Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in
repeated non-emergency situations.

k 2020

Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations.

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína

Basic information

Original name

Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations.

Authors

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína

Edition

Slovak Economic Association Meeting (SEAM 2020), Christmas Workshop, 2020

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Prezentace na konferencích

Field of Study

50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics

Country of publisher

Czech Republic

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

Program konference

Organization unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Keywords in English

economic experiment; bystander; strategic games; group identity

Změněno: 12/1/2021 11:48, Ing. Katarína Čellárová, Ph.D.

Abstract

V originále

We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of strategic and in-group motives in bystander’s decision making. We devise a simple repeated game played in groups of three subjects with one proposer and two followers. Then the proposer chooses the discrete portion of initial endowment that she wants to take from a follower of her choice. In the next step, another follower, i.e., bystander, decides whether she wants to intervene for all possible amounts that the proposer could take. At the end of the round, computer pairs the decision of bystander with the proposer’s decision. If the bystander intervenes, she pays a small cost, but reallocation does not take place, and all players end up with an initial endowment. If she does not intervene, reallocation takes place. This game is played repeatedly in a partner matching and with the same proposer. We study two factors that could have impact on bystander’s decision – probability that she can become victim and membership to social group. We find that a higher chance of being chosen as the victim next time significantly increases the probability that bystanders will intervene. This result is robust even in environment of different social identities among triplets. However, the victim being outgroup decreases intervention just when bystander knows that he cannot become a victim.

Links

MUNI/A/0931/2019, interní kód MU

Name: Experimentální výzkum v mikroekonomii (Acronym: EXPERVYM)

Investor: Masaryk University, Category A

Citovat

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína. Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations. In Slovak Economic Association Meeting (SEAM 2020), Christmas Workshop. 2020.

@proceedings{1726066,
   author = {Čellárová, Katarína},
   booktitle = {Slovak Economic Association Meeting (SEAM 2020), Christmas Workshop},
   keywords = {economic experiment; bystander; strategic games; group identity},
   language = {eng},
   title = {Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations.},
   url = {https://slovakecon.sk/seam2020/program.html},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - CONF
ID  - 1726066
AU  - Čellárová, Katarína
PY  - 2020
TI  - Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations.
KW  - economic experiment
KW  - bystander
KW  - strategic games
KW  - group identity
UR  - https://slovakecon.sk/seam2020/program.html
N2  - We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of strategic and in-group motives in bystander’s decision making. We devise a simple repeated game played in groups of three subjects with one proposer and two followers. Then the proposer chooses the discrete portion of initial endowment that she wants to take from a follower of her choice. In the next step, another follower, i.e., bystander, decides whether she wants to intervene for all possible amounts that the proposer could take. At the end of the round, computer pairs the decision of bystander with the proposer’s decision. If the bystander intervenes, she pays a small cost, but reallocation does not take place, and all players end up with an initial endowment. If she does not intervene, reallocation takes place. This game is played repeatedly in a partner matching and with the same proposer. We study two factors that could have impact on bystander’s decision – probability that she can become victim and membership to social group. We find that a higher chance of being chosen as the victim next time significantly increases the probability that bystanders will intervene. This result is robust even in environment of different social identities among triplets. However, the victim being outgroup decreases intervention just when bystander knows that he cannot become a victim.
ER  -

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína. Strategic vs. in-group motives of bystander to intervene in repeated non-emergency situations. In \textit{Slovak Economic Association Meeting (SEAM 2020), Christmas Workshop}. 2020.

Detailed Information on Publication Record