FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Jiří ŠPALEK, Rostislav STANĚK a James Christopher TREMEWAN. A Competitive Audit Selection Mechanism with Incomplete Information. MUNI ECON Working Papers. Brno: Masaryk University, č. 8. ISSN 2571-130X. 2019.
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Základní údaje
Originální název A Competitive Audit Selection Mechanism with Incomplete Information
Autoři FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Jiří ŠPALEK, Rostislav STANĚK a James Christopher TREMEWAN.
Vydání MUNI ECON Working Papers, Brno, Masaryk University, 2019, 2571-130X.
Další údaje
Originální jazyk angličtina
Typ výsledku Článek v odborném periodiku (nerecenzovaný)
Obor 50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Stát vydavatele Česká republika
Utajení není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
WWW URL
Organizační jednotka Ekonomicko-správní fakulta
Změnil Změnil: Ing. Miloš Fišar, Ph.D., učo 171966. Změněno: 30. 1. 2020 14:13.
Anotace
The experimental tax and regulatory compliance literature has shown the effectiveness of competitive audit selection mechanisms (ASMs) based on declarations and a signal of the taxpayers' actual income. However, collecting information about actual income prior to audit selection is costly. In this article, we test the effectiveness of an endogenous ASM based solely on declared income. We show theoretically and in a laboratory experiment that this new endogenous ASM significantly increases compliance in comparison with an ASM where all taxpayers face audit with equal probability. However, a further consequence of conditioning solely on declared income is that poorer taxpayers are audited more frequently, reducing the effectiveness of this ASM in generating revenue and reducing inequality. We further compare the new mechanism with an ASM that also uses a noisy signal of actual income and show that it is a significant improvement over the other two ASMs in terms of compliance, revenue, and inequality. Our results suggest that ASMs that condition only on reported income can increase compliance but should be implemented with caution, and investing in acquiring information before audit selection can have substantial benefits.
Návaznosti
GA17-00496S, projekt VaVNázev: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup
Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Tax Compliance with a Competitive Audit Selection Mechanism: An Experimental Approach
VytisknoutZobrazeno: 29. 3. 2024 14:11