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@article{1593996,
author = {Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher and Reggiani, Tommaso},
article_location = {USA},
article_number = {4},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6},
keywords = {Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising},
language = {eng},
issn = {1386-4157},
journal = {Experimental Econonomics},
title = {Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6},
volume = {23},
year = {2020}
}
TY - JOUR
ID - 1593996
AU - Corazzini, Luca - Cotton, Christopher - Reggiani, Tommaso
PY - 2020
TI - Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence
JF - Experimental Econonomics
VL - 23
IS - 4
SP - 1030-1068
EP - 1030-1068
PB - Springer
SN - 13864157
KW - Delegation
KW - Threshold public goods
KW - Laboratory experiment
KW - Fundraising
UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
L2 - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
N2 - When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
ER -
CORAZZINI, Luca, Christopher COTTON and Tommaso REGGIANI. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. \textit{Experimental Econonomics}. USA: Springer, 2020, vol.~23, No~4, p.~1030-1068. ISSN~1386-4157. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6.
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