More goals, fewer babies? On national teams’ performance and birth rates

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Luca Fumarco** | **Francesco Principe** |
| **Tulane University - Murphy Institute, Masaryk University, IZA, GLO** | **Erasmus School of Economics****Tinbergen Institute** |

**Abstract**

Does national team performance boost birth rates? We compiled a unique dataset combining country-level monthly birth rates for 50 European countries, along 56 years, with measures of national teams’ performance in 27 international football events. We find that an increase in national teams’ performance in international cups is associated with a drop in birth rates nine months after the event. We hypothesize that these results might be explained by individuals’ time allocation choices.

**JEL Codes:** I10, J10, J11, J13

**Keywords:** football, sporting events, time allocation, birth rates, fertility

Luca Fumarco: Department of Economics, Tulane University, United States; lfumarco@tulane.edu Francesco Principe: Erasmus School of Economics, Tinbergen Institute and ECASE (Erasmus Center for Applied Sports Economics), the Netherlands; principe@ese.eur.nl

# 1 Introduction

Anecdotic evidence suggests that a great performance in major sports competitions results in births increase among fans. International press reported various cases, namely a baby boom in Iceland nine months after the Euro 2016 win against England, an increase in births in Barcelona after Iniesta’s last-minute goal in the 2009 Champions League semi-final. In the US, this phenomenon is often referred to as “Super Bowl babies”: an increase in births among fans of the NFL Super Bowl winning team.

Indeed, major sporting events, such as FIFA World Cup, play an important role in reviving national pride and are by far the most watched events on television. For example, the latest World Cup, hosted by Russia in 2018, attracted a total of 3.6 billion watchers worldwide. In Europe, 86.1% of the population watched at least one minute of the competition (FIFA, 2018). As shown by a recent literature, the qualification and participation of the national team in the tournament represents the most relevant predictor of audience size, followed by match quality and scheduling-related variables (Uribe *et al.* 2021).

A growing body of literature has investigated the main determinants of birth rates and fertility, focusing on socioeconomic conditions (Kearney and Wilson 2018; Schaller *et al.* 2020), religion (Anderson and Coale 2017; Basedau *et al.* 2018), natural disasters (Nandi *et al*. 2018), power outages (Burlando 2014; Fetzer *et al.* 2018), mass media exposure (Billari *et al*. 2019; La Ferrara *et al.* 2012), and weather (Barreca *et al.* 2018). While the idea that euphoria generated by sports success can nurture hedonic sensations and then increase human conception has been widely suggested in society and mass media, it has not received much empirical attention. We fill this gap in the literature and provide the first empirical evidence on the relationship between national sports success and birth rates.

We compiled a unique dataset combining country-level monthly births for 50 European countries, along 56 years, with measures of national teams’ performance in 27 major international football events (i.e., FIFA Wold Cup and UEFA European Football Championship). Our empirical results contradict the anecdotical evidence. We find that an increase in national teams’ performance is associated with a *reduction* in births nine months after the event.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the main empirical analyses, while Section 4 presents some robustness checks. Section 5 discusses and concludes.

# 2 Data

We combined data from Eurostat on country-level monthly births for 50 European countries, from 1960 to 2016, with national team’s performance, as measured by the ELO rating system, which is used by FIFA to compile the world national teams rank.

The ELO system accounts for two aspects of performance. First, it depends on individual match results and importance. Second, it cumulates through the competition, so it accounts for the permanence in the competitions and for the different number of games per competition over time. Both aspects are important for the results interpretation. More details are provided in Appendix A.

Information on national teams’ performance is obtained from Wikipedia and covers 13 European Championships and 14 World Cups. About half of the competitions takes place between June and July, half in June, and two in July. Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics.

|  |
| --- |
| **Table 1.** Descriptive statistics. |
| Variables | N | Mean | SD  | Min | Max |
| Monthly births | 17,658 | 15,548.17 | 22,689.18 | 5 | 174,839 |
| Performance, ELO | 17,658 | 1.628 | 18.074 | 0 | 425 |
| Organizer | 17,658 | 0.001 |  | 0 | 1 |
| Year | 17,658 |  |  | 1960 | 2016 |
| *Note:* ELO is the rating system used by FIFA. |

The ELO score ranges between 0 (i.e., country *c* did not participate) and 425 (i.e., country *c* wins the competition and most matches). Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the complete list of countries, their first and last year in the Eurostat database.

# 3 Empirical analysis

To investigate the relationship between national football teams’ performance and birth rates, we estimate the following equation by means of FE estimator:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| $$Ln\\_Births\_{ct+9}= β\_{0}+ β\_{1}Std\\_ELO\_{ct} + β\_{2}Organizer\_{ct}+ γ\_{t}+ μ\_{ct}$$ | (1) |

Where $Ln\\_Births\_{ct+9}$ is the natural logarithm of monthly births in country *c* and month *t+9,* $Std\\_ELO\_{ct}$ is the standardized measure of national team’s performance, $Organizer\_{ct}$ is a dummy taking value 1 if country *c* hosted the competition in *t*. $γ\_{t}$ is a vector for time fixed-effects, while country fixed-effects are eliminated by the within transformation. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the country.

Results from estimating Equation (1) are presented in Table 2 and look very robust. Across all the specifications, we see that, on average, an increase in performance by one standard deviation is associated with a reduction in monthly births by 0.3% nine months after the event. Thus, these results challenge the anecdotic narrative often provided by mass media. On the contrary, they provide strong evidence that national teams’ performance in major sports competitions is associated with a drop in births.

A back-of-the-envelope calculation of the number of missed births unveils the economic significance of our results. Let us consider a basic case, a participating country that obtains 127.74 points (i.e., the average score of a participating country); in this case, we could expect a drop in monthly births by 2.13% ([127.74/18] \*0.3) nine months after the competition. More concretely, consider Italy and France, with average monthly births equal to 52k and 66.5k respectively, this result corresponds to 1.1k and 1.4k fewer monthly births, respectively.

|  |
| --- |
| **Table 2.** Effect of performance on the natural logarithm of number of births, 9 months after the beginning of the tournament; fixed-effect parameter estimates. |
| Variables | Ln\_Births 9 months after the tournament |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Std\_ELO | -0.003\*\* | -0.003\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\* | -0.003\* | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.002\* | -0.003\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Organizer |  | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Year FE |  |  | X | X |  |  |  |  |
| Month FE |  |  | X |  |  |  |  |  |
| Month × Country FE |  |  |  | X | X | X |  | X |
| Year × Month  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Year × Month FE |  |  |  |  | X |  |  | X |
| Year × Month × Country |  |  |  |  |  |  | X | X |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 17,010 | 17,010 | 17,010 | 17,010 | 17,010 | 17,010 | 17,010 | 17,010 |
| N countries | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| *Note:* Country fixed-effects and the constant are eliminated by the within transformation. Robust standard errors, clustered at country level, are in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 |

Notice that column (6) to (8) account for general and for country-specific time trends. Among other unobservable trends, these analyses account for evolution and spread over time of television and internet. This point is discussed in Section 5.

# 4 Robustness checks

We conduct a four falsification tests. First, we conduct analyses on births from 1 to 11 months after the competition on the subsample of years when the tournaments were held entirely in one month, either only June or only July. These analyses are based on observations from 20 years (i.e., about 4.6k observations), which gives a smaller sample; thus, we use model specification from Column (3), Table 2.

Figure 1 illustrates the results. The effect of performance on monthly births is highly statistically significant nine and ten months after the tournament,[[1]](#footnote-1) while the effect after eleven months is on the edge of significance.[[2]](#footnote-2)

**Figure 1**. Effect of performance on monthly births



*Note*: The figure plots the parameter estimates alongside 95% confidence intervals of the analysis which estimates Equation (1) on the natural logarithm of births from 1 to 11 months after the tournament.

The results are equivalent to those from Column (3) with the same specification, and from Table 2 more in general.

Second, we conduct three randomization tests by means of Montecarlo simulation, 100 repetitions each: (i) we weight the ELO coefficient with a random number between 0 and 1; (ii) we randomly reassign country-ELO scores across time for participating countries;[[3]](#footnote-3) (iii) we randomly reassign monthly-births within year, for each country. Third, we look at what happens to births in the typical nine months after the tournament, but shifted one year later (i.e. 21 months after the tournament; the standard nine months after a tournament in June-July gives March-April of the following year, we add 12 months to that) and one year earlier (i.e. 14 months before the tournament; we look at March-April in the year previous the tournament). Table 3 reports the results for both second and third falsification tests. For comparison sake, we use the model specification from Column (3) in Table 2.

|  |
| --- |
| **Table 3.** Effect of performance on the natural logarithm of number of births; fixed-effect parameter estimates. Randomization tests (panel A), and one-year shift analyses (panel B). |
|  | Randomization tests(A) | One-year shift analyses(B) |
|  | ELO rescaling | ELO reassignment | Births reassignment |  |  |
| Variables | Ln\_Births 9 months after the tournament | Ln\_Births 21 months after the tournament | Ln\_Births 14 months before the tournament |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Std\_ELO | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.003 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *Note:* Panel (A) reports average estimates and standard errors across 100 simulations for three different randomization tests: with rescaled ELO, reassigned ELO, and reassigned births. Panel (B) reports estimates from one-year shift analyses: 21 months after the tournament (i.e. 9 + 12 months lead), and 15 months before the tournament (i.e. 12 + 2 months lag). Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the country, in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 |

Panel A shows that neither of the three randomization test provides a statistically significant association between national teams’ performance and country’s births, nine months after the competition. Similarly, panel B shows no statistically significant association between national teams’ performance and country’s births in the one-year shift analyses.

Finally, we perform a series of 50 leave-one-out analyses, where we subsequently exclude one country at a time. Appendix C, Figure C.1 reports the estimates from this analyses. Compared to Table 2, these results are virtually unchanged in term of magnitude and statistical significance.

# 5 Discussion

We have analysed the relationship between national teams’ performance in major sports competitions and birth rates. We find that an increase in national team performance in international football competitions is associated with a drop in births nine months after the event.

Our paper contributes to shed light on the social determinants of birth rates and fertility. While our data provide a neat longitudinal framework, they do not allow us to investigate mechanisms linking national teams’ performance and birth rates. We hypothesize that these results might be explained by individuals’ time allocations choices (Mincer, 1963; Becker, 1965). In this framework, the attendance of live events (e.g., from late afternoon to late night, on TV, at the stadium, on big screens in public places[[4]](#footnote-4)) may reduce the time spent on physical intimacy as suggested in other studies (Grimm *et al*., 2015; Dewi *et al*., 2017; Johnson, 2001; Hornik and McAnany, 2001). As a support to this substitution mechanism, it is important to notice that contrary to other entertainment video activities (e.g., watching movies and series, connecting on online social media), sports events are characterized by their uniqueness and unrepeatability as well as by their collective engagement. On top of that, good national teams’ performances are likely followed by celebrations with friends and fellow countrymen, which reduces even more physical intimacy time. Differently, bad performances cause early exclusion from the tournament, without disrupting intimacy time. To this end, time allocation choices seem more salient than euphoria in explaining reproductive behaviour.

Our results have implications for both economics and demography. On one hand, in high-fertility settings, such as developing countries, governments may aim at reducing births, even with indirect interventions, such as increasing access to entertainment activities and TV. On the other hand, our results suggest that an increase in entertainment activities may reduce births even in low-fertility settings, such as most European countries, where governments typically aim at increasing fertility. While the effect of the massive increase in the consumption of media and entertainment in rich countries is broadly debated (Wallsten, 2013), its specific effect on reproductive behaviour remains largely unexplored.

# References

Anderson, B. A., & Coale, A. J. (2017). Regional and cultural factors in the decline of marital fertility in Europe. In *The decline of fertility in Europe* (pp. 293-313). Princeton University Press.

Barreca, A., Deschenes, O., & Guldi, M. (2018). Maybe next month? Temperature shocks and dynamic adjustments in birth rates. *Demography, 55*(4), 1269-1293.

Basedau, M., Gobien, S., & Prediger, S. (2018). The multidimensional effects of religion on socioeconomic development: a review of the empirical literature. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, *32*(4), 1106-1133.

Becker, G. S. (1965). A Theory of the Allocation of Time. *The Economic Journal*, *75*(299), 493-517.

Billari, F. C., Giuntella, O., & Stella, L. (2019). Does broadband Internet affect fertility?. *Population Studies*, *73*(3), 297-316.

Burlando, A. (2014). Power outages, power externalities, and baby booms. *Demography*, *51*(4), 1477-1500.

Fetzer, T., Pardo, O., & Shanghavi, A. (2018). More than an urban legend: the short-and long-run effects of unplanned fertility shocks. *Journal of Population Economics*, *31*(4), 1125-1176.

FIFA (2018). 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia™ Global broadcast and audience summary. Available at: www.fifa.com. Last accessed: 10/05/2021

Kearney, M. S., & Wilson, R. (2018). Male earnings, marriageable men, and nonmarital fertility: Evidence from the fracking boom. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *100*(4), 678-690.

La Ferrara, O., Ching, A., Duryea, S. (2012). Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2012, 4*(4), 1-31.

Mincer, J. (1963) Market Prices, Opportunity costs, and Income Effects, in *Measurement in Economics: Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics in honor of Yehuda Grunfield,* ed. C. Christ, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press).

Nandi, A., Mazumdar, S., & Behrman, J. R. (2018). The effect of natural disaster on fertility, birth spacing, and child sex ratio: evidence from a major earthquake in India. *Journal of Population Economics*, *31*(1), 267-293.

Schaller, J., Fishback, P., & Marquardt, K. (2020). Local Economic Conditions and Fertility from the Great Depression through the Great Recession. *AEA: Papers and Proceedings*, 110, 236-240.

Uribe, R., Buzeta, C., Manzur, E., & Alvarez, I. (2021). Determinants of football TV audience: The straight and ancillary effects of the presence of the local team on the FIFA world cup. *Journal of Business Research*, *127*, 454-463.

Wallsten, S. (2013). What Are We Not Doing When We’re Online. *National Bureau of Economic Research, w19549.*

# Appendix A: FIFA ELO score

To build our measure of national team’s performance, we follow the official ELO system used by FIFA. The computation of individual national teams’ performance in one international cup proceeds in two stages: first, we multiply the importance and result coefficient (see below) for each game played by one national team and, second, we sum the results of these multiplications across matches for the same national team, within the same competition. These are the two coefficients we combine:

* *importance coefficient:* 50 for matches before quarter-finals and 60 for matches in quarter-finals or later. In this dataset we have coefficients only on the final stages of international tournaments.
* *result coefficient:* 0 for a loss after regular or extra time, 0.5 for a draw or loss in a penalty shootout, 0.75 for a victory in a penalty shootout, 1 for a victory after regular or extra time.

If a game ends with a winner but still requires a penalty shootouts (i.e., in the second game of a two-legged tie), it is scored as a regular game (e.g., the score is based on the regular time result).

Since we are simply interested in studying a proxy for the national team’s two-performance in an international tournament, we modify the official ELO scoring system to account for four aspects. First, international competitions format changed slightly over time, with some earlier competitions having a small group stage before the semi-finals, which factually corresponded to quarter-finals. Therefore, we assigned the importance coefficient equal to 60 to matches at that stage as well. Second, we added 60 additional points to the team that wins the international cup, regardless of whether the match ends after the regular time, extra time or penalty shootouts; a final victory has to count more than a victory in the semifinals or earlier. Third, we added 1 point to all of the national teams that participate to the international cup (i.e., a national team is assigned at least 1 point, even after loosing all of the matches in the international cup). A team that participates but looses all of the matches is still better off than a team that does not participate at all. Fourth, we are not considering ELO points assigned by the FIFA to national teams up until the tournament (i.e., points cumulated during qualification matches to the final stages of the competition); related to that, we are not accounting for the opponent team strength.

We conduct additional robustness checks that exclude the victory bonus (i.e., the second change in the ELO scoring system). The results are identical; it is not surprising, given that the amount of countries that are in the Eurostat database and win an international tournament is very small (i.e., 17).

# Appendix B: Countries and Years

|  |
| --- |
| **Table B.1** First and last year in the database, by country. |
| Country | First year | Last year |
| Albania | 1997 | 2016 |
| Andorra | 2005 | 2012 |
| Armenia | 2005 | 2016 |
| Austria | 1960 | 2016 |
| Azerbaijan | 2005 | 2016 |
| Belarus | 2005 | 2015 |
| Belgium | 1960 | 2016 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2003 | 2012 |
| Bulgaria | 1994 | 2016 |
| Croatia | 1994 | 2016 |
| Cyprus | 1994 | 2016 |
| Czech Republic | 1990 | 2016 |
| Denmark | 1960 | 2016 |
| Estonia | 1960 | 2016 |
| Finland | 1960 | 2016 |
| Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | 1994 | 2016 |
| France | 1994 | 2016 |
| Georgia | 2005 | 2015 |
| Germany | 1991 | 2016 |
| Greece | 1969 | 2016 |
| Hungary | 1994 | 2016 |
| Iceland | 1960 | 2016 |
| Ireland | 1969 | 2016 |
| Italy | 1960 | 2016 |
| Kosovo under United Nations security | 2005 | 2015 |
| Latvia | 1996 | 2016 |
| Liechtenstein | 1980 | 2016 |
| Lithuania | 1994 | 2016 |
| Luxembourg | 1960 | 2016 |
| Malta | 1994 | 2016 |
| Moldova | 2005 | 2016 |
| Monaco | 2005 | 2005 |
| Montenegro | 2005 | 2016 |
| Netherland | 1960 | 2016 |
| Norway | 1960 | 2016 |
| Poland | 1995 | 2016 |
| Portugal | 1969 | 2016 |
| Romania | 1995 | 2016 |
| Russia | 2005 | 2013 |
| San Marino | 2005 | 2012 |
| Serbia | 2000 | 2016 |
| Slovakia | 1996 | 2016 |
| Slovenia | 1994 | 2016 |
| Spain | 1960 | 2016 |
| Sweden | 1960 | 2016 |
| Switzerland | 1960 | 2016 |
| Turkey | 2004 | 2016 |
| Ukraine | 2005 | 2015 |
| United Kingdom | 1973 | 2016 |
| Western Germany | 1960 | 1990 |

*Note:* Countries entry to and exit from the database follows exogenous political agreements. Countries that have split over this time period are usually countries from the former Soviet bloc and former Yugoslavia. These countries enter the Eurostat database after they split. The database includes Western Germany from 1960 to 1990, while from 1991 it includes the unified Germany. Countries names in Table B.1 are those used in the Eurostat database.

# Appendix C: Leave-one-out analysis

**Figure C.1** Leave-one-out analysis.



*Note*: The figure plots the parameter estimates alongside 95% confidence intervals of the leave-one-out analysis which estimates Equation (1) by omitting one Country at time. The red diamond/line refers to the baseline estimate with no omitted Country.

1. That is, eight and nine months after the month when the tournament started, which gives nine and ten months of gestation respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This is probably due to the lack of information on *daily* births. Lower conception rate at the end of the month when the tournament started might reflect into lower birth rates about ten months later, that is, between ten and eleven months after the beginning of the tournament. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For example, let us say that Italy participated to 20 international competitions, so we have 20 ELO scores for Italy; we randomly reassign these 20 ELO scores across the 20 Italian appearances in these competitions. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Historically, also World Cups outside of Europe scheduled matches at times corresponding to late afternoon/night in Europe (e.g., the US and Brazil World Cups). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)