ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš. The Paradox of Moralistic Fallacy: A Case against the Dangerous Knowledge. Teorie vědy : věda, technika, společnost. AV ČR, Filosofický ústav, 2018, vol. 40, No 2, p. 191-210. ISSN 1210-0250.
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Basic information
Original name The Paradox of Moralistic Fallacy: A Case against the Dangerous Knowledge
Authors ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Teorie vědy : věda, technika, společnost, AV ČR, Filosofický ústav, 2018, 1210-0250.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Article in a journal
Field of Study 50204 Business and management
Country of publisher Czech Republic
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW odkaz na článek
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14560/18:00101816
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Keywords in English moralistic fallacy; reverse naturalistic fallacy; Bernard D. Davis; paradox of moralistic fallacy; dangerous knowledge
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. et Mgr. Tomáš Ondráček, Ph.D., učo 216870. Changed: 23/4/2019 09:28.
Abstract
In this article, the concept of moralistic fallacy introduced by B. D. Davis is elaborated on in more detail. The main features of this fallacy are discussed, and its general form is presented. The moralistic fallacy might have some undesirable outcomes. Some of them might even be in direct conflict to the original moral position. If this occurs, it is possible to characterize it as a paradox of moralistic fallacy. The possibility of this paradox provides a further reason not to prevent any scientific inquiries and not to depict any knowledge as dangerous.
Links
GA16-19395S, research and development projectName: Sémantické pojmy, paradoxy a hyperintenzionální logika založená na moderní rozvětvené teorii typů (Acronym: Sémantické pojmy)
Investor: Czech Science Foundation
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