The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed

FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK and Jiří ŠPALEK. The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed. MUNI ECON Working Papers. Brno: Masaryk University, 2019, No 01. ISSN 2571-130X.

Basic information

• Original name: The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed
• Authors: FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK and Jiří ŠPALEK.
• Edition: MUNI ECON Working Papers, Brno, Masaryk University, 2019, 2571-130X.

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Article in a journal (not reviewed)
• Field of Study: 50200 5.2 Economics and Business
• Country of publisher: Czech Republic
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• WWW: URL
• Organization unit: Faculty of Economics and Administration

Abstract

Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. This paper proposes an experimental design that tests the anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations where public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the~share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The~outcome of the~staff-rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibria.

Links

• MUNI/M/0045/2013, interní kód MU: Name: Experimentální analýza rozhodování při opakované volbě: ekonomické a politologické přístupy

Investor: Masaryk University, INTERDISCIPLINARY - Interdisciplinary research projects