STANĚK, Rostislav, Ondřej KRČÁL and Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ. Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. New York: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2022, vol. 98, June, p. 1-9. ISSN 2214-8043. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101851.
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Basic information
Original name Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard
Authors STANĚK, Rostislav (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Ondřej KRČÁL (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution).
Edition Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, New York, ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2022, 2214-8043.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Article in a journal
Field of Study 50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Country of publisher United States of America
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
Impact factor Impact factor: 1.831 in 2021
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
UT WoS 000793635800013
Keywords in English Strict liability;Assistance;Procedural preferences;Experiment;Moral hazard
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. Pavlína Kurková, učo 368752. Changed: 11/8/2022 12:54.
Governments and organizations often implement policies designed to help people affected by undesirable events. Such policies can make the society better off, but they may also create moral hazard. We use a laboratory experiment to examine two questions. First, can discretionary decisions to provide assistance overcome the problem of moral hazard and lead to higher efficiency? Second, if so, will people prefer this discretionary procedure to the strict liability policy in which no assistance is provided? We find that assistance is more efficient than a strict liability procedure. However, people still prefer the strict liability regime over assistance. We conduct additional treatments that show that this effect is not driven by the presence of human discretion, nor by aversion to risk, ambiguity, loss or inequality. This suggests that when moral hazard is a concern people have procedural preferences in favor of strict liability.
GA17-00496S, research and development projectName: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup
Investor: Czech Science Foundation
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