The “coal villain” of the European Union? Path dependence,
profiteering and the role of the Energetický a průmyslový
holding (EPH) company in the energy transition

ČERNOCH, Filip, Jan OSIČKA and Sebastián MARIŇÁK. The “coal villain” of the European Union? Path dependence, profiteering and the role of the Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) company in the energy transition. Energy Research & Social Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2021, vol. 76, July, p. 1-10. ISSN 2214-6296. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102066.

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TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1786658
AU  - Černoch, Filip - Osička, Jan - Mariňák, Sebastián
PY  - 2021
TI  - The “coal villain” of the European Union? Path dependence, profiteering and the role of the Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) company in the energy transition
JF  - Energy Research & Social Science
VL  - 76
IS  - July
SP  - 1-10
EP  - 1-10
PB  - Elsevier
SN  - 22146296
KW  - Stranded assets
KW  - Rent-seeking
KW  - EPH
KW  - Capacity remuneration mechanism
KW  - Utilities
KW  - Niche actors
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629621001596?via%3Dihub
N2  - Parallel to the ongoing energy transition, Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) has emerged as one of the leading energy companies in the EU. Since its expansion started in 2009, the company has acquired assets worth EUR 16.7 billion while entering eight European markets, establishing itself as a crucial EU natural gas stakeholder and essential coal mining company in Germany and Poland, collecting around 26 GW of installed electricity generation capacity, and becoming the second largest polluter in the EU ETS. Unlike other rising stars of the shifting socio-technical regime such as Orsted or Tesla, EPH swims against the current. Depending on the perspective, it acts like either a scavenger, buying out “dirty” coal assets from energy incumbents, or a profiteer, taking advantage of the recently introduced capacity mechanisms which give an afterlife to such assets, thereby extracting rents from transition policies. EPH thus simultaneously contributes to the transition and compromises the goal of decarbonization. This paper offers a detailed analysis of EPH’s investment strategy. The resulting image is one of a company with Europe-wide aspirations but the structure and behaviour of a garage start-up—an image that does not fit the traditional perception of transition as a conflict between status quo and niche actors over the fate of the regime. EPH is interested not in the end-state of the regime change but in the change itself. We conclude by discussing what the emergence of such an actor could mean for current European energy transition policies.
ER  -

Basic information
Original name	The “coal villain” of the European Union? Path dependence, profiteering and the role of the Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) company in the energy transition
Authors	ČERNOCH, Filip (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Jan OSIČKA (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Sebastián MARIŇÁK (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution).
Edition	Energy Research & Social Science, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2021, 2214-6296.

Other information
Original language	English
Type of outcome	Article in a journal
Field of Study	50601 Political science
Country of publisher	Netherlands
Confidentiality degree	is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW	URL
Impact factor	Impact factor: 8.514
RIV identification code	RIV/00216224:14230/21:00122105
Organization unit	Faculty of Social Studies
Doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102066
UT WoS	000656405400002
Keywords in English	Stranded assets; Rent-seeking; EPH; Capacity remuneration mechanism; Utilities; Niche actors
Tags	rivok
Tags	International impact, Reviewed
Changed by	Changed by: Mgr. Blanka Farkašová, učo 97333. Changed: 17/8/2021 15:30.

Abstract

Parallel to the ongoing energy transition, Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) has emerged as one of the leading energy companies in the EU. Since its expansion started in 2009, the company has acquired assets worth EUR 16.7 billion while entering eight European markets, establishing itself as a crucial EU natural gas stakeholder and essential coal mining company in Germany and Poland, collecting around 26 GW of installed electricity generation capacity, and becoming the second largest polluter in the EU ETS. Unlike other rising stars of the shifting socio-technical regime such as Orsted or Tesla, EPH swims against the current. Depending on the perspective, it acts like either a scavenger, buying out “dirty” coal assets from energy incumbents, or a profiteer, taking advantage of the recently introduced capacity mechanisms which give an afterlife to such assets, thereby extracting rents from transition policies. EPH thus simultaneously contributes to the transition and compromises the goal of decarbonization. This paper offers a detailed analysis of EPH’s investment strategy. The resulting image is one of a company with Europe-wide aspirations but the structure and behaviour of a garage start-up—an image that does not fit the traditional perception of transition as a conflict between status quo and niche actors over the fate of the regime. EPH is interested not in the end-state of the regime change but in the change itself. We conclude by discussing what the emergence of such an actor could mean for current European energy transition policies.

Links
MUNI/A/1044/2019, interní kód MU	Name: Perspektivy evropské integrace v kontextu globální politiky II
MUNI/A/1044/2019, interní kód MU	Investor: Masaryk University, Category A

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