Fooling primality tests on smartcards

D 2020

Fooling primality tests on smartcards

SEDLÁČEK, Vladimír, Ján JANČÁR and Petr ŠVENDA

Basic information

Original name

Fooling primality tests on smartcards

Authors

SEDLÁČEK, Vladimír (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Ján JANČÁR (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution) and Petr ŠVENDA (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution)

Edition

Švýcarsko, 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2020, p. 209-229, 21 pp. 2020

Publisher

Springer

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Stať ve sborníku

Field of Study

10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Publication form

printed version "print"

References:

Website

Impact factor

Impact factor: 0.402 in 2005

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14330/20:00114216

Organization unit

Faculty of Informatics

ISBN

978-3-030-59012-3

ISSN

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_11

Keywords in English

ECC; primality; pseudoprimes; smartcards

Abstract

V originále

We analyse whether the smartcards of the JavaCard platform correctly validate primality of domain parameters. The work is inspired by Albrecht et al. (Prime and Prejudice) [1], where the authors analysed many open-source libraries and constructed pseudoprimes fooling the primality testing functions. However, in the case of smartcards, often there is no way to invoke the primality test directly, so we trigger it by replacing (EC)DSA and (EC)DH prime domain parameters by adversarial composites. Such a replacement results in vulnerability to Pohlig-Hellman [30] style attacks, leading to private key recovery. Out of nine smartcards (produced by five major manufacturers) we tested (See https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/papers/primality_esorics20 for more information), all but one have no primality test in parameter validation. As the JavaCard platform provides no public primality testing API, the problem cannot be fixed by an extra parameter check, making it difficult to mitigate in already deployed smartcards.

Links

GA20-03426S, research and development project

Name: Ověření a zlepšení bezpečnosti kryptografie eliptických křivek

Investor: Czech Science Foundation

MUNI/C/1701/2018, interní kód MU

Name: Side channel analysis of elliptic curve cryptography on smart cards (Acronym: ECSCA)

Investor: Masaryk University, Rector's Program

Citovat

SEDLÁČEK, Vladimír, Ján JANČÁR and Petr ŠVENDA. Fooling primality tests on smartcards. In Liqun Chen, Ninghui Li, Kaitai Liang and Steve Schneider. 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2020. Švýcarsko: Springer, 2020, p. 209-229. ISBN 978-3-030-59012-3. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_11.

@inproceedings{1668739,
   author = {Sedláček, Vladimír and Jančár, Ján and Švenda, Petr},
   address = {Švýcarsko},
   booktitle = {25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2020},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_11},
   editor = {Liqun Chen, Ninghui Li, Kaitai Liang and Steve Schneider},
   keywords = {ECC; primality; pseudoprimes; smartcards},
   howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Švýcarsko},
   isbn = {978-3-030-59012-3},
   pages = {209-229},
   publisher = {Springer},
   title = {Fooling primality tests on smartcards},
   url = {https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/primality_esorics20},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1668739
AU  - Sedláček, Vladimír - Jančár, Ján - Švenda, Petr
PY  - 2020
TI  - Fooling primality tests on smartcards
PB  - Springer
CY  - Švýcarsko
SN  - 9783030590123
KW  - ECC
KW  - primality
KW  - pseudoprimes
KW  - smartcards
UR  - https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/primality_esorics20
L2  - https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/primality_esorics20
N2  - We analyse whether the smartcards of the JavaCard platform correctly validate primality of domain parameters. The work is inspired by Albrecht et al. (Prime and Prejudice) [1], where the authors analysed many open-source libraries and constructed pseudoprimes fooling the primality testing functions. However, in the case of smartcards, often there is no way to invoke the primality test directly, so we trigger it by replacing (EC)DSA and (EC)DH prime domain parameters by adversarial composites. Such a replacement results in vulnerability to Pohlig-Hellman [30] style attacks, leading to private key recovery. Out of nine smartcards (produced by five major manufacturers) we tested (See https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/papers/primality_esorics20 for more information), all but one have no primality test in parameter validation. As the JavaCard platform provides no public primality testing API, the problem cannot be fixed by an extra parameter check, making it difficult to mitigate in already deployed smartcards.
ER  -

SEDLÁČEK, Vladimír, Ján JANČÁR and Petr ŠVENDA. Fooling primality tests on smartcards. In Liqun Chen, Ninghui Li, Kaitai Liang and Steve Schneider. \textit{25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2020}. Švýcarsko: Springer, 2020, p.~209-229. ISBN~978-3-030-59012-3. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0\_{}11.

Detailed Information on Publication Record