Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public
goods: experimental evidence

J 2020

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

CORAZZINI, Luca, Christopher COTTON and Tommaso REGGIANI

Basic information

Original name

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Authors

CORAZZINI, Luca (380 Italy), Christopher COTTON (840 United States of America) and Tommaso REGGIANI (380 Italy, guarantor, belonging to the institution)

Edition

Experimental Econonomics, USA, Springer, 2020, 1386-4157

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics

Country of publisher

United States of America

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

URL

Impact factor

Impact factor: 2.367

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14560/20:00114002

Organization unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6

UT WoS

000541812600001

Keywords in English

Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising

Abstract

V originále

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Links

GA18-19492S, research and development project

Name: Vliv kvality bydlení na preference a chování: ekonomické experimenty s účastníky randomizovaného kontrolovaného experimentu

Investor: Czech Science Foundation

Files attached

ExpEcon_onlinefirst_10.1007_s10683-019-09639-6.pdf

Request the author's version of the file

Citovat

CORAZZINI, Luca, Christopher COTTON and Tommaso REGGIANI. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. Experimental Econonomics. USA: Springer, 2020, vol. 23, No 4, p. 1030-1068. ISSN 1386-4157. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6.

@article{1593996,
   author = {Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher and Reggiani, Tommaso},
   article_location = {USA},
   article_number = {4},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6},
   keywords = {Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1386-4157},
   journal = {Experimental Econonomics},
   title = {Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence},
   url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6},
   volume = {23},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1593996
AU  - Corazzini, Luca - Cotton, Christopher - Reggiani, Tommaso
PY  - 2020
TI  - Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence
JF  - Experimental Econonomics
VL  - 23
IS  - 4
SP  - 1030-1068
EP  - 1030-1068
PB  - Springer
SN  - 13864157
KW  - Delegation
KW  - Threshold public goods
KW  - Laboratory experiment
KW  - Fundraising
UR  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
L2  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
N2  - When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
ER  -

CORAZZINI, Luca, Christopher COTTON and Tommaso REGGIANI. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. \textit{Experimental Econonomics}. USA: Springer, 2020, vol.~23, No~4, p.~1030-1068. ISSN~1386-4157. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6.

Detailed Information on Publication Record