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@proceedings{1663156,
author = {Raclavský, Jiří},
booktitle = {Studia Logica - Trends in Logic 19, Moscow, Russia, 2.-4. 10. 2019},
keywords = {logical space; higher-order modal logic; paradoxes about propositions; kaplan's paradoxr paradox},
language = {eng},
note = {(conf.)},
title = {Limitation of logical space puts restrictions on the explication of the notions of knowledge, belief, necessity and truth},
url = {https://sites.google.com/view/trendsinlogic2019/%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F?authuser=0},
year = {2019}
}
TY - CONF
ID - 1663156
AU - Raclavský, Jiří
PY - 2019
TI - Limitation of logical space puts restrictions on the explication of the notions of knowledge, belief, necessity and truth
N1 - (conf.)
KW - logical space
KW - higher-order modal logic
KW - paradoxes about propositions
KW - kaplan's paradoxr paradox
UR - https://sites.google.com/view/trendsinlogic2019/%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F?authuser=0
N2 - I demonstrate that (i) the limitation of logical space (entailed by Cantor's theorem) imposes (ii) limits to the explication of certain important 'propositional' ('intentional') notions, e.g. knowledge. A naive approach to the limitations of both types leads to a group of famous paradoxes, e.g. the Liar Paradox, the Knower paradox. I establish some theorems related to (i) and (ii), partly utilising the paradoxes. They demonstrate similarities and also dissimilarities between the notions of knowledge, necessity, truth, belief and assertion. Unlike Montague, who treated the notions as predicates applied to coding numbers of formulas, I treat them as applied to hyperintensional, fine-grained meanings of sentences. The logical framework employed is a ramified version of (a Church-like) simple theory of types.
ER -
RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. Limitation of logical space puts restrictions on the explication of the notions of knowledge, belief, necessity and truth. In \textit{Studia Logica - Trends in Logic 19, Moscow, Russia, 2.-4. 10. 2019}. 2019.
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