	
  of	
  the	
  ECtHR.
254
	
  
	
  
Finally,	
   regarding	
   the	
   impact	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   on	
   the	
   transparency	
   of	
   the	
  
judiciary,	
  case	
  studies	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  provide	
  much	
  richer	
  information.
255
	
  Here,	
  some	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  bodies	
  fare	
  particularly	
  well.	
  In	
  Spain,	
  “the	
  Council	
  has	
  labored	
  to	
  
provide	
   the	
   public	
   with	
   broad,	
   easily	
   available	
   information	
   and	
   promote	
   increased	
  
transparency	
  regarding	
  judicial	
  activities”,	
  including	
  a	
  special	
  Website	
  on	
  Transparency.
256
	
  
Regarding	
  Ireland,	
  O’Brien	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  Courts	
  Service	
  “ha[s]	
  increased	
  the	
  transparency	
  
of	
  the	
  courts	
  system	
  through	
  the	
  Courts	
  Service	
  website	
  and	
  annual	
  reports.	
  It	
  is	
  possible	
  
that	
  these	
  changes	
  have	
  played	
  a	
  small	
  role	
  in	
  enhancing	
  public	
  trust	
  and	
  improving	
  the	
  
legitimacy	
   of	
   judges	
   and	
   the	
   courts.”
257
	
   In	
   Slovakia,	
   the	
   establishment	
   of	
   the	
   Judicial	
  
Council	
  of	
  the	
  Slovak	
  Republic	
  in	
  2003	
  led	
  to	
  a	
  major	
  improvement	
  in	
  the	
  transparency	
  of	
  
the	
   Slovak	
   judiciary,	
   but	
   the	
   key	
   transparency	
   reform	
   was	
   adopted	
   by	
   the	
   Slovak	
  
parliament	
  in	
  2011,	
  among	
  other	
  things,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  opaque	
  decision-­‐making	
  processes	
  at	
  
the	
   Judicial	
   Council	
   of	
   the	
   Slovak	
   Republic.
258
	
   Hence,	
   judicial	
   councils	
   can	
   improve	
  
transparency	
   both	
   directly	
   and	
   indirectly,	
   and	
   sometimes	
   even	
   their	
   negative	
   view	
   of	
  
judicial	
  transparency	
  may	
  prompt	
  legislative	
  reform.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
   contrast,	
   Fabian	
   Wittreck	
   argues	
   that	
   “mechanisms	
   of	
   self-­‐government	
   have	
   only	
   a	
  
marginal	
   effect	
   on	
   the	
   (lacking)	
   transparency	
   of	
   the	
   [German]	
   judiciary”,	
   because	
   their	
  
outputs	
  are	
  too	
  technical.
259
	
  This	
  suggests	
  that	
  in	
  studying	
  transparency	
  we	
  should	
  care	
  
not	
  only	
  about	
  the	
  accessibility	
  of	
  data	
  about	
  the	
  judiciary	
  and	
  their	
  findability	
  (how	
  easily	
  
these	
  data	
  can	
  be	
  located),	
  but	
  also	
  about	
  their	
  understandability	
  (e.g.	
  their	
  user-­‐friendly	
  
format).	
  Future	
  research	
  on	
  judicial	
  transparency	
  should	
  inquire	
  into	
  “the	
  degree	
  to	
  which	
  
253
	
  But	
  note	
  that	
  according	
  to	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  individual	
  ECtHR’s	
  judges	
  can	
  be	
  held	
  accountable	
  by	
  way	
  of	
  
naming	
   and	
   shaming	
   tactics	
   undertaken	
   by	
   external	
   actors,	
   for	
   example,	
   NGOs,	
   commentators	
   on	
   Strasbourg	
  
jurisprudence,	
  domestic	
  supreme	
  courts,	
  parliaments	
  and	
  the	
  executive.	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  6.	
  
254
	
  See	
  Jeffrey	
  L.	
  Dunoff	
  &	
  Mark	
  A.	
  Pollack,	
  The	
  Judicial	
  Trilemma,	
  111(2)	
  AMERICAN	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  LAW	
  
713–760	
  (2017).	
  
255
	
  See	
  also	
  Solomon,	
  supra	
  note	
  52.	
  	
  
256
	
  See	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39.	
  	
   	
  
257
	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
258
	
  See	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
259
	
  See	
  Wittreck,	
  supra	
  note	
  45.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1609	
  
	
  	
  
desirable	
  (recorded)	
  information	
  about	
  the	
  judiciary	
  is	
  (perceived	
  to	
  be)	
  made	
  available,	
  
findable	
  and	
  understandable”.
260
	
  
	
  
Both	
  contributions	
  on	
  transnational	
  courts	
  also	
  raise	
  interesting	
  insights	
  regarding	
  judicial	
  
transparency.	
   Regarding	
   the	
   ECtHR,	
   Başak	
   Çalı	
   and	
   Stewart	
   Cunningham	
   challenge	
   the	
  
picture	
   of	
   ECtHR’s	
   wide	
   transparency	
   painted	
   by	
   the	
   “judicial	
   trilemma”	
   theory	
   of	
  
transnational	
   courts.
261
	
   According	
   to	
   them,	
   when	
   considered	
   in	
   light	
   of	
   the	
   totality	
   of	
  
judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   practices	
   at	
   the	
   Strasbourg	
   Court,	
   they	
   find	
   that	
   the	
   effect	
   of	
  
judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   in	
   promoting	
   transparency	
   is	
   more	
   complex.	
   More	
   specifically,	
  
they	
  argue	
  while	
  the	
  output	
  of	
  Strasbourg	
  judges	
  is	
  highly	
  transparent	
  information	
  on	
  how	
  
they	
  work	
  behind	
  the	
  scenes	
  is	
  much	
  less	
  clear.
262
	
  
	
  
Finally,	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  and	
  Ireland	
  provide	
  optimistic	
  insights	
  regarding	
  the	
  impact	
  on	
  the	
  
effectiveness	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  It	
  seems	
  that	
  in	
  both	
  countries,	
  the	
  judicial	
  council
263
	
  (the	
  
Netherlands)	
   and	
   the	
   Court	
   Service	
   (Ireland)	
   were	
   established	
   primarily	
   to	
   improve	
   the	
  
management	
   of	
   the	
   courts,	
   and	
   they	
   were	
   not	
   expected	
   to	
   become	
   the	
   guarantors	
   of	
  
judicial	
   independence,	
   also	
   because	
   in	
   both	
   countries	
   the	
   judiciary	
   has	
   traditionally	
  
enjoyed	
  a	
  high	
  level	
  of	
  independence.	
  Both	
  O’Brien	
  and	
  Mak	
  argue	
  that	
  this	
  promise	
  has	
  
been	
  fulfilled.	
  Regarding	
  Ireland,	
  O’Brien	
  argues	
  that	
  “the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  Courts	
  Service	
  has	
  
allowed	
   the	
   judiciary	
   to	
   improve	
   the	
   public	
   image	
   of	
   the	
   courts	
   through	
   improved	
  
facilities.”
264
	
   Mak	
   concludes	
   that	
   “judicial	
   self-­‐government	
   in	
   the	
   Netherlands	
   can	
   be	
  
assessed	
  as	
  functioning	
  adequately”	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  rule-­‐of-­‐law	
  values	
  
and	
   new	
   public	
   management	
   values	
   (effectiveness,	
   efficiency,	
   and	
   a	
   client-­‐oriented	
  
system).
265
	
   However,	
   experience	
   from	
   these	
   two	
   countries	
   also	
   shows	
   that	
   there	
   is	
   a	
  
certain	
  trade-­‐off	
  between	
  the	
  efficiency	
  of	
  courts	
  and	
  judicial	
  independence.	
  In	
  particular	
  
in	
   the	
   Netherlands,	
   the	
   establishment	
   and	
   functioning	
   of	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
   led	
   to	
  
260
	
  In	
  developing	
  this	
  definition	
  I	
  build	
  heavily	
  on	
  Jenny	
  De	
  Fine	
  Licht,	
  Daniel	
  Naurin,	
  Peter	
  Esaiasson	
  &	
  Mikael	
  
Gilljam,	
  When	
  Does	
  Transparency	
  Generate	
  Legitimacy?	
  Experimenting	
  on	
  a	
  Context-­‐Bound	
  Relationship,	
  27(1)	
  
GOVERNANCE:	
   AN	
   INTERNATIONAL	
   JOURNAL	
   OF	
   POLICY,	
   ADMINISTRATION,	
   AND	
   INSTITUTIONS	
   111–134	
   (2014);	
   and	
   Greg	
  
Michener	
  &	
  Katherine	
  Bersch,	
  Identifying	
  Transparency,	
  18	
  INFORMATION	
  POLITY	
  233–242	
  (2013).	
  
261
	
  See	
  Jeffrey	
  L.	
  Dunoff	
  &	
  Mark	
  A.	
  Pollack,	
  The	
  Judicial	
  Trilemma,	
  111(2)	
  AMERICAN	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  LAW	
  
713–760	
  (2017).	
  
262
	
  See	
  Çalı	
  &	
  Cunningham,	
  supra	
  note	
  47.	
  
263
	
  But	
  note	
  that	
  the	
  Dutch	
  judicial	
  council,	
  despite	
  its	
  nominal	
  name,	
  is	
  actually	
  very	
  close	
  to	
  the	
  Irish	
  Court	
  
Service	
  model.	
  See	
  supra	
  note	
  79.	
  
264
	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31.	
  
265
	
  Mak,	
  supra	
  note	
  37.	
  
1610	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
concerns	
   that	
   the	
   new	
   public	
   management	
   approach	
   might	
   encroach	
   upon	
   judicial	
  
independence	
  at	
  risk
266
	
  and	
  it	
  took	
  a	
  while	
  to	
  find	
  a	
  proper	
  balance.	
  	
  
	
  
In	
  sum,	
  the	
  case	
  studies	
  in	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  provide	
  a	
  lot	
  of	
  food	
  for	
  thought	
  regarding	
  the	
  
effects	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils.	
   Three	
   insights	
   emerge	
   clearly.	
   First,	
   regarding	
   the	
   impact	
   of	
  
judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   on	
   judicial	
   independence	
   and	
   accountability	
   it	
   is	
   crucial	
   to	
  
distinguish	
   between	
   the	
   institutional	
   and	
   individual	
   levels.	
   Several	
   case	
   studies	
   actually	
  
argue	
   that	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   increased	
   the	
   institutional	
  
independence	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary,	
   but	
   did	
   not	
   improve	
   or	
   even	
   negatively	
   affected	
   the	
  
independence	
  of	
  individual	
  judges.
267
	
  The	
  same	
  problem	
  arises	
  mutatis	
  mutandis	
  regarding	
  
the	
  impact	
  on	
  accountability	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  on	
  the	
  one	
  hand	
  and	
  the	
  accountability	
  of	
  
judges	
   on	
   the	
   other.	
   Second,	
   judicial	
   councils	
   failed	
   to	
   deliver	
   in	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
  
Europe.	
  In	
  fact,	
  case	
  studies	
  on	
  Poland,	
  Slovakia,	
  and	
  Slovenia	
  show	
  that	
  they	
  fare	
  much	
  
worse	
   than	
   suggested	
   by	
   earlier	
   research,	
   which	
   focused	
   on	
   the	
   perception	
   of	
  
independence	
  by	
  judges	
  in	
  these	
  countries.
268
	
  The	
  major	
  difference	
  is	
  that	
  in	
  Poland	
  this	
  is	
  
due	
   to	
   exogenous	
   factors,	
   while	
   in	
   Slovakia	
   and	
   Slovenia	
   the	
   explanation	
   is	
   primarily	
  
endogenous.	
   The	
   only	
   contribution	
   from	
   Central	
   and	
   Eastern	
   Europe	
   which	
   views	
   the	
  
impact	
  of	
  judicial	
  councils	
  positively	
  is	
  Bianca	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan’s	
  assessment	
  of	
  the	
  Romanian	
  
Superior	
  Council	
  of	
  Magistracy.	
  But	
  even	
  she	
  identified	
  many	
  negative	
  effects	
  such	
  as	
  lack	
  
of	
   transparency	
   and	
   minimal	
   accountability	
   and	
   argues	
   merely	
   that	
   the	
   judicial	
   council	
  
model	
   is	
   a	
   “lesser	
   evil”.
269
	
   Third,	
   judicial	
   councils	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   many	
   other	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   bodies,	
   in	
   general,	
   seem	
   to	
   be	
   better	
   at	
   enhancing	
   transparency	
   and	
  
effectiveness
270
	
   rather	
   than	
   judicial	
   independence,	
   judicial	
   accountability,	
   and	
   public	
  
confidence.	
  This	
  goes	
  against	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  existing	
  scholarship,	
  which	
  focuses	
  primarily	
  on	
  
the	
  impact	
  of	
  these	
  bodies	
  on	
  judicial	
  independence	
  and	
  judicial	
  accountability.
271
	
  
266
	
  For	
  instance,	
  some	
  judges	
  did	
  not	
  feel	
  represented	
  by	
  the	
  Council,	
  objected	
  to	
  the	
  temporary	
  appointment	
  
procedure	
   for	
   new	
   court	
   presidents,	
   and	
   claimed	
   that	
   the	
   assessment	
   of	
   judicial	
   performance	
   had	
   come	
   to	
  
emphasize	
  output	
  too	
  much.	
  For	
  further	
  details	
  see	
  ibid.	
  
267
	
  On	
  how	
  impotant	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  these	
  two	
  levels	
  is	
  see	
  also	
  John	
  Ferejohn,	
  Independent	
  Judges,	
  
Dependent	
  Judiciary:	
  Explaining	
  Judicial	
  Independence,	
  72	
  S.	
  CAL.	
  L.	
  REV.	
  353	
  (1999).	
  
268
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Castillo	
  Ortiz,	
  supra	
  note	
  52	
  (suggesting	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  only	
  moderate	
  perception	
  of	
  disrespect	
  of	
  judicial	
  
independence	
  in	
  Slovakia	
  and	
  Slovenia	
  and	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  low	
  perception	
  of	
  disrespect	
  of	
  judicial	
  independence	
  in	
  
Poland).	
  
269
	
  See	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  supra	
  note	
  14.	
  
270
	
  But	
  note	
  that	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  determinants	
  of	
  judicial	
  performance	
  based	
  on	
  data	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  European	
  
Commission	
  for	
  the	
  Efficiency	
  of	
  Justice	
  (CEPEJ)	
  conducted	
  by	
  Voigt	
  and	
  El	
  Bialy	
  suggested	
  that	
  judicial	
  councils	
  
were	
  consistently	
  correlated	
  with	
  a	
  worse,	
  rather	
  than	
  a	
  better	
  performance.	
  See	
  Stefan	
  Voigt	
  &	
  Nora	
  El-­‐Bialy,	
  
Identifying	
  the	
  determinants	
  of	
  aggregate	
  judicial	
  performance:	
  taxpayers’	
  money	
  well	
  spent?,	
  41(2)	
  EUROPEAN	
  
JOURNAL	
  OF	
  LAW	
  AND	
  ECONOMICS	
  283-­‐319	
  (2016).	
  
271
	
  See	
  the	
  literature	
  in	
  supra	
  notes	
  50	
  and	
  52.	
  
2018	
   Beyond	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
   1611	
  
	
  	
  
	
  
In	
   future	
   research,	
   these	
   insights	
   should	
   ideally	
   be	
   combined	
   with	
   rigorous	
   empirical	
  
testing	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  well-­‐defined	
  indicators.
272
	
  The	
  reconstructive	
  legal	
  method	
  applied	
  by	
  
most	
   contributions	
   to	
   this	
   special	
   issue	
   has	
   a	
   lot	
   to	
   learn	
   from	
   the	
   growing	
   empirical	
  
research	
  on	
  judicial	
  councils,	
  and	
  vice	
  versa.	
  These	
  two	
  groups	
  of	
  scholars	
  have	
  the	
  same	
  
aim	
  in	
  the	
  end	
  –	
  to	
  get	
  closer	
  to	
  the	
  truth.	
  They	
  just	
  tackle	
  the	
  same	
  issue	
  from	
  a	
  different	
  
angle.	
  
	
  
F.	
  Conclusion	
  	
  
	
  
Judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   has	
   a	
   long	
   tradition	
   in	
   several	
   European	
   countries,
273
	
   but	
   it	
   has	
  
increased	
  significantly	
  during	
  the	
  1990s	
  and	
  the	
  2000s,	
  especially	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  judicial	
  
councils	
  (broadly	
  understood)	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe.	
  However,	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  period	
  
judicial	
  self-­‐governance,	
  albeit	
  in	
  different	
  forms,	
  has	
  also	
  gradually	
  expanded	
  in	
  Western	
  
European	
  countries	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  at	
  the	
  ECtHR	
  and	
  the	
  CJEU.	
  This	
  has	
  allowed	
  us	
  to	
  see	
  how	
  
different	
   forms	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   work	
   in	
   different	
   environments	
   and	
   theorize	
  
about	
  them.	
  
	
  
This	
   special	
   issue	
   takes	
   stock	
   of	
   the	
   forms,	
   rationales,	
   and	
   effects	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
   in	
   Europe.	
   It	
   has	
   shown	
   that	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   is	
   a	
   much	
   broader	
  
phenomenon	
   than	
   judicial	
   councils	
   and	
   may	
   also	
   take	
   different	
   forms.	
   It	
   has	
   also	
  
questioned	
   several	
   assumptions	
   about	
   the	
   effects	
   of	
   judicial	
   councils	
   and	
   other	
   judicial	
  
self-­‐governance	
   bodies.	
   Most	
   importantly,	
   it	
   exposed	
   the	
   liquid	
   nature	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
governance	
  and	
  its	
  embeddedness	
  in	
  the	
  political,	
  social,	
  cultural,	
  and	
  social	
  context.
274
	
  In	
  
contrast	
  to	
  the	
  standard	
  picture,	
  in	
  most	
  European	
  states	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  judicial	
  
self-­‐governance	
  has	
  been	
  non-­‐linear	
  and	
  responded	
  to	
  political	
  and	
  social	
  changes.	
  
	
  
Each	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  body	
  simply	
  has	
  to	
  protect	
  its	
  turf	
  against	
  the	
  political	
  actors	
  
as	
   well	
   as	
   against	
   judges	
   and	
   other	
   judicial	
   self-­‐governance	
   bodies.	
   If	
   it	
   fails,	
   it	
   may	
   be	
  
272
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Castillo	
  Ortiz,	
  supra	
  note	
  52;	
  Stefan	
  Voigt,	
  Jerg	
  Gutmann	
  &	
  Lars	
  P.	
  Feld,	
  Economic	
  growth	
  and	
  judicial	
  
independence,	
  a	
  dozen	
  years	
  on:	
  Cross-­‐country	
  evidence	
  using	
  an	
  updated	
  set	
  of	
  indicators,	
  38	
  EUROPEAN	
  JOURNAL	
  
OF	
   POLITICAL	
   ECONOMY	
  197–211	
  (2015);	
  Jerg	
  Gutmann	
  &	
  Stefan	
  Voigt,	
  Judicial	
  independence	
  in	
  the	
  EU:	
  a	
  puzzle,	
  
EUROPEAN	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  LAW	
  AND	
  ECONOMICS	
  1-­‐18	
  (2018);	
  and	
  ANDREAS	
  LIENHARD	
  &	
  DANIEL	
  KETTIGER,	
  THE	
  JUDICIARY	
  BETWEEN	
  
MANAGEMENT	
   AND	
   THE	
   RULE	
   OF	
   LAW:	
   RESULTS	
   OF	
   THE	
   RESEARCH	
   PROJECT	
   BASIC	
   RESEARCH	
   INTO	
   COURT	
   MANAGEMENT	
   IN	
  
SWITZERLAND	
  (2016).	
  	
  
273
	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Italy,	
  Romania	
  and	
  partly	
  also	
  France.	
  See	
  Benvenuti	
  &	
  Paris,	
  supra	
  note	
  36;	
  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	
  
supra	
  note	
  14;	
  and	
  Vauchez,	
  supra	
  note	
  35.	
  
274
	
   This	
   is	
   in	
   line	
   with	
   empirical	
   findings	
   that	
   conclude	
   that	
   cultural	
   traits	
   are	
   of	
   fundamental	
   importance	
   for	
  
judicial	
  independence	
  and	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  formal	
  institutions	
  more	
  generally.	
  See	
  Gutmann	
  &	
  Voigt,	
  supra	
  note	
  
272.	
  
1612	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
captured	
  by	
  political	
  forces,
275
	
  abused	
  by	
  judicial	
  elites,
276
	
  or	
  become	
  inconsequential.
277
	
  If	
  
it	
  succeeds,	
  it	
  may	
  improve	
  the	
  efficiency	
  and	
  transparency	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary,
278
	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  
long	
   term	
   perhaps	
   also	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   courts,	
   judicial	
   independence,	
   and	
   judicial	
  
accountability.	
  All	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  special	
  issue	
  acknowledge	
  this	
  dynamic	
  and	
  openly	
  
address	
  political	
  contestations	
  regarding	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance.	
  It	
  is	
  up	
  to	
  future	
  research	
  
to	
  build	
  on	
  their	
  insights	
  and	
  analyze	
  under	
  what	
  circumstances	
  judicial	
  self-­‐governance	
  
delivers	
  the	
  results	
  we	
  expect	
  from	
  them.	
  
	
  
275
	
  See	
  Spanish	
  judicial	
  council	
  (analyzed	
  in	
  Torres	
  Pérez,	
  supra	
  note	
  39).	
  
276	
  
See	
  Slovak	
  judicial	
  council	
  (analyzed	
  in	
  Spáč,	
  Šipulová	
  &	
  Urbániková,	
  supra	
  note	
  31).	
  
277
	
  See	
  the	
  Hungarian	
  judicial	
  council	
  (analyzed	
  in	
  note	
  105).	
  
278
	
  See	
  especially	
  the	
  Dutch	
  judicial	
  council	
  (analyzed	
  in	
  Mak,	
  supra	
  note	
  37)	
  and	
  the	
  Irish	
  Court	
  Service	
  (analyzed	
  
in	
  O’Brien,	
  supra	
  note	
  31).