FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Jiří ŠPALEK, Rostislav STANĚK and James Christopher TREMEWAN. Tax compliance with endogenous audit selection and heterogeneity of income. In ESA WORLD MEETING. 2019.
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Basic information
Original name Tax compliance with endogenous audit selection and heterogeneity of income
Authors FIŠAR, Miloš (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Ondřej KRČÁL (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Jiří ŠPALEK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Rostislav STANĚK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and James Christopher TREMEWAN (554 New Zealand).
Edition ESA WORLD MEETING, 2019.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Presentations at conferences
Field of Study 50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Country of publisher Canada
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14560/19:00108136
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Keywords in English Tax compliance; Endogenous audit; Heterogeneous income
Tags International impact
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. Daniela Marcollová, učo 111148. Changed: 15/4/2020 08:29.
Abstract
It has been shown in the experimental tax compliance literature that endogenous audit selection mechanism (ASM) increases tax compliance. However, this literature assumes that the tax authority has an unbiased observation of the actual taxpayers' income and consequently the taxpayers with the largest difference between the observed and reported income are most likely to be selected for audit. In reality, the tax authority might not have unbiased information about the actual incomes as these might be observed only for taxpayers who have been selected for audit. In this case, the ASM can be based only on reported incomes. The aim of the paper is to design an endogenous ASM that uses only the reported incomes and experimentally compare the tax compliance under the endogenous and random ASMs. We develop a theoretical model where taxpayers have heterogeneous income and the ASM is based only on the reported income. We show that in the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium the proposed endogenous ASM entails a higher reported income than the random ASM. We test predictions of the model in an economic experiment. Each experimental session consists of 30 rounds. In each round, subjects may be selected for audit with a certain audit probability. In the random ASM, the probability of audit is exogenous and the same for all taxpayers.
Links
GA17-00496S, research and development projectName: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup
Investor: Czech Science Foundation
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