Recent constitutional reforms targeting designs of domestic judiciaries reminded us both how important and how fragile judicial independence is. Examples from Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, or Ukraine showed that domestic courts are an easy target for governments enjoying large parliamentary majorities. Moreover, we have learnt that political leaders implement a plethora of formal and informal court-curbing methods, skilfully using the pretence of legal language. Many inferences however do not seek to incapacitate the courts. On the contrary, political leaders often aim to secure their ideological alignment, while preserving the formal, de iure, judicial independence. The attempts to rig the courts through informal practices challenge our understanding of judicial independence, its safeguards, and the trust in institution building advocated in Central and Eastern Europe during the EU accession process. The aim of this presentation is two-fold. First, it analyses motives of court-curbing attacks happening in Central European countries, asking to what extent informal practices and weak institutions allowed political leaders to curb domestic courts. Second, it explores the reactions of domestic courts, civil society, and media, and examines their role in safeguarding the principles of judicial independence.