Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition

J 2019

Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition

BĚLOHRAD, Radim

Basic information

Original name

Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition

Authors

BĚLOHRAD, Radim (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)

Edition

Organon F, Bratislava, 2019, 1335-0668

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Country of publisher

Slovakia

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

URL

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14210/19:00107392

Organization unit

Faculty of Arts

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26202

UT WoS

000469310400002

Keywords in English

Animalism; Lockeanism; partial identity; personal identity; supervaluations; vagueness

Abstract

V originále

Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including thinking. As a result, the animalist must also posit ‘too many thinkers’ where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism.

Links

GA17-12551S, research and development project

Name: Neurčitá identita

Investor: Czech Science Foundation

Citovat

BĚLOHRAD, Radim. Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition. Organon F. Bratislava, 2019, vol. 26, No 2, p. 207-227. ISSN 1335-0668. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26202.

@article{1529396,
   author = {Bělohrad, Radim},
   article_location = {Bratislava},
   article_number = {2},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26202},
   keywords = {Animalism; Lockeanism; partial identity; personal identity; supervaluations; vagueness},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1335-0668},
   journal = {Organon F},
   title = {Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition},
   url = {https://www.organonf.com/journal/orgf-2019-26202/},
   volume = {26},
   year = {2019}
}

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JF  - Organon F
VL  - 26
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KW  - Animalism
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KW  - partial identity
KW  - personal identity
KW  - supervaluations
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N2  - Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including thinking. As a result, the animalist must also posit ‘too many thinkers’ where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism.
ER  -

BĚLOHRAD, Radim. Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition. \textit{Organon F}. Bratislava, 2019, vol.~26, No~2, p.~207-227. ISSN~1335-0668. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26202.

Detailed Information on Publication Record