2020
Explicative-Existential Justification of Human Rights. Analysis of Robert Alexy's Argument in Context of Is-Ought Problem
HAPLA, MartinBasic information
Original name
Explicative-Existential Justification of Human Rights. Analysis of Robert Alexy's Argument in Context of Is-Ought Problem
Name in Czech
Explikativně-existenciální justifikace lidských práv. Analýza argumentu Roberta Alexyho v kontextu Is-Ought problému
Authors
HAPLA, Martin (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)
Edition
The Age of Human Rights Journal, Jaén, Universidad de Jaén, 2020, 2340-9592
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Article in a journal
Field of Study
50501 Law
Country of publisher
Spain
Confidentiality degree
is not subject to a state or trade secret
References:
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14220/20:00114646
Organization unit
Faculty of Law
UT WoS
000599748500005
EID Scopus
2-s2.0-85098782012
Keywords (in Czech)
Lidská práva; justifikace; explikativně-existenciální justifikace; is-ought problém; univerzalita lidských práv
Keywords in English
Human rights; justification; explicative-existential justification; is-ought problem; universality of human rights
Tags
Tags
International impact, Reviewed
Changed: 17/3/2021 14:43, Mgr. Petra Georgala
Abstract
V originále
This paper analyzes Robert Alexy’s explicative-existential justification of human rights. According to the author, there are two problems connected with this concept. It cannot establish human rights universally and explain why we should accept them. In the paper, these questions are addressed in the context of the Is-Ought problem. Alexy’s approach is compared with other theories that strive for human rights justification (basic needs approach, capability approach, and the foundationalism of Alan Gewirth). The author finds that in this respect all other theories have similar disadvantages. The inability to adequately elucidate the transition from Is to Ought is a general problem in moral philosophy, and therefore cannot diminish the position of Alexy’s justification in this context. Although his approach does not really meet certain absolute requirements for good justification, if we evaluate it in relation to other available alternatives, we have to acknowledge its significant place in the philosophy of human rights. Even with Alexy’s theory, however, the problem persists that it establishes rights of human persons rather than rights of human beings. It is therefore not able to fulfill some of its universalist aspirations.
Links
GA20-10464S, research and development project |
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