Detailed Information on Publication Record

MÁCHA, Jakub. Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept. Hegel Bulletin. 2022, vol. 43, No 19, p. 93-120. ISSN 2051-5367. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24.

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TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1677133
AU  - Mácha, Jakub
PY  - 2022
TI  - Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept
JF  - Hegel Bulletin
VL  - 43
IS  - 19
SP  - 93-120
EP  - 93-120
SN  - 20515367
KW  - Hegel
KW  - concept
KW  - particularity
KW  - deconstruction
KW  - Derrida
KW  - example
KW  - paradigm
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24
L2  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24
N2  - Understanding Hegel’s account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida’s analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel’s neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida’s view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou’s concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel’s claim that the movement of the concept is play.
ER  -

Basic information
Original name	Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept
Authors	MÁCHA, Jakub (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition	Hegel Bulletin, 2022, 2051-5367.

Other information
Original language	English
Type of outcome	Article in a journal
Field of Study	60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Country of publisher	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Confidentiality degree	is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW	URL
RIV identification code	RIV/00216224:14210/22:00118757
Organization unit	Faculty of Arts
Doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24
Keywords in English	Hegel; concept; particularity; deconstruction; Derrida; example; paradigm
Tags	International impact, Reviewed
Changed by	Changed by: prof. Dr. phil. Jakub Mácha, Ph.D., učo 3662. Changed: 3/1/2023 16:09.

Abstract
Understanding Hegel’s account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida’s analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel’s neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida’s view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou’s concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel’s claim that the movement of the concept is play.

Abstract

Understanding Hegel’s account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida’s analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel’s neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida’s view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou’s concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel’s claim that the movement of the concept is play.

Links
GA19-16680S, research and development project	Name: Paradigmatické myšlení: singularita, universalita, sebe-reference (Acronym: Paradigmatic thinking)
GA19-16680S, research and development project	Investor: Czech Science Foundation