Detailed Information on Publication Record
2022
Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment : Two Preregistered Replications of Paxton, Ungar, and Greene (2012)
HEREC, Jonáš, Jaroslav SÝKORA, Kamil BRAHMI, David VONDRÁČEK, Oldřiška DOBEŠOVÁ et. al.Basic information
Original name
Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment : Two Preregistered Replications of Paxton, Ungar, and Greene (2012)
Authors
HEREC, Jonáš (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Jaroslav SÝKORA (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Kamil BRAHMI (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), David VONDRÁČEK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Oldřiška DOBEŠOVÁ (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Martin SMĚLÍK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Martin VACULÍK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Jakub PROCHÁZKA (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution)
Edition
Cognitive Science, Hoboken, Wiley, 2022, 0364-0213
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Článek v odborném periodiku
Field of Study
50101 Psychology
Country of publisher
United States of America
Confidentiality degree
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
References:
Impact factor
Impact factor: 2.500
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14230/22:00126407
Organization unit
Faculty of Social Studies
UT WoS
000827112100001
Keywords in English
Moral judgment; Moral reasoning; Reflection; Argument strength; Replication
Tags
Tags
International impact, Reviewed
Změněno: 7/4/2024 14:24, prof. PhDr. Martin Vaculík, Ph.D.
Abstract
V originále
This study consists of two preregistered systematic replications of an experiment on reflection and reasoning in moral judgment by Paxton, Ungar, and Greene (2012). Czech students read a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings and an argument supporting the moral acceptability of the behavior. We manipulated the factors of argument strength (strong vs. weak) and the time that participants had to reflect on the argument (no time vs. 2 min). In the first replication (n = 347), neither the manipulated factors nor their interaction influenced how participants rated the moral acceptability of the incestuous behavior. The only significant predictor in the second replication (n = 717) was argument strength but with a very small effect. The effect of argument strength did not differ across groups either with or without deliberation time. Therefore, neither of the studies replicated the effect that deliberation time moderates the influence of argument strength on moral judgment, even though the samples were considerably larger than in the original study. We thus conclude that the effect of the interaction between the strength of an argument and deliberation time on moral judgment either does not exist or is moderated by certain contextual or sample characteristics.
Links
MUNI/A/1073/2019, interní kód MU |
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MUNI/A/1376/2018, interní kód MU |
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