SEDLÁČEK, Vladimír, Dušan KLINEC, Marek SÝS, Petr ŠVENDA and Václav MATYÁŠ. I want to break square-free: The 4p - 1 factorization method and its RSA backdoor viability. Online. In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2019) - Volume 2: SECRYPT. Prague, Czech Republic: SCITEPRESS, 2019, p. 25-36. ISBN 978-989-758-378-0. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0007786600250036.
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Basic information
Original name I want to break square-free: The 4p - 1 factorization method and its RSA backdoor viability
Authors SEDLÁČEK, Vladimír (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Dušan KLINEC (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution), Marek SÝS (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution), Petr ŠVENDA (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Václav MATYÁŠ (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Prague, Czech Republic, Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2019) - Volume 2: SECRYPT, p. 25-36, 12 pp. 2019.
Publisher SCITEPRESS
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Proceedings paper
Field of Study 10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics
Country of publisher Portugal
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
Publication form electronic version available online
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14330/19:00110000
Organization unit Faculty of Informatics
ISBN 978-989-758-378-0
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0007786600250036
UT WoS 000571438700002
Keywords in English Backdoor; complex multiplication; integer factorization; RSA security; smartcard
Tags firank_B
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D., učo 3880. Changed: 3/5/2020 12:37.
Abstract
We analyze Cheng’s 4p - 1 factorization method as the means of a potential backdoor for the RSA primes generated inside black-box devices like cryptographic smartcards. We devise three detection methods for such a backdoor and also audit 44 millions of RSA keypairs generated by 18 different types of cryptographic devices. Finally, we present an improved, simplified and asymptotically deterministic version of the method, together with a deeper analysis of its performance and we offer a public implementation written in Sage.
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