Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii

MENCL, Matouš and Pavel DUFEK. Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii (Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification : On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory). Acta Politologica. Praha: Univerzita Karlova, 2021, vol. 13, No 2, p. 49-70. ISSN 1803-8220. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.14712/1803-8220/14_2020.

Basic information

• Original name: Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii
• Name (in English): Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification : On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory
• Authors: MENCL, Matouš (203 Czech Republic) and Pavel DUFEK (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
• Edition: Acta Politologica, Praha, Univerzita Karlova, 2021, 1803-8220.

Other information

• Original language: Czech
• Type of outcome: Article in a journal
• Field of Study: 50601 Political science
• Country of publisher: Czech Republic
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• WWW: článek - open access Article on the journal website
• RIV identification code: RIV/00216224:14230/21:00118933
• Organization unit: Faculty of Social Studies
• Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/1803-8220/14_2020
• Keywords (in Czech): ideální teorie; anti-utopismus; normativní diverzita; Gaus; Estlund; liberalismus; rozumnost, veřejné ospravedlnění
• Keywords in English: ideal theory; anti-utopianism; normative diversity; Gaus; Estlund; liberalism; reasonableness; public justification
• Tags: rivok
• Tags: Reviewed

Abstract

The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone

Abstract (in English)

The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone

Links

• GA19-11091S, research and development project: Name: Jak dál s veřejným rozumem? Kritiky a obhajoby veřejného ospravedlnění podle liberalismu

Investor: Czech Science Foundation