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@article{1786634,
author = {Xygalatas, Dimitrios and Maňo, Peter and Bahna, Vladimír and Kundtová Klocová, Eva and Kundt, Radek and Lang, Martin and Shaver, John Hayward},
article_number = {6},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.05.006},
keywords = {Social status; Costly signaling; Mauritius; Ritual},
language = {eng},
issn = {1090-5138},
journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
title = {Social inequality and signaling in a costly ritual},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.05.006},
volume = {42},
year = {2021}
}
TY - JOUR
ID - 1786634
AU - Xygalatas, Dimitrios - Maňo, Peter - Bahna, Vladimír - Kundtová Klocová, Eva - Kundt, Radek - Lang, Martin - Shaver, John Hayward
PY - 2021
TI - Social inequality and signaling in a costly ritual
JF - Evolution and Human Behavior
VL - 42
IS - 6
SP - 524-533
EP - 524-533
SN - 10905138
KW - Social status
KW - Costly signaling
KW - Mauritius
KW - Ritual
UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.05.006
N2 - Evolutionary perspectives suggest that participation in collective rituals may serve important communicative functions by signaling practitioners' commitment to the community and its values. While previous research has examined the effects of ritual signals at the individual and collective level, there has been limited attention directed to the impact of socio-environmental factors on the quality of ritual signaling. We examined this impact in the context of the Thaipusam Kavadi, a collective ritual performed by Tamil Hindus worldwide that involves body piercings and other costly activities. We show that participants' relative position in the social hierarchy systematically affects the form of ritual signaling. Specifically, we found that low-status participants are more likely to engage in signaling modalities that require somatic and opportunity costs in the form of body piercings and cumulative effort, while high-status individuals are more likely to use financial capital, in the form of more elaborate material offerings to the deity. Moreover, signaling in each particular modality is stronger among individuals who participate in more public (but not private) rituals, corresponding to their long-term commitment to the community. In sum, our results demonstrate that social hierarchies exact unequal requirements on ritual participants, who in turn modify their signaling strategies accordingly.
ER -
XYGALATAS, Dimitrios, Peter MAŇO, Vladimír BAHNA, Eva KUNDTOVÁ KLOCOVÁ, Radek KUNDT, Martin LANG and John Hayward SHAVER. Social inequality and signaling in a costly ritual. \textit{Evolution and Human Behavior}. 2021, vol.~42, No~6, p.~524-533. ISSN~1090-5138. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.05.006.
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