J 2020

Explicative-Existential Justification of Human Rights. Analysis of Robert Alexy's Argument in Context of Is-Ought Problem

HAPLA, Martin

Basic information

Original name

Explicative-Existential Justification of Human Rights. Analysis of Robert Alexy's Argument in Context of Is-Ought Problem

Name in Czech

Explikativně-existenciální justifikace lidských práv. Analýza argumentu Roberta Alexyho v kontextu Is-Ought problému

Authors

HAPLA, Martin (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)

Edition

The Age of Human Rights Journal, Jaén, Universidad de Jaén, 2020, 2340-9592

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Article in a journal

Field of Study

50501 Law

Country of publisher

Spain

Confidentiality degree

is not subject to a state or trade secret

References:

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14220/20:00114646

Organization unit

Faculty of Law

UT WoS

000599748500005

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85098782012

Keywords (in Czech)

Lidská práva; justifikace; explikativně-existenciální justifikace; is-ought problém; univerzalita lidských práv

Keywords in English

Human rights; justification; explicative-existential justification; is-ought problem; universality of human rights

Tags

Tags

International impact, Reviewed
Changed: 17/3/2021 14:43, Mgr. Petra Georgala

Abstract

V originále

This paper analyzes Robert Alexy’s explicative-existential justification of human rights. According to the author, there are two problems connected with this concept. It cannot establish human rights universally and explain why we should accept them. In the paper, these questions are addressed in the context of the Is-Ought problem. Alexy’s approach is compared with other theories that strive for human rights justification (basic needs approach, capability approach, and the foundationalism of Alan Gewirth). The author finds that in this respect all other theories have similar disadvantages. The inability to adequately elucidate the transition from Is to Ought is a general problem in moral philosophy, and therefore cannot diminish the position of Alexy’s justification in this context. Although his approach does not really meet certain absolute requirements for good justification, if we evaluate it in relation to other available alternatives, we have to acknowledge its significant place in the philosophy of human rights. Even with Alexy’s theory, however, the problem persists that it establishes rights of human persons rather than rights of human beings. It is therefore not able to fulfill some of its universalist aspirations.

Links

GA20-10464S, research and development project
Name: Kontextuální vazby justifikace lidských práv jako problém právní filosofie
Investor: Czech Science Foundation