ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína. Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations. In ESA 2020 Global Around-the-Clock Virtual Conference. 2020.
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Basic information
Original name Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations
Authors ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína (703 Slovakia, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition ESA 2020 Global Around-the-Clock Virtual Conference, 2020.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Presentations at conferences
Field of Study 50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics
Country of publisher Czech Republic
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW Program konference
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14560/20:00117698
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Keywords in English economic experiment; bystander; strategic games; group identity
Changed by Changed by: Ing. Katarína Čellárová, učo 461845. Changed: 12/1/2021 11:44.
We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of strategic and in-group motives in bystander’s decision making. We devise a simple repeated game played in groups of three subjects with one proposer and two followers. Then the proposer chooses the discrete portion of initial endowment that she wants to take from a follower of her choice. In the next step, another follower, i.e., bystander, decides whether she wants to intervene for all possible amounts that the proposer could take. At the end of the round, computer pairs the decision of bystander with the proposer’s decision. If the bystander intervenes, she pays a small cost, but reallocation does not take place, and all players end up with an initial endowment. If she does not intervene, reallocation takes place. This game is played repeatedly in a partner matching and with the same proposer. We study two factors that could have impact on bystander’s decision – probability that she can become victim and membership to social group. We find that a higher chance of being chosen as the victim next time significantly increases the probability that bystanders will intervene. This result is robust even in environment of different social identities among triplets. However, the victim being outgroup decreases intervention just when bystander knows that he cannot become a victim.
MUNI/A/0931/2019, interní kód MUName: Experimentální výzkum v mikroekonomii (Acronym: EXPERVYM)
Investor: Masaryk University, Category A
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