How to Fight Court-Packing

KOSAŘ, David and Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ. How to Fight Court-Packing. Constitutional Studies. Madison, WI, USA: Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, vol. 6, No 1, p. 133-164. ISSN 2474-9427.

Basic information

• Original name: How to Fight Court-Packing
• Authors: KOSAŘ, David (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution) and Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution).
• Edition: Constitutional Studies, Madison, WI, USA, Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, 2474-9427.

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Article in a journal
• Field of Study: 50501 Law
• Country of publisher: United States of America
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• WWW: Web časopisu
• RIV identification code: RIV/00216224:14220/20:00115855
• Organization unit: Faculty of Law
• Keywords in English: courts; judges; court-packing; court curbing; judicial independence; court presidents; separation of powers; unconstitutional constitutional amendments; informal institutions; Court of Justice of the European Union
• Tags: rivok
• Tags: International impact, Reviewed

Abstract

Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.

Links

• 46943, interní kód MU: Name: JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect (Acronym: JUDI-ARCH)

Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)