FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK and Jiří ŠPALEK. Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration. Public Performance & Management Review. Abingdon (England): ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2021, vol. 44, No 2, p. 404-424. ISSN 1530-9576. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410.
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Basic information
Original name Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration
Authors FIŠAR, Miloš (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Ondřej KRČÁL (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Rostislav STANĚK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Jiří ŠPALEK (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Public Performance & Management Review, Abingdon (England), ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2021, 1530-9576.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Article in a journal
Field of Study 50602 Public administration
Country of publisher United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW URL
Impact factor Impact factor: 2.806
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14560/21:00118752
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410
UT WoS 000567613600001
Keywords in English bribery; economic experiment; staff rotation; anti-corruption practices
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. Pavlína Kurková, učo 368752. Changed: 25/8/2022 22:04.
Abstract
Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.
Links
GA17-00496S, research and development projectName: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup
Investor: Czech Science Foundation
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