RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution. Logic and logical philosophy. Nicolas Copernicus University Press, 2022, vol. 31, No 1, p. 105-141. ISSN 1425-3305. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011.
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Basic information
Original name The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution
Authors RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Logic and logical philosophy, Nicolas Copernicus University Press, 2022, 1425-3305.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Article in a journal
Field of Study 60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Country of publisher Poland
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW URL
Impact factor Impact factor: 0.500
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14210/22:00129024
Organization unit Faculty of Arts
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011
UT WoS 000701852400001
Keywords in English existential generalisation; quantifying in; explicit substitution; hyperintensional logic; natural deduction
Tags rivok
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. et Mgr. Lucie Tomaňová, učo 445546. Changed: 3/4/2023 10:52.
Abstract
The present paper offers the rule of existential generalisation (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.
Links
GA19-12420S, research and development projectName: Hyperintenzionální význam, teorie typů a logická dedukce (Acronym: Hyperintensionality and Types)
Investor: Czech Science Foundation
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