Articles	
  
Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
  
	
  
By	
  Adam	
  Blisa,∗
	
  
Tereza	
  Papoušková∗∗
	
  &	
  Marína	
  Urbániková∗∗∗
	
  
	
  
Abstract	
  
	
  
This	
  paper	
  maps	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  in	
  Czechia	
  and	
  argues	
  that	
  although	
  Czechia	
  is	
  
sometimes	
  perceived	
  as	
  a	
  black	
  sheep	
  of	
  Europe	
  for	
  not	
  introducing	
  any	
  form	
  of	
  judicial	
  
council	
   into	
   its	
   judicial	
   system,	
   there	
   is	
   in	
   fact	
   a	
   substantial	
   amount	
   of	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
government	
  exercised	
  by	
  several	
  bodies,	
  the	
  most	
  important	
  being	
  the	
  court	
  presidents,	
  
and	
  it	
  is	
  therefore	
  a	
  mistake	
  to	
  conflate	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  with	
  judicial	
  councils.	
  The	
  
most	
  notable	
  changes	
  to	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  are	
  then	
  introduced	
  and	
  their	
  impact	
  on	
  
values	
   crucial	
   for	
   the	
   functioning	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   assessed.	
   And,	
   as	
   the	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
government	
  in	
  Czechia	
  is	
  primarily	
  exercised	
  by	
  court	
  presidents,	
  the	
  narrative	
  of	
  changes	
  
to	
   judicial	
   self-­‐government	
   and	
   their	
   impact	
   is	
   presented	
   as	
   a	
   narrative	
   of	
   changes	
  
affecting	
  court	
  presidents	
  and	
  of	
  their	
  effects	
  on	
  the	
  wider	
  legal,	
  social	
  and	
  political	
  fields.	
  
The	
  dominance	
  of	
  court	
  presidents,	
  built	
  in	
  part	
  on	
  informal	
  powers,	
  is	
  a	
  mixed	
  blessing	
  
however,	
  as	
  it	
  can	
  have	
  both	
  positive	
  and	
  negative	
  impact	
  on	
  the	
  crucial	
  values	
  and	
  may	
  
prove	
  rather	
  fragile	
  in	
  the	
  future.	
   	
  
∗
	
  Adam	
  Blisa	
  is	
  a	
  Researcher	
  at	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Studies	
  Institute,	
  Ph.D.	
  Candidate	
  at	
  the	
  Department	
  of	
  Constitutional	
  
Law	
  and	
  Political	
  Science	
  at	
  the	
  Faculty	
  of	
  Law	
  of	
  Masaryk	
  University,	
  and	
  Law	
  Clerk	
  to	
  a	
  Judge	
  at	
  the	
  Supreme	
  
Administrative	
  Court	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic.	
  Email:	
  adam.blisa@law.muni.cz.	
  The	
  research	
  leading	
  to	
  this	
  article	
  
has	
   received	
   funding	
   from	
   the	
   European	
   Research	
   Council	
   (ERC)	
   under	
   the	
   European	
   Union’s	
   Horizon	
   2020	
  
research	
  and	
  innovation	
  programme	
  (grant	
  no.	
  678375-­‐JUDI-­‐ARCH-­‐ERC-­‐2015-­‐STG).	
  
∗∗
	
  Tereza	
  Papoušková	
  is	
  a	
  Researcher	
  at	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Studies	
  Institute	
  and	
  a	
  Ph.D.	
  Candidate	
  at	
  the	
  Department	
  of	
  
Constitutional	
  Law	
  and	
  Political	
  Science	
  at	
  the	
  Faculty	
  of	
  Law	
  of	
  Masaryk	
  University.	
  Previously,	
  she	
  worked	
  as	
  a	
  
law	
   clerk	
   for	
   a	
   constitutional	
   justice	
   and	
   as	
   a	
   member	
   of	
   the	
   OPCAT	
   National	
   Preventive	
   Mechanism.	
   Email:	
  
tereza.papouskova@law.muni.cz.	
  
∗∗∗
	
   Marína	
   Urbániková	
   is	
   a	
   Senior	
   Researcher	
   at	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Studies	
   Institute,	
   Masaryk	
   University,	
   an	
   assistant	
  
professor	
   at	
   the	
   Faculty	
   of	
   Social	
   Studies,	
   Masaryk	
   University,	
   and	
   a	
   sociologist	
   at	
   the	
   Office	
   of	
   the	
   Public	
  
Defender	
  of	
  Rights	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic.	
  ORCID:	
  0000-­‐0003-­‐1640-­‐9823.	
  
1952	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
At	
   first	
   sight,	
   Czechia	
   does	
   not	
   differ	
   from	
   most	
   European	
   countries	
   as	
   far	
   as	
   the	
  
organization	
  of	
  justice	
  is	
  concerned.	
  Its	
  judicial	
  system	
  consists	
  of	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  
and	
   the	
   'ordinary'	
   court	
   system,	
   which	
   is	
   comprised	
   of	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   (SC),	
   the	
  
Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court	
  (SAC),	
  high	
  courts,	
  regional	
  courts	
  and	
  district	
  courts.	
  Apart	
  
from	
  the	
  top	
  two	
  courts	
  and	
  the	
  district	
  courts,	
  all	
  the	
  ordinary	
  courts	
  decide	
  on	
  criminal,
1
	
  
civil	
  and	
  administrative	
  matters.	
  However,	
  there	
  is	
  something	
  that	
  makes	
  Czechia	
  special	
  –	
  
unlike	
  many	
  of	
  its	
  European	
  counterparts,	
  Czechia	
  has	
  never	
  had	
  a	
  judicial	
  council,	
  i.e.	
  a	
  
body	
   that	
   centralizes	
   the	
   administration	
   of	
   courts	
   in	
   the	
   hands	
   of	
   judges.	
   In	
   this	
   sense	
  
Czechia,	
  when	
  it	
  comes	
  to	
  judicial	
  self-­‐government	
  (JSG),	
  is	
  the	
  proverbial	
  “black	
  sheep”.
2
	
  
During	
  the	
  1990’s	
  and	
  2000’s,	
  when	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  candidate-­‐countries	
  for	
  accession	
  to	
  the	
  
European	
  Union	
  adopted	
  the	
  Euro-­‐model	
  of	
  judicial	
  council,	
  Czechia	
  resisted	
  and	
  retained	
  
its	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  model	
  with	
  roots	
  in	
  the	
  Austro-­‐Hungarian	
  Empire.
3
	
  
	
  
Even	
   though	
   there	
   is	
   no	
   judicial	
   council	
   as	
   yet	
   and	
   many	
   hold	
   the	
   opinion	
   that	
   its	
  
introduction	
  is	
  long	
  overdue,	
  it	
  cannot	
  be	
  said	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  JSG	
  in	
  Czechia.	
  In	
  fact,	
  quite	
  
the	
   contrary	
   is	
   true.
4
	
   Two	
   crucial	
   actors	
   stand	
   at	
   the	
   center	
   of	
   the	
   Ministry	
   of	
   Justice	
  
model,	
  in	
  whose	
  hands	
  lie	
  most	
  of	
  the	
  personal,	
  administrative	
  and	
  financial	
  affairs	
  of	
  the	
  
judiciary:	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice	
  (MoJ)	
  and	
  the	
  court	
  presidents	
  (CPs).
5
	
  Several	
  other	
  actors	
  
complement	
  them.	
  They	
  are	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic,	
  who	
  formally	
  appoints	
  
judges	
  and	
  CPs	
  (and	
  in	
  the	
  past	
  also	
  attempted	
  to	
  dismiss	
  them),	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  (the	
  
only	
  body	
  with	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  dismiss	
  judges),	
  judicial	
  boards	
  functioning	
  as	
  a	
  consultative	
  
body	
  at	
  each	
  court,	
  and	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy,	
  responsible	
  for	
  educating	
  present	
  and	
  future	
  
judges.
6
	
  It	
  is	
  thus	
  clear	
  that	
  actors	
  from	
  within	
  the	
  judiciary	
  play	
  a	
  rather	
  important	
  role	
  in	
  
the	
  matters	
  of	
  judicial	
  government	
  (see	
  Table	
  1	
  below).	
  
1
	
  Note	
  that	
  prosecutors	
  do	
  not	
  form	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  judiciary	
  but	
  are	
  independent	
  from	
  it.	
  
2
	
   See	
   David	
   Kosař,	
   Politics	
   of	
   Judicial	
   Independence	
   and	
   Judicial	
   Accountability	
   in	
   Czechia:	
   Bargaining	
   in	
   the	
  
Shadow	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  between	
  Court	
  Presidents	
  and	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Justice,	
  13	
  EUROPEAN	
  CONSTITUTIONAL	
  LAW	
  REVIEW	
  
13,	
  97	
  (2017).	
  
3
	
  Michal	
  Bobek,	
  The	
  Administration	
  of	
  Courts	
  in	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic	
  –	
  In	
  Search	
  of	
  a	
  Constitutional	
  Balance,	
  16	
  EUR.	
  
PUB.	
  L.	
  251	
  (2010);	
  and,	
  generally,	
  Michal	
  Bobek	
  &	
  David	
  Kosař,	
  Global	
  Solutions,	
  Local	
  Damages:	
  A	
  Critical	
  Study	
  
in	
  Judicial	
  Councils	
  in	
  Central	
  and	
  Eastern	
  Europe,	
  15	
  GERMAN	
  L.J.	
  1257	
  (2014).	
  
4
	
  We	
  define	
  a	
  JSG	
  body	
  as	
  a	
  body	
  with	
  at	
  least	
  one	
  judge	
  whose	
  primary	
  function,	
  entrenched	
  in	
  a	
  legal	
  norm,	
  is	
  
to	
   decide	
   about	
   issues	
   regarding	
   court	
   administration	
   and/or	
   the	
   career	
   of	
   a	
   judge,	
   and/or	
   advise	
   those	
   who	
  
decide	
  about	
  such	
  issues.	
  
5
	
  DAVID	
  KOSAŘ,	
  PERILS	
  OF	
  JUDICIAL	
  SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT	
  IN	
  TRANSITIONAL	
  SOCIETIES	
  176	
  (2016).	
  
6
	
  For	
  further	
  information	
  regarding	
  the	
  Czech	
  judicial	
  environment	
  and	
  its	
  actors	
  see	
  especially	
  Michal	
  Bobek,	
  The	
  
Fortress	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Independence	
  and	
  the	
  Mental	
  Transitions	
  of	
  the	
  Central	
  European	
  Judiciaries,	
  14	
  EUR.	
  PUB.	
  L.	
  99	
  
(2008);	
  Bobek,	
  supra	
  note	
  3;	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5;	
  Zdeněk	
  Kühn,	
  The	
  Democratization	
  and	
  Modernization	
  of	
  Post-­‐
Communist	
  Judiciaries,	
  in	
  CENTRAL	
  AND	
  EASTERN	
  EUROPE	
  AFTER	
  TRANSITION	
  177	
  (Alberto	
  Febbrajo	
  &	
  Wojciech	
  Sadurski	
  
eds.,	
   2010);	
   ZDENĚK	
   KÜHN,	
   THE	
   JUDICIARY	
   IN	
   CENTRAL	
   AND	
   EASTERN	
   EUROPE:	
   MECHANICAL	
   JURISPRUDENCE	
   IN	
  
TRANSFORMATION?	
  (2011);	
  Zdeněk	
  Kühn,	
  Judicial	
  Administration	
  Reforms	
  in	
  Central-­‐Eastern	
  Europe:	
  Lessons	
  to	
  be	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1953	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  aim	
  of	
  this	
  article	
  is	
  to	
  provide	
  complex	
  insight	
  into	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  JSG	
  in	
  Czechia	
  
and	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  its	
  effects	
  on	
  the	
  wider	
  legal,	
  social	
  and	
  political	
  fields.	
  We	
  claim	
  that	
  
the	
  case	
  of	
  Czechia	
  proves	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  mistake	
  to	
  conflate	
  JSG	
  only	
  with	
  judicial	
  councils,	
  and	
  
that	
  JSG	
  can	
  exist	
  without	
  them.	
  In	
  Czechia,	
  it	
  was	
  the	
  CPs	
  who	
  built	
  and	
  preserved	
  a	
  great	
  
deal	
  of	
  JSG,	
  but,	
  at	
  the	
  price	
  of	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  transparency	
  and	
  fragility	
  of	
  the	
  balance	
  between	
  
all	
   actors	
   involved.	
   Section	
   A	
   thus	
   provides	
   an	
   overview	
   of	
   the	
   actors	
   and	
   a	
   historical	
  
context	
  of	
  their	
  evolution;	
  Section	
  B	
  tracks	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  changes	
  in	
  JSG	
  on	
  values	
  that	
  are	
  
critical	
  for	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  namely	
  judicial	
  independence,	
  accountability,	
  
transparency,	
  public	
  confidence	
  and	
  legitimacy;	
  and	
  Section	
  C	
  assesses	
  the	
  influence	
  the	
  
JSG	
  had	
  on	
  the	
  separation	
  of	
  powers	
  and	
  the	
  democratic	
  principle.	
  Section	
  D	
  then	
  briefly	
  
concludes.	
  
Table	
  1:	
  Bodies	
  and	
  actors	
  of	
  judicial	
  government	
  and	
  self-­‐government	
  in	
  Czechia	
  
	
  
	
  
A.	
  Of	
  Court	
  Presidents…	
  and	
  Others:	
  Forms	
  and	
  Rationales	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  
	
  
This	
  section	
  maps	
  the	
  key	
  JSG	
  bodies	
  in	
  Czechia;	
  their	
  powers,	
  composition	
  and	
  functioning	
  
are	
  discussed	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  part.	
  The	
  following	
  part	
  then	
  traces,	
  where	
  relevant,	
  rationales	
  
behind	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
   those	
   bodies	
   and	
   key	
   changes	
   made	
   to	
   them	
   (i.e.	
   critical	
  
junctures	
  in	
  their	
  development).	
  The	
  overall	
  picture	
  is	
  that	
  even	
  though	
  there	
  are	
  several	
  
JSG	
  bodies,	
  the	
  primary	
  role	
  is	
  played	
  by	
  the	
  CPs,	
  and	
  the	
  narrative	
  of	
  changes	
  to	
  JSG	
  is	
  
predominantly	
  a	
  narrative	
  of	
  changes	
  in	
  CP	
  powers	
  or	
  attempts	
  to	
  take	
  powers	
  away	
  from	
  
CPs.	
  
	
  
	
   	
  
Learned,	
  in	
  JUDICIAL	
  INDEPENDENCE	
  IN	
  TRANSITION	
  613	
  (Anja	
  Seibert-­‐Fohr	
  ed.,	
  2012);	
  and	
  HLEDÁNÍ	
  OPTIMÁLNÍHO	
  MODELU	
  
SPRÁVY	
  SOUDNICTVÍ	
  PRO	
  ČESKOU	
  REPUBLIKU	
  (Jan	
  Kysela	
  ed.,	
  2008).	
  
Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
   Judicial	
  Government	
  
Court	
  presidents	
  
College	
  of	
  
presidents	
  of	
  
regional	
  courts	
  
Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  Trinity	
  of	
  top	
  
court	
  presidents	
  
Judicial	
  boards	
  
Judicial	
  Academy	
  
President	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic	
  
Disciplinary	
  panels	
  
1954	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
I.	
  Overview	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  Bodies	
  
	
  
Court	
   presidents	
   are	
   arguably	
   the	
   most	
   important	
   and	
   powerful	
   JSG	
   actors	
   inside	
   and	
  
outside	
  the	
  judiciary	
  in	
  Czechia.
7
	
  Firstly,	
  they	
  are	
  key	
  players	
  in	
  personal	
  JSG,	
  as	
  they	
  play	
  a	
  
significant	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  careers	
  of	
  judges	
  from	
  beginning	
  to	
  end	
  and	
  have	
  a	
  say	
  in	
  judges’	
  
appointments,	
  secondments,	
  reassignments	
  and	
  promotions
8
	
  and	
  hold	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  file	
  a	
  
disciplinary	
   motion.
9
	
   More	
   specifically,	
   the	
   consent	
   of
10
	
   or	
   consultation	
   with
11
	
   CPs	
   is	
   de	
  
jure	
  needed	
  for	
  the	
  appointment	
  of	
  a	
  judge	
  to	
  “their”	
  courts.
12
	
  Nonetheless,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  
lack	
  of	
  formal	
  legal	
  criteria,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  CPs	
  themselves	
  who	
  de	
  facto	
  create	
  the	
  criteria	
  for	
  
selecting	
  judges,	
  and	
  they	
  hand-­‐pick	
  them,
13
	
  thus	
  serving	
  as	
  gatekeepers	
  to	
  the	
  judiciary.
14
	
  
Court	
  presidents	
  also	
  wield	
  significant	
  managerial	
  powers	
  regarding	
  their	
  courts,	
  ranging	
  
from	
  staffing	
  the	
  courts	
  with	
  administrative	
  personnel	
  and	
  controlling	
  the	
  court’s	
  budget
15
	
  
to	
  creating	
  rules	
  for	
  case	
  assignment,	
  assigning	
  judges	
  to	
  panels	
  and	
  selecting	
  judges	
  for	
  
grand	
  chambers	
  at	
  top	
  courts	
  (administrative	
  and	
  financial	
  JSG).
16
	
  
	
  
Secondly,	
   CPs	
   form	
   two	
   informal	
   groups	
   which	
   also	
   exert	
   strong	
   influence	
   outside	
   the	
  
judiciary	
  (normative	
  JSG):	
  the	
  college	
  of	
  presidents	
  of	
  regional	
  courts	
  and	
  the	
  trinity	
  of	
  top	
  
courts	
  presidents.	
  The	
  college	
  of	
  presidents	
  of	
  regional	
  courts	
  consists	
  of	
  the	
  presidents	
  of	
  
all	
  eight	
  regional	
  courts	
  who	
  meet	
  four	
  times	
  a	
  year.	
  Their	
  significance	
  is	
  underlined	
  by	
  the	
  
7
	
  Kühn	
  2012,	
  supra	
  note	
  6,	
  at	
  609.	
  
8
	
  Art.	
  73	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
9
	
  Art.	
  8(c)	
  to	
  (g)	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  7/2002	
  Coll.,	
  the	
  Code	
  of	
  Disciplinary	
  Procedure	
  with	
  Judges	
  and	
  Prosecutors.	
  
10
	
  This	
  goes	
  for	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  and	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court,	
  see	
  art.	
  70	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  
On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges,	
  and	
  art.	
  124	
  of	
  the	
  No.	
  150/2002	
  Coll.,	
  the	
  Code	
  of	
  Administrative	
  Justice.	
  
11
	
  This	
  goes	
  for	
  the	
  presidents	
  for	
  high	
  and	
  regional	
  courts;	
  see	
  art.	
  73	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  
and	
  Judges.	
  Assignment	
  to	
  the	
  district	
  courts	
  needs	
  to	
  be	
  in	
  consultation	
  with	
  the	
  presidents	
  of	
  the	
  respective	
  
regional	
  courts,	
  who	
  are	
  thus	
  “masters”	
  of	
  district	
  courts	
  as	
  well.	
  	
  
12
	
  An	
  attempt	
  by	
  the	
  former	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic,	
  Václav	
  Klaus,	
  to	
  circumvent	
  this	
  rule	
  was	
  thwarted	
  
by	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court;	
  for	
  a	
  concise	
  description	
  of	
  the	
  circumstances,	
  see	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  174–
175,	
  and	
  Bobek,	
  supra	
  note	
  3,	
  at	
  263–265.	
  
13
	
  For	
  further	
  details	
  on	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judges,	
  see	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  188–191	
  and	
  215–216.	
  The	
  rules	
  for	
  
the	
   selection	
   of	
   judges	
   for	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   and	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Administrative	
   Court	
   are	
   set	
   out	
   in	
   publicly	
  
available	
  court	
  presidents’	
  memoranda;	
  at	
  the	
  regional	
  court	
  level,	
  the	
  situation	
  is	
  rather	
  chaotic,	
  see	
  Kristián	
  
Léko,	
  Výběr	
  českých	
  soudců	
  ovládá	
  chaos,	
  LIDOVÉ	
  NOVINY,	
  June	
  5,	
  2017.	
  
14
	
  Kühn	
  2012,	
  supra	
  note	
  6,	
  at	
  612;	
  and	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  97	
  and	
  100.	
   	
  
15
	
  Arts.	
  124	
  to	
  127	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges;	
  Art.	
  29	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.150/2002	
  Coll.,	
  
the	
  Code	
  of	
  Administrative	
  Justice.	
  
16
	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  100.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1955	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
fact	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  reportedly	
  difficult	
  to	
  push	
  any	
  change	
  without	
  the	
  approval	
  of	
  the	
  college.
17
	
  
The	
  trinity	
  of	
  top	
  courts	
  presidents
18
	
  is	
  formed	
  by	
  the	
  presidents	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court,	
  the	
  
Supreme	
   Administrative	
   Court	
   and	
   the	
   Constitutional	
   Court.	
   Each	
   of	
   the	
   presidents	
   has	
  
always	
   exercised	
   a	
   significant	
   influence	
   on	
   the	
   Czech	
   judiciary,
19
	
   and	
   since	
   2015,	
   they	
  
solidified	
  their	
  position	
  by	
  sharing	
  their	
  views	
  at	
  regular	
  informal	
  meetings.
20
	
  
	
  
Judicial	
  boards	
  are	
  advisory	
  bodies	
  that,	
  since	
  2002,	
  exist	
  at	
  almost	
  every	
  court.
21
	
  Judicial	
  
boards	
   are	
   composed	
   of	
   three	
   to	
   five	
   judges	
   of	
   the	
   respective	
   court	
   elected	
   by	
   all	
   the	
  
court’s	
  judges	
  for	
  a	
  five-­‐year	
  term.	
  Their	
  task	
  is	
  to	
  comment	
  on	
  various	
  issues	
  concerning	
  
the	
   functioning	
   of	
   the	
   court:	
   candidates	
   for	
   the	
   positions	
   of	
   the	
   president	
   and	
   vice-­‐
president	
  of	
  the	
  court,	
  temporary	
  and	
  permanent	
  secondment	
  of	
  judges,	
  drafts	
  of	
  work	
  
schedules	
   setting	
   rules	
   for	
   case	
   assignment	
   etc.
22
	
   Owing	
   to	
   the	
   non-­‐binding	
   nature	
   of	
  
judicial	
   boards’	
   recommendations	
   and	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   CPs	
   partly	
   set	
   their	
   agenda,	
   the	
  
strength	
   of	
   judicial	
   boards	
   depends	
   primarily	
   on	
   the	
   personality	
   of	
   the	
   CPs	
   and	
   their	
  
willingness	
   to	
   cooperate	
   and	
   listen.
23
	
   Nevertheless,	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   they	
   must	
   be	
   at	
   times	
  
mandatorily	
  consulted	
  gives	
  them	
  some,	
  albeit	
  informal,	
  power.	
  
	
  
The	
   Judicial	
   Academy	
   prepares	
   and	
   educates	
   future	
   judges	
   and	
   provides	
   continuing	
  
education	
   for	
   current	
   judges	
   and	
   other	
   persons	
   serving	
   in	
   the	
   judicial	
   system	
   (clerks,	
  
advocates,	
   notaries,	
   public	
   prosecutors	
   etc.),
24
	
   thus	
   playing	
   a	
   crucial	
   role	
   in	
   educational	
  
JSG.	
   The	
   Judicial	
   Academy,	
   established	
   in	
   2002,	
   is	
   led	
   by	
   the	
   Director	
   of	
   the	
   Judicial	
  
Academy,	
   appointed	
   by	
   the	
   MoJ,
25
	
   and	
   the	
   Board	
   of	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Academy	
   which	
  
determines	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  the	
  education	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy.	
  The	
  Board	
  has	
  
15	
  members	
  and	
  is	
  composed	
  of	
  judges	
  and	
  public	
  prosecutors,	
  who	
  are	
  required	
  to	
  have	
  
17
	
  The	
  minutes	
  from	
  the	
  meetings	
  of	
  the	
  college	
  are	
  sent	
  to	
  the	
  MoJ	
  and	
  discussed	
  there,	
  see	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  
at	
  179–181,	
  and	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  100–101.	
  
18
	
  This	
  term	
  for	
  the	
  group	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  coined	
  officially.	
  
19
	
  The	
  most	
  vocal	
  one	
  is	
  Josef	
  Baxa,	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  SAC,	
  who	
  is	
  also	
  an	
  ardent	
  supporter	
  of	
  introducing	
  a	
  judicial	
  
council	
  model	
  of	
  JSG.	
  	
  
20
	
  This	
  is	
  also	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  common	
  ground	
  found	
  between	
  the	
  three	
  presidents,	
  Josef	
  Baxa	
  (SAC),	
  Pavel	
  Šámal	
  (SC),	
  
and	
  Pavel	
  Rychetský	
  (CC);	
  see	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  101.	
  
21
	
  Where	
  there	
  is	
  fewer	
  than	
  11	
  judges,	
  the	
  plenary	
  session	
  consisting	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  judges	
  fulfils	
  the	
  tasks	
  of	
  a	
  judicial	
  
board;	
  see	
  Arts.	
  46	
  and	
  47	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  on	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
22
	
  Arts.	
  50–53	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
23
	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  178–179.	
  
24
	
  Art.	
  129	
  to	
  133	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
25
	
  Art	
  130(3)	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
1956	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
majority	
  together,	
  and	
  persons	
  from	
  other	
  legal	
  professions	
  such	
  as	
  academics,	
  advocates	
  
or	
  notaries.
26
	
  
	
  
Disciplinary	
  panels	
  are	
  the	
  last	
  JSG	
  body	
  to	
  be	
  mentioned.	
  Since	
  2008,	
  there	
  are	
  separate	
  
mixed	
   disciplinary	
   panels	
   composed	
   of	
   three	
   judges	
   and	
   three	
   non-­‐judges	
   functioning	
  
under	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Administrative	
   Court.
27
	
   The	
   panels	
   have	
   broad	
   powers	
   regarding	
   a	
  
judge’s	
  career,	
  as	
  the	
  sanctions	
  they	
  can	
  impose	
  on	
  disciplined	
  judges	
  include	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  
reprimand	
   or	
   several	
   types	
   of	
   salary	
   reductions,	
   but	
   also	
   their	
   dismissal.	
   A	
   Disciplinary	
  
panel’s	
   role	
   is	
   further	
   strengthened	
   by	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   its	
   decisions	
   cannot	
   be	
   appealed.	
  
Nevertheless,	
   this	
   role	
   is	
   conditioned	
   by	
   the	
   activity	
   of	
   those	
   entitled	
   to	
   initiate	
   the	
  
disciplinary	
   proceedings	
   –	
   the	
   Minister	
   of	
   Justice,	
   CPs	
   and	
   the	
   President	
   of	
   the	
   Czech	
  
Republic.
28
	
  
	
  
II.	
  Critical	
  Junctures:	
  Changes	
  to	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  
	
  
The	
  Czech	
  model	
  of	
  court	
  administration	
  has	
  long	
  rested	
  on	
  three	
  pillars	
  –	
  the	
  MoJ,	
  CPs	
  
and	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  –	
  to	
  which	
  new	
  ones	
  –	
  judicial	
  boards	
  and	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy	
  –	
  
were	
  added	
  only	
  recently.	
  The	
  MoJ-­‐CPs-­‐disciplinary	
  panel	
  model	
  of	
  court	
  administration	
  
was	
   present	
   in	
   Czechoslovakia	
   ever	
   since	
   its	
   formation	
   after	
   the	
   fall	
   of	
   the	
   Austro-­‐
Hungarian	
  Empire.	
  In	
  a	
  nutshell,	
  apart	
  from	
  both	
  introducing	
  judicial	
  boards	
  that	
  only	
  play	
  
an	
   advisory	
   role	
   and	
   cannot,	
   de	
   jure,	
   decide	
   on	
   anything	
   and	
   establishing	
   the	
   Judicial	
  
Academy,	
  which	
  has	
  powers	
  related	
  only	
  to	
  a	
  narrow	
  dimension	
  of	
  court	
  administration,	
  
there	
  were	
  no	
  significant	
  changes	
  to	
  the	
  JSG	
  in	
  Czechia	
  since	
  the	
  Velvet	
  Revolution.	
  None	
  
of	
  the	
  events	
  that	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  nation-­‐wide	
  judicial	
  councils	
  in	
  other	
  countries	
  
had	
   such	
   an	
   impact	
   in	
   Czechia.	
   Neither	
   the	
   revolution	
   itself,	
   nor	
   the	
   subsequent	
  
democratization	
   of	
   the	
   country	
   resulted	
   in	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
   a	
   new	
   model	
   of	
   court	
  
administration.	
  Neither	
  did	
  the	
  EU	
  Accession	
  Process:	
  in	
  1997,	
  the	
  European	
  Commission	
  
concluded	
  simply	
  that	
  “[t]he	
  Czech	
  judiciary	
  [was]	
  independent”	
  and	
  it	
  thereafter	
  devoted	
  
little	
   attention	
   to	
   the	
   system	
   of	
   court	
   administration	
   and	
   separation	
   of	
   powers	
   in	
   the	
  
accession	
  progress	
  reports	
  on	
  Czechia.	
  Therefore,	
  it	
  is	
  fitting	
  to	
  instead	
  discuss	
  the	
  partial	
  
modifications	
  of	
  the	
  long	
  existing	
  model	
  within	
  which	
  CPs	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  the	
  primary	
  
26
	
   Art	
   130(2)	
   of	
   the	
   Law	
   No.6/2002	
   Coll.,	
   On	
   the	
   Courts	
   and	
   Judges.	
   As	
   of	
   2017,	
   judges	
   alone	
   do	
   not	
   have	
   a	
  
majority	
   on	
   the	
   board,	
   although	
   the	
   rules	
   permit	
   it:	
   there	
   are	
   7	
   judges,	
   2	
   public	
   prosecutors,	
   3	
   academics,	
   1	
  
advocate,	
  1	
  lawyer	
  from	
  the	
  MoJ,	
  and	
  a	
  former	
  constitutional	
  justice/ombudsman.	
  
27
	
  The	
  panel	
  is	
  composed	
  of	
  one	
  judge	
  from	
  the	
  SAC,	
  one	
  judge	
  from	
  the	
  SC,	
  one	
  judge	
  from	
  regional	
  or	
  district	
  
court,	
  one	
  attorney,	
  one	
  state	
  prosecutor,	
  and	
  one	
  academic;	
  see	
  Art.	
  4(1)	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.7/2002	
  Coll.,	
  the	
  Code	
  
of	
  Disciplinary	
  Procedure	
  with	
  Judges	
  and	
  Prosecutors,	
  as	
  amended	
  by	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  314/2008	
  Coll.	
  (hereinafter	
  
“2008	
   Disciplinary	
   Code”).	
   For	
   more	
   info	
   on	
   disciplinary	
   panels,	
   see	
   DAVID	
   KOSAŘ	
   &	
   TEREZA	
   PAPOUŠKOVÁ,	
   KÁRNÁ	
  
ODPOVĚDNOST	
  SOUDCE	
  V	
  PŘERODU:	
  PONAUČENÍ	
  Z	
  ČESKÉ	
  REPUBLIKY	
  (2017).	
  
28
	
  Art.	
  8(2)	
  and	
  (3)	
  of	
  the	
  2008	
  Disciplinary	
  Code.	
  Note	
  that	
  the	
  Public	
  Defender	
  of	
  Rights	
  can	
  initiate	
  disciplinary	
  
proceedings	
  as	
  well,	
  but	
  only	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  court	
  officials.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1957	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
JSG	
  actors,	
  and	
  where	
  disciplinary	
  panels,	
  judicial	
  boards	
  and	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy	
  play	
  
rather	
  a	
  marginal,	
  but	
  still	
  JSG	
  related,	
  role.	
  
	
  
Let	
  us	
  concentrate	
  on	
  the	
  marginal	
  JSG	
  bodies	
  first.	
  Disciplinary	
  panels	
  existed	
  since	
  the	
  
very	
  founding	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic
29
	
  and	
  their	
  functioning	
  has	
  changed	
  only	
  twice	
  –	
  in	
  
2002	
  and	
  2008.
30
	
  The	
  power	
  to	
  initiate	
  disciplinary	
  proceedings	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  entrusted	
  
to	
  CPs	
  and	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice.
31
	
  Since	
  2008,	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic	
  and	
  
the	
   Public	
   Defender	
   of	
   Rights
32
	
   also	
   have	
   this	
   power,	
   however	
   they	
   use	
   it	
   very	
   rarely.
33
	
  
Whereas	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  have	
  always	
  been	
  empowered	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  harshest	
  sanction	
  
possible	
  –	
  dismissal	
  of	
  the	
  judge	
  facing	
  discipline	
  –	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  to	
  decide	
  on	
  salary	
  reductions	
  
or	
  impose	
  reprimands,	
  since	
  2002	
  they	
  have	
  lost	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  reassign	
  a	
  judge	
  to	
  a	
  court	
  
of	
  the	
  same	
  or	
  lower	
  level.	
  Between	
  1993	
  and	
  2008	
  disciplinary	
  proceedings	
  were	
  two-­‐
tiered,
34
	
  with	
  high	
  courts	
  or,	
  until	
  2002,	
  regional	
  courts	
  serving	
  as	
  the	
  first	
  instance	
  and	
  the	
  
Supreme	
  Court	
  serving	
  as	
  the	
  appellate	
  one.
35
	
  Since	
  2008,	
  there	
  is	
  only	
  one	
  disciplinary	
  tier	
  
–	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court.	
  It	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  the	
  case	
  that	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  
were	
  composed	
  of	
  judges,	
  however,	
  since	
  2008	
  non-­‐judges	
  were	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  panels	
  and	
  
the	
  parity	
  of	
  them	
  and	
  judges	
  was	
  introduced.
36
	
  The	
  official	
  rationale	
  behind	
  this	
  change	
  
was	
   to	
   increase	
   the	
   objectivity	
   of	
   disciplinary	
   panels’	
   decision-­‐making	
   and	
   to	
   enrich	
  
disciplinary	
   proceedings	
   with	
   views	
   that	
   cannot	
   be	
   expected	
   of	
   judicial	
   members	
   of	
  
disciplinary	
  panels.
37
	
  The	
  real	
  aim	
  was	
  then	
  to	
  tighten	
  the	
  proceedings.
38
	
  	
  
	
  
29
	
  In	
  fact	
  they	
  existed	
  even	
  before,	
  in	
  Czechoslovakia.	
  See	
  MICHAL	
  PRINC.	
  SOUDNICTVÍ	
  V	
  ČESKÝCH	
  ZEMÍCH	
  V	
  LETECH	
  1848–
1938	
  (SOUDY,	
  SOUDNÍ	
  OSOBY,	
  DOBOVÉ	
  PROBLÉMY)	
  143–149	
  (2015).	
  
30
	
   See	
   the	
   Law	
   No.	
   412/1991	
   Coll.,	
   on	
   Disciplinary	
   Liability	
   of	
   Judges,	
   the	
   Law	
   No.	
   7/2002	
   Coll.,	
   the	
   Code	
   of	
  
Disciplinary	
   Procedure	
   with	
   Judges	
   and	
   Prosecutors	
   (hereinafter	
   “2002	
   Disciplinary	
   Code”)	
   and	
   the	
   2008	
  
Disciplinary	
  Code.	
  
31
	
  Note	
  that	
  from	
  2002	
  to	
  2008	
  a	
  judge	
  accused	
  of	
  an	
  offense	
  could	
  request	
  that	
  the	
  offense	
  be	
  dealt	
  with	
  in	
  
disciplinary	
  proceedings.	
  Previously,	
  the	
  law	
  enforcement	
  authorities	
  could	
  refer	
  the	
  matter	
  to	
  the	
  disciplinary	
  
panels.	
  
	
  	
  
32
	
  Nevertheless,	
  she	
  can	
  initiate	
  the	
  disciplinary	
  proceedings	
  only	
  against	
  court	
  officials.	
  
33
	
  David	
  Kosař	
  &	
  Tereza	
  Papoušková,	
  Přinesla	
  “Pospíšilova”	
  reforma	
  kárného	
  řízení	
  skutečně	
  zpřísnění	
  kárného	
  
postihu	
  českých	
  soudců?	
  25	
  ČASOPIS	
  PRO	
  PRÁVNÍ	
  VĚDU	
  A	
  PRAXI	
  219	
  (2017).	
  
34
	
  From	
  1993	
  to	
  2002,	
  the	
  proceedings	
  were	
  only	
  one-­‐tiered	
  for	
  judges	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court.	
  
35
	
  Art.	
  5	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  412/1991	
  Coll.,	
  on	
  Disciplinary	
  Liability	
  of	
  Judges	
  and	
  art.	
  3	
  of	
  the	
  2002	
  Disciplinary	
  Code.	
  
36
	
  For	
  information	
  on	
  composition	
  of	
  the	
  panels	
  see	
  supra	
  note	
  27.	
  
37
	
  See	
  the	
  Explanatory	
  Memorandum	
  to	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  314/2008	
  Coll.,	
  amending,	
  among	
  else,	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  7/2002	
  
Coll.,	
  the	
  Code	
  of	
  Disciplinary	
  Procedure	
  with	
  Judges	
  and	
  Prosecutors.	
  
38
	
  KOSAŘ	
  &	
  PAPOUŠKOVÁ,	
  supra	
  note	
  27.	
  
	
  
1958	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
Judicial	
   boards	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Academy	
   were	
   established	
   by	
   law
39
	
   in	
   2002.	
   The	
  
rationale	
  of	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy	
  was	
  simple	
  –	
  to	
  ensure	
  the	
  quality	
  
of	
  judging	
  by	
  centralizing	
  and	
  regulating	
  the	
  life-­‐long	
  education	
  of	
  judges.	
  As	
  this	
  aim	
  was	
  
widely	
   supported,	
   there	
   were	
   no	
   real	
   competing	
   proposals	
   and	
   the	
   only	
   discussion	
  
concerned	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  the	
  hegemonic	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  JA.
40
	
  Nevertheless,	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  
Court	
   found	
   the	
   provisions	
   obliging	
   judges	
   to	
   complete	
   further	
   education	
   of	
   a	
   specified	
  
length,	
  provided	
  by	
  a	
  determined	
  body	
  and	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  evaluation	
  of	
  a	
  judge	
  that	
  could	
  
lead	
  to	
  her	
  dismissal	
  unconstitutional.
41
	
  Another	
  rationale	
  going	
  beyond	
  this	
  aim,	
  added	
  
into	
  the	
  relevant	
  bill	
  only	
  later,	
  was	
  to	
  empower	
  the	
  JA	
  to	
  also	
  ensure	
  that	
  people	
  entering	
  
the	
  judiciary	
  as	
  law	
  clerks	
  are	
  of	
  certain	
  professional	
  quality.	
  However,	
  although	
  the	
  JA	
  is	
  
to	
  express	
  its	
  views	
  on	
  a	
  judicial	
  trainee,	
  who	
  is,	
  in	
  the	
  end,	
  selected	
  by	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  
the	
  relevant	
  regional	
  court,	
  it	
  hardly	
  ever	
  does	
  so.
42
	
  The	
  rationales	
  and	
  consequences	
  of	
  
the	
   introduction	
   of	
   judicial	
   boards	
   are	
   discussed	
   a	
   bit	
   later	
   along	
   with	
   the	
   limitations	
  
placed	
  on	
  the	
  leeway	
  CPs	
  have	
  for	
  exercising	
  their	
  powers.	
  
	
  
We	
  now	
  turn	
  to	
  the	
  crucial	
  JSG	
  body,	
  court	
  presidents.	
  As	
  already	
  emphasized,	
  CPs	
  always	
  
had	
   the	
   major	
   say	
   in	
   court	
   administration	
   and	
   the	
   careers	
   of	
   individual	
   judges.	
  
Nevertheless,	
  the	
  entities	
  that	
  could	
  determine	
  or	
  influence	
  the	
  way	
  they	
  exercised	
  their	
  
powers	
  differed.	
  At	
  first,	
  until	
  1989,	
  CPs	
  de	
  facto	
  served	
  as	
  the	
  “transmission	
  belt”,	
  as	
  they	
  
could	
  be	
  recalled	
  by	
  the	
  Communist	
  Party	
  anytime	
  at	
  a	
  whim	
  and	
  had	
  to	
  “transmit”	
  orders	
  
from	
  the	
  Communist	
  Party	
  to	
  individual	
  judges	
  in	
  sensitive	
  cases.	
  This	
  changed	
  after	
  the	
  
Velvet	
  Revolution.	
  Not	
  only	
  was	
  the	
  MoJ	
  no	
  longer	
  under	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Communist	
  
Party,	
   but	
   it	
   practically	
   stopped	
   exercising	
   its	
   influence	
   on	
   CPs,	
   even	
   though	
   it	
   de	
   jure	
  
could,	
  as	
  the	
  Minister	
  still	
  had	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  recall	
  CPs	
  at	
  any	
  time.
43
	
  There	
  are	
  two	
  major	
  
reasons	
   why	
   the	
   “transmission	
   belt”	
   argument	
   no	
   longer	
   worked	
  in	
  Czechia.	
  First,	
  most	
  
ministers	
  desperately	
  wanted	
  to	
  avoid	
  this	
  type	
  of	
  confrontation,	
  which	
  would	
  hand	
  the	
  
opposition	
   parties	
   the	
   proverbial	
   stick	
   with	
   which	
   to	
   beat	
   the	
   Minister	
   and	
   the	
   ruling	
  
coalition.
44
	
  Second,	
  as	
  CPs	
  remained	
  in	
  office	
  much	
  longer	
  than	
  the	
  Ministers	
  of	
  Justice
45
	
  
39
	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  on	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
40
	
   In	
   the	
   end,	
   judges	
   can	
   fulfil	
   their	
   obligation	
   to	
   educate	
   themselves	
   also	
   by	
   attending	
   education	
   events	
  
organized	
  by	
  other	
  courts	
  and	
  universities.	
  
41
	
  Judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  18	
  June	
  2002,	
  case	
  no.	
  Pl.	
  ÚS	
  7/02.	
  
	
  
42
	
  See	
  the	
  next	
  Section	
  on	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  selection	
  of	
  judicial	
  personnel.	
  
43
	
  Note	
  that	
  presidents	
  of	
  top	
  three	
  courts	
  (the	
  Supreme,	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  and	
  the	
  Constitutional)	
  are	
  
appointed	
  and	
  recalled	
  by	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic.	
  Nevertheless,	
  analogical	
  argumentation	
  applies.	
  
44
	
  In	
  the	
  1990s	
  some	
  Ministers	
  dared	
  to	
  take	
  the	
  risk.	
  For	
  instance,	
  when	
  Otakar	
  Motejl	
  became	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  
Justice	
  in	
  1998,	
  he	
  soon	
  dismissed	
  five	
  of	
  the	
  eight	
  regional	
  court	
  presidents.	
  However,	
  Motejl’s	
  gravitas	
  was	
  
rather	
  unique.	
  
45
	
  There	
  were	
  16	
  ministers	
  of	
  justice	
  between	
  1993	
  and	
  2015	
  and	
  the	
  average	
  length	
  of	
  their	
  terms	
  was	
  less	
  than	
  
two	
  years.	
  In	
  contrast,	
  most	
  CPs	
  held	
  office	
  for	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  decade.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1959	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
they	
  had	
  the	
  best	
  overview	
  of	
  what	
  was	
  going	
  on	
  within	
  the	
  judiciary	
  and	
  this	
  information	
  
asymmetry	
   worked	
   in	
   their	
   favour.	
   Therefore,	
   after	
   1989,	
   no	
   other	
   entity	
   was	
   able	
   to	
  
significantly	
  influence	
  the	
  way	
  CPs	
  exercised	
  their	
  JSG-­‐related	
  powers.	
  
	
  
This	
   changed	
   in	
   2002	
   with	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
   judicial	
   boards.	
   Entrusted	
   only	
   with	
  
consultative	
  function,	
  judicial	
  boards	
  were	
  meant	
  to	
  “address	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  the	
  involvement	
  
of	
  judges	
  in	
  the	
  court	
  administration”
46
	
  and	
  to	
  advise	
  CPs	
  on	
  how	
  they	
  should	
  administer	
  
their	
  court	
  and	
  treat	
  its	
  judges.	
  When	
  the	
  government	
  submitted	
  the	
  relevant	
  bill,	
  judicial	
  
boards	
  were	
  also	
  supposed	
  to	
  evaluate	
  judges	
  and	
  submit	
  proposals	
  for	
  the	
  assessment	
  of	
  
their	
   professional	
   competence.	
   However,	
   discussions	
   in	
   the	
   Chamber	
   of	
   Deputies’	
  
Constitutional	
  Law	
  Committee,	
  to	
  which	
  representatives	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  were	
  also	
  invited,	
  
resulted	
   in	
   the	
   compromise	
   conclusion	
   that	
   judicial	
   boards	
   were	
   to	
   have	
   only	
   advisory	
  
competences.	
  The	
  lack	
  of	
  will	
  to	
  create	
  any	
  new	
  JSG	
  body	
  and	
  the	
  urge	
  to	
  take	
  a	
  step	
  that	
  
would	
   at	
   least	
   simulate	
   its	
   creation	
   were	
   the	
   results	
   of	
   the	
   2000	
   rejection	
   of	
   the	
  
constitutional	
  bill	
  establishing	
  a	
  nation-­‐wide	
  JC	
  with	
  relatively	
  substantive	
  powers	
  that	
  will	
  
be	
  discussed	
  below.	
  
	
  
The	
   year	
   2002	
   brought	
   yet	
   another	
   modification.	
   An	
   informal	
   body	
   potentially	
   able	
   to	
  
influence	
  the	
  way	
  CPs	
  exercised	
  their	
  powers	
  emerged.	
  This	
  entity	
  was	
  formed	
  by	
  the	
  eight	
  
presidents	
  of	
  regional	
  courts	
  who	
  decided	
  to	
  meet	
  regularly
47
	
  to	
  discuss	
  practical	
  issues	
  
that	
   affected	
   all	
   regional	
   courts	
   and	
   take	
   the	
   lead	
   in	
   judicial	
   reform.
48
	
   Although	
   this	
  
informal	
   body	
   –	
   the	
   college	
   of	
   regional	
   court	
   presidents	
   –	
   had	
   no	
   statutory	
   basis,
49
	
   the	
  
costs	
  of	
  its	
  meetings	
  were	
  and	
  still	
  are	
  covered	
  by	
  the	
  regional	
  court	
  budgets	
  and,	
  more	
  
importantly,	
   its	
   voice	
   is	
   often	
   heard	
   not	
   only	
   in	
   professional	
   circles,	
   but	
   also	
   in	
   public	
  
debates.	
  
	
  
Another	
  modification,	
  this	
  time	
  greatly	
  influencing	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  CPs,	
  came	
  in	
  2008,	
  when	
  
the	
  limitation	
  of	
  their	
  term	
  of	
  office	
  was	
  enacted.
50
	
  It	
  is	
  true	
  that	
  until	
  then	
  the	
  law	
  gave	
  
46
	
  Explanatory	
  Memorandum	
  to	
  the	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  on	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
47
	
  See	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  100,	
  who	
  claims	
  that	
  according	
  to	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  “founding	
  fathers”	
  of	
  the	
  body,	
  the	
  
idea	
  of	
  creating	
  an	
  informal	
  association	
  of	
  regional	
  court	
  presidents	
  was	
  suggested	
  to	
  them	
  by	
  Mr	
  Jean-­‐Michel	
  
Peltier,	
  a	
  French	
  liaison	
  magistrate	
  in	
  Prague.	
  	
  
48
	
  Id.	
  	
  
49
	
  Id.	
  In	
  2007,	
  presidents	
  of	
  regional	
  courts	
  attempted	
  to	
  formalize	
  the	
  college,	
  but	
  both	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  
and	
  the	
  presidents	
  of	
  the	
  top	
  courts	
  rejected	
  that	
  idea.	
  
50
	
  Law	
  No.	
  314/2008	
  Coll.,	
  amending,	
  among	
  other	
  things,	
  the	
  Law	
  on	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  Note	
  that	
  this	
  very	
  
amendment	
  also	
  transferred	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  discipline	
  judges	
  from	
  exclusively	
  judicial	
  panels	
  at	
  high	
  courts	
  (and	
  the	
  
Supreme	
  Court	
  acting	
  as	
  the	
  appellate	
  body)	
  to	
  mixed	
  panels	
  (composed	
  of	
  three	
  judges	
  and	
  three	
  non-­‐judges)	
  at	
  
the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court.	
  	
  
1960	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  dismiss	
  CPs	
  at	
  any	
  time,
51
	
  however	
  this	
  power	
  was,	
  for	
  
the	
  reasons	
  outlined	
  above,	
  de	
  facto	
  non-­‐exercisable.
52
	
  The	
  enactment	
  of	
  a	
  7-­‐year	
  limit	
  for	
  
officials	
   of	
   ordinary	
   courts	
   and	
   a	
   10-­‐year	
   limit	
   for	
   officials	
   of	
   the	
   two	
   supreme	
   courts
53
	
  
came	
  as	
  a	
  reaction	
  to	
  CPs’	
  efforts	
  to	
  secure	
  their	
  irrevocability,	
  also	
  de	
  jure.	
  In	
  the	
  mid-­‐
2000s,	
  Czech	
  CPs	
  started	
  to	
  challenge	
  their	
  dismissals	
  before	
  administrative	
  courts	
  and	
  the	
  
Constitutional	
  Court,	
  and	
  they	
  eventually	
  won.
54
	
  Moreover,	
  in	
  2006,	
  the	
  Czech	
  President,	
  
for	
   the	
   first	
   time	
   ever,	
   dared	
   to	
   dismiss	
   the	
   President	
   of	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court.	
   She	
  
immediately	
  challenged	
  her	
  dismissal	
  before	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court.	
  The	
  Constitutional	
  
Court	
   decided	
   not	
   only	
   in	
   favour	
   of	
   the	
   dismissed	
   president,	
   but	
   also	
   struck	
   down	
   the	
  
relevant	
   article	
   of	
   the	
   Czech	
   Law	
   on	
   Courts	
   and	
   Judges	
   declaring	
   that	
   it	
   was	
  
unconstitutional	
   for	
   the	
   executive	
   to	
   dismiss	
   court	
   officials.
55
	
   The	
   Constitutional	
   Court	
  
influenced	
  the	
  2008	
  JSG	
  modification	
  one	
  more	
  time	
  when	
  in	
  2010	
  it	
  not	
  only	
  found	
  that	
  
the	
  introduction	
  of	
  limited	
  terms	
  for	
  CPs	
  and	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  limited	
  terms	
  to	
  the	
  
incumbent	
  CPs	
  were	
  constitutional,	
  but	
  also	
  struck	
  down	
  the	
  provision	
  that	
  allowed	
  the	
  re-­‐
appointment	
   of	
   the	
   same	
   court	
   president	
   for	
   a	
   second	
   term.
56
	
   Consequently,	
   all	
   then-­‐
incumbent	
   CPs
57
	
   are	
   now	
   gone,	
   which	
   is	
   the	
   most	
   important	
   change	
   within	
   the	
   Czech	
  
judiciary	
  since	
  the	
  Velvet	
  Revolution.	
  
	
  
The	
  last	
  significant	
  modification	
  of	
  JSG	
  constituted	
  by	
  CPs	
  took	
  place	
  in	
  2015.	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  
year	
   the	
   presidents	
   of	
   the	
   Constitutional	
   Court,	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   and	
   the	
   Supreme	
  
Administrative	
  Court	
  created	
  an	
  informal	
  “trinity	
  of	
  top	
  court	
  presidents”.	
  The	
  presidents	
  
of	
  these	
  three	
  top	
  courts,	
  each	
  in	
  his	
  or	
  her	
  way,	
  have	
  always	
  exercised	
  their	
  influence	
  on	
  
the	
  Czech	
  judiciary.	
  However,	
  they	
  only	
  formed	
  a	
  truly	
  cohesive	
  group	
  in	
  2015.	
  This	
  was	
  
prompted	
   by	
   the	
   resignation	
   of	
   then	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   President	
   Iva	
   Brožová	
   in	
   January	
  
2015,
58
	
  who	
  was	
  eventually	
  replaced	
  by	
  Pavel	
  Šámal.	
  Šámal	
  soon	
  found	
  common	
  ground	
  
51
	
  Note,	
  again,	
  that	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Republic	
  could	
  have	
  dismissed	
  the	
  presidents	
  of	
  the	
  top	
  three	
  
courts.	
  
52
	
  Compare	
  supra	
  note	
  46.	
  For	
  details	
  see	
  Otakar	
  Motejl,	
  Pohled	
  ministrů	
  spravedlnosti,	
  in	
  HLEDÁNÍ	
  OPTIMÁLNÍHO	
  
MODELU	
  SPRÁVY	
  SOUDNICTVÍ	
  PRO	
  ČESKOU	
  REPUBLIKU	
  13	
  (Jan	
  Kysela	
  ed.,	
  2008).	
  	
  
53
	
  Note	
  that	
  officials	
  of	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  are	
  selected	
  from	
  among	
  the	
  constitutional	
  justices,	
  who	
  are	
  
appointed	
  for	
  a	
  period	
  of	
  ten	
  years	
  (that	
  is,	
  as	
  the	
  tradition	
  has	
  it,	
  once	
  renewable),	
  therefore	
  their	
  office	
  has	
  
always	
  been	
  limited	
  in	
  this	
  sense.	
  
54
	
  For	
  further	
  details	
  including	
  more	
  doctrinal	
  analysis	
  of	
  these	
  cases	
  see	
  Bobek,	
  supra	
  note	
  3,	
  at	
  263–265.	
  
55
	
  Judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  11	
  July	
  2006,	
  case	
  no.	
  Pl.	
  ÚS	
  18/06.	
  For	
  further	
  details	
  see	
  KOSAŘ,	
  
supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  173–175.	
  
56
	
  Judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  6	
  October	
  2010,	
  case	
  no.	
  Pl.	
  ÚS	
  39/08.	
  
57
	
  The	
  former	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court,	
  Iva	
  Brožová,	
  resigned	
  voluntarily	
  in	
  January	
  2015.	
  
58
	
  Iva	
  Brožová	
  was	
  often	
  out	
  of	
  sync	
  with	
  Pavel	
  Rychetský	
  and	
  Josef	
  Baxa.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1961	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
with	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court,	
  Pavel	
  Rychetský,	
  and,	
  in	
  particular,	
  with	
  the	
  
President	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court,	
  Josef	
  Baxa.
59
	
  
	
  
Apart	
  from	
  the	
  five	
  modifications	
  of	
  CPs’	
  position	
  within	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  there	
  were	
  several	
  
attempts	
  to	
  take	
  away	
  some	
  of	
  their	
  powers	
  and	
  vest	
  them	
  in	
  a	
  nation-­‐wide	
  JSG	
  body.	
  
These	
   attempts	
   were,	
   however,	
   except	
   for	
   the	
   establishment	
   of	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Academy,	
  
unsuccessful.	
  The	
  first	
  one	
  came	
  in	
  1999	
  when	
  Otakar	
  Motejl,	
  the	
  then	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice,	
  
introduced	
  a	
  judicial	
  reform	
  package
60
	
  which	
  consisted	
  of	
  a	
  Constitutional	
  Amendment
61
	
  
and	
  two	
  brand	
  new	
  laws
62
	
  on	
  courts	
  and	
  judges	
  and	
  whose	
  aim	
  was	
  to	
  replace	
  the	
  MoJ	
  
model	
   of	
   court	
   administration	
   with	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Council	
   Euro-­‐model.	
   More	
   concretely,	
  
Motejl	
  suggested	
  establishing	
  a	
  High	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary	
  consisting	
  of	
  sixteen	
  members	
  
–	
  eight	
  judges	
  and	
  eight	
  members	
  from	
  other	
  legal	
  professions	
  –	
  elected	
  for	
  five	
  years	
  and	
  
giving	
  it	
  broad	
  powers	
  concerning	
  the	
  selection	
  and	
  nomination	
  of	
  candidates	
  for	
  judicial	
  
office,	
  the	
  appointment	
  and	
  dismissal	
  of	
  judicial	
  officials	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  training	
  of	
  judges.	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  majority	
  of	
  deputies	
  rejected	
  Motejl’s	
  reform.
63
	
  There	
  are	
  various	
  explanations	
  for	
  this	
  
failure.	
  The	
  most	
  widely	
  accepted	
  one	
  is	
  that	
  politicians	
  did	
  not	
  consent	
  to	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  
such	
  broad	
  powers	
  to	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  because	
  they	
  were	
  afraid	
  of	
  judicial	
  corporatism	
  and	
  
elitism.
64
	
   However,	
   several	
   commentators	
   suggested	
   that	
   the	
   proposal	
   failed	
   because	
   it	
  
required	
   a	
   significant	
   amendment	
   of	
   the	
   Czech	
   Constitution,
65
	
   as	
   Motejl	
   was	
   an	
  
independent	
  minister	
  without	
  sufficient	
  political	
  support	
  even	
  within	
  the	
  Social	
  Democratic	
  
Party	
  that	
  appointed	
  him,	
  as	
  judges	
  themselves	
  were	
  divided	
  and	
  many	
  of	
  them	
  disagreed	
  
with	
  the	
  judicial	
  reform	
  package	
  and	
  as	
  many	
  politicians	
  feared	
  that	
  Motejl	
  had	
  become	
  
“too	
  big”	
  and	
  successful.
66
	
  Motejl	
  also	
  alienated	
  regional	
  CPs	
  by	
  dismissing	
  five	
  of	
  them	
  in	
  
59
	
  Pavel	
  Rychetský	
  and	
  Josef	
  Baxa	
  have	
  known	
  each	
  other	
  well	
  since	
  the	
  late	
  1990s,	
  as	
  Josef	
  Baxa	
  was	
  a	
  Vice-­‐
Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  in	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  Miloš	
  Zeman	
  (1998–2002)	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  Pavel	
  Rychetský	
  was	
  Vice-­‐
PM.	
  	
  	
  
60
	
  See	
  the	
  document	
  entitled	
  Návrh	
  koncepce	
  reformy	
  soudnictví	
  [The	
  Conception	
  of	
  the	
  Reform	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary]	
  
of	
  16	
  June	
  1999	
  (no.	
  1097/99-­‐L),	
  approved	
  by	
  the	
  Czech	
  Government	
  by	
  the	
  decision	
  no.	
  686	
  of	
  7	
  July	
  1999.	
  An	
  
outline	
  of	
  the	
  reform	
  proposal	
  was	
  published	
  as	
  a	
  special	
  supplement	
  in	
  5	
  PRÁVNÍ	
  ROZHLEDY	
  1,	
  1–8	
  (1999).	
  
61
	
  See	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Bill	
  No.	
  541/0.	
  
62
	
  These	
  two	
  statutes	
  were	
  Law	
  on	
  Courts	
  (Bill	
  No.	
  539/0)	
  and	
  Law	
  on	
  Judges	
  and	
  Lay	
  Judges	
  (Bill	
  No.	
  540/0).	
  	
  
63
	
  The	
  Constitutional	
  Bill	
  was	
  rejected	
  in	
  the	
  second	
  reading	
  –	
  114	
  MPs	
  voted	
  for	
  the	
  rejection	
  of	
  the	
  bill,	
  68	
  MPs	
  
voted	
  for	
  the	
  bill	
  –	
  and	
  the	
  other	
  two	
  bills	
  soon	
  followed	
  the	
  same	
  fate	
  –	
  one	
  of	
  them	
  was	
  rejected	
  by	
  71	
  MPs	
  (69	
  
opposed	
  the	
  motion	
  to	
  reject	
  it)	
  and	
  the	
  second	
  one	
  by	
  85	
  MPs	
  (81	
  opposed).	
  
64
	
  See	
  Bobek,	
  supra	
  note	
  3,	
  at	
  269.	
  
65
	
  The	
  Constitutional	
  Bill,	
  apart	
  from	
  introducing	
  the	
  High	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Judiciary,	
  also	
  introduced	
  a	
  maximum	
  age	
  
limit	
   for	
   ordinary	
   judges	
   and	
   Constitutional	
   Court	
   Justices,	
   prohibited	
   a	
   renewal	
   of	
   the	
   term	
   of	
   Constitutional	
  
Court	
  Justices,	
  changed	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  National	
  Bank	
  and	
  amended	
  several	
  other	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  
Constitution.	
  
66
	
   These	
   explanations	
   are	
   based	
   on	
   informal	
   interviews	
   with	
   former	
   and	
   current	
   politicians	
   and	
   CPs,	
   but	
   they	
  
cannot	
  be	
  corroborated	
  by	
  the	
  hard	
  data.	
  
1962	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
1999.	
  He	
  himself	
  in	
  retrospect	
  blamed	
  the	
  “judicial	
  oligarchy”	
  for	
  the	
  failure	
  of	
  his	
  judicial	
  
reform.
67
	
  
	
  
The	
  second	
  attempt	
  to	
  establish	
  a	
  new	
  JSG	
  body	
  came	
  in	
  2002	
  when	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  
Jaroslav	
  Bureš	
  prepared	
  the	
  new	
  Law	
  on	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges,	
  which,	
  besides	
  establishing	
  the	
  
judicial	
  boards,	
  strove	
  to	
  introduce	
  the	
  Council	
  for	
  Assessing	
  Professional	
  Competence	
  of	
  
Judges.	
  This	
  body	
  was	
  to	
  be	
  divided	
  into	
  three	
  sub-­‐bodies,	
  each	
  of	
  them	
  constituted	
  by	
  
four	
  non-­‐judicial	
  members	
  and	
  five	
  judicial	
  members	
  elected	
  by	
  judges	
  of	
  selected	
  courts	
  
for	
  a	
  three-­‐year	
  period,	
  and	
  was	
  to	
  be	
  empowered	
  to	
  assess	
  the	
  professional	
  competence	
  
of	
   judges	
   whenever	
   asked	
   to	
   do	
   so	
   by	
   authorized	
   proposers;	
   the	
   decisions	
   of	
   the	
   body	
  
were	
   to	
   be	
   appealed	
   before	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court.	
   Nevertheless,	
   the	
   Constitutional	
   Court	
  
struck	
  the	
  relevant	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  down.	
  It	
  did	
  so	
  for	
  several	
  reasons,	
  the	
  crucial	
  ones	
  
being	
  that	
  the	
  competence	
  of	
  judges	
  should	
  be	
  assessed,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  preserve	
  their	
  
independence,	
  only	
  before	
  their	
  appointment	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  body	
  could	
  decide	
  on	
  the	
  non-­‐
competence	
  of	
  a	
  judge	
  in	
  the	
  presence	
  of	
  only	
  seven	
  members,	
  four	
  of	
  which	
  could	
  have	
  
been	
  the	
  non-­‐judicial	
  members	
  appointed	
  by	
  the	
  executive	
  power	
  (the	
  Minister).	
  
	
  
The	
   last	
   attempt	
   to	
   establish	
   a	
   new	
   JSG	
   body	
   came	
   in	
   2012.	
   This	
   time	
   the	
   Minister	
   of	
  
Justice	
  (Jiří	
  Pospíšil)	
  prepared	
  a	
  bill	
  which	
  was	
  to	
  change	
  the	
  method	
  for	
  selecting	
  judges	
  
and	
  CPs.
68
	
  More	
  specifically,	
  it	
  proposed	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  mixed	
  commissions,	
  composed	
  of	
  
both	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  MoJ	
  and	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  who	
  would	
  select	
  new	
  judges	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  new	
  
CPs.	
  However,	
  Pospíšil	
  was	
  dismissed	
  as	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  before	
  he	
  could	
  present	
  the	
  bill	
  
in	
  Parliament.	
  The	
  new	
  minister	
  of	
  justice	
  had	
  less	
  radical	
  views	
  regarding	
  judicial	
  reform,	
  
wanted	
   to	
   maintain	
   a	
   friendlier	
   relationship	
   with	
   CPs,	
   and	
   thus	
   scrapped	
   the	
   bill	
  
altogether.
69
	
  
	
  
To	
  summarize,	
  while	
  there	
  were	
  five	
  successful	
  and	
  three	
  unsuccessful	
  attempts	
  to	
  modify	
  
the	
   position	
   of	
   CPs,	
   who	
   are	
   the	
   primary	
   JSG	
   actors,	
   little	
   has	
   changed	
   as	
   far	
   as	
   their	
  
powers	
  are	
  concerned.	
  Only	
  one	
  new	
  JSG	
  body	
  that	
  took	
  away	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  CPs’	
  powers,	
  
the	
   Judicial	
   Academy,	
   was	
   introduced.	
   However,	
   the	
   Judicial	
   Academy	
   was	
   vested	
   only	
  
with	
   very	
   specific	
   powers	
   regarding	
   educational	
   administration	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   and	
  
therefore	
  could	
  not	
  change	
  the	
  existing	
  model	
  of	
  court	
  administration,	
  which,	
  in	
  Czechia,	
  
rests	
  on	
  three	
  pillars	
  –	
  the	
  MoJ,	
  CPs	
  and	
  disciplinary	
  panels.	
  The	
  motives	
  for	
  preserving	
  
such	
  a	
  model	
  are	
  simple:	
  the	
  executive	
  was	
  hesitant	
  to	
  give	
  up	
  its	
  powers	
  and	
  the	
  Czech	
  
judiciary	
  was	
  unable	
  to	
  agree	
  on	
  the	
  one	
  way	
  it	
  wanted	
  to	
  govern	
  itself.	
  
67
	
  Motejl,	
  supra	
  note	
  52,	
  at	
  14.	
  	
  
68
	
  The	
  2012	
  Bill	
  also	
  intended	
  to	
  introduce	
  judicial	
  performance	
  evaluation	
  and	
  financial	
  declarations	
  of	
  judges.	
  
Both	
  of	
  these	
  tools	
  would	
  give	
  the	
  MoJ	
  the	
  necessary	
  information	
  to	
  counter	
  the	
  existing	
  information	
  asymmetry	
  
and	
  to	
  make	
  more	
  informed	
  decisions	
  regarding	
  the	
  promotion	
  of	
  judges.	
  
69
	
  See	
  Jiří	
  Hardoš,	
  Blažek	
  odložil	
  zavedení	
  výběrových	
  řízení	
  na	
  nové	
  soudce,	
  PRÁVO,	
  August	
  2,	
  2012,	
  at	
  4.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1963	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
B.	
  Changes	
  of	
  Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  and	
  the	
  Impact	
  on	
  the	
  Wider	
  Environment	
  
	
  
This	
  section	
  maps	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  the	
  changes	
  of	
  JSG	
  on	
  the	
  wider	
  legal,	
  political	
  and	
  social	
  
environment.	
  We	
  map	
  the	
  impact	
  by	
  examining	
  the	
  effect	
  the	
  changes	
  had	
  on	
  five	
  basic	
  
values	
   that	
   we	
   consider	
   critical	
   for	
   the	
   proper	
   functioning	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   and	
   its	
  
relationship	
   with	
   rest	
   of	
   the	
   society:	
   	
   judicial	
   independence,	
   accountability,	
   legitimacy,	
  
transparency	
  and	
  public	
  confidence.	
  We	
  have	
  already	
  said	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  “big	
  bang”	
  
related	
  to	
  JSG	
  in	
  Czechia;	
  furthermore,	
  the	
  changes	
  we	
  identified	
  in	
  the	
  previous	
  section	
  
are	
  not	
  necessarily	
  connected	
  to	
  one	
  another	
  and	
  are	
  difficult	
  to	
  arrange	
  into	
  a	
  coherent	
  
narrative.	
  Nevertheless,	
  the	
  overall	
  picture	
  emerging	
  from	
  this	
  section	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  judiciary	
  
is	
  capable	
  of	
  functioning	
  and	
  sustaining	
  self-­‐governance	
  and	
  the	
  mentioned	
  core	
  values	
  
even	
  without	
  a	
  judicial	
  council	
  in	
  place.	
  On	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  maintaining	
  such	
  state	
  depends	
  
largely	
  on	
  CPs	
  keeping	
  their	
  powers	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  a	
  carefully	
  balanced	
  relationship	
  with	
  other	
  
actors	
  of	
  judicial	
  government	
  and	
  government	
  in	
  general.	
  
	
  
I.	
  On	
  Mandates,	
  Powers	
  and	
  Independence	
  
	
  
Even	
  though	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  JSG	
  “big	
  bang”	
  in	
  Czechia,	
  three	
  notable	
  changes	
  in	
  JSG	
  occurred	
  
that	
  may	
  have	
  had	
  some	
  impact	
  on	
  judicial	
  independence,	
  concerning	
  selection	
  of	
  judges,	
  
CPs’	
  mandates,	
  and	
  work	
  schedules.	
  All	
  the	
  changes	
  touched	
  the	
  powers	
  or	
  mandates	
  of	
  
the	
  CPs,	
  proving	
  that	
  CPs	
  have	
  a	
  substantial	
  potential	
  to	
  influence	
  judicial	
  independence.	
  
And	
   although	
   their	
   position	
   gives	
   them	
   the	
   opportunity	
   and	
   resources	
   to	
   guard	
   the	
  
external	
  judicial	
  independence	
  from	
  other	
  branches	
  of	
  power	
  during	
  “peaceful	
  times”,
70
	
  
the	
  setup	
  might	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  leave	
  individual	
  judges	
  vulnerable	
  and	
  create	
  a	
  space	
  for	
  
possible	
  encroachment	
  on	
  internal	
  judicial	
  independence.
71
	
  	
  
	
  
Selection	
  and	
  appointment	
  of	
  judges,	
  the	
  first	
  power	
  that	
  was	
  influenced	
  by	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  
JSG,	
  is	
  a	
  problematic	
  point	
  of	
  both	
  de	
  jure	
  and	
  de	
  facto	
  independence.	
  As	
  no	
  transparent	
  
and	
  detailed	
  de	
  jure	
  criteria	
  for	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judges	
  exist,	
  the	
  selection	
  lies	
  de	
  facto	
  
primarily	
   in	
   the	
   hands	
   of	
   CPs.	
   Among	
   those,	
   the	
   presidents	
   of	
   regional	
   courts	
   play	
   a	
  
prominent	
   role	
   as	
   the	
   law	
   specifies	
   that	
   they	
   control	
   the	
   way	
   district	
   court	
   presidents	
  
exercise	
  their	
  powers.
72
	
  The	
  process	
  therefore	
  differs	
  from	
  one	
  supreme	
  or	
  high	
  court	
  to	
  
another	
   or	
   from	
   one	
   district	
   of	
   a	
   regional	
   court	
   to	
   another,
73
	
   which	
   creates	
   a	
   potential	
  
space	
  for	
  personal	
  corruption	
  and	
  later	
  encroachment	
  of	
  output	
  independence	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  
70
	
  The	
  recent	
  developments	
  in	
  Hungary	
  and	
  Poland	
  prove	
  that	
  if	
  the	
  other	
  branches	
  of	
  power	
  launch	
  a	
  large-­‐scale	
  
offensive	
  on	
  the	
  judiciary,	
  there	
  is	
  little	
  that	
  actors	
  from	
  within	
  judiciary	
  can	
  do.	
  
71
	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  115–122.	
  
72
	
  Art.	
  126	
  para.	
  1	
  letter	
  h)	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  No.6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  On	
  the	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
73
	
  Being	
  appointed	
  therefore	
  equals	
  a	
  win	
  in	
  a	
  lottery	
  to	
  a	
  certain	
  degree,	
  see	
  Léko,	
  supra	
  note	
  13.	
  
1964	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
personal	
  loyalty	
  of	
  the	
  selected	
  judges	
  to	
  the	
  relevant	
  CP.
74
	
  A	
  change	
  occurred	
  when	
  apex	
  
court	
  presidents	
  set	
  out	
  criteria	
  for	
  selecting	
  judges	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  memoranda
75
	
  and	
  some	
  
regional	
  court	
  presidents	
  even	
  introduced	
  an	
  open	
  selection	
  procedure	
  based	
  upon	
  tests	
  
run	
  by	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy.
76
	
  This	
  step	
  led	
  partly	
  to	
  a	
  more	
  objective	
  and	
  merit-­‐based	
  
selection	
   process	
   and	
   potentially	
   limited	
   the	
   space	
   for	
   favouritism.	
   The	
   change	
   was,	
  
however,	
  quite	
  small	
  and	
  happened	
  only	
  in	
  a	
  few	
  courts	
  thanks	
  to	
  a	
  few	
  “enlightened”	
  CPs.	
  
As	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  openness	
  lies	
  almost	
  exclusively	
  in	
  the	
  hands	
  of	
  CPs,	
  however,	
  there	
  are	
  
still	
  regions	
  with	
  no	
  open	
  selection	
  procedure	
  whatsoever,	
  and	
  the	
  changes	
  that	
  already	
  
took	
  place	
  may	
  be	
  easily	
  reversed.	
  
	
  
The	
  second	
  change	
  in	
  JSG	
  to	
  be	
  mentioned	
  is	
  the	
  2008	
  implementation	
  of	
  CP	
  term	
  limits;	
  
these	
  may	
  have	
  had	
  the	
  biggest	
  impact	
  on	
  the	
  judicial	
  independence	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  so	
  far,	
  
both	
   positively	
   and	
   negatively.	
   This	
   move	
   first	
   of	
   all	
   meant	
   that	
   no	
   CP	
   could	
   exert	
   his	
  
influence	
  for	
  too	
  long.	
  Moreover,	
  the	
  dynamics	
  between	
  CPs	
  and	
  the	
  MoJ	
  changed	
  –	
  CPs	
  
had	
   to	
   find	
   a	
   new	
   balance	
   in	
   the	
   relationship	
   with	
   the	
   MoJ,	
   inventing	
   various	
   and	
  
sometimes	
   dubious	
   strategies	
   to	
   preserve	
   their	
   privileges	
   along	
   the	
   way.	
   After	
   the	
  
expiration	
  of	
  their	
  mandate,	
  some	
  of	
  them	
  arranged	
  their	
  promotion	
  to	
  a	
  higher	
  court,	
  
some	
  switched	
  their	
  position	
  with	
  vice-­‐presidents	
  and	
  some	
  even	
  openly	
  defied	
  the	
  rules	
  
completely	
  and	
  nominated	
  some	
  vice-­‐presidents	
  for	
  second	
  terms.
77
	
  The	
  change	
  therefore	
  
clearly	
   created	
   space	
   for	
   various	
   political	
   bargains,	
   posing	
   significant	
   challenges	
   also	
   to	
  
judicial	
  independence.	
  The	
  actual	
  impact	
  remains	
  to	
  be	
  seen.	
  	
  
	
  
The	
  last	
  change	
  in	
  JSG	
  concerned	
  work	
  schedules,	
  issued	
  by	
  CPs	
  and	
  containing	
  detailed	
  
rules	
  for	
  case	
  assignment.	
  For	
  a	
  long	
  time,	
  the	
  attention	
  paid	
  to	
  this	
  instrument	
  was	
  rather	
  
limited,
78
	
  which	
  created	
  a	
  space	
  for	
  possible	
  corruption	
  and	
  attempts	
  to	
  circumvent	
  case	
  
assignments.
79
	
  Recently,	
  however,	
  work	
  schedules	
  again	
  came	
  under	
  academic	
  and	
  public	
  
scrutiny,
80
	
  as	
  it	
  came	
  to	
  light	
  that	
  some	
  CPs	
  had	
  rigged	
  the	
  assignment	
  of	
  bankruptcy	
  cases,	
  
an	
  area	
  especially	
  prone	
  to	
  corruption.
81
	
  A	
  change	
  came	
  from	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  that	
  
74
	
  Note	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  research	
  or	
  direct	
  evidence	
  proving	
  that	
  this	
  claim	
  holds	
  true,	
  which	
  is	
  why	
  we	
  present	
  it	
  
only	
  as	
  a	
  potential	
  threat	
  to	
  judicial	
  independence.	
  
75
	
  The	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court	
  introduced	
  the	
  memorandum	
  in	
  2012,	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  in	
  2017.	
  
76
	
  This	
  concerns	
  the	
  Municipal	
  Court	
  in	
  Prague,	
  which	
  introduced	
  the	
  testing	
  in	
  2014.	
  Some	
  other	
  regional	
  courts	
  
use	
  the	
  testing	
  as	
  well	
  (Regional	
  Court	
  in	
  Pilsen,	
  Regional	
  Court	
  in	
  Brno);	
  see	
  Léko,	
  supra	
  note	
  13.	
  
77
	
  See	
  Kosař	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  110–114.	
  
78
	
  The	
  exception	
  was	
  the	
  early	
  and	
  mid-­‐1990s;	
  see	
  e.g.	
  9	
  PRÁVNÍ	
  PRAXE	
  (1995).	
  
79
	
  David	
  Kosař,	
  Rozvrh	
  práce:	
  Klíčový	
  nástroj	
  pro	
  boj	
  s	
  korupcí	
  soudců	
  a	
  nezbytný	
  předpoklad	
  nezávislosti	
  řadových	
  
soudců,	
  12	
  PRÁVNÍK	
  1060,	
  1060–1066	
  (2014).	
  
80
	
  See	
  id.,	
  at	
  1049–1076,	
  and	
  the	
  newspaper	
  articles	
  cited	
  there.	
  
81
	
  The	
  term	
  “bankruptcy	
  mafia”	
  was	
  coined	
  for	
  a	
  group	
  with	
  alleged	
  influence	
  in	
  the	
  area.	
  See	
  id.,	
  at	
  1050.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1965	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
significantly	
  curtailed	
  the	
  CPs’	
  power	
  to	
  set	
  the	
  criteria.
82
	
  Although	
  this	
  change	
  may	
  seem	
  
marginal,	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  the	
  ruling	
  is	
  considerable:	
  by	
  narrowing	
  the	
  space	
  for	
  rigging	
  a	
  case	
  
assignment,	
   it	
   potentially	
   boosted	
   the	
   output	
   independence	
   of	
   individual	
   judges	
   and	
  
reduced	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  corruption.	
  
	
  
Despite	
  the	
  abovementioned	
  changes,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  significant	
  shift	
  in	
  the	
  CPs’	
  powers	
  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	
  individual	
  judges.	
  For	
  a	
  long	
  time,	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  CPs	
  could	
  be	
  seen	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  key	
  
challenge	
  in	
  Czechia,	
  a	
  challenge	
  that	
  is	
  rarely	
  addressed	
  or	
  thoroughly	
  discussed	
  outside	
  
of	
  academic	
  circles.	
  There	
  are	
  not	
  many	
  reported	
  accounts	
  of	
  abuse	
  of	
  CPs’	
  powers,
83
	
  and	
  
we	
  cannot	
  be	
  sure	
  how	
  many	
  remain	
  unnoticed;	
  moreover,	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Slovakia	
  shows	
  that	
  
unchecked	
   powers	
   of	
   CPs,	
   combined	
   with	
   other	
   actors,	
   may	
   yield	
   truly	
   pathological	
  
results.
84
	
  However,	
  as	
  the	
  cases	
  of	
  Poland	
  and	
  Hungary	
  show,	
  the	
  external	
  threat	
  to	
  judicial	
  
independence	
  is	
  gaining	
  momentum	
  and	
  may	
  become	
  an	
  urgent	
  problem	
  in	
  a	
  very	
  short	
  
time,	
   once	
   again	
   shifting	
   the	
   focus	
   to	
   the	
   relationship	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   with	
   the	
   other	
  
branches	
  of	
  power.	
  
	
  
II.	
  On	
  Powers	
  to	
  Discipline	
  
	
  
Only	
  two	
  of	
  the	
  JSG	
  related	
  modifications	
  discussed	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  section	
  had	
  considerable	
  
impact	
  on	
  judicial	
  accountability	
  –	
  the	
  2002	
  and	
  the	
  2008	
  reforms	
  that	
  changed	
  the	
  way	
  
judges	
   were	
   disciplined.	
   However,	
   there	
   certainly	
   were	
   changes	
   in	
   (the	
   use	
   of)	
   other	
  
accountability	
  mechanisms	
  available	
  in	
  Czechia	
  –	
  reassignment	
  within	
  the	
  same	
  court,	
  case	
  
assignment,	
  promotion	
  to	
  a	
  higher	
  court,	
  promotion	
  to	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  chamber	
  president,	
  
appointment	
  to	
  the	
  grand	
  chamber	
  of	
  the	
  SC,	
  secondment,	
  temporary	
  assignment	
  outside	
  
the	
   judiciary,	
   the	
   appointment	
   of	
   a	
   judge	
   to	
   the	
   position	
   of	
   court	
   president	
   or	
   vice-­‐
president	
   or	
   the	
   complaint	
   mechanism.
85
	
   Nevertheless,	
   these	
   changes	
   either	
   had	
   other	
  
causes
86
	
  or	
  were	
  practically	
  untraceable	
  as	
  they	
  were	
  not	
  changes	
  to	
  de	
  jure	
  mechanisms	
  
and	
  hard	
  data	
  on	
  de	
  facto	
  use	
  of	
  these	
  mechanisms	
  are	
  missing.	
  
	
  
Therefore,	
  we	
  concentrate	
  on	
  both	
  de	
  jure	
  and	
  de	
  facto	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  judges	
  were	
  
disciplined	
  after	
  the	
  2002	
  and	
  the	
  2008	
  reforms	
  and	
  only	
  briefly	
  discuss	
  some	
  changes	
  to	
  
82
	
  See	
  especially	
  the	
  judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  15	
  June	
  2016,	
  case	
  no.	
  I.	
  ÚS	
  2769/15;	
  as	
  well	
  
as	
  judgments	
  of	
  27	
  May	
  2004,	
  case	
  no.	
  IV.	
  ÚS	
  307/03;	
  judgment	
  of	
  27	
  September	
  2005,	
  case	
  no.	
  I.	
  ÚS	
  93/99;	
  
judgment	
  of	
  21	
  April	
  2009,	
  case	
  no.	
  II.	
  ÚS	
  2747/08;	
  judgment	
  of	
  28	
  May	
  2009,	
  case	
  no.	
  II.	
  ÚS	
  2029/08;	
  judgment	
  
of	
  20	
  April	
  2011,	
  case	
  no.	
  IV.	
  ÚS	
  1302/10;	
  and	
  judgment	
  of	
  1	
  November	
  2012,	
  case	
  no.	
  IV.	
  ÚS	
  2053/12.	
  
83
	
  For	
  an	
  account	
  of	
  some	
  of	
  such	
  incidents,	
  see	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  117–118.	
  
84
	
  See	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  236–333.	
  
85
	
  See	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  187–235.	
  
86
	
  See	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  changes	
  to	
  case	
  assignment	
  (work	
  schedules)	
  caused	
  by	
  a	
  ruling	
  of	
  the	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  
described	
  above.	
  
1966	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
informal	
   accountability.	
   The	
   2002	
   reform	
   brought	
   three	
   significant	
   changes	
   to	
   de	
   jure	
  
accountability	
   of	
   judges.	
   First,	
   the	
   presidents	
   of	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   and	
   the	
   Supreme	
  
Administrative	
   Court	
   got	
   the	
   power	
   to	
   initiate	
   proceedings	
   not	
   only	
   against	
   judges	
   of	
  
“their”	
  courts,	
  but	
  also	
  against	
  the	
  judges	
  of	
  all	
  lower	
  courts.	
  As	
  the	
  presidents	
  of	
  high	
  and	
  
regional	
  court	
  already	
  had	
  such	
  a	
  power,	
  the	
  2002	
  reform	
  finalized	
  the	
  hierarchical	
  model	
  
of	
  initiating	
  disciplinary	
  proceedings.	
  Second,	
  the	
  disciplinary	
  proceedings	
  became	
  unified.	
  
Previously,	
  district	
  court	
  judges	
  had	
  been	
  disciplined	
  by	
  regional	
  courts	
  and	
  could	
  appeal	
  to	
  
the	
  SC,	
  regional	
  and	
  high	
  court	
  judges	
  had	
  been	
  disciplined	
  by	
  high	
  courts	
  and	
  could	
  also	
  
appeal	
  to	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Courts	
  and	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  judges	
  had	
  been	
  disciplined	
  by	
  this	
  very	
  
court	
  and	
  thus	
  could	
  not	
  appeal.	
  Afterwards,	
  all	
  judges	
  were	
  disciplined	
  by	
  the	
  high	
  court	
  
and	
  could	
  appeal	
  to	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court.	
  Third,	
  the	
  set	
  of	
  sanctions	
  available	
  was	
  reduced	
  
and,	
  after	
  the	
  2002	
  reform,	
  disciplined	
  judges	
  could	
  no	
  longer	
  be	
  reassigned	
  to	
  a	
  court	
  of	
  
the	
   same	
   or	
   lower	
   level.	
   The	
   2008	
   reform	
   also	
   changed	
   several	
   de	
   jure	
   aspects	
   of	
  
disciplinary	
  proceedings.	
  First,	
  since	
  2008,	
  not	
  only	
  could	
  the	
  CP	
  of	
  the	
  relevant	
  or	
  a	
  higher	
  
court	
  and	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Justice	
  initiate	
  the	
  proceedings,	
  but	
  so	
  could	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  
Czech	
   Republic.
87
	
   Second,	
   the	
   composition	
   of	
   disciplinary	
   panels	
   changed	
   significantly.	
  
Whereas	
  before	
  the	
  2008	
  reform	
  judges	
  were	
  judged	
  (disciplined)	
  only	
  by	
  judges,	
  after	
  the	
  
reform	
  mixed	
  panels	
  composed	
  of	
  3	
  judges	
  and	
  3	
  members	
  of	
  other	
  legal	
  professions	
  were	
  
introduced.
88
	
  Third,	
  whereas	
  before	
  the	
  reform	
  there	
  was	
  a	
  possibility	
  to	
  appeal	
  against	
  
the	
   decision	
   issued	
   in	
   the	
   disciplinary	
   proceedings,
89
	
   there	
   was	
   no	
   such	
   possibility	
  
afterwards.
90
	
   Fourth,	
   a	
   new	
   type	
   of	
   disciplinary	
   offense	
   was	
   introduced	
   in	
   2008	
   –	
   the	
  
breach	
  of	
  CP	
  duties.
91
	
  
	
  
As	
  regards	
  de	
  facto	
  accountability,	
  both	
  reforms	
  seem	
  to	
  have	
  had	
  some	
  impact	
  on	
  the	
  
frequency,	
  reasons	
  and/or	
  ways	
  judges	
  were	
  actually	
  disciplined.	
  Kosař	
  and	
  Papoušková	
  
came	
   to	
   the	
   following	
   conclusions	
   when	
   analysing	
   decisions	
   issued	
   in	
   disciplinary	
  
87
	
  Compare	
  art.	
  8	
  of	
  the	
  2002	
  Disciplinary	
  Code	
  and	
  of	
  the	
  2008	
  Disciplinary	
  Code.	
  Note	
  also,	
  that	
  the	
  Public	
  
Defender	
  of	
  Rights	
  could	
  initiate	
  the	
  proceedings	
  against	
  court	
  officials.	
  
88
	
  Compare	
  art.	
  4	
  of	
  the	
  2002	
  and	
  2008	
  Disciplinary	
  Codes.	
  
89
	
  Note	
  that	
  from	
  1991	
  to	
  2002	
  judges	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  had	
  no	
  such	
  possibility,	
  as	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  disciplinary	
  
panels	
   were	
   assembled	
   pursuant	
   to	
   a	
   hierarchical	
   pattern	
   –	
   disciplinary	
   panels	
   at	
   regional	
   courts	
   decided	
   on	
  
motions	
  against	
  judges	
  of	
  district	
  courts;	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  at	
  high	
  courts	
  decided	
  on	
  motions	
  against	
  judges	
  of	
  
regional	
  courts	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  against	
  judges	
  of	
  the	
  relevant	
  high	
  court;	
  and	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  at	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  
decided	
  on	
  motions	
  against	
  judges	
  of	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court.	
  In	
  the	
  next	
  period,	
  i.e.	
  from	
  2002	
  to	
  2008,	
  all	
  first-­‐
instance	
   disciplinary	
   proceedings	
   were	
   held	
   at	
   high	
   courts.	
   Comp.	
   art.	
   5	
   of	
   the	
   Law	
   No.	
   412/1991	
   Coll.,	
   on	
  
Disciplinary	
  Liability	
  of	
  Judges	
  (hereinafter	
  “1991	
  Disciplinary	
  Code”)	
  and	
  art.	
  3	
  of	
  the	
  2002	
  Disciplinary	
  Code.	
  
	
  
90
	
  Compare	
  art.	
  21	
  of	
  the	
  2002	
  and	
  2008	
  Disciplinary	
  Codes.	
  
91
	
   See	
   art.	
   87	
   of	
   the	
   Law	
   No.	
   6/2002	
   Coll,	
   on	
   Courts	
   and	
   Judges,	
   as	
   amended	
   by	
   the	
   Law	
   No.	
   314/2008	
   Coll.	
  
Otherwise	
  judges	
  could	
  still	
  be	
  disciplined	
  for	
  infringing	
  upon	
  dignity	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  office	
  or	
  threatening	
  public	
  
confidence	
  in	
  independent,	
  impartial	
  and	
  just	
  decision-­‐making	
  of	
  courts.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1967	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
proceedings	
  initiated	
  from	
  the	
  beginning	
  of	
  the	
  year	
  1993	
  till	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  year	
  2014.
92
	
  
First,	
  both	
  reforms	
  seem	
  to	
  have	
  influenced	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  disciplinary	
  motions.	
  Whereas	
  
before	
   the	
   2002	
   reform	
   on	
   average	
   26	
   motions	
   a	
   year	
   were	
   filed,	
   after	
   the	
   reform	
   this	
  
number	
  increased	
  to	
  33	
  and	
  dropped	
  again	
  to	
  28	
  after	
  the	
  2008	
  reform.	
  Second,	
  the	
  2008	
  
reform	
  brought	
  a	
  slight	
  increase	
  in	
  the	
  proportion	
  of	
  proceedings	
  initiated	
  by	
  the	
  Minister	
  
of	
  Justice.	
  In	
  the	
  period	
  1993-­‐2002,	
  10	
  %	
  of	
  proceedings	
  were	
  initiated	
  by	
  the	
  Minister	
  and	
  
in	
   the	
   following	
   period	
   the	
   number	
   was	
   nearly	
   the	
   same	
   (9	
   %),	
   but	
   in	
   2008-­‐2014	
   it	
  
increased	
   to	
   16	
   %.	
   Third,	
   after	
   the	
   2008	
   reform	
   judges	
   were	
   less	
   often	
   prosecuted	
   for	
  
having	
  caused	
  delays	
  in	
  court	
  proceedings	
  and	
  more	
  often	
  for	
  disciplinary	
  offenses	
  related	
  
to	
  judicial	
  independence	
  and	
  ethics.	
  More	
  concretely,	
  whereas	
  before	
  2002	
  reform	
  61	
  %	
  
and	
  before	
  the	
  2008	
  reform	
  66	
  %	
  of	
  disciplinary	
  proceedings	
  were	
  initiated	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  
first	
  grounds	
  and	
  7	
  and	
  9	
  %	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  second,	
  after	
  the	
  reform	
  it	
  changed	
  to	
  54	
  and	
  20	
  
%.	
   Fourth,	
   the	
   2008	
   reform	
   also	
   brought	
   a	
   significant	
   decrease	
   in	
   the	
   proportion	
   of	
  
disciplinary	
  proceedings	
  that	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  imposing	
  of	
  a	
  sanction.	
  The	
  proportion	
  was	
  55	
  
%	
  in	
  the	
  period	
  of	
  1993-­‐2002;	
  this	
  increased	
  to	
  60%	
  in	
  the	
  next	
  period	
  and	
  dropped	
  to	
  40%	
  
after	
  the	
  2008	
  reform.	
  All	
  in	
  all	
  the	
  successfulness	
  of	
  the	
  disciplinary	
  motions,	
  measured	
  as	
  
the	
   proportion	
   of	
   proceedings	
   that	
   resulted	
   either	
   in	
   the	
   imposing	
   of	
   a	
   sanction	
   or	
   the	
  
resignation	
  of	
  the	
  disciplined	
  judge,	
  also	
  dropped	
  significantly	
  after	
  the	
  2008	
  reform,	
  as	
  it	
  
was	
  53	
  %,	
  whereas	
  in	
  1993-­‐2002	
  it	
  was	
  68	
  %	
  and	
  in	
  2002-­‐2008	
  even	
  71	
  %.	
  	
  
	
  
Apart	
   from	
   the	
   abovementioned	
   changes,	
   judicial	
   accountability	
   also	
   evolved	
   in	
   its	
  
informal	
  aspect.	
  Judges	
  are	
  more	
  and	
  more	
  often	
  scrutinized	
  by	
  the	
  media	
  and	
  the	
  broader	
  
public
93
	
  and,	
  as	
  CPs	
  will	
  eventually	
  lose	
  their	
  offices,	
  they	
  may	
  feel	
  the	
  urge	
  to	
  please	
  the	
  
judges	
  of	
  the	
  court	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  preside,	
  i.e.	
  their	
  future	
  colleagues.	
  However,	
  only	
  the	
  
last	
   of	
   these	
   evolvements	
   can	
   be	
   directly	
   related	
   to	
   a	
   concrete	
   event,	
   let	
   alone	
   to	
   a	
  
concrete	
  modification	
  in	
  JSG	
  in	
  Czechia.	
  
	
  
III.	
  On	
  Mandates,	
  Selection	
  and	
  Legitimacy	
  
	
  
It	
  is	
  hard	
  to	
  put	
  a	
  finger	
  on	
  a	
  concept	
  like	
  judicial	
  legitimacy	
  alone,	
  and	
  it	
  may	
  prove	
  even	
  
more	
  difficult	
  to	
  cover	
  the	
  effects	
  that	
  JSG	
  changes	
  had	
  on	
  it.
94
	
  Nevertheless,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  
to	
  say	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  following	
  the	
  (legal)	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  place	
  which	
  provides	
  any	
  organ	
  with	
  a	
  
basic	
  source	
  of	
  legitimacy.	
  In	
  this	
  respect,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  argued	
  that	
  limiting	
  CPs’	
  mandates	
  may	
  
have	
  indirectly	
  caused	
  a	
  decrease	
  of	
  judicial	
  legitimacy	
  in	
  its	
  legal	
  dimension.
95
	
  Although	
  
92
	
  KOSAŘ	
  &	
  PAPOUŠKOVÁ,	
  supra	
  note	
  27.	
  
93
	
  In	
  2010,	
  a	
  website	
  platform	
  for	
  discussing	
  personal	
  experience	
  with	
  individual	
  judges	
  and	
  opinions	
  on	
  them	
  was	
  
launched.	
  See	
  znamysoudce.cz.	
  
94
	
   To	
   avoid	
   overlap	
   with	
   the	
   account	
   of	
   impact	
   on	
   public	
   opinion,	
   we	
   omit	
   the	
   social	
   dimension	
   of	
   judicial	
  
legitimacy.	
  
95
	
  This	
  understanding	
  connects	
  legitimacy	
  with	
  legality	
  and	
  claims	
  that	
  judiciary	
  is	
  legitimate	
  when	
  it	
  adheres	
  to	
  
legal	
  rules;	
  see	
  e.g.	
  CARL	
  SCHMITT,	
  LEGALITY	
  AND	
  LEGITIMACY	
  (2004);	
  and	
  DAVID	
  DYZENHAUS,	
  LEGALITY	
  AND	
  LEGITIMACY:	
  CARL	
  
1968	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
the	
   change	
   of	
   law	
   and	
   the	
   intervention	
   of	
   the	
   Constitutional	
   Court	
   did	
   not	
   cause	
   a	
  
decrease	
   in	
   legal	
   judicial	
   legitimacy,	
   the	
   subsequent	
   conduct	
   of	
   several	
   CPs,	
   who	
  
circumvented	
  these	
  rules	
  to	
  retain	
  their	
  mandates,
96
	
  surely	
  did	
  have	
  some	
  impact.	
  
	
  
Two	
  other	
  changes	
  in	
  JSG	
  had	
  potential	
  influence	
  on	
  the	
  normative	
  dimension	
  of	
  judicial	
  
legitimacy.
97
	
  In	
  the	
  first	
  place,	
  we	
  must	
  mention	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judges,	
  which	
  is	
  arguably	
  
the	
  area	
  with	
  the	
  greatest	
  importance	
  for	
  judicial	
  legitimacy,	
  the	
  current	
  state	
  of	
  which	
  is	
  
one	
  of	
  the	
  biggest	
  legitimacy	
  issues.	
  As	
  the	
  rules	
  for	
  selection	
  are	
  in	
  the	
  hands	
  of	
  (some)	
  
CPs	
  and	
  are	
  rather	
  opaque	
  at	
  most	
  courts,	
  any	
  improvement	
  here	
  should	
  boost	
  judicial	
  
legitimacy.
98
	
  Despite	
  partial	
  improvement	
  in	
  this	
  area	
  (notably	
  regarding	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  
judges	
  at	
  the	
  SC,	
  the	
  SAC,	
  and	
  the	
  Municipal	
  Court	
  in	
  Prague
99
),	
  the	
  rules	
  are	
  still	
  far	
  from	
  
unified	
  and	
  transparent.	
  The	
  2003	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  age	
  limit	
  for	
  a	
  judge’s	
  eligibility	
  for	
  office	
  
from	
   25	
   to	
   30	
   years	
   may	
   have	
   resulted	
   in	
   a	
   minor	
   boost	
   in	
   legitimacy.
100
	
   Secondly,	
   the	
  
introduction	
  of	
  judicial	
  boards	
  in	
  2002	
  promised	
  that	
  at	
  least	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  courts	
  would	
  be	
  
run	
  somewhat	
  more	
  democratically,	
  constraining	
  to	
  a	
  certain	
  degree	
  the	
  monocratic	
  CPs	
  
and	
  possibly	
  boosting	
  legitimacy.	
  Whether	
  this	
  in	
  fact	
  happened	
  depends	
  significantly	
  on	
  
the	
  person	
  of	
  the	
  CP.	
  
	
  
There	
   are	
   other	
   judicial	
   legitimacy	
   issues	
   in	
   Czechia,	
   although	
   non-­‐JSG	
   related,	
   that	
   are	
  
worth	
   mentioning.	
   The	
   foremost	
   of	
   these	
   is	
   the	
   composition	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   and	
   its	
  
changes	
   after	
   the	
   fall	
   of	
   the	
   communist	
   regime.	
   After	
   the	
   Velvet	
   Revolution,	
   the	
   new	
  
regime	
  attempted	
  to	
  purge	
  the	
  judiciary	
  from	
  judges	
  directly	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  execution	
  of	
  
the	
   “communist	
   justice”.
101
	
   Still,	
   many	
   judges	
   who	
   were	
   former	
   members	
   of	
   the	
  
Communist	
  Party	
  remained	
  in	
  the	
  judiciary
102
	
  and	
  a	
  list	
  of	
  them	
  was	
  published	
  after	
  an	
  
intervention	
   by	
   the	
   CC,
103
	
   which	
   may	
   be	
   seen	
   by	
   many	
   as	
   delegitimizing	
   the	
   judiciary.	
  
SCHMITT,	
  HANS	
  KELSEN	
  AND	
  HERMAN	
  HELLER	
  IN	
  WEIMAR	
  (1999);	
  and	
  various	
  contributions	
  in	
  LEGITIMACY	
  IN	
  INTERNATIONAL	
  
LAW	
  (Rudiger	
  Wolfrum	
  &	
  Volker	
  Roeben	
  eds.,	
  2008).	
  
96
	
  See	
  Kosař,	
  supra	
  note	
  2,	
  at	
  110–112;	
  Ladislav	
  Derka,	
  Pro	
  soudní	
  funkcionáře	
  právo	
  neplatí?	
  4	
  SOUDCE	
  7	
  (2015);	
  
Viktor	
  Derka,	
  Ústavnost	
  opakovaného	
  jmenování	
  soudních	
  funkcionářů,	
  23	
  JURISPRUDENCE	
  3	
  (2014).	
  
97
	
  See	
  e.g.	
  Peter	
  G.	
  Stillman,	
  The	
  Concept	
  of	
  Legitimacy,	
  7	
  POLITY	
  32	
  (1974).	
  
98
	
  Better	
  rules	
  for	
  selection	
  could	
  have	
  a	
  sort	
  of	
  “trickle-­‐down	
  effect”,	
  as	
  it	
  may	
  improve	
  also	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  judges	
  
and,	
  subsequently,	
  of	
  the	
  judicial	
  process	
  and	
  decisions.	
  
99
	
  See	
  supra	
  notes	
  75	
  and	
  76.	
  
100
	
  Before,	
  many	
  may	
  have	
  had	
  the	
  impression	
  that	
  “kids”	
  with	
  little	
  life,	
  to	
  say	
  nothing	
  of	
  legal,	
  experience,	
  sit	
  on	
  
the	
  bench;	
  see	
  Kühn	
  2012,	
  supra	
  note	
  6,	
  at	
  614.	
  
101
	
  For	
  an	
  overview,	
  see	
  KOSAŘ,	
  supra	
  note	
  5,	
  at	
  167–173;	
  and	
  David	
  Kosař,	
  The	
  Least	
  Accountable	
  Branch,	
  11	
  
INTERNATIONAL	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  CONSTITUTIONAL	
  LAW	
  234,	
  251–252	
  (2013).	
  
102
	
  At	
  the	
  beginning,	
  almost	
  two	
  thirds	
  of	
  judges	
  were	
  ex-­‐communists.	
  
103
	
  See	
  the	
  judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  15	
  November	
  2010,	
  case	
  no.	
  I.	
  ÚS	
  517/10.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1969	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
Secondly,	
   the	
   Czech	
   judiciary	
   has	
   often	
   been	
   criticized	
   for	
   the	
   excessive	
   length	
   of	
  
proceedings.
104
	
   Even	
   though	
   this	
   criticism	
   lacks	
   objective	
   foundation,
105
	
   the	
   “slow	
  
judiciary”	
  myth	
  seems	
  to	
  persist.
106
	
  	
  
	
  
The	
   third	
   legitimacy	
   issue	
   is	
   corruption	
   inside	
   the	
   judiciary,	
   which	
   always	
   delegitimizes	
  
judiciary	
  as	
  a	
  whole,	
  especially	
  when	
  it	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  systemic	
  and	
  organized,	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  
of	
   the	
   so-­‐called	
   “bankruptcy	
   mafia”.
107
	
   Lastly,	
   several	
   high-­‐profile	
   criminal	
   cases	
   with	
  
(former)	
   politicians
108
	
   accused	
   of	
   corruption	
   have	
   been	
   making	
   their	
   way	
   through	
   the	
  
judiciary	
   recently.	
   Although	
   cases	
   of	
   political	
   corruption	
   are	
   understandably	
   difficult	
   to	
  
judge	
  and	
  take	
  a	
  long	
  time,	
  a	
  high	
  degree	
  of	
  disagreement	
  between	
  courts	
  often	
  results	
  in	
  
higher	
   courts	
   quashing	
   the	
   decisions	
   of	
   lower	
   courts.	
   This	
   in	
   turn	
   may	
   create	
   in	
   some	
  
people	
  the	
  impression	
  that	
  courts	
  are	
  both	
  unable	
  to	
  “finish”	
  the	
  cases	
  because	
  they	
  are	
  
corrupt	
  as	
  well,	
  and	
  that	
  criminal	
  justice	
  is	
  being	
  politicized	
  and	
  serves	
  a	
  different	
  purpose	
  
than	
  it	
  should.	
  
	
  
IV.	
  On	
  Transparency	
  
	
  
There	
  is	
  only	
  one	
  change	
  in	
  judicial	
  transparency	
  that	
  may	
  be	
  connected	
  with	
  (changes	
  in)	
  
JSG
109
	
  and	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  opening	
  up	
  and	
  standardizing	
  of	
  the	
  selection	
  procedure	
  for	
  judges	
  at	
  
one	
  of	
  the	
  eight	
  regional	
  courts	
  in	
  Czechia.	
  This	
  change	
  is	
  related	
  to	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  
the	
  Judicial	
  Academy,	
  as	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  Municipal	
  Court	
  in	
  Prague	
  agreed	
  with	
  the	
  JA	
  
that	
  it	
  will	
  administer	
  written	
  tests	
  and	
  score	
  the	
  candidates	
  and	
  thus	
  determine	
  who	
  will	
  
be	
  invited	
  for	
  an	
  interview.
110
	
  As	
  noted	
  above,	
  although	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  de	
  jure	
  aims	
  of	
  the	
  JA	
  is	
  
to	
  “participate	
  in	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  persons	
  who	
  apply	
  for	
  a	
  position	
  of	
  a	
  law	
  clerk”,
111
	
  except	
  
104
	
  For	
  this,	
  Czechia	
  was	
  criticised	
  many	
  times	
  by	
  the	
  European	
  Court	
  of	
  Human	
  Rights.	
  	
  
105
	
   The	
   length	
   of	
   proceedings	
   in	
   Czechia	
   is,	
   if	
   compared	
   to	
   other	
   EU	
   countries,	
   average.	
   See	
   the	
   European	
  
Commission’s	
  2017	
  EU	
  Justice	
  Scoreboard,	
  at	
  7–11.	
  
106
	
  See	
  for	
  example	
  Kristián	
  Léko,	
  Soudci	
  by	
  se	
  „pod	
  lupou“	
  víc	
  snažili,	
  LIDOVÉ	
  NOVINY,	
  July	
  17,	
  2017,	
  at	
  5,	
  where	
  one	
  
of	
  the	
  respondents,	
  a	
  professional	
  lawyer,	
  claimed	
  that	
  “If	
  the	
  judiciary	
  is	
  slow,	
  at	
  least	
  make	
  it	
  transparent.”	
  
107
	
  See	
  supra	
  note	
  81.	
  
108
	
  This	
  includes	
  e.g.	
  the	
  former	
  Prime	
  Minister	
  Petr	
  Nečas	
  and	
  his	
  spouse	
  Jana	
  Nečasová,	
  former	
  Minister	
  of	
  
Health	
  David	
  Rath,	
  and	
  Marek	
  Dalík,	
  an	
  influential	
  lobbyist	
  and	
  an	
  advisor	
  to	
  the	
  former	
  Prime	
  Minister	
  Mirek	
  
Topolánek.	
  
109
	
  Note	
  that	
  we	
  are	
  speaking	
  mainly	
  about	
  systemic	
  changes,	
  as	
  “local”	
  (i.e.	
  court	
  specific)	
  changes	
  in	
  judicial	
  
transparency	
  may	
  appear	
  any	
  time	
  a	
  new	
  court	
  president	
  is	
  appointed	
  and	
  thus	
  has	
  an	
  opportunity	
  to	
  adopt	
  a	
  
new	
  transparency	
  policy.	
  
110
	
  See,	
  for	
  instance,	
  Léko,	
  supra	
  note	
  13.	
  
111
	
  See	
  art.	
  132	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  6/2002	
  Sb.,	
  on	
  Court	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
1970	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
for	
   the	
   case	
   just	
   mentioned	
   neither	
   this	
   very	
   aim	
   nor	
   its	
   modification	
   consisting	
   in	
   the	
  
participation	
  in	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  judges	
  was	
  actually	
  ever	
  fully	
  realized.
112
	
  
	
  
Other	
  changes	
  in	
  judicial	
  transparency	
  were	
  connected	
  rather	
  with	
  two	
  other	
  evolvements	
  
–	
   the	
   adoption	
   of	
   Law	
   No.	
   106/1999	
   Coll.,	
   on	
   Free	
   Access	
   to	
   Information,	
   and	
   the	
  
advancement	
  in	
  information	
  and	
  communications	
  technologies.	
  The	
  first	
  evolvement,	
  for	
  
instance,	
  opened	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  find	
  out	
  which	
  judges	
  were	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Communist	
  Party	
  
before	
  1989
113
	
  or	
  which	
  constitutional	
  justices	
  deal	
  with	
  the	
  cases	
  assigned	
  to	
  them	
  in	
  the	
  
most	
   timely	
   and	
   responsive	
   manner.
114
	
   The	
   second	
   evolvement	
   mainly	
   brought	
   the	
  
possibility	
  to	
  publish	
  court	
  decisions	
  online.	
  So	
  far,	
  only	
  the	
  top	
  three	
  courts	
  have	
  taken	
  full	
  
advantage	
  of	
  this	
  possibility.
115
	
  The	
  decisions	
  of	
  other	
  Czech	
  courts	
  have	
  been	
  published	
  
since	
  2011,	
  but	
  only	
  to	
  a	
  very	
  limited	
  extent.
116
	
  While	
  the	
  non-­‐apex	
  courts	
  were	
  instructed	
  
by	
  the	
  Ministry	
  to	
  publish	
  every	
  important	
  decision,	
  in	
  2015,	
  for	
  instance,	
  they	
  published	
  
only	
  75	
  of	
  them.
117
	
  Another	
  step	
  that	
  was	
  made	
  possible	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  advancement	
  in	
  ICT	
  
was	
  the	
  2007	
  launch	
  of	
  the	
  “eJustice”	
  (electronic	
  justice)	
  project.	
  The	
  project	
  resulted	
  in	
  
the	
  creation	
  of	
  an	
  online	
  form	
  for	
  filing	
  an	
  electronic	
  payment	
  order	
  and	
  for	
  making	
  any	
  
other	
  submission	
  to	
  a	
  court;	
  the	
  publication	
  of	
  dates,	
  times	
  and	
  venues	
  of	
  court	
  hearings	
  
and	
  of	
  information	
  regarding	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  court	
  proceedings;	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  aggregation	
  and	
  
publication	
  of	
  statistics	
  on	
  the	
  activity	
  of	
  individual	
  courts.
118
	
  Last	
  but	
  not	
  least,	
  since	
  2015	
  
all	
   courts	
   publish	
   information	
   on	
   their	
   contracts	
   and	
   paid	
   invoices	
   in	
   a	
   central	
   online	
  
database	
  that	
  is	
  accessible	
  free	
  of	
  charge.
119
	
  
	
  
All	
  these	
  developments	
  influenced	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  way	
  relevant	
  information	
  is	
  made	
  available	
  
and	
  findable	
  but	
  they	
  also	
  had	
  an	
  impact	
  on	
  who	
  uses	
  it.	
  It	
  is	
  logical	
  that	
  before	
  launching	
  
112
	
  Only	
  three	
  more	
  of	
  the	
  eight	
  regional	
  courts	
  organize	
  an	
  open	
  selection	
  procedure	
  for	
  law	
  clerks,	
  but	
  they	
  do	
  
so	
  without	
  assistance	
  of	
  the	
  Judicial	
  Academy.	
  
113
	
  The	
  MoJ	
  published	
  a	
  list	
  of	
  such	
  judges	
  following	
  to	
  the	
  judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  15	
  
November	
  2010,	
  case	
  no.	
  I.	
  ÚS	
  517/10.	
  	
  
114
	
   See	
   Tomáš	
   Němeček,	
   Tajná	
   data	
   z	
   Ústavního	
   soudu,	
   LIDOVÉ	
   NOVINY,	
   February	
   28,	
   2011;	
   Tomáš	
   Němeček,	
  
Zachraňte	
  doktora	
  Balíka,	
  LIDOVÉ	
  NOVINY,	
  March	
  5,	
  2012;	
  and	
  Tomáš	
  Němeček,	
  Doktorka	
  Lastovecká	
  se	
  topí,	
  LIDOVÉ	
  
NOVINY,	
  February	
  23,	
  2013.	
  
115
	
   The	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   began	
   publishing	
   all	
   its	
   decisions	
   online	
   in	
   2000.	
   The	
   newly	
   established	
   Supreme	
  
Administrative	
  Courts	
  followed	
  this	
  path	
  and	
  started	
  publishing	
  all	
  decisions	
  online	
  soon	
  after	
  its	
  establishment	
  in	
  
2003.	
  The	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  made	
  this	
  step	
  in	
  2006.	
  
116
	
  They	
  are	
  accessible	
  through	
  http://www.nsoud.cz/Judikaturans_new/judikatura_vks.nsf/uvod.	
  	
  
117
	
  The	
  Office	
  of	
  the	
  Public	
  Defender	
  of	
  Rights,	
  2017.	
  Výroční	
  zpráva	
  2016,	
  at	
  57:	
  https://www.ochrance.cz/file	
  
admin/user_upload/zpravy_pro_poslaneckou_snemovnu/Vyrocni-­‐zprava2016_web.pdf	
  	
  
118
	
  For	
  more	
  details	
  see	
  the	
  web	
  http://www.reformajustice.cz/ejustice/	
  and	
  other	
  websites	
  it	
  references.	
  
119
	
  See	
  http://data.justice.cz/SitePages/DomovskaStranka.aspx.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1971	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
the	
  relevant	
  databases	
  only	
  big	
  entities	
  like	
  the	
  MoJ	
  or	
  companies	
  developing	
  and	
  selling	
  
legal	
  information	
  systems	
  could	
  make	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  information.	
  However,	
  currently	
  also	
  the	
  
media,	
   researchers	
   and	
   civil	
   society	
   can	
   easily	
   utilize	
   it.	
   Nevertheless,	
   despite	
   all	
   these	
  
changes,	
   judicial	
   transparency	
   remains	
   a	
   much-­‐debated	
   issue	
   as	
   the	
   public	
   still	
   lacks	
  
information	
  on	
  the	
  activity	
  of	
  individual	
  judges
120
	
  or	
  on	
  individual	
  candidates	
  for	
  a	
  judicial	
  
position.
121
	
  
	
  
V.	
  On	
  Public	
  Confidence	
  
	
  
Changes	
  in	
  JSG	
  can	
  have	
  repercussions	
  not	
  only	
  for	
  the	
  legal	
  and	
  political	
  fields,	
  but	
  also	
  
for	
  the	
  wider	
  social	
  field,	
  i.e.	
  for	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  judiciary	
  and	
  the	
  public.	
  In	
  
general,	
   one	
   of	
   the	
   most	
   important	
   indicators	
   of	
   this	
   relationship	
   is	
   the	
   level	
   of	
   public	
  
confidence,	
   which	
   can	
   be	
   described	
   as	
   the	
   public’s	
   belief	
   in	
   the	
   reliability,	
   honesty	
   and	
  
ability	
  of	
  courts	
  and	
  judges,	
  and	
  the	
  belief	
  that	
  the	
  courts	
  act	
  competently	
  in	
  the	
  sense	
  
that	
  they	
  are	
  able	
  to	
  perform	
  the	
  functions	
  that	
  are	
  legally	
  or	
  constitutionally	
  assigned	
  to	
  
them.
122
	
  	
  
	
  
Public	
   confidence	
   in	
   the	
   judiciary	
   stems	
   from	
   two	
   broad	
   groups	
   of	
   factors:
123
	
   cultural	
  
(confidence	
   originates	
   in	
   long-­‐standing	
   and	
   deeply-­‐seated	
   beliefs	
   that	
   are	
   rooted	
   in	
  
cultural	
  norms)	
  and	
  institutional	
  (confidence	
  is	
  related	
  to	
  institutional	
  performance).	
  Thus,	
  
the	
  influence	
  of	
  changes	
  in	
  JSG	
  on	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  public	
  confidence	
  is	
  predominantly	
  indirect,	
  
and	
  this	
  only	
  happens	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  that	
  the	
  changes	
  somehow	
  affect	
  the	
  performance	
  of	
  
the	
  courts	
  and	
  judges.	
  As	
  already	
  mentioned,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  JSG	
  “big	
  bang”	
  in	
  Czechia	
  that	
  
would	
  have	
  had	
  this	
  power.	
  However,	
  the	
  Czech	
  example	
  shows	
  that	
  a	
  judiciary	
  can	
  enjoy	
  
a	
  reasonable	
  level	
  of	
  public	
  confidence	
  even	
  without	
  adopting	
  a	
  strong	
  model	
  of	
  JSG	
  or	
  
establishing	
  a	
  judicial	
  council.	
  	
  
	
  
As	
   pictured	
   in	
   Figure	
   1,	
   trust	
   in	
   courts,	
   measured	
   continually	
   since	
   1990,	
   is	
   gradually	
  
increasing.	
  The	
  trend	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  influenced	
  chiefly	
  by	
  broader	
  historical	
  socio-­‐political	
  
development.	
  In	
  1990,	
  shortly	
  after	
  the	
  fall	
  of	
  the	
  authoritarian	
  regime,	
  public	
  confidence	
  
in	
  courts	
  was	
  very	
  low,	
  with	
  a	
  considerably	
  higher	
  percentage	
  of	
  distrusting	
  respondents	
  
(almost	
   double)	
   than	
   trusting	
   ones.	
   As	
   summarized	
   by	
   Sztompka,
124
	
   in	
   communist	
  
countries,	
  trusting	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  its	
  political	
  institutions,	
  including	
  courts	
  and	
  judges,	
  was	
  
120
	
  Note	
  that,	
  for	
  instance,	
  in	
  Slovakia	
  such	
  information	
  is	
  available	
  through	
  the	
  website	
  https://otvorenesudy.sk/.	
  	
  
121
	
  However,	
  see	
  above	
  for	
  information	
  on	
  the	
  quite	
  transparent	
  selection	
  of	
  judges	
  for	
  the	
  two	
  apex	
  courts.	
  
122
	
   George	
   W.	
   Dougherty,	
   Stefanie	
   A.	
   Lindquist	
   &	
   Mark	
   D.	
   Bradbury,	
   Evaluating	
   Performance	
   in	
   State	
   Judicial	
  
Institutions:	
  Trust	
  and	
  Confidence	
  in	
  the	
  Georgia	
  Judiciary,	
  38	
  STATE	
  AND	
  LOCAL	
  GOVERNMENT	
  REVIEW	
  176	
  (2006).	
  
123
	
   William	
   Mishler	
   &	
   Richard	
   Rose,	
   What	
   Are	
   the	
   Origins	
   of	
   Political	
   Trust?	
   Testing	
   Institutional	
   and	
   Cultural	
  
Theories	
  in	
  Post-­‐communist	
  Societies,	
  34	
  COMPARATIVE	
  POLITICAL	
  STUDIES	
  30	
  (2001).	
  
124
	
  PIOTR	
  SZTOMPKA,	
  TRUST:	
  A	
  SOCIOLOGICAL	
  THEORY	
  (2000).	
  
1972	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
seen	
  as	
  naive	
  and	
  stupid.	
  Moreover,	
  under	
  the	
  authoritarian	
  regime,	
  the	
  judicial	
  profession	
  
suffered	
  from	
  low	
  prestige	
  (both	
  in	
  social	
  and	
  financial	
  terms)
125
	
  and	
  was	
  considered	
  to	
  be	
  
unattractive	
   and	
   corrupt.	
   After	
   1989,	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   courts	
   has	
   gradually	
   been	
  
restored,	
  probably	
  a	
  sign	
  of	
  a	
  successful	
  transformation	
  that	
  also	
  included	
  a	
  turnover	
  in	
  
judicial	
  ranks.	
  In	
  2006,	
  the	
  share	
  of	
  respondents	
  trusting	
  in	
  courts	
  exceeded	
  the	
  share	
  of	
  
distrusting	
   respondents	
   for	
   the	
   first	
   time	
   and,	
   after	
   some	
   volatility,	
   this	
   has	
   become	
   a	
  
stable	
  pattern	
  since	
  2014.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
Figure	
  1:	
  Trust	
  in	
  courts	
  in	
  Czechia,	
  1990-­‐2017	
  (in	
  %)
126
	
  
	
  
In	
  addition	
  to	
  institutional	
  confidence,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  important	
  to	
  assess	
  public	
  confidence	
  in	
  
judges,	
   as	
   confidence	
   in	
   institutions	
   can	
   differ	
   from	
   confidence	
   in	
   individuals.	
  
Unfortunately,	
   a	
   continual	
   measurement	
   of	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   judges	
   is	
   missing	
   in	
  
Czechia.	
  As	
  a	
  proxy	
  indicator,	
  prestige	
  of	
  judges	
  (as	
  a	
  profession),	
  measured	
  since	
  2004,	
  
can	
  be	
  used.	
  As	
  pictured	
  in	
  Figure	
  2,	
  the	
  social	
  position	
  of	
  judges	
  in	
  the	
  last	
  almost	
  fifteen	
  
years	
  has	
  been	
  very	
  high,	
  with	
  no	
  significant	
  swings.	
  Judges	
  belong	
  to	
  the	
  group	
  of	
  top	
  ten	
  
most	
   prestigious	
   professions	
   according	
   to	
   the	
   Czech	
   public,	
   together	
   with	
   doctors,	
  
teachers,	
   scientists	
   and	
   nurses.	
   Thus,	
   it	
   seems	
   that	
   after	
   the	
   damage	
   to	
   prestige	
   and	
  
credibility	
   of	
   judges	
   and	
   courts	
   caused	
   in	
   the	
   previous	
   regime,	
   they	
   have	
   successfully	
  
reclaimed	
  their	
  social	
  position,	
  or	
  are	
  at	
  least	
  on	
  the	
  way	
  to	
  doing	
  so.
127
	
  This	
  is	
  probably	
  an	
  
125
	
  See,	
  e.	
  g.	
  KÜHN	
  2011,	
  supra	
  note	
  6,	
  at	
  53.	
  
126
	
  Source:	
  Czech	
  Social	
  Science	
  Data	
  Archive	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Institute	
  of	
  Sociology.	
  The	
  remainder	
  (to	
  100	
  %)	
  are	
  "do	
  
not	
   know"	
   answers.	
   The	
   question	
   asked	
   was:	
   “Please	
   tell	
   us,	
   do	
   you	
   trust	
   or	
   distrust	
   the	
   courts?”	
   Possible	
  
answers:	
  I	
  definitely	
  trust/I	
  rather	
  trust/I	
  rather	
  distrust/I	
  definitely	
  distrust	
  them.	
  
127
	
  The	
  restoration	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  position	
  of	
  judges	
  becomes	
  evident	
  also	
  when	
  looking	
  at	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  their	
  salaries.	
  
In	
  Czechoslovakia	
  in	
  the	
  1950s,	
  judges’	
  salaries	
  were	
  only	
  slightly	
  above	
  the	
  national	
  average	
  salary,	
  and	
  below	
  
e.g.	
  miners’	
  or	
  bus	
  drivers’	
  salaries,	
  see	
  OTA	
   ULČ,	
  MALÁ	
   DOZNÁNÍ	
   OKRESNÍHO	
   SOUDCE	
  76	
  (1974).	
  In	
  2017,	
  a	
  judge’s	
  
salary	
  base	
  is	
  calculated	
  by	
  multiplying	
  the	
  average	
  nominal	
  monthly	
  salary	
  of	
  individuals	
  in	
  the	
  non-­‐business	
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
II/1990
IX/1992
II/1994
II/1995
II/1996
II/1997
II/1998
II/1999
II/2000
II/2001
II/2002
VI/2003
III/2004
X/2005
XII/2006
IX/2007
IX/2008
IX/2009
IX/2010
IX/2011
IX/2012
IX/2013
IX/2014
X/2015
X/2016
Definitely trust + Rather trust Definitely distrust + Rather distrust
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1973	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
effect	
   of	
   a	
   broader	
   successful	
   transformation	
   process	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   managed	
   without	
  
blatant	
   scandals	
   or	
   affairs	
   eroding	
   the	
   emerging	
   public	
   confidence	
   in	
   courts	
   or	
   judges.	
  
However,	
  the	
  forms	
  or	
  levels	
  of	
  JSG	
  do	
  not	
  seem	
  to	
  play	
  any	
  distinct	
  direct	
  role	
  in	
  this	
  
process.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
Figure	
  2	
  Prestige	
  of	
  the	
  top	
  eight	
  professions	
  in	
  Czechia,	
  2004-­‐2016	
  (in	
  %)
128
	
  
	
  
VI.	
  On	
  Lateral	
  Selection	
  and	
  Male	
  Court	
  Presidents	
  
	
  
As	
  there	
  were	
  few	
  JSG	
  changes	
  that	
  would	
  significantly	
  affect	
  the	
  CIATL	
  values,	
  it	
  follows	
  
that	
  such	
  changes	
  would	
  have	
  little	
  impact	
  on	
  other	
  values	
  as	
  well,	
  apart	
  from	
  diversity.	
  
The	
  professional	
  diversity	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  may	
  have	
  been	
  influenced	
  by	
  the	
  presidents’	
  of	
  
the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  and	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court	
  intentions	
  to	
  select	
  judges	
  not	
  
only	
  from	
  the	
  ranks	
  of	
  professional	
  judges,	
  but	
  also	
  from	
  the	
  ranks	
  of	
  academics	
  and	
  other	
  
legal	
  professions.
129
	
  It	
  was,	
  however,	
  only	
  at	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Administrative	
  Court	
  that	
  the	
  
change	
  was	
  actually	
  implemented;	
  it	
  remains	
  to	
  be	
  seen	
  whether	
  this	
  will	
  be	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  
the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   as	
   well;	
   there	
   are	
   no	
   signs	
   of	
   such	
   change	
   happening	
   at	
   the	
   lower	
  
courts.
130
	
  Gender-­‐wise,	
  the	
  Czech	
  judiciary	
  is	
  quite	
  constantly
131
	
  a	
  predominantly	
  female	
  
(public)	
  sector	
  by	
  the	
  coefficient	
  of	
  3.	
  The	
  salary	
  base	
  is	
  then	
  in	
  turn	
  multiplied	
  by	
  a	
  specific	
  coefficient	
  depending	
  
on	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  a	
  judge	
  etc.	
  	
  
128
Source:	
  Czech	
  Social	
  Science	
  Data	
  Archive	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Institute	
  of	
  Sociology.	
  Legend:	
  The	
  data	
  in	
  the	
  figure	
  
represent	
  the	
  average	
  score	
  of	
  prestige	
  on	
  a	
  scale	
  from	
  1=the	
  lowest	
  prestige	
  to	
  99=the	
  highest	
  prestige.	
  
129
	
  See	
  the	
  memos	
  published	
  by	
  the	
  CPs,	
  supra	
  note	
  75.	
  
130
	
  Kühn	
  2012,	
  supra	
  note	
  6,	
  at	
  613–616.	
  
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
Judge	
  
Doctor	
  
Scien‰st	
  
University	
  teacher	
  
Primary	
  school	
  teacher	
  
Programmer	
  
Project	
  designer	
  
Nurse	
  
1974	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
profession,	
  with	
  women	
  occupying	
  about	
  66%	
  of	
  the	
  posts	
  at	
  the	
  district	
  courts,	
  57%	
  of	
  the	
  
posts	
   at	
   the	
   regional	
   courts,	
   44%	
   of	
   the	
   posts	
   at	
   the	
   high	
   courts,	
   and	
   25%	
   at	
   the	
   apex	
  
courts,
132
	
  although	
  the	
  positions	
  of	
  CPs	
  and	
  vice-­‐presidents,	
  especially	
  at	
  the	
  higher	
  courts,	
  
tend	
  to	
  be	
  dominated	
  by	
  men.
133
	
  Furthermore,	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  available	
  data	
  about	
  the	
  ethnic	
  
diversity	
   of	
   the	
   Czech	
   judiciary,	
   but	
   we	
   may	
   safely	
   guess	
   that	
   it	
   reflects	
   the	
   mostly	
  
homogeneous	
   Czech	
   population.	
   Thus,	
   no	
   apparent	
   changes,	
   including	
   those	
   related	
   to	
  
JSG,	
  took	
  place	
  that	
  would	
  affect	
  the	
  gender	
  or	
  ethnic	
  diversity	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  	
  
	
  
C.	
  Place	
  of	
  Court	
  Presidents	
  in	
  the	
  Separation	
  of	
  Powers	
  and	
  their	
  Link	
  to	
  the	
  People	
  
	
  
In	
  this	
  final	
  section,	
  we	
  take	
  a	
  step	
  back	
  from	
  the	
  five	
  values	
  and	
  assess	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  JSG	
  
on	
  the	
  modern	
  state	
  in	
  a	
  more	
  general	
  sense,	
  namely	
  on	
  the	
  architecture	
  of	
  the	
  separation	
  
of	
  powers	
  and	
  the	
  democratic	
  principle.	
  Similarly	
  to	
  the	
  previous	
  parts,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  position	
  
and	
  powers	
  of	
  CPs,	
  who	
  most	
  often	
  come	
  into	
  contact	
  with	
  the	
  other	
  branches	
  of	
  power,	
  
which	
  pose	
  the	
  biggest	
  challenge	
  to	
  the	
  separation	
  of	
  powers.	
  This	
  is	
  caused	
  by	
  the	
  fact	
  
that	
  court	
  administration	
  in	
  Czechia	
  has	
  traditionally	
  belonged	
  to	
  the	
  executive	
  branch,
134
	
  
the	
  telling	
  proof	
  of	
  which	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  term	
  “state’s	
  administration	
  of	
  courts”	
  is	
  used	
  to	
  this	
  
day.
135
	
   We	
   have	
   already	
   stated	
   that	
   the	
   state	
   administration	
   of	
   courts	
   is	
   a	
   task	
   of	
   CPs	
  
together	
  with	
  the	
  MoJ.
136
	
  As	
  there	
  can	
  be	
  no	
  doubt	
  that	
  MoJ	
  is	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  executive,	
  it	
  is	
  
the	
  role	
  of	
  CPs	
  that	
  may	
  create	
  confusion.	
  Until	
  2008,	
  it	
  was	
  safe	
  to	
  assert	
  that	
  CPs	
  were	
  
part	
  of	
  the	
  executive	
  power,	
  as	
  they	
  carried	
  out	
  a	
  role	
  that	
  was	
  traditionally	
  understood	
  as	
  
executive	
  and	
  the	
  rules	
  that	
  apply	
  in	
  the	
  administration	
  applied	
  to	
  them	
  as	
  well.
137
	
  After	
  
2008,	
  however,	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  CPs	
  changed.	
  The	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  declared	
  that	
  CPs’	
  
specific	
   role	
   is	
   to	
   ensure	
   the	
   proper	
   functioning	
   of	
   the	
   judiciary	
   (separation	
   of	
  
functions/institutions),
138
	
  and,	
  consequently,	
  it	
  struck	
  down	
  a	
  provision	
  that	
  declared	
  CPs	
  
part	
  of	
  the	
  public	
  administration	
  for	
  personal	
  incompatibility.
139
	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  CPs	
  are	
  on	
  the	
  
131
	
  Kühn	
  2010,	
  supra	
  note	
  6,	
  at	
  191,	
  reports	
  that	
  in	
  2001	
  the	
  numbers	
  were	
  quite	
  similar.	
  
132
	
  See	
  České	
  soudnictví	
  2016:	
  Výroční	
  statistická	
  zpráva,	
  Ministerstvo	
  spravedlnosti,	
  2017,	
  at	
  12,	
  53,	
  94,	
  105,	
  and	
  
111.	
   The	
   causes	
   of	
   underrepresentation	
   of	
   women	
   at	
   the	
   upper	
   echelons	
   of	
   the	
   Czech	
   judiciary	
   are	
   not	
   yet	
  
determined.	
  
133
	
  See	
  http://portal.justice.cz/Justice2/Soudci/soudci.html.	
  
134
	
  This	
  tradition	
  dates	
  to	
  the	
  times	
  of	
  Austro-­‐Hungarian	
  Empire;	
  see	
  PRINC,	
  supra	
  note	
  29,	
  at	
  209–220.	
  
135
	
  See	
  Art.	
  119	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  no.	
  6/2002	
  Sb.,	
  On	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges;	
  and	
  art.	
  74(2)	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  no.	
  6/2002	
  Sb.,	
  On	
  
Courts	
   and	
   Judges,	
   which	
   explicitly	
   admits	
   that	
   the	
   function	
   of	
   the	
   court	
   president	
   is	
   part	
   of	
   the	
   public	
  
administration.	
  
136
	
  Art.	
  119(2)	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  no.	
  6/2002	
  Sb.,	
  On	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
137
	
  Especially	
  the	
  rule	
  that	
  who	
  appoints,	
  dismisses	
  as	
  well.	
  
138
	
  Judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  11	
  July	
  2006,	
  case	
  no.	
  Pl.	
  ÚS	
  18/06.	
  
139
	
  Judgment	
  of	
  the	
  Czech	
  Constitutional	
  Court	
  of	
  4	
  May	
  2010,	
  case	
  no.	
  Pl.	
  ÚS	
  7/09.	
  
2018	
   Judicial	
  Self-­‐Government	
  in	
  Czechia:	
  Europe’s	
  Black	
  Sheep?	
   1975	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
one	
  hand	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  public	
  administration	
  with	
  administrative	
  powers,	
  but	
  on	
  the	
  other,	
  
their	
  position	
  is	
  protected	
  by	
  judicial	
  independence,	
  which	
  makes	
  them	
  what	
  could	
  be	
  best	
  
described	
  as	
  sui	
  generis	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  public	
  administration.	
  Accordingly,	
  as	
  the	
  position	
  
of	
  CPs	
  was	
  no	
  longer	
  of	
  a	
  predominantly	
  executive	
  nature,	
  and	
  the	
  rules	
  applicable	
  in	
  the	
  
executive	
   no	
   longer	
   applied	
   to	
   them,	
   we	
   can	
   now	
   say	
   that	
   the	
   role	
   of	
   CPs,	
   and	
   the	
  
separation	
  of	
  powers	
  with	
  it,	
  was	
  altered.	
  	
  
	
  
We	
  now	
  briefly	
  turn	
  to	
  the	
  democratic	
  principle.	
  This	
  principle	
  requires	
  that	
  the	
  people	
  are	
  
more	
  or	
  less	
  directly	
  connected	
  with	
  their	
  representatives	
  and	
  it	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  
debates	
  concerning	
  the	
  Czech	
  judiciary,	
  although	
  different	
  terms	
  have	
  often	
  been	
  used.	
  
For	
  instance,	
  during	
  the	
  2017	
  parliamentary	
  elections,	
  almost	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  nine	
  later	
  elected	
  
political	
  parties	
  emphasized	
  that	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  judges	
  and	
  their	
  work	
  had	
  to	
  be	
  subjected	
  
to	
  public	
  inspection	
  and	
  that	
  judges	
  had	
  to	
  be	
  personally	
  accountable	
  for	
  the	
  judgements	
  
they	
  issue.
140
	
  These	
  measures	
  were	
  to	
  ensure	
  that	
  people	
  knew	
  who	
  the	
  judge	
  deciding	
  
their	
  case	
  was	
  and	
  how	
  well	
  she	
  performed	
  her	
  function.	
  Therefore,	
  although	
  there	
  has	
  
never	
  been	
  a	
  proposal	
  in	
  Czechia	
  to	
  introduce	
  the	
  election	
  of	
  judges	
  by	
  the	
  people	
  or	
  the	
  
Parliament,	
  including	
  people	
  in	
  the	
  scrutiny	
  of	
  the	
  judiciary	
  has	
  been	
  always	
  called	
  for.	
  So	
  
far,	
  however,	
  this	
  has	
  materialized	
  only	
  in	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  non-­‐judicial	
  members	
  into	
  
the	
  disciplinary	
  panels	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  preservation	
  of	
  the	
  Communist	
  system	
  of	
  lay	
  judges,	
  i.e.	
  
laymen	
  who	
  are	
  elected	
  by	
  municipal	
  or	
  regional	
  councils	
  and	
  have	
  a	
  majority	
  say	
  in	
  some	
  
matters	
  decided	
  at	
  district	
  and	
  regional	
  courts.
141
	
  The	
  legitimacy	
  chain	
  between	
  the	
  people	
  
and	
   judges	
   thus	
   remains	
   rather	
   loose,	
   which	
   is	
   even	
   more	
   true	
   in	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   court	
  
presidents	
   –	
   the	
   primary	
   JSG	
   actors	
   –	
   whose	
   selection	
   remains	
   shrouded	
   in	
   mystery	
   in	
  
Czechia.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
D.	
  Conclusion	
  
	
  
This	
   article	
   argued	
   that,	
   despite	
   having	
   no	
   judicial	
   council,	
   there	
   is	
   indeed	
   judicial	
   self-­‐
government	
  in	
  Czechia.	
  Firstly,	
  it	
  showed	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  several	
  bodies	
  that	
  take	
  part	
  in	
  
JSG,	
  although	
  the	
  crucial	
  role	
  is	
  played	
  by	
  the	
  CPs,	
  who	
  hold	
  substantial	
  formal	
  powers	
  and	
  
informal	
  influence	
  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	
  the	
  judiciary	
  and	
  the	
  other	
  branches	
  of	
  power,	
  namely	
  the	
  MoJ	
  
(Section	
  A).	
  Furthermore,	
  the	
  article	
  stressed	
  that	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  institutionalized	
  JSG	
  in	
  the	
  
form	
  of	
  a	
  judicial	
  council	
  does	
  not	
  bar	
  the	
  judiciary	
  from	
  functioning	
  properly	
  in	
  the	
  wider	
  
legal,	
   political	
   and	
   social	
   environment,	
   although	
   there	
   are	
   some	
   problematic	
   points	
  
(Section	
  B).	
  Thus,	
  the	
  JSG	
  in	
  Czechia	
  on	
  the	
  one	
  hand	
  facilitates,	
  but,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  
also	
  potentially	
  endangers	
  judicial	
  independence	
  by	
  concentrating	
  power	
  in	
  the	
  hands	
  of	
  
CPs;	
  similarly,	
  JSG	
  may	
  have	
  increased	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  disciplinary	
  motions,	
  but	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  
time	
  may	
  have	
  decreased	
  their	
  successfulness.	
  By	
  bringing	
  transparency	
  to	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  
judges,	
   CPs	
   may	
   have	
   given	
   the	
   judiciary	
   a	
   legitimacy	
   boost;	
   nevertheless,	
   by	
   not	
  
140
	
  See	
  e.	
  g.	
  http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/tema/484360-­‐volby-­‐2017-­‐spravedlnost-­‐a-­‐stav-­‐justice.	
  
141
	
  See	
  arts.	
  64	
  and	
  further	
  Law	
  No.	
  6/2002	
  Coll.,	
  on	
  Courts	
  and	
  Judges.	
  
1976	
   G erm an	
  Law 	
  Journal	
  	
   Vol.	
  19	
  No.	
  07	
  
respecting	
   the	
   prohibition	
   of	
   their	
   own	
   reappointment	
   and	
   because	
   of	
   the	
   lack	
   of	
  
transparency	
   in	
   the	
   informal	
   JSG	
   processes,	
   the	
   legitimacy	
   may	
   again	
   suffer.	
   As	
   far	
   as	
  
public	
  confidence	
  in	
  judiciary	
  goes,	
  it	
  remains	
  fairly	
  strong	
  and	
  apparently	
  unaffected	
  by	
  
the	
  JSG	
  issues.	
  Finally,	
  from	
  a	
  more	
  general	
  point	
  of	
  view	
  (Section	
  C),	
  we	
  have	
  showed	
  that	
  
the	
  JSG	
  influenced	
  the	
  separation	
  of	
  powers	
  in	
  Czechia	
  in	
  a	
  peculiar	
  way	
  by	
  making	
  CPs	
  sui	
  
generis	
   actors	
   belonging	
   somewhere	
   between	
   the	
   judiciary	
   and	
   the	
   executive	
   branch,	
  
while	
  not	
  contributing	
  to	
  the	
  democratic	
  connection	
  between	
  the	
  people	
  and	
  the	
  judiciary.	
  
To	
   sum	
   up,	
   calling	
   Czechia	
   the	
   “black	
   sheep”	
   for	
   not	
   establishing	
   a	
   judicial	
   council	
   may	
  
therefore	
   not	
   be	
   appropriate,	
   as	
   the	
   judiciary	
   has	
   been	
   able	
   to	
   sustain	
   a	
   substantial	
  
amount	
  of	
  JSG.	
  Whether	
  it	
  will	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  hold	
  onto	
  it	
  and	
  manage	
  to	
  guard	
  the	
  crucial	
  
values	
  is	
  a	
  question	
  that	
  remains	
  to	
  be	
  answered;	
  whether	
  a	
  judicial	
  council	
  would	
  help	
  it	
  
in	
  this	
  task	
  can	
  only	
  be	
  hypothesized.