Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The
effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration

J 2021

Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration

FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK and Jiří ŠPALEK

Basic information

Original name

Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration

Authors

FIŠAR, Miloš (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Ondřej KRČÁL (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Rostislav STANĚK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Jiří ŠPALEK (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)

Edition

Public Performance & Management Review, Abingdon (England), ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2021, 1530-9576

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

50602 Public administration

Country of publisher

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

URL

Impact factor

Impact factor: 2.806

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14560/21:00118752

Organization unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410

UT WoS

000567613600001

Keywords in English

bribery; economic experiment; staff rotation; anti-corruption practices

Abstract

V originále

Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.

Links

GA17-00496S, research and development project

Name: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup

Investor: Czech Science Foundation

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Citovat

FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK and Jiří ŠPALEK. Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration. Public Performance & Management Review. Abingdon (England): ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2021, vol. 44, No 2, p. 404-424. ISSN 1530-9576. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410.

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   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410},
   keywords = {bribery; economic experiment; staff rotation; anti-corruption practices},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1530-9576},
   journal = {Public Performance & Management Review},
   title = {Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration},
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   year = {2021}
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SN  - 15309576
KW  - bribery
KW  - economic experiment
KW  - staff rotation
KW  - anti-corruption practices
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L2  - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410?needAccess=true
N2  - Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.
ER  -

FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK and Jiří ŠPALEK. Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration. \textit{Public Performance \&{} Management Review}. Abingdon (England): ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR \&{} FRANCIS LTD, 2021, vol.~44, No~2, p.~404-424. ISSN~1530-9576. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410.

Detailed Information on Publication Record