Futures 141 (2022) 102972
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Securitising the future: Dystopian migration discourses in Poland
and the Czech Republic
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Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicza
' , Otto Eibl , Magdalena El Ghamari'
a
Department of Technology and Safety, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Troms0, Norway
b
Department of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
c
Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Collegium Civitas University, Warsaw, Poland
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
Migration
Securitisation
Demographic change
Dystopian future
Poland
The Czech Republic
This paper presents findings of a comparative study carried out in Poland and the Czech Republic,
which analysed the societal attitudes towards migration and migrants in Europe. Our research
shows that the reaction to migration in Poland and the Czech Republic constitutes a reversed
(bottom up) securitisation. Moreover, contrary to the majority of security challenges where the
immediate threats are understood to be more dangerous than those placed in a distant future,
when it comes to securitised migration, the threat projection increases the further into the future
it is cast, and immediacy loses its potency as a catalyst. Societal discourses on migration foresee a
dismal future which becomes more and more dystopian with the passing time.
1. Introduction
Movement belongs to the fundamental ontological theories essential both from the perspective of h u m a n history (Castles et al.,
2009) and the h u m a n future. It is generally accepted that freedom of movement is a determinant and, at the same time, a condition for
the dynamic development of h u m a n communities, just as o n the other hand, incumbent, long-term settlement, and inability or
reluctance to m o v e are sometimes regarded as symptoms of stagnant and hindered development.
In the last decade, w e witnessed increased migration flows from the M i d d l e East and Africa; the vast majority of these migrants
headed for Europe. In 2015, w h e n this w a v e of migration peaked, the topic of migration was one of the most salient triggers that had
the power to divide w h o l e societies and dominated the public debate for quite an extended period. A s data from various sources show
(Meltzer et al., 2017), European attitudes towards migration were rather negative. However, there are some differences between the
" o l d " and " n e w " parts of the European U n i o n (EU) (Bandelj & Gibson, 2020; Boomgaarden & de Vreese, 2007; Vieten & Poynting,
2016). In our paper, w e look specifically at Central and Eastern Europe to analyze the societal attitudes towards migration and m i grants
outside of the historically grounded " K o d a k m o m e n t " of here and now, w h i c h is prevalent for the majority of scholarship on
migration. O n the contrary, w e focus o n h o w people i n P o l a n d and the Czech Republic (Czechia) understand and see migrants i n the
context of the future. By exploring h o w the visions of a future society have been formulated i n the societal discourses on migration i n
Poland and Czechia, w e identify the forecasts made w i t h regard to this phenomenon.1
To tackle this research puzzle, w e used the concept of securitized migration (Aalberg et al., 2012; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Esses et al.,
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: monika.bartoszewicz@uit.no (M.G. Bartoszewicz), eibl@fss.muni.cz (O. Eibl), magdalena.elghamari@civitas.edu.pl
(M.E. Ghamari).
1
Please note that our research predates the current war-induced migration from Ukraine to Poland and the Czech Republic.
https://doi.Org/10.1016/j.futures.2022.102972
Received 29 October 2021; Received in revised form 21 April 2022; Accepted 30 May 2022
Available online 9 June 2022
0016-3287/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by/4.0/).
M.G. Bartoszewicz et al Futures 141 (2022) 102972
2017; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Sniderman et al., 2004) as a springboard for our theorizing through w h i c h w e developed our m a i n
argument. Building o n the existing literature, w e refine the conceptualization of securitized migration by incorporating the temporal
dimension, w h i c h provides a bigger picture of the phenomenon.
Our research shows that the reaction to migration i n P o l a n d and the Czech Republic constitutes a reversed (bottom-up) securitization.
Specifically, racist anxieties about h o w populations w i l l 'change' are projected into the future as racialized migrants are not yet
established there. This reveals the relation between anxieties about migration and the anxieties about race.2
Moreover, contrary to the
majority of security challenges where immediate threats are understood to be more dangerous than those expected i n the distant future
w h e n it comes to securitized migration, the threat projection (exacerbated by both the elites and media) increases the further into the
future it is cast. W e conclude that the societal narratives o n migration are forecasts, w h i c h make neither truth nor explanatory claims,
and therefore can be classified as dystopias (Bergman et al., 2010). W h i l e these 'speculative imaginations' (Slaughter, 1998, p. 30) do
not pretend to be accurate or bother to offer compelling explanations as to the " w h y s ? " of the envisioned scenarios, they foresee a
dismal future. Our findings are based o n a series of focus groups carried out i n both countries.
In what follows, w e discuss h o w migration can be understood through the lens of securitization theory. This theoretical frame is
supplemented w i t h a description of our study's methodological design. Lastly, a case study is presented, followed by a discussion of the
findings.
2. Securitizing the future
Security can be understood as a phenomenon not solely evident from a material distribution of power but as a socially constructed
phenomenon existing w i t h i n social structures (positions of authority), whereby those i n power convince their audience that there is
something to be feared (a threat that must be affectively recognized, internalized, and responded to). This approach, w h i c h has become
important i n security theory, places heavy emphasis o n society as the focal point of security concerns. One of the fundamental assumptions
is that the state and the society "of the same people" are two different things (Buzan et al., 1990, p. 119), w i t h the latter able
to reproduce itself independently of the state and even i n opposition to it. M o r e importantly, w i t h respect to the argument presented
here, a lack of societal security also enhances the discrepancy between the state and the society or, more precisely, between the society
and the political elites. This is understandable w h e n one considers that the elites and the general public pursue different logics, w i t h
the elites more closely l i n k e d to the state and the public to the society (Waever et al., 1993). Elites are both compartmentalized and
stratified, w h i c h means that they can be divided into different groups (e.g., political, economic, cultural or intellectual elites) and form
distinctive networks o n different levels (for detailed overview see Bartoszewicz, 2019a). Similarly, the public is far from monolithic
either. A t the same time, it demonstrates a unified belonging expressed through the willingness to defend itself against internal or
external threats. However, Watson observes (2009, p. 19) that there is no consensus o n h o w political collectives come to view
themselves as threatened due to varying perceptions of similar external circumstances. For this reason, he believes that w h e n it comes
to political collectivities such as societies insecurity cannot simply be reduced to subjectively held feelings but should be based on
considerations h o w threats are intersubjectively established through argumentation and persuasion. This angle also reflects h o w social
reality is contingent on h o w ordinary people think and talk about security (Van Rythoven, 2015).
W i t h i n the societal security frame, w e use the theory of securitization, w h i c h provides insight into the influence of security issues i n
state policy-making (Buzan et al., 1998). The theory suggests that a security issue passes over time from non-politicization to politicization
to securitization (Balzacq, 2011; Emmers, 2013). A t first, the non-political issue moves into the public policy field, to be
securitized w h e n framed as a threat that requires extraordinary measures, breaking classical political rules (Bartoszewicz, 2016). The
theory consists of several constituent elements: referent object, securitizing actor, securitizing move, and an audience. A referent object
is a specific entity that experiences an existential threat but must survive at any cost. A classic example is a state whose territorial
integrity is under attack. The existential threat is the securitization trigger. Securitizing actors are those individuals or factions able to
raise an alarm or, i n the theory's terminology, perform a securitizing move. This is usually made v i a w h a t Stritzel (2014), p. 23) calls " a
particular grammar of security," i.e., public speech acts addressed to an audience. However, a security speech act does not constitute a
securitization; it only represents an attempt to present an issue as a security threat (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 45). The last element plays a
critical role: the audience is supposed to agree or disagree w i t h the securitizing actors (most often, politicians) that the referent object
is endangered and permit or reject the imposition of extraordinary measures. Thus, the co-dependency of agency and context (Balzacq
2011; Lenz-Raymann, 2014) is captured by the m u t u a l constitution of the plausibility of the proposed future. A consensus or controversy
between a securitizing actor and the audience influences the securitization results because the structure of securitization
depends on the correlation between the elements.
It is, therefore, evident that the concept of securitization is concentrated on the relationship between the securitizing actor and the
audience. Classic studies of the securitization process show that it usually has a top-down structure whereby the political elites initiate
the process, and the society is a passive receiver (Bartoszewicz, 2019b). However, this dynamic can be challenged and reversed w h e n
the audience performs securitizing moves and strongly influences elite securitizing actors. Bourbeau (2011) suggests that the prevalent
understanding of the role of the audience is misleading because it approaches the sequence of the securitization process i n a unidirectional
fashion i n w h i c h the audience stands only at the very end and does not incorporate the possibility of feedback and multidirectionality
between securitizing agents and audiences that are at the core of the securitization. Against this focus on audiences' mere
2
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this idea to our attention.
2
M.G. Bartoszewicz et ah Futures 141 (2022) 102972
" a p p r o v a l " capability, Bourbeau puts forward a constructivist approach that acknowledges the polymorphous character of power by
problematizing the enabling and/or constraining influence of contextual factors such as the mass or popular audience, w h i c h i n his
view could induce securitization by enabling the securitizing actor to make security speech acts. The role reversal means that the
security initiative moves to the audience (Bartoszewicz, 2021). The elite's ability to influence or change the process is weak, and the
securitizing actors "at the top" remain under pressure to accept the audience's vision of the security problem. In this case, the audience
can either influence the traditional securitizing actors or securitize the issue by itself i n a struggle against the elites. To put it bluntly,
the audience seizes the securitizing initiative.
W e c l a i m that the reaction to migration issue i n Poland and the Czech Republic constitutes a reversed (bottom-up) securitization
whereby society securitizes specific issues (e.g., mass immigration, Islamisation, an increase i n foreigners or Überfremdung, European
integration) and become the agents of securitization. In our approach, the audience (society) is considered an active agent, initiating
securitization dynamics v i a evident dystopian narratives augmented by the media to w h i c h politicians can (but do not have to) respond
to, feed off of, and only then reinforce and cultivate the societal hype so that the securitized becomes the new normal, the new
mainstream policy option. A n d indeed, it seems that it is exactly what happened i n Central Europe: A significant number of far right
and mainstream political parties responded to the call of the public opinion and followed the " w i l l of the c r o w d " to be i n line w i t h their
voters' attitudes (see the concept of tactical populism discussed by O r m r o d & Henneberg, 2010). In other words, they used the opportunity
and included nationalism into their daily communication. A s a consequence, xenophobia and perhaps racism became part of
the mainstream (of the new "normal") i n the V 4 countries (Stojarovä, 2018; conf. "everyday r a c i s m " i n the works of Essed, 2002).
The second and more critical refinement to the existing theory refers to the aspect of threat projection. The temporal dimension is
inextricably tied to a dynamic of threats and connected w i t h the sense of urgency (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 12) brought about by the
now. Threats that are encroaching on the n o w are somehow generally understood to be more dangerous than those referring to some
distant future. In a canonical definition, U l l m a n (1983) writes that a threat "is an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically
and over a relatively brief span of time [emphasis added] to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state." Initially, according
to W i l l i a m s (2007), discussing threats i n material terms was meant to enable a reasoned discourse around them. Broadening and
deepening the field, scholars have focused on including non-physical threats into the inventory of perils and encapsulating as broad a
range of non-military dangers to humans as possible (Bain, 2006; H o u g h et al., 2015), rather than considering temporal stretching to
account for possible future threats faced by individuals and communities.
Usually, regardless whether conceived as normative threats (Creppell, 2011) or traditional physical dangers, both internal and
external risks gain prominence w i t h increased immediacy. In other words, the closer and more pervasive the threat is temporally, the
more serious a danger it represents. Interestingly, i n the context of securitized migration, immediacy loses its potency as a catalyst. O n
the contrary, the evident dystopian narratives indicate that w h e n the danger is removed i n time, it only enhances the gravity of the
issue. This counter-intuitive securitization of the future is highly peculiar, rendering migration very interesting, if not unique, i n this
regard.
Outside of crises, migration is a slow onset phenomenon embedded i n a continuously evolving socio-cultural milieu. In its temporal
dynamics, migration is inherently future-oriented. Hence, consequences of migration temporalities offer important insights that might
be gleaned from reflecting o n the security vulnerabilities that underpin them. W e argue that for the societal audience, w h i l e the threat
of migration does not originate from a specific place (Dal Lago & Palidda, 2010, p. 105) and is both material and normative, its
perilousness only increases w i t h time - i n contrast to the majority of other conventional dangers. Paradoxically, where migration is
concerned, the further into the future, the more severe the issue becomes. This threat perception is based o n the belief that Eastern
Europe is " b e h i n d " its Western counterparts (Hägen, 2003). Such a perspective positions the region i n the core-peripheries hieratic
relationship w i t h the Western member states of the European U n i o n . The fate of the "imitative peripheries" East encapsulates, thus, the
copycat post-1989 modernization efforts accepted by the majority of the region's elites after the fall of communism. This reveals
another dimension of the "return to Europe" project, encompassing not only the adoption of the Western governance style and economic
rules and membership i n Western institutions but also a return to a shared European future. The need to "catch u p " to the West
both politically, economically but also i n socio-cultural terms means that the Western Europe "present" becomes i n this projection a
proof of the future threat that Eastern Europe w i l l inevitably face.
3. Research design and methodology: phenomenology of the future
Social constructivism set this perimeter of our research centered around not so m u c h ontology and inquiry into what is reality but
epistemology and the question of h o w w e interpret reality. The experience becomes a (socially) shared story that can be shared w i t h
others. This key role i n the interpretation of meanings makes h u m a n tales, stories, narratives - or ways of understanding reality - the
primary area of analysis amounting to a "narrative t u r n " i n political sciences. However, w h i l e it is through narratives that people make
sense i n a chaotic stream of experience, they are not an alternative to truth or reality but rather to the w a y i n w h i c h this truth or reality
is presented. To understand the dynamics behind the societal approach to migration i n both countries, w e conducted a series of Focus
Group Interviews (FGIs). This method, relying o n group dynamics, allowed us to examine the attitudes and - at least partially - understand
the perspectives, constructions, notions, and interpretations of migration among Czech and Polish citizens albeit without
sanctioning it.
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M.G. Bartoszewicz et al Futures 141 (2022) 102972
In total, w e organized eight focus groups (four i n the Czech Republic and four i n Poland0
). Our respondents d i d not k n o w the exact
topic of our research. A l l of them were recruited by their age (younger vs. older respondents) and residence (big city vs. small cities/
villages). W e also controlled for their education - all of them had either secondary or higher education. However, w e deliberatively
decided not to control for gender (even though the groups were relatively balanced i n terms of gender composition) and their initial
attitudes toward migration. W h i l e w e are aware of the gendered variance i n migration discourses (Pessar & Mahler, 2003), the reason
for that was our effort to rely on partially randomised "natural groups of people." Our approach to recruitment has paid off as all the
discussions were dynamic and vibrant. In all the groups, supporters and opponents of accepting migrants met, and the structure of
interactions of our respondents resembled those i n the public/media/political sphere. Therefore, our decision to w o r k w i t h
semi-heterogeneous groups of respondents brought us solid results. Also, the number of sessions was more than sufficient; a pattern i n
the respondents' thinking emerged almost immediately, as suggested by the literature o n the subject (Guest et al., 2017; H e n n i n k et al.,
2019). W e reached narrative saturation after the second session i n both countries; the meaning saturation, however, was achieved a
litde bit later, but no later than after the third session.
Each focus group consisted of six to eight respondents and was led by a professional moderator w h o followed a script covering
various aspects of perceptions of migration and related issues: the general image of a migrant i n various contexts (moral, security,
economic, cultural), their personal experiences w i t h migrants, and last but not least their perception of media coverage of migration
and political responses to challenges posed by migration. A few projective techniques were part of the session; however, i n some cases,
they d i d not w o r k well. For example, w e prompted our respondents to draw a migrant or a symbol of migration, but they refused to do
it (they said they c o u l d not draw) and used words instead. After this situation was repeated i n the first two focus groups, w e decided to
drop this task altogether. The duration of each focus group meeting was roughly 90 m i n , and the discussions were recorded for
subsequent critical narrative4
analysis. W h i l e phenomenology is interested i n h o w people experience phenomena i n a specific context
and time (how they perceive and talk about them), "rather than describing the phenomenon according to a predefined categorial,
conceptual, and scientific criteria" (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012, p. 362), critical analysis allows to make the position of the researcher
more explicit.
In this paper, w e cite the translated statements of the respondents; these are i n quotation marks and marked w i t h the number of the
interview they come from: W 1 - W 4 for P o l a n d and B1-B4 for the Czech Republic, whereby W l / B l corresponds to young responders
(<25 years old) living outside Warsaw/Brno; W 2 / B 2 corresponds to young responders (<25 years old) living i n Warsaw/Brno; W 3 / B 3
denotes older responders (26 + years old) living outside Warsaw/Brno; and W 4 / B 4 indicates older responders (26 + years old) living
i n Warsaw/Brno. It should be emphasized that due to the qualitative nature of the research, the findings are not representative, and the
conclusions cannot be reasonably extended to the entire population i n P o l a n d and the Czech Republic. The qualifiers used i n the
analysis, such as "the majority of respondents" or " a small proportion of respondents," are only descriptive and indicative. Most
importantly, instead of annotated paraphrases, i n harmony w i t h narrative phenomenology, preference is given to quote at length i n
order to let the interviewees speak for themselves i n an attempt to avoid the inadvertent changes i n the meaning of their words or
infusing them w i t h our interpretations and impressions, creating a "patchwork" w i t h quotations taken out of context. Thus, the paper
offers a bifocal approach as it firstly provides the v i e w of the w o r l d through the eyes of the very same individual w h o is the subject of
the subsequent analysis.
4. Case study: Societal migration discourses in Poland and the Czech Republic
The w h o l e Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region has rich experience w i t h immigration, and the Czech Republic and P o l a n d are
no exception (IOM, 2020). However, migration has long been associated rather negatively w i t h brain drain and a significant loss i n the
local demographic, economic and cultural sectors (Glorius, 2018). W h i l e some researchers (Stola, 1998) predicted that after E U
accession, they w o u l d gradually change from being a source of migrants to a transit country and finally become an immigration
destination, that never really happened. To this day, both countries remain remarkably homogenous i n terms of ethnic, religious, and
other minorities (Bara et al., 2013; Czech Statistical Office, 2018; European Commission, 2018; Statistics Poland, 2020). The numbers
of refugees accepted i n both countries since the crisis are summarised i n Table 1. This fact is very important for understanding the
attitudes that most of our respondents, and w e w i l l return to it later i n the discussion.
However, before w e present and discuss our findings, it is useful to provide at least a crude commentary o n the baseline situation i n
relation to migration i n both countries. The 2015 migration crisis i n Poland and the Czech Republic was not characterized by a vast
number of incoming refugees crossing the border or applying for protection i n those countries. Instead, similarly to the other Visegrad
3
In Poland, the research took place on 20-21 November 2019, and on 3 and 14 February 2020 in the Czech Republic.
4
To analyze the collected material, we used Critical Narrative Analysis, based on the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur: With the hermeneutic of trust,
the researcher recreates and reconstructs meaning - demystifies it through empathic engagement in the process of discovering meaning through the
fusion of the horizons (researcher and the researched). This hermeneutic assumes respect for the author of the text, whose story is justified in the
process of understanding. Secondly, the hermeneutic of suspicion is the process of demystifying significance, searching for it under the surface of the
text since it is never directly given and transparent in this process. Here "the task of the researcher is.to reach the hidden sense, sometimes assuming
quite radical assumptions, for example, that the significance of the sentence can only be attained through symbolic interpretation" (Soroko, 2007, p.
201). Finally, the critique of the illusions of the subject accounts for the possible mistake in the process of discovering (and in principle, appropriating)
the meaning recognizing this action as a form of subjectivity in which the scholar reflects their subjectivity to the text so that the
perspective of the researcher dominates the perspective of the text itself.
4
M.G. Bartoszewicz et al. Futures 141 (2022) 102972
Table 1
Number of accepted refugees in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Refugee acceptances: number of people 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Poland" 1074 11 285b
4 430 3 835 3 769 2647 7 252
Czech Republic 2564 4885 4360c
2186d
2054 or 1 922' 19591
1354
a
Boder Guard Headquarters (pol. Komenda Gtówna Stražy Granicznej), Informacja Statystyczna za 2021, https://strazgraniczna.p1/download/l/
27 269/Informacjastatystycznaza2021r.pdf
b
Country Report: Poland, The Asylum Information Database, https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/AIDA-PL_2020update.
pdf
c
Czech Republic, 2021, https://www.globaldetentionproject.Org/countries/europe/czech-republic#statistics-data,
d
COUNTRY REPORT IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: "WE WILL NOT ACCEPT EVEN ONE MORE REFUGE, 2018, https://
www.globaldetentionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Immigration-Detention-in-the-Czech-Republic-December-2018-Web.pdf
e
https://www.mvcr.cz/migrace/soubor/zprava-o-situaci-v-oblasti-migrace-a-integrace-cizincu-na-uzemi-ceske-republiky-v-roce-2019.aspx
f
Czech Republic Refugee Statistics 1991-20 222 022, https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CZE/czech-republic/refugee-statistics
4 countries (Hungary and Slovakia), the crisis was primarily felt i n the meta sphere of public debates, media coverage and later i n the
political discourse as well. In each country, the primary response heavily focused o n the securitization of the issue, w i t h considerable
criticism directed against the obligatory distribution scheme put forward by the E U and Germany and calls to reject them. Neither
Poland nor Czechia fulfilled its commitment invoking the right of member states to refuse relocation to individuals that pose a threat to
public order and internal security. A t the same time, i n both countries anti-immigration movements (e.g., Konfederacja and the
Freedom and Direct Democracy Party, respectively) gained a new foothold, and anti-immigration rhetoric became normalized i n
political debates. Simultaneously, radical right and most of the mainstream parties as w e l l added a new component into their already
well-established populism - nationalism (Stojarová, 2018). Emphasis o n patriotism, the need for (national) unity and protection of our
cultural and national heritage became part of their everyday vocabulary. Consequently, xenophobia and perhaps racism were
mainstreamed as well.
The media coverage of the "migration crisis" corresponded to this: the majority of the most read media chose a negative framing
and migration was portrayed as a "wave that could sweep us away." The focus was on several basic frames, however the most negative
were those focusing o n security, cultural and economic (for a detailed analysis of Czech media see Pospěch & Jurečková, 2019; for the
Polish one Troszyňski & El-Ghamari, 2022). Subsequendy, societal attitudes toward migrants and refugees increasingly trend i n a
negative direction (Brožová et al., 2018; L a c i a k et al., 2018), w h i c h created a sort of vicious circle. A l t h o u g h the frightening scenarios
of refugees flooding the Czech Republic and P o l a n d were not fulfilled, and the numbers of refugees coming to the Czech Republic have
remained l o w since 2015, the popular imagination still cast v i v i d projections as to the possible migration-induced futures. A n d it seems
that the more information the public had, the more negative their attitudes became, and the more extreme were the attitudes of the
political elites. Alternatively, the more migration was talked about, the more the public grew apathetic. However, this d i d not lead to
an improvement i n the perception of migrants - o n the contrary. Stereotypes and prejudices triggered by the "otherness" of the m i grants
were intensely present i n the assessment of the whole situation.
Though superficially paradoxical, this observation is congruent w i t h our securitization argument. Most accounts assign a central
role to the media i n promoting an alarmist message and turning the audience into fearful, even brainwashed, subjects (Furedi, 2018,
pp. 10-11). O n the contrary, Furedi (2018) shows that h o w people think, behave and fear is not a direct result of media consumption.
Whereas the media plays a significant role i n cultivating fears by providing a constantly evolving script h o w to experience and react to
threats, direct experience, personal circumstance, social context and emotional dispositions lead to differentiated responses. Thus,
media is not an omnipotent variable w h e n it comes to threat construction and framing, because these are i n the first place underpinned
by culture. This reinforces our c l a i m concerning bottom-up securitization and societal agency.
4.1. Findings
Our respondents were very clearly aware of media contribution to the securitized migration image. It is undeniably visible i n h o w
the respondents speak first about issues that are beyond their personal experience. Sometimes uncertainty was caused by too m u c h
information; especially young respondents accused the m e d i a and politicians of exaggerating {Bad news is good news [B3]) or m a k i n g it
impossible to k n o w what to believe. Contradictory sentiments were also reflected i n the belief that the media both exaggerate and are
simultaneously censored. The latter was, however, a widespread belief among the older respondents w h o also criticized the vocabulary
pertaining to migration discourse, blaming forced political correctness for the fact that the media do not tell the truth either to lower or
to ramp up the fears: They publish only things that people can bear. If they published everything that is going on there [in Germany...it is
censored. It's because they want to lower our fears (B4). Alternatively: People are afraid of new things in general Here is the aim of the media
and the politicians - their goal is to raise manipulative fear (Bl). Indeed, some politicians have regularly used the topic as a tool to activate
their supporters and i n more than one case the topic of migration has become an election campaign issue (e.g., i n Czechia i n 2017
parliamentary elections, and 2018 presidential elections). Respondents were aware of this fact and mentioned it as an easy tool to gain
political points and attention: Occasionally something comes up when the government has to deal with something so they have to define
themselves sharply in order to score political points (B2).
Not far into the interviews, it became apparent that migration presents not only an economic but also a moral dilemma. This was
5
M.G. Bartoszewicz et ah Futures 141 (2022) 102972
evident i n h o w the respondents i n both countries maintained a strict and consistent differentiation between economic and other
migrants. Simultaneously, for the majority of the respondents, the need to prevent migration, i.e., the desire instead to give aid i n
migrants' homelands (we can help them there, notbring them to us [Wl]) was balanced w i t h a readiness to help people i n need (Sure, we
should offer them help [give jobs] [B2]). A g a i n , two opposite tendencies were apparent: the help was very conditional, very often
temporary, and contingent o n h a r d w o r k and integration: When someone seeks a better life, they integrate/adapt themselves (Bl). O r as
another respondent put it: If only educated people would migrate and would work here, there is no reasonfor not helping them. Ifitwill be only
those who will look for benefits and will not show any effort to integrate, then I would disagree (B4). Nevertheless, some interviewees also
exhibited palpable scepticism about the impact of (rare) positive examples that, according to the respondents i n both countries, tended
to be the exception rather than the rule: Who migrates? Do we talk about those who really need something? OK, we can help them. However, I
haven't seen such migrants. Fellas should stay at home and fight; those who should migrate are women and children (B4).
Nevertheless, migration as a cultural issue understood i n terms of a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1991) was perceived as the
most " r e a l , " especially i n the context of migrants of M u s l i m origin, w h o , according to some respondents, are not able to integrate.
These were rarely seen as uninformed victims of smugglers or people i n need of political asylum. Thus, i n addition to the economic vs.
non-economic migrants, the second qualifier appeared differentiating the M u s l i m from the non-Muslim: For example, [when] Ukrainians
are here, it is OK because we are culturally close, but Muslims should go to countries, seek help in countries where their culture is also
similar, [those that] culturally are similar (Wl).
Muslims consistently across all the groups and i n both countries were perceived as a looming threat w i t h explicit references to the
future:
Our culture and religion formed for centuries. The Middle East is completely different. Integration is possible just to a certain level (and
influenced by the number of migrants and their concentration) - see, for example, the excluded localities in France (B4).
Muslims will come, and when they come, they will destroy [us]; there will be nothing here. We will not have a word; they will do what
they want, they willpray ten times during work, they will not work, and a Pole will have to do when [the Muslim] has his prayer (W3).
When it comes to migrants from the Middle East, I think this is stupid in general because these people will never enter [our] culture. They
are simply too much rooted in that [other] culture. [It] means completely different customs, that there is no such assimilation, and there
will be no assimilation here (W4).
A small proportion of the respondents noticed that some of the problems they discussed are only hypothetical, thanks to the small
scale of i n c o m i n g non-European migrants i n both countries. Those observations had a "we are not quite there yet" ring to them, the
temporal divergence between the Eastern and the Western part of Europe: In the Czech Republic, the clash is not a threat - there is not
enough of them here. In the West, the situation is quite different; there are strong communities there (B4). Even though the acknowledged
respite was not to be taken for granted: I also do not feel threatened, and thanks to the currently ruling party, I suspect that we will not feel
threatened during their years of power. Compared to other cities and countries, we can feel safe, and many people will agree (Wl). O n the
contrary, the respondent understood that certain processes w o u l d inevitably brought about changes; cultural enrichment understood
as striving for an ideal of a multicultural society, stood starkly i n this regard: It became a synonym for something unwanted, something that
causes most people to feel that their hair is standing up (Bl).
And the fact that maybe in these other countries such as France it is actually worse [than here], the more so is the political correctness,
that the media say otherwise, and sometimes they even did not want to admit the truth, so that let's be tolerant anyway and so on. Let us
assume, we [in CEE] must accept and so on (W4).
The cultural issues felt real across all the interview groups to varying degrees. O n the one hand, the visible signs of cultural d i versity,
for instance, restaurants offering exotic foods, were appreciated. O n the other, the respondents commented o n the darker
undertows of demographic change: Do I feel threatened? Culturally (W2). In this context, the problem of not integrating and not
speaking the language was also regularly raised, although the respondents d i d not specify whether the lack of c o m m o n logos is one of
the symptoms of not being integrated or an issue o n its o w n : Because we no longer hear Polish, only Ukrainian everywhere, Warsaw or near
Warsaw. And when there will be a lot of them, will they -1 don't know - will they not attack us [like in Volhynia5
] (W4) ?
In this context, the anticipated future emerges not only v i a the employment of the future tense but also v i a the juxtaposition of the
temporal divergence: Meaning we do not yet have such an influx of immigrants from everywhere that we could feel culturally endangered. As
unfortunately, they [the Western Europeans] are culturally endangered. The French probably didn't have any culture there; maybe that's why
the French don't keep it (W2). The possible scenarios based on the "do not yet" appear as a function of m o d a l i t y " whereby the future
development w o u l d conform to the "futures created beforehand" (Pinot et al., 2021) i n Western Europe: What can be an issue is a
situation where a lot of migrants would create a closed group or more families lived together (Bl). This way, the future is transformed from
the if future to a when future: However, in the Czech Republic, it is not an issue - there are countries which are affected far more, i.e., Germany.
It could be a problem if they [migrants] wanted to continue in their faith (B2).
Every time the motif of ghettos or so-called "no go zones" appeared, the respondents immediately drew comparisons w i t h western
5
The Volhynian massacres (Polish: "rzez wofynska", literally "Volhynian slaughter") took place in 1943. There is no agreement between the Poles
and the Ukrainians as to how to categorise these events. The Polish collective memory frames them as anti-Polish genocidal ethnic cleansings
conducted by Ukrainian nationalists. The massacres took place within Poland's borders and claimed over 100 000 victims, of whom the overwhelming
majority were unarmed civilians murdered with particular cruelty (so-called genocidum atrox).
6
M.G. Bartoszewicz et at Futures 141 (2022) 102972
Europe based not so m u c h o n media images but o n their personal experiences or those shared by immediate family members or close
friends: Like [it is] in London, where you can just be unsure where you are, because it's hard to meet an Englishman there, and it seems to me
that if it [migration] would come to Poland on such a large scale, it would be a delicate cultural threat, because not necessarily these people from
abroad want to respect our traditions, they are not sympathetic towards it, and they have no idea about our faith or habits, and the more of these
people [will come], [the more] they will create their own groups, which will a bit displace our traditions (W2).
It seems to me that it does not affect us so much yet, because there are too few of these people, but for example, I cannot imagine a
situation like in London, where you can just get confused about where you actually are, because it's hard to meet an Englishman there,
and it seems to me that if it [migration] came to Poland on such a large scale, itwould be a slight cultural threatbecause these people from
abroad are not necessarily willing to respect our traditions, they are not sympathetic towards them, and they also have concepts neither
about our faith nor about our habits, and the more of these people, they will form their own groups (Wl).
They [migrants] do what they want; it will come to that in a moment, it will be [in] a year or two that they will start to riot, there will be
clashes. In my opinion, there will be brawls; they will start destroying bus stops, cars; it is not hereyet, it is not talked about, it is not heard
on TV, but it is a matter of time when it will happen the same way as - another example - in France what the Blacks, [and] Muslims do.
Because France let them in, they let them, they accepted, and they became like this. Like I travel to the Netherlands, because I go fishing
and go out there in the evening to see what's going on. How the Dutch sit at home. Ninety percent of the population in a big Dutch city
after 10 p.m. are the Blacks. People are afraid to go out. It will be the same here (W2).
Thesepeople [in Italy, where immigrants came] no longer had their own city, yes, because it was practically completely overwhelmed by
the migrants (W4).
In a district such as Ludwigshafen, that is, I am talking about our closest neighbor [Germany], this is happening; there are districts where
the police will not enter at all (W2).
In France, they are scared, and at the moment, they don't leave the house. They weren 't [scared] like that 10-15 years ago either. They
let [the migrants] come in, come in. Come, and what they have today, they [the migrants] are so nested, so settled that no strength, no
energy will throw them away from this France. It will be the same for us (W2).
This was particularly visible across all Polish groups, whereas the Czech respondents were more circumspect and d i d not elaborate
on this matter. W h e n the respondents were asked if they felt threatened personally, the consensus was that there is no reason for that,
for now. However, there were strong concerns over what w o u l d happen i n a few years. The theme of dangers looming i n the future
rather than being anchored i n the present was dominant.
I personally do not feel so threatened in Poland. In Poland, well, in my opinion, it is safe for now (Wl).
Problems with the law are emerging. When there are clear rules, the problem won't arise. If they were not set, intheend, itcanleadto an
unwanted change (B4).
I think that the near future may pose a threat from thesepeople because the same things will happen [that happened] in Belgium, or in
France or in Germany. There will be so many of these migrants that they just -1 don't know - they will start to act in some other way
(W4).
As long as we keep them [migrants] in check a little longer, it may not be second France or second Germany here. I expect the same
situation; if we do not stop it, I expect this situation to be in Warsaw in a maximum of five years (W2).
Do I feel threatened? Maybe I am thinking about this in general because it is known that it is not 100% certain in which direction it
[migration] will go, but maybe not so much at the moment. If more and more of these immigrants come to us, it may be a threat in the
near future (W4).
5. The dystopian narratives of securitized future
In both countries, the FGIs reveal a multi-layered fear of more or less distant future. Dovetailing other findings from migration
studies (Achilli, 2016; Beare, 1997), one dimension of the issue might be seen as "practical" since people tend to fear of organised crime
and terrorism. However, at the same time, they feel obliged to help people w h o are trying to escape w a r or other ordeals. This tension
creates and interesting d i l e m m a of conditionality (Hunger et al., 2019), either dependent o n time (i.e., it ends w h e n the unfavourable
conditions pass) or on the behaviour of the migrants (they have to integrate into the majority). The second, and from our point of v i e w
more severe and interesting, dimension is the anxiety concerning the permanent change of the societies corresponding w i t h the
well-researched cultural purity versus growth of nationalism nexus (Mavroudi, 2010; Thorleifsson, 2021). Accordingly, since both
countries are ethnically and culturally homogeneous, according to our respondents the biggest danger clearly lies i n creating new,
multi-cultural societies and i n erosion of traditional cultural and national patterns.
The public is exposed to an unflattering image of migrants i n the media and numerous exaggerated statements of politicians. This
message is further reinforced by anecdotal dystopian images from major cities i n Western Europe are contrary to the existing research
(Keith, 2005; Saha, 2022). For m a n y the issue is "the otherness" or "not belonging" of migrants, constructed through factors like
ethnicity, skin colour, language, religion, or culture (Balogun, 2020). In other words, visual somatic and corporeal differences are often
racialized and stereotyped (Parmar, 2020), w h i l e the visible otherness triggers racism and xenophobia. The lifestyle of migrants often
7
M.G. Bartoszewicz et ah Futures 141 (2022) 102972
contradicting the national and cultural identity of the majority serves as a trigger (Balogun, 2020). In this sense, our research echoes
other studies showing h o w the majority fears becoming a minority, of being colonized w i t h i n the borders of their o w n state and
becoming second class citizens. Therefore, where help is conditional, the demand for integration of the already stigmatized minorities
becomes an unconditional one. Thus, the migrant are condemned into perpetual cultural precarity (Eriksen, 2015) whereby only
giving up o n their original religion, culture, and habits, can confirm their new societal belonging. Otherwise, their admission should be
only temporary or even denied (conf. Sheller, 2011; Tyler, 2018).
It also speaks volumes that most of our respondents d i d not perceive migrants as a threat for domestic labour market (a "surplus"
population), nor d i d they fear that the migrants w o u l d represent a low-cost w o r k i n g force (Rajaram, 2018; Vickers & Rutter, 2018). W e
believe that this is another consequence of racial stereotypes and media framing. Accordingly, economic migrants represented no
"market value" because instead of coming to work, they w o u l d rather enjoy the benefits of the welfare state. In this sense, "economic"
migrants were dehumanized (McCubbins & Ramirez, 2021) into a "lazy parasites".
If w e organise the findings i n accordance w i t h the theoretical frame of societal security and connect them o n the temporal basis, the
following dystopian scenario emerges: In the CEE, Western Europe is not perceived as a diverse and tolerant place that could be a role
model and something to aspire to, but as a dystopian realm brought about by mass migration and caused by irresponsible, even
traitorous, political elites (Tyler, 2018). W h i l e the process of transformation of a country goes beyond the lifespan of an individual, our
interviewees clearly differentiated between the safe "today" and the potentially dangerous "tomorrow." Analysis of their narratives
allows us to sequentially organize their threat projections into a coherent dystopian story, a short-term scenario (Clark, 2000) whereby
the short-term future can be assayed through a filter of the socio-cultural lens.
In the first stage, a homogeneous population (almost monolithic ethnically and racially), the country reforms its migration law and
opens the border to mass migration from geographically distant and culturally alien civilizations. The time-lapse is evident: whereas
this scenario n o w looms for the Czech Republic and Poland, it describes most of the western countries 50 years ago.
In the second stage, a decade or so later, people of other races are visible i n the streets of larger cities, ethnic bars and restaurants
appear, but so do the first signs of ghettoization as i n d i v i d u a l streets or neighbourhoods begin to attract people by country of origin,
culture, and religion. Nevertheless, the new minorities are only a few percent of the population and remain marginal. Another leap i n
time, by thirty or forty years forward, shows very numerous migrant minorities, constituting ten percent or more of the total population.
They are concentrated i n large cities, where w h o l e districts become hostile and sometimes even inaccessible to the natives. The
allusions to or direct acknowledgments of French banlieues and German cities were frequent i n this regard. It is clear that the state
begins to lose control over these zones as they become too dangerous due to increased crime. Furthermore, there are evident ethnic and
cultural tensions between i n d i v i d u a l communities. Minorities become more and more assertive and aggressive i n social life, using
democratic mechanisms to transform their cultural identities into economic and political influence. This is the future the respondents
see awaiting their countries should they follow the path of Western migration policies.
This image leads to even more frightening projections where the indigenous people, half a century earlier, the rightful owners of the
country, become de facto guests i n their o w n homeland. It shows a multi-ethnic and multiracial society, but w i t h strongly oudined
dividing lines that define and separate i n d i v i d u a l communities, including the now-minority indigenous population, w h i c h , until
recently, h a d been the majority. In this vision, such a country's value system, political structure, economic strength, and culture w i l l
depend o n the new dominant minority.
Finally, i n line w i t h this thinking, it w o u l d be false to imagine any present-day Western society as the ultimate result of opening up
to mass migration. In the furthest and starkest future looms the image of a country dominated by M u s l i m s (sometimes, i n the Polish
variant, they are replaced by Ukrainians) w h o no longer feel that they need to respect the local population and either settle historical
scores (a repetition of the V o l h y n i a n massacres i n the Polish version) or ruin the country completely, replicating the dysfunctions of the
places from w h i c h they migrated i n search of a better fate. It also means that i n such a future, the host countries lose all attractiveness
to potential new migrants. This understanding of migration dynamics is accompanied by economic decline, decapitalisation of
infrastructure, gradual dismantling of the social and economic system, and ever-present violence.
Uncertainty about the future is connected not only w i t h the length of the process but also its endgame. None of the Western E U
member states, so often cited by the respondents, has completed the process of diversification, but each is at some stage described
above. In this sense, the present conditions i n Western societies appear to be a transitional state i n a great historical process spread over
decades. These changes call into question deeply held convictions that have long served as taken-for-granted assumptions for and serve
as a security threat amplifier. Projecting these fundamental changes into the forecasts of national futures, the respondents seem to be
asking whether today's Germany is better than the one that existed half a century ago and wonder if Poland and the Czech Republic be
i n the same place i n five decades. It is u n k n o w n w h e n the anticipated moment w i l l come that the historical majority becomes a m i nority
i n a given population, but sooner or later, it w i l l be revealed i n the census, or v i a news titbits peddled by the media, like the
information concerning the most popular baby names i n the country. However, it is both evident and crucial that all these threats are
not placed " i n the n o w . " They belong to some undefined future, and none of the respondents denied the possible short-term benefits of
migration both i n economic and cultural terms.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The societal reactions to migration, so conspicuous i n Central and Eastern Europe, especially after 2015, were usually met by
scholars w i t h either puzzlement or scorn. W h i l e neither of those reactions is fruitful, particularly the first is unbecoming the academic
community. Prominent interpretations offered to explain this phenomenon are so firmly fixed on the residues of the past and limited to
contemporary elements that they remain b l i n d to the crucial variable, the temporal dimension of the problem. O n the contrary, by
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M.G. Bartoszewicz et al Futures 141 (2022) 102972
incorporating the future as a factor of analysis, w e are able to shed light o n the dynamic of securitized migration. Futures are stretched
on a continuum between a vision and a nightmare (Moriarty & Honnery, 2018). M i g r a t i o n contextualises those extremes as the beatific
vision of "white mirage" and the nightmare of a "multicultural hell," and reveals the complex interplay between these two impulses at
the everyday level of societal mimesis. This process might serve as a source of temporal dislocation i n h o w the societies secure the
future selves i n relation to significant others. Our analysis of societal dystopian discourses o n migration allows for an engagement w i t h
the ontological dimension of the future i n the context of Derrida (1990) n o r m a l monstrosities whereby the current source of horror is
cast into the future as an extrapolation of current trends that form hypothetical chains of events (Hjerpe & Linner, 2009).
In this regard, the dystopian mindset can continue to w o r k over openly illegitimate postulates or phenomena detached from the
immediate experiences to conjure something that Gendron (1977), p. 68) calls a "half-baked" or " m i x e d " or "intermediate" dystopia. It
is also something that mocks the hope for a future promised by the Utopia of a multicultural society or, as Cattarinussi (1977), a
skeptical disillusion that emphasizes the inherent danger of implementing the Utopian perspective. Those forecasts of the inevitable
social disaster brought about by relentless migration fit w i t h i n Cattarinussi's 'whimper theory' that envisions not a single calamity (a
bang) but gradual slow-motion destruction wrought by demographic change induced by migration.
Our study shows that - as opposed to other security threats, w h i c h become worse the closer and more i m m i n e n t they appear migration
has a reversed logic and dynamic to it. Accordingly, the more distant the visions connected w i t h the threats caused by
migration, the scarier migration becomes for the general public. It is not what is happening n o w that invokes the feeling of danger; it is
the frightening visions of the future that amplify current trends and project them into societal security dilemmas. Dystopia reflects an
unyielding and regressive vision of politics (Van Rythoven, 2018), depicting horrifying societies and highlighting the dangers lurking
i n the future. Moreover, dystopian visions reveal a profound pessimism and therefore lead to the politics of fear (Shames & Atchison,
2019). Deterministic forecasting presents Western Europe's past and present as Eastern Europe's future, thus l i m i t i n g the margin for
political maneuver to a m i n i m u m , w h i c h is pivotal given that different temporal foci interact and produce synergies or competitions
(Staupe-Delgado & Rubin, 2022). Whereas the current war-induced migration from Ukraine to P o l a n d and the Czech Republic confronts
the positive responses to Ukrainian refugees w i t h the post-2015 adverse reactions to the M i d d l e Eastern migrants, the apprehension
towards the future is still palpable, especially i n Poland, w h i c h accepted over two m i l l i o n of refugees i n the span of a month.
Visions of " U k r o p o l " immediately started to float around o n social media, and they were only exacerbated by a group of influential
Polish politicians from across the spectrum who, at the 7th European Congress of Local Governments, declared that "This is the
moment to create a Polish-Ukrainian U n i o n . "
There are noteworthy implications of these insights that ought to be taken on board by the politicians, societies, and researchers
alike. Firstly, fears of the future amplified by populist parties thriving o n narratives of restorative nationalism (Ding & Hlavac, 2017)
can bolster other dystopias of societal exclusion and oppression placed i n the now. However, outcomes of migration largely depend on
the w a y migration is valued and managed both o n the political and societal level. Allport (1954) specified four conditions for optimal
intergroup contact: equal group status, authority support, inter-group cooperation, and c o m m o n goals. The last element is of critical
importance given the temporal dimension of securitized migration. Hence the second lesson for political elites. Highlighting commonalities
between different societal groups and focus o n the gains of celebrating differences w o u l d suggest their exploration as an
important strategic source for the nation. That requires openness w h i c h reflects a low prescription culture and appreciation whereby
migration is perceived as an advantage for the society, rather than as a problem. This brings us to the final conclusion that appreciating
diversity o n the societal level w o u l d relate positively w i t h the multicultural state as a vessel of renewal instead of destruction. This is
highlighted by the civil sphere theory w h i c h manifests i n cross-group solidarity efforts (Tognato et al., 2020).
Nevertheless, as Priyadharshini (2019) advised, w e took the inquiry regarding futures beyond the institutional preoccupations and
sought out people's perspectives, w h i c h also enables shedding light o n h o w these narratives depart from the mainstream, pre-existing
frameworks. This resonates w i t h h o w the respondents dismissed the obsession of both politicians and the media w i t h current events,
w h i c h they believed were often exaggerated at the expense of serious debates o n the future. Professional politicians are seen to be
short-sighted, thinking only about the next poll, or the next elections, mainly focusing o n third-rate issues. They are believed to be
neither intellectually nor morally prepared to analyse socio-political phenomena - like migration - i n the long term. The m a i n concerns
expressed during the FGIs i n both countries boil d o w n to the fact that no one talks about the long-term effects of migration, w h i c h is an
irreversible process, and that no one asks the voters whether they want such effects i n the future. This places a heavy burden on the
national politicians and the supporters of Europe-wide migration policies o n the E U level. Western politicians especially are blamed for
their unilateral decisions that have tied the hands of successive governments, and most of all, destroyed the future of national
communities.
Inadvertently, our study also confirms Pinto et al. (2021) call for methodologies that prioritize the identification of dystopias,
w h i c h w e believe to be a key takeaway for the scholarly community. A l t h o u g h dystopia takes the undesired qualities of contemporary
society as a point of departure, it functions as more than merely a scenario that provides a coherent and plausible story about the future
of society (Hjerpe & Linner, 2009, 241). Even though they are based on contrafactual or transfactual propositions, dystopias, Bergman
et al. note (2010, p. 863) can have effects of self-fulfilling prophecies, w h i c h means that they can have a great impact o n social developments
of preconditions, reflections, attitudes, and actions taken towards or against the future. Dystopia becomes something more
than merely a normative narration capable of tapping into societal anxieties and exploring societal fears. This is where dystopia can be
used as a critical method. Once w e m o v e beyond simple denunciations of the futures that are seen as both ludicrous and undesirable
and reject the blinds of the political mainstream, the dystopian narrative impulse becomes an apparent response to a transformative
change. D r a w i n g u p o n Bina et al. (2020), w e can call this phenomenon a heuristic dystopianism that enables going beyond theprima
facie dominant pessimism and looking into redemptive possibilities of political solutions that are able to overcome the dystopian
warnings and explore responses of effective political possibilities that could defuse the time-bomb.
9
M.G. Bartoszewicz et ah Futures 141 (2022) 102972
As the dystopian futures are most certainly not inevitable, policymakers on the national and international levels need to consider
the bottom-up and future-oriented securitization of migration. Our study confirms that fixation o n dispelling fears connected to the
present w i l l not resolve the issues that have accumulated around this problem.
Funding
This research is financed by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange as part of the "Academic International Partnerships"
Programme No. P P I / A P M / 2 0 1 8 / 1 / 0 0 0 1 9 / D E C / l and w i t h the support of the Specific University Research Grant provided by
the Ministry of Education, Y o u t h and Sports of the Czech Republic no. M U N I / A / 1 0 0 0 / 2 0 1 9 .
Authors' contributions
Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, W r i t i n g - original draft and revisions, Funding
acquisition. Otto Eibl: Methodology, Investigation, W r i t i n g - original draft and revisions, Funding acquisition. Magdalena El Ghamari:
Methodology, Investigation, W r i t i n g - review & editing, Funding acquisition..
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Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz specialises in non-linear and cross-sectoral threats to societal security in the emerging Festung Europa (Fortress Europe),
especially in the context of securitised migration. She has conducted research and worked in the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and the Czech Republic.
Otto Eibl graduated in Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, where he is now an assistant
professor, mainly teaching courses about political communication and marketing. Recently, he co-edited the volume Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in
Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave).
Magdalena El Ghamari is the Cultural Security Chair at the Collegium Civitas Centre for Social and Economic Risk Research. She cooperates with NATO's
Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, Frontex, the European Academy of Diplomacy, the Training Centre for the Needs of NATO Peacekeeping
Forces, UNESCO, Intervention Groups of the Prison Guard, the Border Guard, and the police.
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