Measuring Populism in Spain

Content and discourse analysis of Spanish political parties

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Abstract

The rise of populist parties across Europe is shaking the foundations of Representative Democracy, of which Spain is a particular example: decades of bipartisanship have been broken amidst a territorial, economic, and social crisis, with new parties rising on the left and the right side of the spectrum. The aim of this paper is to analyse the Spanish political scenario and find which (if any) parties classify as populist and what are the other ideological traits of this (or these) parties, by means of both content and discourse analysis.

Introduction

This paper aims to provide insight into the political scene of Spain and particularly in the degree and type of populism in political parties in the country, in order to find if there are any populist political parties with relevance in the country, and to what extent.

The concept of populism has become increasingly popular globally, and particularly in the US with the Trump phenomenon, as well as in Europe (Bröning 2016; Europe 2016; Grabbe & Lehne 2016; Mount 2016). However, the word is used mostly as a political weapon in the public sphere; often an insult (Taguieff 2002), and many times a proxy for demagogy (Gianolla 2017), which does not provide much aid in using this category for analysis (Hubé & Truan 2016).

Between 2011 and 2016, the political landscape of Spain has completely changed, with the traditional, unchallenged majority of either PP or PSOE disrupted (Solá & Rendueles 2017) with the emergence of Ciudadanos on the centre-right and Podemos on the left (Lavezzolo 2017), due mostly to the concurrence of economic crisis, soaring unemployment, lack of trust in political parties, and corruption (Solá & Rendueles 2017). In the light of these changes, the word 'populism' has been a constant, sometimes as a self-described strategy (Iglesias Turrión 2015), but more often in the media and through political accusations (de Santiago Guervós 2015; Fernández-Llébrez 2016; Casquete 2016).

The academic analysis has had similar results in terms of political analysis and lack of systematic measurement. This paper aims to cover that gap in the field by providing a characterisation of the political landscape of Spain, identifying (if present) the populist parties, and so aims to answer the question *are there any populist parties in Spain?* And, if so, *to what degree?* Together with these two main questions, the research expects that newcomer parties will have higher populistic scores than established parties, as populism was not a discussed subject in Spain before the irruption of the two new relevant political parties in the national arena (Podemos and Ciudadanos).

The paper, therefore, proceeds to set the theoretical definition of Populism, followed by an explanation on methodology, and afterwards the analysis and conclusions.

Populism

The study of populism in academic terms has had several perspectives, both in defining the term itself (Deegan-Krause & Haughton 2009; Havlík & Pinková 2012; Školkay 2009; Taggart 1995) and in studying it from a comparative perspective, taking into account factors such as the welfare state and globalisation (Swank & Betz 2003), voting behaviour and dissatisfaction with institutions (Pauwels 2014) and Identity (Betz 1993), in many cases exclusively one side of populism (Mammone 2009). These many perspectives have been narrowed down to three: populism as an organisational form, populism as a political style, and populism as an ideology (Pauwels 2011). As an organisational form, populism is analysed based on a hierarchical structure (with the leader at the apex), but the same authors using this approach admit that there are populist parties that do not have this organisation (Jaggers & Walgrave 2007) or that there are organisations whose hierarchical structure cannot be classified as populist (Taggart 2000). As for political style, it implies the use of simplistic and direct language, akin to demagogy, to host mediatic, spectacular rallies and events that breach social taboos and refer constantly to the *people* (Heinisch 2003; Jaggers & Walgrave 2007). However, it is argued that populism hosts more than a mere style in communication, it has a normative dimension that makes it more similar to an ideology (together with ideology's ability to offer a view of the world and an action repertoire for mobilisation).

In this sense, the third perspective categorises populism as a thin centred ideology, thin meaning here the lack of a complete 'world-view' of other ideologies, and therefore its likeness to pair with other sets of ideas (Pauwels 2011). Therefore, populism by itself would only suggest part of the identity and activity of the party, in need of a 'surname' that could be of social, nationalistic, or other type. Parties normally classified as populistic are found attached to one of these additional dimensions. From this perspective, Mudde (2004), defined populism as a strategy of both communication and reality-shaping: the existence of two homogenous units (people and elite), the antagonism between the two, the 'pure' sovereignty of the people (and unmediated leadership of it by the personal leader), and the simplistic characterisation of the people (the 'common man') as inherently good and the elite as inherently bad. This perspective has been widely used in academic literature afterwards (Stanley 2008; Albertazzi & McDonnel 2007; Ruzza & Fella 2009).

The advantage of the 4-item definition proposed by Mudde and explained in the paragraph above is that it provides a first step towards an analytical breakdown of Laclau's classical definition of contemporary discursive populism, which 'consists in the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology' (Laclau 1977) wherein the people, an 'empty significant' is therefore defined in discursive terms to gather heterogeneous social demands. Its strength relies on the lack of definition itself of the terms 'elite' and 'people' (and the rest), which are constructed one against the other without precisely defining what they include and what they do not[i]. Laclau's definition of populism, within a radical concept of democracy, highlights the tense relationship between populism and liberal democracy. Liberal democracy, in one of its most accepted denominations, unites the participation of people through fair and free elections (majority rule) with the constitutional protection of minority rights. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012). Populism, understood in Laclau's terms expressed above, is certainly linked to the first element (majority rule), along the lines of a radical democracy, where the plurality of demands over which liberal institutions rule are discarded in favour of an encompassing notion of 'people's will', of which the populist party would be the sole interpreter. Given the impossibility of a 'resolution' for the contradiction between majority rule and minority rights, populism seems to cyclically

appear within liberal democratic systems (Arditi 2004). The consequences of populism are in any case under discussion: for some authors, it would depend on the strength of the democratic system (that is, how consolidated are its institutions), and the position of the populists (if the hold government or not) (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012). Others (Arroyas Langa & Pérez Díaz 2016; Hernández & Hurtado 2010) argue that populism, regardless of its pro or anti-democratic initial components, is always detrimental to democracy due to the verticality of its power structure, and to the fact that it mimics the representative system, albeit not including real participation in it (as also argued by Pauwels (2014).

Populist party analysis has been dealt with for the Spanish case, from the point of view of discourse analysis, using Laclau's perspective of discursive setting of the political arena (Villacañas J. L. 2015; Ahedo Rodríguez 2015), and also with other working definitions of Populism such as the 'us v. them' (Moriche de la Cruz 2016), which interestingly have all concluded that Podemos is a populist party in Spain. Particularly relevant is the paper by (Solá & Rendueles 2017), which analyses the conditions that gave rise to the political opportunity of Podemos along its characteristics, and the work of Arroyas Langa & Pérez Díaz (2016), which follows the same conception of populism, analysing Podemos' discourse on twitter. Based on it, they find the party to be populist, yet they note an important difference in the role of leadership, it being depicted as collective, rather than focused on the figure of Pablo Iglesias as leader. However, most of the existing literature on the topic assumes that Podemos is a populist party and attempts to explain it or its success without questioning this status (Figeroa & Thielemann 2016; Javier Damin & Petersen 2016; Fernández-Llébrez 2016) or assumes the party's own declarations as populist together with a few media comments (del Río 2015). Recently, as well, the political developments have produced a number of research pieces on the theoretical side of populism, such as (Fernández Liria, 2016; Villacañas J. L. 2015), all of them drawing on Laclau's theoretical framework.

One particular interesting dimension of Spanish politics introduced by the literature is the three cleavages of discourse management for parties: the left-right one, the radical-moderate, and the new-old, as in (del Río 2015) (Fernández-Llébrez 2016), in which parties such as Podemos (and Ciudadanos) attempt to be included in the last cleavage (new-old) and insist on the surpass of the traditional left-right divide (MacMillan 2017).

Methodology: Populist measurement

Case selection

Due to the elevate number of parties present at some level of representation in Spain (Local, Regional, National and European parliaments), presence in the National Parliament at the current term of the paper (2016-2020) will be the threshold to take the party into account. This gives 14 different political parties that represent ca 97% of the valid votes in the 2016 elections (the other 3% going to another 40 political parties without representation that ran for the elections as well). Out of the 14 parties, the main 4 are 'national', being elected in all the country, while the other 9 are only represented in certain regions and hold nationalist or regionalist interest of some degree: Asturias (FAC), Canarias (CCa, NCa), Navarra (UPN), Catalonia (ERC, PDeCat), Valencia (Compromis), and the Basque Country (Bildu, PNV).

Measuring Populism

This article proposes to analyse the levels of populism (and other attached items to the parties), departing from the proposition of the 4 items and the thin-centred ideology, through an exercise of content analysis, 'making replicable and valid inference from data to their context' (Krippendorf 1989) and quantifying 'what' the message communicates by re-connecting the symbol with its contextual meaning. The analysis is carried out in two stages: computerised content analysis, and discourse analysis. The computerised content analysis explained below finds high degrees of populism: populism here would mean a high level of usage of certain words during speeches (such as the people, the elite, the caste, below, above, and so on) that refer to the 4 items proposed, which would be consistent with the evidence that 'if a word appears once, it is much more likely that it will re-appear again [..], despite the fact that, due to the number of words of a language, the vast majority of them don't' (Brier & Hopp 2011). While these would be more reliable with a classical content analysis following, e.g. Rooduijn's example (2009), the process is time and resource-intensive, and results would lose objectivity.bTherefore, it is argued that a computerised content analysis is the most practical, systematic, and comparable technique to initially measure populism across the spectrum, while allowing as well to measure other attached characteristics of parties than populism. The repetition of words mentioned above, particularly related to 'average and rare words [which] carry the information on a text' (Brier & Hopp 2011), allow, along with this content analysis method, to find the marked words and their concordance within the larger text. As limitations and complexities of this approach are known (as many parties might use a word, not necessarily to oppose or support the concept), and generally speaking there are validity issues with computerised content analysis (Grimmer & Stewart 2013), a preliminary review of the concordance has been conducted with the dictionary. This has been to ensure not only the theoretical relevance of the words to the categories, but also false positives.

Secondly, to overcome the validity limitations of the first stage outlined above, discourse analysis of selected party material, from the parties which surpassed the threshold of the first stage, are considered to effectively find the relevant 4 items or lack thereof. This double-tier system aims to ensure that computer analysis provides the necessary validation of results (Grimmer & Stewart 2013). Thus, before the second stage of discourse analysis is executed, a systematic validation by the coder is undertaken to ensure that the appearance of populist keywords is meaningful, as 'For dictionary methods to work well, the scores attached to words must closely align with how the words are used in a particular context' (Grimmer & Stewart 2013).

The second stage is particularly relevant given the measurement problems of some of the 4 items of populism in computer analysis: while the existence of the two homogeneous social groups, their inherent good and evil nature, and the antagonism between them is relatively accessible through the analysis, problems arise with the pure sovereignty of the people. The existence of the two groups can be directly related to certain word usage in the dictionary, as well as the antagonism by the type of words to describe them: the people is described in positive connotations, which also overlap with the notion of the 'good people', and the same logic inversely applies for the elite. The pure sovereignty and unmediated leadership are harder to grasp with words as unit of analysis, and thus they are considered grey tones of the other items.

For the purpose of this study, the timeframe chosen goes from the European Elections of 2009 (including the political programs and material devised for that election before that date) to the national ones of 2016/2017. This is so as the major political shift in electoral terms has happened during this period of time, with two new major nation-wide political parties being born at the left and right side of the political spectrum.

In terms of selected texts for discourse analysis, however, focus has been placed in 2015 and 2016, particularly for discourse analysis, as it is this period that offers more study material (given the non-existence of Podemos before 2014 and the small and regional character of Ciudadanos before 2015).

Content Analysis
For the content analysis a dictionary has been defined, largely drawing from Pauwels (2011), but adapted to the Spanish context: a first stage of exploratory party literature has been undertaken to estimate the most commonly used words, both in Spanish and Catalan, grouped in several categories. This revision was particularly important due to the problems that these dictionaries present when applied to different contexts that the one originally intended for (Grimmer & Stewart 2013) However, in this case the original dictionary was also thought for populism, which should improve accuracy and validity.

Populism itself is a category that groups, on the first side, the continuous reference to the people, which in the Spanish case can be directly by the word *pueblo,* but also *la gente.* Together with this, comes the rejection of the elite, which is often depicted as elite iself, *casta* (caste), and *los de arriba* (the ones above), which serves as an obvious comparison with *los de abajo* (the ones bellow, identified with *el pueblo* or the people). Following the literature (Pauwels, 2011), words such as corruption, two-party system and establishment refer to populism, and are therefore included.

During this analysis, a general study of other categories has been undertaken (such as social or nationalistic discourse), which allow to characterise the type of 'filler' in the thin-centred populism, whose delimitation has been taken from (Pauwels, 2011) with the national adaptation.

Using all these dimensions, texts are analysed to observe the appearance of any of these dimensions, and concordance is analysed to ensure the validity of the results. The absolute appearance of words in the text is then presented relative to the remaining dimensions, therefore giving a visual and quantified image of how these occupy the meaningful parts of the texts.

For the first stage, party programmes and other party material (Manifestos, internal magazines, speeches in selected sessions of the Spanish Parliament, as well as small declarations) have been analysed, including the texts that will be subject to discourse analysis (political speeches). The separation in the two categories is due to the different

nature of the texts: party programmes tend to be more detailed and potentially less 'populistic', while more literary material has a bigger potential of using rhetoric figures appealing to the people or the elites (Pauwels, 2011). Available material greatly varies from party to party, and thus these differentiations aims to provide a comparable scheme between the parties. The sources analysed (and compared) are in table 1 below. Some degree of populism is expected to appear in all parties due to the quantitative nature of the analysis (and the fact that parties might use the same terminology to reply some to others), and therefore only the highest scorers will be selected for the discourse analysis step.

Discourse Analysis
The selected parties for the second stage are afterwards analysed by means of an equal type of text sources, to assure the strongest comparability possible. During the second stage, appearance of populism's 4 items is required to accept the party as truly populistic. Nevertheless, populism in political parties is a matter of degree, and some appearance of the items will also be noted down.

Discourse analysis has the advantage of ensuring validity of results, argued with explicit text references in the analysis chapter. Instead of taking single words as the computerised content analysis stage, or sentences or paragraphs in classic content analysis, discourse analysis is flexible the unit of measure and allows for a deeper insight into the meaning conveyed by the text. This can be seen in the role of grammar, which allows to create closeness or distance to certain interlocutors by shifts in the language usage. Another interesting language issue that discourse analysis allows to grasp is the usage of quotes: others are cited to reinforce the speech (whether in favour or against), is a common tool to manipulate the public (Reyes, 2011).

Analysis

This chapter contains the two-tier analysis of the party literature to determine the populist nature of the parties selected for study. The annexes provide a comprehensive overview of the materials analysed in the two stages:

Content Analysis

For this article, it is assumed that parties which have never held office, and particularly, the ones that are newcomers, are expected to have a higher degree of populism than established ones. The literature available has been split in two groups: party programmes, and other literature. This is because party programmes show a wide range of issues concerning the parties' position and can provide broader insight into other defining factors of the parties. However, populist levels are expected to be low in the program, as it is usually based on concrete policies rather than vague political statements. For this purpose, the 'other literature' category gathers party manifestos, public speeches, key political interventions in the parliament, and 'internal party literature', such as magazines for internal formation, when available. Another purpose of these additions is to obtain a sufficient number of words to prevent content analysis result from being extreme and unrepresentative due to small samples.

Annex IV contains the complete list of material used for the content analysis. Table 1 shows the specific case of populism, how many words within the dimensions were found of the text, out of total 'relevant' words (belonging to one of the dimensions)

Table 1: Material for content analysis and wordcount

Party	Populist Wordcount	Total Words	Relevant	Total wordcount
Podemos	474,00		2274,00	179097,00
Ciudadanos	151,00		1097,00	65638,00
Bildu	23,00		446,00	15121,00
Coalición Canaria	33,00		1390,00	45800,00
Compromis	61,00		1475,00	100057,00
ERC	109,00		2391,00	117478,00
Foro	9,00		1760,00	98234,00
NCa	20,00		1125,00	45005,00
PdCat	54,00		2334,00	133995,00
PNV	16,00		1050,00	51479,00
PP	123,00		2104,00	129815,00
PSOE	29,00		2639,00	161829,00
UPN	7,00		612,00	50081,00

While the number of total wordcount varies wildly, this is mostly due to available sources, and to the fact that the main amount of 'word analysis' comes from the parliament diaries, in which the speaking time is greatly affected by the seat power in the house.

From the analysis of all available party literature, Figure 1 shows the levels of Populism present in the two types of literature and in the global calculation. According to the party programs, Podemos and Ciudadanos (in that order) are the most populist parties, with 17% and 12% of presence of the populist dimension in texts on average. However, in non-program literature, the most populist party is by far Podemos, with 32%, followed by Ciudadanos with 18%, and by the Popular Party with 15%.

Figure 1: Populism Level by Party and literature type

Podemos and Ciudadanos analysed by dimension

The different dimensions of the two most populist parties can be seen in figures 2, 3, and 4 for Podemos and 5, 6, 7 for ciudadanos:

Figure 2: Podemos dimensions in all texts

PODEMOS - TOTAL

Conservatism 5%
Environment 2%
Immigration 3%
Law and order 6%
Liberalism 8%
national identity 21%
neoliberalism 5%
Populism 18%
Progressive 3%
Social 29%

Figure 3: Podemos dimensions in other party text (no programs)

PODEMOS - NO PROGRAM

Environment 1%
Conservatism 2%
Immigration 2%
Law and order 3%
Liberalism 6%
Social 24%
Progressive 4%
national identity 22%
neoliberalism 3%
Populism 33%

Figure 4: Podemos dimensions in party programmes

**PODEMOS - PROGRAM**

Aside from populism, Podemos has a sizeable amount of content in its political programmes related to the social dimension, 34% (something expected of a party self-identified as leftist) and national identity, 20%, mostly devoted to the territorial configuration of Spain and the different 'nations' that compose the Spanish State. The proportions between dimensions are relatively held when compared to the rest of party materials, with the exception of populism itself, soaring from 2 to 33%. Topics more related in theory with conservative parties, such as law and order, immigration, and conservatism, only add together up to 12% of the wordcount, while another 12% is shared by liberal and neoliberal dimensions. In party programmes, however, this occupies 21% and 19% of the wordcount respectively.

Interestingly enough, progressive and environmental issues play a small role in the discourse configuration, with a share in total of 3% and 2% respectively.

Figure 5: Ciudadanos Dimensions (total)

CIUDADANOS -TOTAL

- Conservatism 13%
- Environment 2%
- Immigration 2%
- Law and order 7%
- Liberalism 11%
- national identity 17%
- neoliberalism 5%
- Populism 11%
- Progressive 3%
- Social 29%

Figure 6: Ciudadanos Dimensions (No program)

CIUDADANOS - NO PROGRAM

- Conservatism 6%
- Environment 0%
- Immigration 1%
- Law and order 4%
- Liberalism 9%
- national identity 19%
- neoliberalism 4%
- Populism 19%
- Progressive 3%
- Social 35%

Figure 7: Ciudadanos Dimensions (Program)

CIUDADANOS PROGRAM

Conservatism 20%
Environment 3%
Immigration 3%
Law and order 9%
Liberalism 12%
National Identity 15%
neoliberalism 6%
Populism 5%
Progressive 2%
Social 25%

Likewise, Ciudadanos devotes little role for populist language in programmes, while conservative issues (Conservatism, Immigration, and Law and Order) add up to 32% of the wordcount. Social topics cover a fourth of the speech, fitting into a centred, liberal-conservative and social-liberal political party (Mateo, 2017). National identity issues appear less salient than in Podemos, yet nevertheless relevant with a fourth of the share in non-programme materials. In this category, social issues also occupy a third of the wordcount.

As difference with Podemos, where dimensions held the proportions between programmes and the rest of the materials, in the Ciudadanos case the situation changes: the rest of materials show an increase of share for national identity and social issues, at expense of conservative and liberal issues. Progressive and environmental dimensions are as small as in the Podemos case.

Podemos and Ciudadanos comparison. The overview of both parties offers an interesting insight: while their ideologies are evidently different in the party programmes, where Ciudadanos is clearly more leaning towards liberalism and conservatism, social and national identity issues are both of the utmost relevance. This would be consistent with the two main issues at stake in Spain: the territorial challenge (focused now on Catalonia) and the economic crisis and unemployment levels.

More interesting is how both parties converge when they leave the content of programmes and the speeches, manifestos and other materials are analysed. Social, national, and populistic dimensions are then prevalent. This is an interesting phenomenon that could be linked to the fact that both parties are trying to attract, to some extent, the same electorate, and/or to the salience of these two topics in the media. In this sense, constant mention to national and social issues can be merely profitable politically.

Podemos and Ciudadanos share, with the rest of the analysed parties, the lack of relevance of environmental or immigration issues, as can be seen in figure 8:

Figure 8: Environmental and Immigration dimensions in Party Programmes

The party that mentions more often immigration topics is Podemos, with almost 5%, and the average stays around 2.5%. Environment is equally irrelevant in general terms, with figures as low as 0.5% in CCA or Foro and only up to 4% in Compromis (the highest). Immigration, after the economic crisis, has apparently ceased to be a main issue among the population, while the lack of interest in environment might be explained by the lack of a relevant 'Green Party' in Spain akin to its European counterparts. Particularly interesting is the case of ERC, which is integrated in the Greens/European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament, yet has barely 0.3% of share for environment in the wordcount.

Discourse Analysis

The content analysis has provided two parties that score particularly high in populism levels: Podemos, and Ciudadanos, that stay within an average of 7-8% of populist wordcount. These two parties are analysed in its discourse, by means of two comparable sources: the main speech of the central act for the elections' campaign in 2015, for both parties.

Podemos

The present analysis covers the first speech of Podemos (before the elections of 20th December 2015), by Pablo Iglesias during the main campaign rally in Madrid (full text provided in annex III), quotes literally extracted from (Iglesias, 2015) in italics, indented; and translated to English below in each case.

Frist of all, the differentiation between the 'people' and the 'elite' is found in different forms. Gramatically speaking, the speech uses two different forms: *vosotros* (you, informally) when the 'people' is addressed, and *ustedes* (you in the formal fashion) when the 'elite' is interpellated, together with the terminology (people v lords)

> *'Sonreíd, sonreíd porque estáis haciendo historia. Y cuando se hace historia, hay algo que Juan Andrade llama excedente democrático, que vuelve. Cuando la gente hace historia en este país […] Estamos orgullosos de vosotros y vosotras, y queremos estar a vuestra altura'*

(Smile, smile because you're making history. And when history is made, there's something that Juan Andrade calls democratic excess, that comes back. When the people make history in this country […], and we are proud of you, and we want to be at your same level)

And the elite, on the other hand:

'Señores, de los partidos del turno. Señores del pasado, no solamente hemos demostrado que les podemos ganar las elecciones, hemos demostrado que podemos gobernar mejor'

(Lords, from the parties of the Turno. Lords of the past, not only have we demonstrated that we can defeat you in elections, we have proved that we can rule better)

Neither the people nor the elite are clearly defined, but an outline of what the elite is about is given in excerpts such as the 'lords of the old' and 'lords from the parties of the Turno'[ii], as well as with '*decir las verdades a la cara a los corruptos*' (tell the truth straight at the face of the the corrupt people), or '*patrimonio de señores con trajes caros que convirtieron la constitución en papel mojado* , (patrimony of gentlemen with expensive suits that left the constitution without meaning). This is, old, corrupt people who betrayed the spirit of the constitution and its people. Together with this, the 'political elite' is blurrily linked with the 'economic elite', namely the big companies:

'Cuando un exministro, cuando un exdiputado, utiliza los conocimientos que ha adquirido en una posición pública, que dependían de la gente le hubiera votado, para vendérselo a red eléctrica, para vendérselo a gas natural, para vendérselo a telefónica: eso es corrupción estructural'

(when a former minister, when a former member of parliament uses the knowledge acquired in a public position, depending from the people who voted for him, to sell it to Red Eléctrica, to sell it to Gas Natural, to sell it to Telefónica, that is structural corruption)

The people, on the other hand, is characterised as honest, working population who brought all that is good to the country

'*Tiene que ver con los que peináis canas, con las abuelas y abuelos […] Estamos orgullosos de todas esas mujeres y de todos esos hombres, que soñaron que España sería un país mejor [...] muchas gracias a las clases populares de este país, estamos orgullosos de vosotros y vosotras, y los avances sociales que se han producido, nos producen honor cuando miramos a la gente humilde*'

(It has to do with those of you with years behind you, with grandparents […], we are proud of all those women and men who dreamt that Spain would be a better country […], thanks to the popular classes from this country, we are proud of all of you, and the achievements accomplished, it honours us when we stare at the humble).

Under these two concepts, the dichotomy between the two, is presented, as:

'*Muchos tardaron en entender, lo que significaba el movimiento 15M. no era sólo lo que se veía en las plazas, el movimiento 15M era la sangre que corría por las venas de España […]. Las banderas tienen que servir para avanzar,*

> *estamos orgullosos de España, porque España dijo a las viejas élites: adiós, no nos representáis, nunca más, una España sin su gente. [...] Este país ha empezado a cambiar, ha empezado a entrar gente corriente en las instituciones, haciendo lo mejor, quien podía imaginar, después de escuchar a esa activista que demostró su ternura con los de abajo y su firmeza con los de arriba'*

> (Many took their time to understand, what 15M meant [the citizen movement]. It wasn't only what you could see on the squares, the 15M movement was the blood flowing through Spain's veins […] Flags must serve be to advance, we are proud of Spain, because Spain told the old elites: good bye, you don't represent us, never again, a Spain without its people […] This country has started to change, normal people have entered the institutions, doing their best. Who could have imagined, after listening to that activist, that showed her kindness with the ones below and her firm hand with the ones above)

And the link between the 'leader' and the wise knowledge of the people to know and rule is presented as well:

> *'Nunca más un jefe de gobierno que sea el jefe de los Españoles. Yo quiero ser el empleado, el trabajador, de los españoles. El presidente está al servicio de la gente, y tiene que trabajar para la gente, y tiene que dar la cara ante la gente [...] Quien forma el poder judicial. Puede que los ciudadanos se equivoquen, pero yo me fío más de los ciudadanos que de los partidos'*

> (Never again a head of government that is the boss of all Spaniards. I want to be the employee, the worker, of Spaniards. The president serves the people, and must work for the people, and accept responsibilities before the people. Who is part of the judicial power [defending the power of citizens to elect judges]. Citizens might get something wrong, but I trust citizens more than I do parties)

In the case of Podemos, the 4 items are encountered. However, while the differentiation between people and elite is evident, repeated, and vertebrates the whole discourse, the unmediated leadership is less evident in the language used.

With respect to the comparison with content analysis, the findings seem consistent, with a high degree of populism and the rest devoted to social issues and the national configuration of the country, without any mention whatsoever for environment or immigration and very few to progressive topics.

Ciudadanos
The speech of Ciudadanos is also held a few days before the elections of December 20th, and here the main part of it (the speech of the party leader, Albert Rivera) is analysed (Full Transcript provided in Annex III), quotes literally extracted from (Rivera, 2015), indented, in italics for the original and translated in each case.

The identification of people and elite is contradictory in the speech, with no grammatical indicator: the speaker uses the formal 'ustedes' to address the public and does not interpellate. It identifies partially the people as the 'normal people', that do not want anything but to be left alone, and now they are going into power through Ciudadanos:

> *'Y gente normal haciendo cosas extraordinarias, la gente normal es la que se va a beneficiar si Ciudadanos gobierna.[...] Esos autónomos que se levantan*

cada mañana para luchar contra las trabas y la burocracia que la propia administración les pone; que se levantan cada mañana para pagar contratos, para pagar IVAs, IRPF, seguridad social, que tienen un sueño, y que quieren llevar a cabo. -Que no piden nada, que sólo quieren que les dejen trabajar. Nosotros vamos a ser los aliados de toda esa gente normal'

(And normal people doing extraordinary things: the normal people will benefit if Ciudadanos rules. […] Those self-employed workers that wake up every day to fight against the red tape of the administration. That wake up every morning to pay salaries, to pay VATs, to pay Personal Income Tax, social security, that have a dream, and want to turn it real. They ask nothing, they just want to work. We are going to be the allies of those normal people)

The process also carries (as with Podemos) a historic recreation of the Spanish people:

'hombres libres, valientes, que defendían ideas liberales y progresistas, que defendían que los derechos eran de los ciudadanos y no de los territorios, que se oponían a los reaccionarios y a los de vivan las cadenas, forjaron la primera constitución liberal y democrática en Europa, junto a la constitución francesa. Fuimos primeros en crear un sistema liberal de derechos. […] les pido que no voten sólo por ustedes, que votemos por la dignidad, el reconocimiento y el esfuerzo de nuestros antepasados, de nuestros padres, de nuestros abuelos, de la gente que nos ha permitido tener un país democrático, de la gente que ha sabido levantarse después de mucho dolor'

(Free men, brave and bold, that advocated for liberal and progressive ideals, that defended that rights belonged to citizens and not territories, that opposed to reactionaries and to the ones of 'vivan las caenas'[iii], they created the first liberal and democratic constitution of Europe, together with the French one. […] I ask you not to vote only for yourselves, but to vote for dignity instead, to vote and recognise the effort of our ancestors, of our parents, of our grandparents, of people that allowed us to have a democratic country, people who managed to stand up again after so much pain)

In comparison with this depiction of the Spanish people as normal, hard-working people, linked to a lineage of determined, freedom-lovers and entrepreneurs, the elite is occasionally hinted in terms of the old politics and the 'Turno parties', particularly linked to corruption:

'Tenemos que empezar a gobernar pensando no sólo en una legislatura, pensando en una generación, en nuestros hijos, en nuestros nietos, en nuestro futuro. Esa es la gran diferencia de nuestro gobierno con los gobiernos que hemos tenido hasta ahora. Nuestro gobierno pensara en el corto plazo, pero también en el largo […]. Si alguien tiene que tener miedo son todos aquellos que si gobernamos van a perder su silla. Miedo van a tener los del senado, los de las diputaciones, los cargos de confianza, miedo […] Llevamos años quejándonos de un bipartidismo decadente, de corrupción, de recortes, de mala gestión, de tomarle el pelo a la gente, de líderes que se esconden y no dan la cara, de políticos que no tratan con respeto a sus ciudadanos. Llevamos años aguantando todo esto, y por tanto ha llegado la hora de cambiar todo esto'

(We need to start to govern thinking not only in one term, but in one generation: in our children, our grandchildren, in our future. This is the great

difference between our government and the ones we have had until now. Our government will consider the short-term but will also think in long-term […]. If someone has to feel fear, are all those who will lose their chairs if we govern. Fear will be felt by the ones in the senate, the provincial governments, in posts of confidence… fear. […]. We have spent years complaining about our decadent bipartisanship, about corruption, social cuts and bad governance, of people being fooled, of leaders that hide, of politicians that do not respect the citizens. We have spent years withstanding this, and the time has come to change it all).

The dichotomy between this 'people' and the 'old elite' is presented in several parts, such as

'Y eso lo vamos a hacer nosotros, quedan cuatro días para el día más importante de España en los últimos 35 años, las elecciones más importantes, el 20 de diciembre los españoles decidirán si gana el miedo o si gana la ilusión, si vence la resignación o si vence la esperanza […] Hablando de fútbol, quiero juego limpio, quiero que la política vuelva a ser algo limpio. Quiero que esos concejales, esos simpatizantes, vuelvan a ser gente que represente a los españoles'

(and this is what we are going to do, we only have 4 days left before the most important day for Spain of the last 35, the most important elections, December 20th Spaniards will decide if the winner is fear or dreams, if resignation or hope triumphs. […] Speaking of football, I want fair play, I want politics to be clean again. I want those representatives, those sympathisers, to be again people that represent the Spaniards).

Together with this, the sovereignty of the people is presented as:

'Porque España, cuando funciona, vale la pena. […] Así que yo sólo quiero el gobierno de España se parezca más a los españoles, que le parlamento de España se parezca más a los españoles, y que la política, por favor, se parezca más a lo que soñamos los españoles'

(Because Spain, when it works, is worth it. […] So, I just want the Spanish government to resemble more the Spaniards, that the Spanish parliament resembles more the Spaniards, and that politics, please, resembles more what we, Spaniards, dream)

However, there are several lines when these lines are blurred: people from other political parties are considered as 'legitimate actors' to discuss policies, and difference and plurality is acknowledged among the people, thus not equalling the party's audience with it

'La nueva política se hace sentándose en la mesa, no sólo con los tuyos, que es muy fácil. Lo difícil es sentarse con lo que piensan distinto y convencerles, y sólo ciudadanos puede liderar esa transición […]. Y cómo les decía quiero gobernar para todos los españoles. No quiero gobernar sólo para una mayoría. El eslogan del partido socialista decía que ellos sólo gobernarán para una mayoría. Yo no. Yo gobierno para todos los españoles, también para los que le queden al partido socialista'

(the 'new politics' is done by sit down, not only with your own side, which is very easy. The hard part is to sit down with people that thinks differently and

convince them, and only Ciudadanos can lead this transition […] And as I was telling you, I want to govern for all Spaniards, not only for a majority of them. The slogan of the Socialist Party says that they will govern for the majority. I won't. I govern for all Spaniards, including the ones remaining in the Socialist Party).

The party, therefore, considers itself part of the 'new politics' and draws a political landscape where the bad attributes of the 'old system' is considered some sort of elite to be expelled. In this process, the people itself is depicted as inherently good and wise, strong and resilient against deceiving and corrupt leaders.

However, the discourse does not continue this discursive division much further than what is expected in a political speech (as no political party would announce that the other options are more suitable than the own one), makes the difference between the Spanish Citizens and the party voters, and assumes the valid political position of other actors in the system. While it presents the people as inherently good and sovereignly wise, it does acknowledge for intermediaries between the leadership and the people:

> *Le prometo honradez, profesionalidad, un gobierno con los mejores, con expertos, con profesionales*

> (I promise you honesty, professionality, a government with the best, with experts, with professionals).

The discourse, therefore, does construct a cleavage of 'old and new politics' and discharges the people of any bad deed, which is linked to the 'old elite'. However, it neither constructs a homogeneous concept of people, as it discerns different groups within the large 'Spaniards' category, nor assumes a homogeneous elite on the other side.

The honesty and wisdom of the 'hard-working man' is praised, but so is considered the labour of professionals and experts.

In comparison with the content analysis, the data also seems consistent for the most part, with mentions of liberal topics (such as entrepreneurship), a strong social content and a wide range of populist-like resources (which are nevertheless common in political speeches). One diverging issue is however national identity: the territorial configuration, and specifically, the unity of Spain. The speech is mostly structured through this recurring idea, approaching jacobine positions (individuals, not territories, have rights) and creating a link between modern regional nationalisms and the ancient regime defeated by the liberals. Therefore, discourse analysis shows that national identity is a much more salient dimension in Ciudadanos that what is shown by content analysis.

This contradiction can be explained by the exclusion of the root 'Spain' and 'spa*' from the dictionary. When introduced, national identity issues soar in almost every party, but concordance analyses showed that in many cases words such as 'Spain', 'the Spanish people' or 'Spaniards' are used generically to refer to people in other context (such as unemployment or corruption, for instance). Therefore, 'Spain' was flagged as a false positive, particularly in materials like party programmes, where the word is used many times in descriptive chapters about any topic.

Conclusions

The findings prove the expected conclusions that all or almost all parties have some degree of populism in their speeches. The analysis shows that two parties have much higher degrees than the rest (Podemos and Ciudadanos), both being the 'newcomers' of the political arena, which also fits the expectations, and concludes that one of them (Podemos) can be classified as a populist party without any doubt. These findings agree with most existing research on the field commented above, obtaining similar conclusions in which party is populistic with different approaches.

Moreover, the analysis shows that Podemos fulfils the 4 items proposed to identify a populist party and is particularly strong in the articulation of a good, homogeneous people and a bad, homogeneous elite, and the conflict between the two. Consistently with the findings of Arroyas Langa & Pérez Díaz (2016), the unmediated leadership of Pablo Iglesias is not as present as the other populist items, although discourse analysis has not found traces of a more collective leadership, either, other than the use of the first person of plural to identify the own party, which is also present in the rest of parties. Both in grammar and content, as well as terminology, the whole speech is structured around the conflict between the people and the elite, often represented by the 'new' and the 'old', and the link between the party-leader and the people, created by both direct assertions and, particularly, by the use of formal and informal ranges of language to create closeness or distance, depending of the target group.

Ciudadanos, on the other hand, shows some degree of populism, but also displays examples of a heterogenous people, and therefore cannot be fully classified as populist. Given that this analysis did not intend a 'either-or' classification, it can be labelled as a party with some populistic traits, which score higher than others probably because it is a newcomer to the political game.

We can also conclude that Podemos, aside from populistic, has a large share of social and national issues on the agenda, while Ciudadanos has a more liberal-conservative stance, with a very strong national identity dimension (as seen in the speech). Both parties align themselves through the speeches along the lines of the old v new cleavage in politics.

In general terms, the political landscape of Spain can be seen as highly salient in social and national terms, which, as commented above, can be linked to the two main crises faced by the country in the last years. Environment and immigration, two issues usually relevant in other countries analysed (Pauwels, 2014), are almost irrelevant in general.

These findings seem to align with the idea that populist parties are simply grasping the most relevant issues among the public and using them. This analysis shows, with the differences between Podemos and Ciudadanos, the key difference between 'somewhat populistic' and 'populistic' that often blurs the line of political discourse analysis, relevant in most western countries if a line is to be drawn and light be shed over the obscure abundance of the label populism.

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Annex

Annex I - Dictionary

DICTIONARY (SPA/CAT)	ENGLISH TRANSLATION
CONSERVATISM: creenci* cristian* eclesiástic* esglési* esquer* estabil* estable fe iglesia izquierd* Jesucristo norma porn* sexe Sexo valores valors	Belief, christian, ecclesial, church, left, stability, faith, jesus, rule, porn, sex, values
ENVIRONMENT: Ecol* calentament calentamiento clima mediambient medioambiente orgánic* verde	Ecol*, global warming, climate, environment, organic, green
IMMIGRATION: Inmigraci* Marroquí burka estrange* extranj* gitan* ilegal il·legal* inmigrant* islam mora moro ruman* sudamerican* velo árab*	Immigra*, Moroccan, burkha, foreigner, gipsy, illegal, islam, moor, Romanian, southamerican, arab veil
LAW AND ORDER: Seguridad crimen criminalidad droga seguretat terroris* violencia	Security, safety, criminality, drugs, terrorism, violence
LIBERALISM: Impuest* burocracia competencia competitividad competitivitat eficien* impostos liberaliz* reducció* tarea	Taxes, bureauracy, competition, efficiency, liberalisation, reduction, task
NATIONALISM: Catalunya Euskal Galiza Herria asturi* autodeterminaci* canari* catalan* galleg* independencia nacion* naciones paisos patria* pluricultur* plurinacional terra tierra valencia* vasc*	Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, Asturias, self-determination, canar*, Independence, nations, countries, fatherland, pluricultural, plurinational, land, valencia
NEOLIBERALISM: Parasit* abusiv* benefici* competiti* competitiv* disrupti* emprende* emprendiment informal	Parasite, abusive, profit, competitive, disruptive, entrepreneurship, informal
POPULISM: abajo arriba arrogant* arrogante Baix bipartidis* calle capitulaci* carrer casta clase corrup* Dalt dictadura direct* elit* establishment expresio* franco franq* gent* gobernant* mafia partitocracia poble* promesa propaganda pueblo referéndum régim* traición traïció vergony* vergüenza élite élites	Below, above, arrogant, bipartidism, street, capitulation, caste, class, corruption, dictatorship, directly, elite, establishment, franco, expression, people, ruling, mafia, partitocracy, promise, propaganda, referendum, regimen, betrayal, shame,
PROGRESSIVE: Individu* LGTB* derecha dereta dona dones feminism* homofob* mujer progresista xenofob*	Individual, LGTB, right, woman, feminism, homophobia, progressism, xenophobia
SOCIAL: atur austeridad austeritat desempl* deshauci* deuda* deute* iscapacit* educació* igualdad igualtat	Austerity, unemployment, evictions, debt, disabled, education, equality, misery,

miseria parad* p<mark>aro</mark> pensió* pobr*
protecció* social

Diccionary notes: populism label: corruption, while understood by Pauwels as a marker for populism, might be deceiving in Spain, as it is such a broad, far-reaching topic common to all parties (either to criticise it or to announce the fight against it). <mark>In yellow,</mark> words that might be causing false positives (most of them taken from Pauwels' dictionary). Followed by * includes all possible endings with the same root.

Party	Document	Literature Type
Podemos	Manifesto Mover Ficha	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	Manifesto Asamblea Ciudadana	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment (other than Iglesias) 2015	Other
	Electoral Speech 2016	Other
	Program Prologue 2015	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Impeachment 2017	Other
	National Elections Program 2015	Program
Ciudadanos	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
	Ciudadanos Magazine	Other
	Electoral Speech 2015	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Impeachment 2017	Other
	II Party congress speech	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment (other than Rivera) 2015	Other
	First Manifesto	Other
	National Elections Program 2016	Program
Bildu	European Elections Program 2014	Program
	Manifesto European Elections	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
Coalición Canaria (CC)	European Elections Program 2014	Program
	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
Compromis	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	European Elections Program 2014	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
	Founding Manifesto	Other
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Manifesto European Elections	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
FORO	Manifesto European Elections	Other
	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program

	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
Nueva Canarias (NCa)	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
Partit Democrata de Catalunya (PDCat)	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Founding Manifesto	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Program
	Political Congress 2016	Other
Partido Nacionalista Basco (PNV)	Political Manifesto	Other
	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
Partido Popular (PP)	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	Electoral Speech 2016	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other
	National Elections 2011 program	Program
	National Elections 2015 program	Program
Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN)	National Elections Program 2011	Program
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2015	Other
	Parliament Speech for PM Appointment 2016	Other

Endnotes

[i] Particularly interesting for Populism is the concept of people, which uses its lack of definition as a common unification device. In this sense, the idea of 'the people' is a metaphor for something that cannot be referred literally, much alike modern currency. Proper functioning of modern monetary systems based on debt rely first and foremost on people's confidence (that is, that they do not attempt to change their currencies into gold -if that were even possible legally speaking), and money acts as a metaphor of everything that can be bought. Populism uses the same system with people, which becomes a metaphor for everything good and every demand individuals might have, and works in the most effective way when no attempt is made to reduce it to any literal meaning, therefore opening who can be included or excluded (Solá & Rendueles, 2017). In this sense, e.g. Villacañas (2015), argues that populism has managed to find a substitute for the unifying narrative of Marxism where the destruction of private property was the demand that unified any other possible one.

ii In reference to the political system of the Bourbonic restoration between the 1870s and 1923, where two parties took turns to occupy power (the so-called dynastic parties), imitating the British system. However, as the designers of the system were not sure of how that would work in Spain, they created a whole corrupt scheme to ensure that no one outside those parties could get effective political power -despite the adoption of universal suffrage in the 20th century)

iii 'Vivan las caenas (sic)', literally 'hail the chains' or 'long live the chains' was a motto of the absolutists against the liberals during the political struggles of the Spanish 19th Century, although over time it became a derogatory term used by the latter group against the first one.