How to Fight Court-Packing

J 2020

How to Fight Court-Packing

KOSAŘ, David and Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ

Basic information

Original name

How to Fight Court-Packing

Authors

KOSAŘ, David (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution) and Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution)

Edition

Constitutional Studies, Madison, WI, USA, Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, 2474-9427

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

50501 Law

Country of publisher

United States of America

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

Web časopisu

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14220/20:00115855

Organization unit

Faculty of Law

Keywords in English

courts; judges; court-packing; court curbing; judicial independence; court presidents; separation of powers; unconstitutional constitutional amendments; informal institutions; Court of Justice of the European Union

Abstract

V originále

Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.

Links

46943, interní kód MU

Name: JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect (Acronym: JUDI-ARCH)

Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)

Files attached

KOSAR_SIPULOVA_-_How_to_Fight_Court-Packing_JOURNAL__2020_.pdf

Request the author's version of the file

Citovat

KOSAŘ, David and Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ. How to Fight Court-Packing. Constitutional Studies. Madison, WI, USA: Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, vol. 6, No 1, p. 133-164. ISSN 2474-9427.

@article{1664078,
   author = {Kosař, David and Šipulová, Katarína},
   article_location = {Madison, WI, USA},
   article_number = {1},
   keywords = {courts; judges; court-packing; court curbing; judicial independence; court presidents; separation of powers; unconstitutional constitutional amendments; informal institutions; Court of Justice of the European Union},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {2474-9427},
   journal = {Constitutional Studies},
   title = {How to Fight Court-Packing},
   url = {https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52},
   volume = {6},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1664078
AU  - Kosař, David - Šipulová, Katarína
PY  - 2020
TI  - How to Fight Court-Packing
JF  - Constitutional Studies
VL  - 6
IS  - 1
SP  - 133-164
EP  - 133-164
PB  - Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy
SN  - 24749427
KW  - courts
KW  - judges
KW  - court-packing
KW  - court curbing
KW  - judicial independence
KW  - court presidents
KW  - separation of powers
KW  - unconstitutional constitutional amendments
KW  - informal institutions
KW  - Court of Justice of the European Union
UR  - https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52
L2  - https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52
N2  - Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.
ER  -

KOSAŘ, David and Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ. How to Fight Court-Packing. \textit{Constitutional Studies}. Madison, WI, USA: Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, vol.~6, No~1, p.~133-164. ISSN~2474-9427.

Detailed Information on Publication Record