Detailed Information on Publication Record
2021
The “coal villain” of the European Union? Path dependence, profiteering and the role of the Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) company in the energy transition
ČERNOCH, Filip, Jan OSIČKA and Sebastián MARIŇÁKBasic information
Original name
The “coal villain” of the European Union? Path dependence, profiteering and the role of the Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) company in the energy transition
Authors
ČERNOCH, Filip (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Jan OSIČKA (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Sebastián MARIŇÁK (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution)
Edition
Energy Research & Social Science, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2021, 2214-6296
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Článek v odborném periodiku
Field of Study
50601 Political science
Country of publisher
Netherlands
Confidentiality degree
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
References:
Impact factor
Impact factor: 8.514
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14230/21:00122105
Organization unit
Faculty of Social Studies
UT WoS
000656405400002
Keywords in English
Stranded assets; Rent-seeking; EPH; Capacity remuneration mechanism; Utilities; Niche actors
Tags
Tags
International impact, Reviewed
Změněno: 17/8/2021 15:30, Mgr. Blanka Farkašová
Abstract
V originále
Parallel to the ongoing energy transition, Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) has emerged as one of the leading energy companies in the EU. Since its expansion started in 2009, the company has acquired assets worth EUR 16.7 billion while entering eight European markets, establishing itself as a crucial EU natural gas stakeholder and essential coal mining company in Germany and Poland, collecting around 26 GW of installed electricity generation capacity, and becoming the second largest polluter in the EU ETS. Unlike other rising stars of the shifting socio-technical regime such as Orsted or Tesla, EPH swims against the current. Depending on the perspective, it acts like either a scavenger, buying out “dirty” coal assets from energy incumbents, or a profiteer, taking advantage of the recently introduced capacity mechanisms which give an afterlife to such assets, thereby extracting rents from transition policies. EPH thus simultaneously contributes to the transition and compromises the goal of decarbonization. This paper offers a detailed analysis of EPH’s investment strategy. The resulting image is one of a company with Europe-wide aspirations but the structure and behaviour of a garage start-up—an image that does not fit the traditional perception of transition as a conflict between status quo and niche actors over the fate of the regime. EPH is interested not in the end-state of the regime change but in the change itself. We conclude by discussing what the emergence of such an actor could mean for current European energy transition policies.
Links
MUNI/A/1044/2019, interní kód MU |
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