

# Graph-Based CPE Matching for Identification of Vulnerable Asset Configurations

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Daniel Tovarňák, Lukáš Sadlek, Pavel Čeleda

Masaryk University, CSIRT-MU

Brno, Czech Republic

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# Vulnerabilities

## Threat

- Foreseen or unforeseen **eventuality** with the potential to negatively impact security (of assets).

## Weakness

- Shortcoming, error, or omission in procedures, standards, rules, policies, organization, system, network, hardware, or software, which allows for a threat to be realized under **favorable conditions**.

## Vulnerability

- **Weakness** that truly allows for a threat to be realized, i.e. it is an **exploitable weakness**.

# Assets

## Asset

- Anything **valuable** to the organization
  - e.g. hardware, software, services, information, people, reputation
- We focus on HW and SW **assets** and their **components**
  - e.g. NICs, servers, operating systems, applications, libraries

## Asset Configuration Examples

- Component Trees

*Firefox 43.0, running on top of Windows 10 v2004 en\_US, on top of Intel Xeon processor, inside a Dell Laptop of a particular type.*

- SW Dependency Trees

*Python & PyPI, Java & Maven, Javascript & npm, Debian & APT*

# Automation Support for HW and SW Vulnerabilities

## Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

- De-facto standard for unambiguous identification and description of vulnerabilities in computer systems

## Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)

- Naming standard for identifying classes of **applications (libraries), OS, hardware**, i.e. individual **asset components**
- Naming, Name matching, Dictionary, Applicability language

## National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

- U.S. government repository containing **CVE vulnerabilities**
- Vulnerabilities are linked to vulnerable **asset configurations**

# NVD CVE Record in YAML

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```
cve:
  CVE_data_meta: {ASSIGNER: cve@mitre.org, ID: CVE-2017-5754}
  # ... Meltdown
  description: { ... }
  problemtype: { ... } # CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
  references: { ... }
  impact: { ... } # CVSS - Common Vulnerability Scoring System
  configurations: # CPE applicability statements
  CVE_data_version: 4.0
  nodes:
    - cpe_match:
        operator: OR
        # ...
        - cpe23Uri: "cpe:2.3:h:intel:atom_c:c2308:***:***:***:***"
          vulnerable: true
        - cpe23Uri: "cpe:2.3:h:intel:atom_c:c2316:***:***:***:***"
          vulnerable: true
        - cpe23Uri: "cpe:2.3:h:intel:xeon_silver:4116t:***:***:***:***"
          vulnerable: true
  lastModifiedDate: 2020-05-05T11:31Z
  publishedDate: 2018-01-04T13:29Z
```

---

# Asset Inventory in YAML

---

```
- name: windows-10-common
  uuid: a84fa9de-de42-443f-87b2-0d892ecdb8f5
  parentUuid: null
  cpe23: "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_10:1709:***:*:x64:"

- name: firefox-browser-80.0
  uuid: 6f66140f-4979-41a7-b067-73860dbddc39
  parentUuid: null
  cpe23: "cpe:2.3:a:mozilla:firefox:80.0:***:android:***"

- name: node-tar-3.1.2
  uuid: 131b6b1c-3ba9-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
  parentUuid: null
  cpe23: "cpe:2.3:a:node-tar_project:node-tar:3.1.2:***:***:***:***"

- name: node-tar-2.1.0
  uuid: 1311111c-0000-11eb-adc1-5555ac120002
  parentUuid: a84fa9de-de42-443f-87b2-0d892ecdb8f5
  cpe23: "cpe:2.3:a:node-tar_project:node-tar:2.1.0:***:***:***:***"
```

---

# Vulnerability Management via CPE Matching

## Motivation

- Determine if there are vulnerable assets in your inventory
- CVE list has more than **150,000 entries**
- Attackers exploit **even very old** vulnerabilities in HW and SW
- **Asset** component **configurations** are complex and ever-changing
- We want to track **every change** in asset inventory and CVE list
- Naïve approach is based on **exhaustive search**
- Graph-based approach may be more **efficient** (lower complexity)

# CPE Naming

## Well-Formed Name (WFN)

- Foundational logical data construct
- Unordered set of **attribute-value pairs**
- Bound or unbound form

## Attribute-Value Pair

- Standard defines **11 attributes**
- Values are **exact strings** or **logical values** (ANY, NA)

---

```
wfn:[part="o", vendor="microsoft", product="windows_server_2008",
  ↪ version="r2", update="sp1", edition=ANY, language=ANY,
  ↪ sw_edition=ANY, target_sw=ANY, target_hw="itanium", other=ANY]
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1:~~~~itanium-
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1:***:itanium:*
```

---

## CPE Name Matching (Pairwise AV Comparison)

No.	Source AV pair	Target AV pair	AV-Relation
1	ANY	ANY	=
2	ANY	NA	$\supset$
3	ANY	$i$	$\supset$
4	ANY	$m^+$	undefined
5	NA	ANY	$\subset$
6	NA	NA	=
7	NA	$i$	$\neq$
8	NA	$m^+$	undefined
9	$i$	$i$	=
10	$i$	$k$	$\neq$
11	$i$	$m^+$	undefined
12	$i$	NA	$\neq$
13	$i$	ANY	$\subset$
14	$m^+$	$i$	$\supset$ or $\neq$
15	$m^+$	ANY	$\subset$
16	$m^+$	NA	$\neq$
17	$m_1^+$	$m_2^+$	undefined

# CPE Name Matching

## CPE Name Matching

- Two steps
  1. Pairwise **AV comparison** (result is a set of AV-Relations)
  2. **CPE name comparison** based on the result from the first step
- Possible results
  - If *any* AV-R is *DISJOINT* ( $\neq$ ), the result is *DISJOINT*.
  - If *all* AV-Rs are *EQUAL* (=) or *SUPERSET* ( $\supset$ ), the result is *SUPERSET*.
  - If *all* AV-Rs are *EQUAL* (=) or *SUBSET* ( $\subset$ ), the result is *SUBSET*.

## CPE Match

- Two CPEs are **matching**, if the **source CPE name** (CVE-side) is *SUPERSET* of the **target CPE name** (asset-side).

# CPE Applicability Language

## CPE Applicability Statements

- Each CVE record can define multiple *applicability statements*
  - *Chrome AND Windows 7 OR Chrome v55.0*
- **Complex Boolean formulas** of bound CPE names ( $R_n^{\text{CPE}}$ )

$$(R_1^{\text{CPE}} \wedge R_2^{\text{CPE}} \wedge \neg(R_3^{\text{CPE}} \vee R_4^{\text{CPE}})) \vee \neg R_5^{\text{CPE}} \quad (1)$$

## Conjunctive Normal Form


- *Conjunction* ( $\wedge$ ) consisting of one or more *clauses*, each of which is a disjunction ( $\vee$ ) of one or more literals.
- The logical complement ( $\neg$ ) can be present only for literals.

$$(R_1^{\text{CPE}} \vee \neg R_5^{\text{CPE}}) \wedge (R_2^{\text{CPE}} \vee \neg R_5^{\text{CPE}}) \wedge (\neg R_3^{\text{CPE}} \vee \neg R_5^{\text{CPE}}) \wedge (\neg R_4^{\text{CPE}} \vee \neg R_5^{\text{CPE}}) \quad (2)$$

# Proposed Graph-Based Approach

- Aims to eliminate **exhaustive search**
- **Graph model** for storing CVEs and their CPE applicability statements and assets with CPE definitions
  - Relies on **Conjunctive Normal Form**
- **Insertion procedure** that performs AV pairwise comparison
- **Graph search query** that finds all the vulnerable (CveVertex, StatementVertex, AssetVertex) tuples in a **single pass**

# Graph Model



# Insertion Procedure

## Insert CVE Record


1. For every new CVE vulnerability, CveVertex is created and every **applicability statement** it contains, is converted into **CNF**
2. Adjacent StatementVertices, AndVertices, OrVertices, and FactRefVertices are recursively inserted.
3. Each FactRefVertex is exploded into **11 AV pairs**, i.e. potential future SourceAVSpecVertices
4. If a corresponding SourceAVSpecVertex **exists**, it is merely **connected** to the FactRefVertex, or **created otherwise**
5. If **created**, the new SourceAVSpecVertex **is compared** with all the TargetAVSpecVertices of the same type (e.g. version), and new RelationEdges are stored

# Insertion Procedure


## Insert Asset Record

1. AssetVertex is **created** for the new asset component and its (optional) **parent is set**
2. Each AssetCPEVertex is exploded into **11 AV pairs**, i.e. potential future TargetAVSpecVertices
3. If a corresponding TargetAVSpecVertex **exists**, it is merely **connected** to the AssetCPEVertex, or **created otherwise**
4. If **created**, the new TargetAVSpecVertex **is compared** with all the SourceAVSpecVertices of the same type (e.g. edition), and new RelationEdges are stored

# Populated Graph Example



# Populated Graph Example Detail



# Graph Search Query

## Starting the Traversal (1)

- Start in selected CveVertices and continue through the outbound edges to StatementVertices, then AndVertices, and finally to the OrVertices

## Branching of the Traversal (2)

- For **positive** literals, find such (FactRefVertex, AssetCPEVertex) **pairs that match**
- For **negative** literals, find such (FactRefVertex, AssetCPEVertex) **pairs that don't match**
- Uses helper traversals T1 and T2

## Finding the Asset Roots (3)

- Find **root** AssetVertices for encountered AssetCPEVertices
- Parent-less AssetVertices represent individual **asset configurations**

# Graph Search Query


## Grouping of the Results (4)

- Graph **traversal stops**
- In the `group().by()` step, the traversal history is keyed by the n-tuple of (`CveVertex`, `StatementVertex`, `AssetVertex`)
- Each key represents a **candidate match** for a particular `StatementVertex` and a particular `AssetVertex` root


## Boolean Evaluation (5)

- Helper traversal C1 represents the **(expected)** number of `AndVertices` (operands) for each `StatementVertex` (conjunction) **that must hold true**
- Helper traversal C2 represents the **(actual)** number of `AndVertices` that **evaluate to true**
- Query returns only grouped pairs where the **counts are equal**

# Populated Graph Example



# Populated Graph Example Detail



# Graph Search Query

## Gremlin

- Graph **traversal machine** and **language** (DSL)
- Independent from a particular graph system (database) implementation
- Imperative **traversal queries** and declarative **pattern-match queries** within the same framework

## Gremlin Graph Traversal Machine

- Graph  $G$  (data), traversal  $\Psi$  (instructions), set of traversers  $T$  (read/write heads).
- Collection of traversers in  $T$  move about  $G$  according to the instructions specified in  $\Psi$ .
- The computation is complete when either:
  1. There no longer exist any traversers in  $T$
  2. All existing traversers no longer reference an instruction in  $\Psi$

# Graph Search Query

## Gremlin Graph Traversal Language

- Language enabling a human user to easily define  $\Psi$

## Examples

- `out("label")`: Move to the outgoing adjacent vertices given the edge labels.
- `in("label")`: Move to the incoming adjacent vertices given the edge labels.
- `bothE("label")`: Move to both the incoming and outgoing incident edges given the edge labels.
- `hasLabel("label")`: Remove the traverser if its element does not have any of the labels.
- `hasId(<predicate P>)`: Remove the traverser if the element id does not satisfy the given predicate.

# Graph Search Query Traversal

```
1 QUERY = g.V()
2 .hasLabel("type::CveVertex").hasId(P1).as_("x_Cve") ①
3 .out("hasStatement").as_("x_Statement")
4 .out("hasAndOperand").out("hasOrOperand").as_("x_Or")
5 .choose(has_("negate", False), T1, T2).as_("x_AssetCPE") ②
6 .dedup("x_FactRef", "x_AssetCPE")
7 .out("classifies").optional(Z).hasId(P2).as_("x_RootAsset") ③
8 .group() ④
9     .by(select("x_Cve", "x_Statement", "x_RootAsset"))
10    .by(select("x_Or", "x_FactRef", "x_AssetCPE").fold())
11 .unfold()
12 .project("match", "path", "expectedCount", "actualCount") ⑤
13     .by(select(Column.keys)).by(select(Column.values))
14     .by(C1).by(C2)
15 .where("expectedCount", P.eq("actualCount"))
```

# Graph Search Query Traversal Helpers

```
1 P1 = P.without([]) # or P.eq(<someCveId>)
2 P2 = P.without([]) # or P.eq(<someAssetUUID>)
3 RL = [SUPERSET, EQUALS] # desired AV pair match
4
5 M[] = CPE_ATTR_NAMES.forEachElement(_X -> # 11 WFN attributes
6   __.as_("x_FactRef").out("hasSourceAVSpec").has_("attrName", _X)
7   .bothE("hasRelation").has_("relation", P.within(RL))
8   .outV().in_("hasTargetAVSpec").as_("x_Same_AssetCPE")).toArr()
9 T1 = __.out("hasFactRef") # negate = False
10 .match([traverse(p) for p in M]).select("x_Same_AssetCPE")
11
12 T2 = __.out("hasFactRef").as_("x_FactRef") # negate = True
13 .out("hasSourceAVSpec").bothE("hasRelation")
14 .has_("relation", P.without(RL)).outV().in_("hasTargetAVSpec")
15
16 Z = __.repeat(out("hasParent"))
17 .until(outE("hasParent").count().is_(0))
18
19 C1 = __.select(Column.keys).select("x_Statement")
20 .out("hasAndOperand").count()
21 C2 = __.select(Column.values).unfold().select("x_Or")
22 .dedup().in_("hasOrOperand").dedup().count()
```

# Experimental Implementation

- Open source implementation in Java<sup>1</sup>
- Object-Graph Mapping used to implement the graph model
- Search query described in **Gremlin** (for Java)
- **CPE 2.3 Reference Implementation**<sup>2</sup> provides a Java API for creating, using, and matching CPE Names
- Support for AV pair versions defined as **version ranges**

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<sup>1</sup> <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4569393>

<sup>2</sup> <https://pages.nist.gov/cpe-reference-implementation/>

# Summary

## Problem

- Automated vulnerability management via CPE matching

## Contribution

- Elimination of **exhaustive search**
- **Graph model** for storing CVEs and their CPE applicability statements and assets with CPE definitions
- **Insertion procedure** that performs AV pairwise comparison
- **Graph search query** that finds all the vulnerable (`CveVertex`, `StatementVertex`, `AssetVertex`) tuples in a **single pass**
- **Experimental implementation** in Java and Gremlin

## Future Work

- **Performance evaluation** of the experimental implementation
- Approaches for **asset discovery** and their CPE classification

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