ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína. Why do bystanders choose not to intervene to stop bullying? A laboratory experiment. In 12th JDMx Meeting for Early Career Researchers, Trento. 2019.
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Basic information
Original name Why do bystanders choose not to intervene to stop bullying? A laboratory experiment.
Authors ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína.
Edition 12th JDMx Meeting for Early Career Researchers, Trento, 2019.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Presentations at conferences
Field of Study 50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics
Country of publisher Italy
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW web
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Keywords in English experiment; social identity; repeated games; bystander; fear of retaliation
Changed by Changed by: Ing. Katarína Čellárová, učo 461845. Changed: 30/10/2019 13:31.
Abstract
We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of bystanders in bullying. We devise a simple repeated game played in groups of three subjects with one leader and two followers. At the beginning of each round, each subject receives the same initial endowment. Then the leader proposes to reallocate a certain portion of the endowment from a follower of her choice to herself. If the other follower, i.e. the bystander, agrees, the reallocation takes place. If the bystander disagrees (at zero additional cost), payoffs of all players equal to the initial endowment. This game is played repeatedly in a partner matching and with the same leader. The allocation of the role of the victim and bystander depends on leader’s choice in every round. The aim of the paper is to explore the motives of the bystander to agree with the unequal distribution. For this, we use two manipulations. First, we elicit social identity (SI) creating two teams of different colors, letting them wear different T-shirts and play a cooperative game in teams. In the treatment with different social identities, one follower is on the same team as the leader while the other follower is on the other team. In the treatment with the same SI, all players are from the same team. Second, the number of rounds played is either known (finitely repeated) or uncertain (infinitely repeated). The choices of bystanders in the last rounds of these treatments might reflect the bystander’s fear of retaliation from the side of the leader, as the bystander who disagrees with the proposed re-allocation might expect to become the victim in the next round. Our experiment shows that while the different social identity of the victim makes the bystander more likely to accept the unequal distribution, fear of retaliation has no significant effect on her choice.
Links
MUNI/A/1198/2018, interní kód MUName: Determinanty vzniku exploatačních koalic v diferenciovaném a unifikovaném prostředí (Acronym: DEVEKDUP)
Investor: Masaryk University, Category A
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