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Original Research Article
PartyPolitics
Politically motivated interpersonal biases:
Polarizing effects of partisanship and
immigration attitudes
Lenka Hrbková
Masaryk University, Czech Republic
Petr Voda
Masaryk University, Czech Republic
Party Politics
2023, Vol. 0(0) 1-15
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/13540688231156409
journals.sagepub.com/home/ppq
b Sage
Vlastimil Havlík
Masaryk University, Czech Republic
A b s t r a c t
W e demonstrate effects of political preferences on interpersonal interactions in the environment of the highly unstable and
volatile party system of the Czech Republic. The effects of partisanship on interpersonal relations are compared to the
effects of attitudes on a salient issue. T w o experiments confirm the potential of political partisanship to affect the individual's
ingroup preferences and outgroup biases, which can influence willingness to converse with others in the context
of an unstable party system. In a conjoint experiment, dis/agreement on immigration has comparable effects on
interpersonal interactions. Avoidance of interactions with out-partisans is amplified when out-partisans talk about politics
often. The patterns of ingroup preferences and outgroup biases are replicated in a trust game experiment. Both
partisanship and immigration attitudes influence how subjects interact with others. Given the political context, the study
provides a hard test of politically motivated ingroup and outgroup biases stemming both from party and policy preferences.
K e y w o r d s
partisanship, policy preferences, immigration, conjoint, trust game
Introduction
Does affective polarization influence interpersonal interactions
outside the realm of politics under a condition of
unstable multipartism? A n extensive body of research has
demonstrated how partisan sympathy and antipathy drive
attitudes and behaviour outside politics (Chen and Rohla,
2018; Huber and Malhotra, 2017; Hui, 2013; McConnell
et al., 2018; see Iyengar et al., 2019 for a review). However,
most of this work on partisan spillover has been confined to
the U S with its distinctive party system. It is unclear whether
political animosity similarly spills over into other spheres of
people's lives in countries where partisanship is not as longlasting
and all-consuming as it is in the U S . To better
understand where and how political hostilities work, we
need to look at contexts outside the U S (Iyengar et al.,
2019). Our study considers a difficult case for partisan
spillover theory. We look at the Czech Republic, where
partisan identities are relatively new, unstable, and less
salient than in party systems with established and wellinstitutionalized
political parties. If we find effects of politically
driven animosities on people's interactions outside
politics in Czechia, it is likely to be a widespread and
perhaps even universal phenomenon.
Based on two original experimental studies, one conjoint
and the other a trust game, this paper advances research on
political polarization and hostility in several ways. First, we
test the effects of political partisanship and policy
Paper submitted 23 August 2021; accepted for publication 22 January 2023
Corresponding author:
Lenka Hrbková, Department of Political Science, Masaryk University,
Joštova 10, Brno 60200, the Czech Republic.
Email: hrbkova@mail.muni.cz
2 Party Politics 0(0)
preferences on interpersonal interactions in the context of
the Czech Republic. While previous research confirms that
affective polarization towards political parties is not a
uniquely U S phenomenon and that it also applies to both
Western and Central and Eastern Europe (Boxell et al.,
2022; Gidron et al., 2020; Harteveld, 2021; Knudsen, 2021;
Reiljan, 2019; Reiljan and Ryan, 2021; Wagner, 2021),
there has been little attention paid to the polarizing potential
of political preferences in the everyday lives of citizens.
Evidence from multiple West European countries suggests
that partisanship diminishes interpersonal trust compared to
traditional social cleavages such as class or regional identity
(Westwood et al., 2018). However, there is little evidence on
the effects of partisanship on people's social interactions
relative to political issues (Hobolt et al., 2021; Orr and
Huber, 2020).
Second, while previous research conducted in multiparty
settings focused on relatively stable party systems (Helbling
and Jungkunz, 2020; Westwood et al., 2018), we investigate
a country with a fragmented and considerably volatile party
system. The Czech Republic has been experiencing party
system 'earthquakes' typical of C E E party politics
(Haughton and Deegan-Krause, 2015) in which new parties
emerge only to be replaced in the next election cycle with
even newer ones. Our study is a hard test of politically
motivated intergroup hostility hypotheses focusing on the
influence of political partisanship and issue attitudes on
social relations in a fragmented and unstable party system.
Within a polity, affective polarization, a concept anchored
in the notion of partisanship as a social identity
(Huddy, 2001; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Tajfel and
Turner, 1979), supposedly arises over time as voters develop
psychological attachments to political parties. But
scholars have found a gap between likes of one's preferred
party and dislikes of other parties even in C E E politics
(Reiljan, 2019; Wagner, 2021). This finding deserves more
scholarly attention not only to shed light on the nature of
partisanship in the region, but also to extend our understanding
of politically motivated biases.
We present two original experiments in a party system
consisting of nine major political parties. These experiments
allow us to determine how individuals behave differently
towards those who share and those who do not share their
political preferences. The first study is a conjoint experiment
which tests partisanship relative to other potential
polarizing factors. We explore the effects of partisan biases
in respondents' selection of communication partners relative
to the effects of a political issue preferences, argued by some
scholars to be the true source of affective polarization
(Bougher, 2017; Lelkes, 2021; Orr and Huber, 2020;
Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz,
2017). We also include people's values and their habit of
talking about politics in the conjoint design. In the second
study, we conduct a trust game experiment to determine
whether biases rooted in either partisanship or issue preferences
operate beyond attitudes and affect behaviour
as well.
We find that differences in both party and issue preferences
diminish both willingness of subjects to converse
with others as well as the level of interpersonal trust. The
findings confirm the primacy of political partyism in a
system without stable partisan patterns. Our results also
indicate that attitudes towards salient issues may have
similar effects on people's interpersonal interactions as
partisanship. However, the difference between partisan
spillover and the effects of issue (dis)agreement lies in the
capacity of shared party preferences to provoke stronger
ingroup biases (Carlin and Love, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2012;
Iyengar and Westwood, 2015b; Mason, 2015).
Political parties and polarization
The origins of politically motivated hostility and biases in
social relations are typically traced back to political partisanship
(Carlin and Love, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2012;
Iyengar and Westwood, 2015b; Mason, 2015). The literature
on affective polarization demonstrates that in the U S A ,
partisanship not only polarizes people's attachments to
political parties but it also influences their evaluation of
other voters (Druckman and Levendusky, 2019) and their
preferences outside the political realm, such as romantic and
family relationships (Chen and Rohla, 2018; Huber and
Malhotra, 2017), economic behaviour (McConnell et al.,
2018), choice of residential neighbourhood (Chopik and
Motyl, 2016; Gimpel and Hui, 2015; Hui, 2013), and
students' roommate preferences (Shafranek, 2021).
In this paper, we examine the influence of political
disagreement on two types of interpersonal interactions:
conversations and interpersonal trust. Lack of interpersonal
interaction resulting from political disagreement might have
a crucial effect on democracy, because everyday interactions
with others enable people to test new and old ideas and
improve decision making (Mansbridge, 1999). Interpersonal
conversations are the basis of political dialogue and
the social integration of communities, and of tolerance to
opposing attitudes (McPherson et al., 2001; Mutz, 2002).
The interactions and informal communication of private
citizens, even i f they do not appear directly politically
relevant, are vital for sustaining social networks and for
democratic governance (Putnam, 2000). Mass polarization
has a negative impact on democratic processes, since polarized
citizens disregard the views of outgroups and perceive
their arguments as unworthy of consideration
(Strickler, 2018).
Behaviour concerning others may be also affected by
political preferences. For example, altruism is stronger for
one's ingroup political party (Fowler and Kam, 2007) and
partisanship decreases trust in out-partisans while
Hrbkovä et al. 3
increasing ingroup trust (Carlin and Love, 2018). These
effects are especially important since the weakening of
interpersonal trust due to partisan biases can cause collective
action problems and strengthen a zero-sum perception
of politics. These patterns have already been
identified in multiple political systems (Carlin and Love,
2018; Helbling and Jungkunz, 2020; Iyengar and
Westwood, 2015; Martini and Torcal, 2019; Westwood
et al., 2018). The literature suggests that people tend to
trust their co-partisans significantly more than partisans of
other parties, which results in sending more endowment to
co-partisan players than to other partisans in game theoretical
experiments. The strength of the party effect is
substantial across multiple political contexts in established
Western democracies and in the Latin world, where partybased
effects usually trump the influence o f other relevant
social cleavages such as race, class, or regional identity
(Carlin and Love, 2018; Martini and Torcal, 2019;
Westwood et al., 2018). Research o f affective polarization
of social interactions in multiparty systems is rather limited.
Knudsen (2021) found that people in Norway tend to
be unhappy with their child marrying somebody from the
opposing party bloc. Helbling and Jungkunz, 2020 confirm
negative attitudes towards voters of the out-parties, especially
i f the parties belongs to the other side o f the
integration-demarcation cleavage. However, effects of
party-driven affective gap compared to political attitude
dis/agreement on interpersonal relations are understudied.
We test the potential of partisan preferences to influence
personal interaction in terms of conversations and interpersonal
trust in the context of Czechia's fragmented and
unstable multipartism. We assume that the mechanism of
party-based group biases might not be straightforward. This
is because of the high number of parties occupying varying
positions in the political space, multiple political cleavages,
party coalition patterns, and the ever-changing number of
parties in the parliament; these factors make it difficult to
identify the political ingroups and outgroups based on party
affiliation.
Previous research in multi-party systems revealed that
party preferences influence social distance in Austria and
Germany, where division occurs mainly between supporters
of parties on opposite sides of the populist cleavage
(Helbling and Jungkunz, 2020). In Czechia, the idea of
interpersonal interactions being affected by political partisanship
seems less likely. After becoming one of the most
stable party systems among the post-communist countries,
with electorally and organizationally stabilized parties (the
conservative ODS, Christian Democratic K D U - C S L , Czech
Social Democratic Party, and the radical left communists)
resembling the party families in Western Europe, the
combination of both economic and political crises in the late
2000s and the beginning of the 2010s led to a dramatic
decrease in support for the established parties and the
emergence of new anti-establishment parties, including the
far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy, technocratic
populist A N O , and the social-liberal and technocratic Pirate
Party (Hanley, 2012). The rise of these challengers undermined
the long-established patterns of electoral behaviour
structured around the socio-economic conflict of the
political right and left and increased the importance of issues
such as immigration and populism cross-cutting the traditional
cleavages (Havlik and Kluknavska, 2022; Havlik and
Voda, 2018). In turn, factors such as increasing voter
volatility (Linek, 2014), low levels of trust in parties and
party identification (Linek and Vozenilkova, 2017), historically
strong anti-party sentiments and anti-party populism
(Havelka, 2016; Havlik, 2019), and the strengthening
role of the non-partisan president have weakened the potential
of party-based group biases. Reiljan (2019), however,
identified strong polarization in evaluations by voters
of their party of choice and other parties. If partisan affective
polarization applies not only to parties but also to their
supporters, then we assume that party driven affective
polarization does affect everyday interactions in terms of
communication and interpersonal trust.
H I a: Individuals prefer to interact with voters of their
own preferred political party.
H l b : Individuals reject interaction with voters of their
own least preferred political party.
Research on affective polarization in multipartisms
(Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2019; Wagner, 2021) reveals
that citizens hold different affective evaluations of different
political parties. Unlike voters in a two-party system, voters
in multi-party systems may have unequally positive and
negative feelings about several political parties. We assume
that these differences in sympathy may drive differences in
the magnitude of out-party bias, and we test this assumption
in the trust game experiment.
H 2 : Willingness to allocate money to others is conditional
on the individual's level of sympathy for another player's
preferred party.
Polarization over issues
Even though partisanship has been identified in the literature
as the main source of politically driven biases (Iyengar
et al., 2019), some scholars suggest that affective polarization
originates in ideological disagreements over issues
(Bougher, 2017; Lelkes, 2021; Orr and Huber, 2020;
Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz,
2017). People evaluate others based on their attitudes towards
salient issues and they are more attracted to and
associate more with those who agree with them on such
issues (Krosnick, 1990). Issues which are perceived as
salient have strong polarizing effects even when the actual
distance between groups' opinions is relatively small
4 Party Politics 0(0)
(Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). According to this alternative
explanation of affective polarization, people base their
evaluations of political actors on policies. These evaluations
evolve into hostility to both political actors and people with
opposing policy preferences (Orr and Huber, 2020).
Takeoff issues (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007), i.e.
highly salient issues substantively attracting collective attention,
are especially likely to polarize public opinion and
distract people's attention from other issues which remain
unpolarized. For example, Brexit created two distinct
groups, 'Leavers' and 'Remainers', displaying all the features
of affectively polarized identity-based political camps,
a division that transcended or even replaced traditional
partisanship in the U K (Hobolt et al., 2021). Moreover,
attitudes towards an issue as salient as Brexit can bias and
polarize other attitudes (Sorace and Hobolt, 2021). Huddy,
Bankert, and Davies (Huddy et al., 2018) observe that even
though voters in multiparty systems are affectively polarized
towards political parties, information about policies
may evoke affective responses equally strong towards
political parties as partisan identities.
The takeoff issue that we consider as a polarizing factor
is immigration. Though the issue of immigration has been
important in Western Europe for decades (Grande et al.,
2019; Kriesi, 2010), it only recently became a takeoff issue
in C E E (Hooghe and Marks, 2018), with the culmination
of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. Even though the
actual numbers of refugees coming to Czechia have been
low and other types of migration have been stable over
time, immigration became a dominant issue in public
discourse, with almost 80% of the public considering
immigration one of the two most important issues (Institute
of Sociology Czech Academy of Sciences, 2015). This
distracted attention from other issues (Prokop, 2020). The
2017 Czech Election Study revealed that 14.9% of voters
agreed that immigration was beneficial for the Czech
economy, while 27.9% of voters held a neutral attitude,
and 35.6% disagreed. Tensions rose within parties when
some members expressed disapproval o f official antirefugee
party positions (Dolejsi, 2015). This crosscutting
nature of the issue contributes to its potential to
create specific opinion groups (Hobolt et al., 2021). In both
the conjoint and trust game studies, we experimentally test
whether attitudes towards immigration significantly influence
social interaction in terms of conversation with
others and interpersonal trust.
H3a: Individuals prefer to interact with people with a
similar attitude towards immigration.
H 3 b : Individuals reject interaction with people with a
different attitude towards immigration.
Alternative explanation: dislike of politics
and values
Besides the two main explanatory factors of politically
motivated biases, political partisanship and attitudes towards
immigration, we include other potential factors which may
drive people away from others. One such factor relates to an
alternative explanation of individuals distancing themselves
from other partisans. Klar et al. (2018) argue that politically
motivated social distance stems not from partisan hostility but
instead is a manifestation of a general dislike of political
parties and politics. To capture the effect of avoidance of
politics in everyday interaction, in the conjoint experiment
we include the frequency of political talk as a potential source
of reluctance to communicate with others.
H 4 : Willingness to interact decreases when the others talk
about politics frequently.
Evidence suggests that political engagement may interact
with political preferences and that incongruent political
partisanship causes people to avoid others who are highly
interested in politics (Shafranek, 2021). Individuals might
shun those who like talking about politics and who also
express opposing political preferences. Building on the
previous hypotheses, we propose two additional assumptions
to test in the conjoint experiment.
H4a: Individuals prefer to talk less to those people who
frequently talk about politics and vote for the individual's
disliked parties compared to voters of liked parties.
H 4 b : Individuals prefer to talk less to those people with
different attitudes on immigration who frequently talk
about politics compared to those with similar attitudes on
immigration.
Political preferences might reflect one's underlying
political values; therefore, we test the effects of values on
people's willingness to interact with others, as well. For
example, authoritarian values such as emphasis on security
against risk and disorder, conformity to traditional ways of
life, and obedience to authorities protecting social order
may drive both party choice and immigration attitudes
(Norris and Inglehart, 2019). There is a link between authoritarianism
and positions on issues such as gay rights and
immigration (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Hetherington
and Weiler, 2009), but authoritarianism also affects how
citizens process information about economic policies
(Johnston, 2018). Incorporating the core authoritarianlibertarian
value scale into our research design adds a robust
test of the causal effects of partisan and immigration
preferences in the conjoint experiment.
H 5 : Individuals prefer to talk less to people with different
values.
Hrbková et al. 5
Table I. Conjoint attributes and attribute levels.
Attribute Attribute values
Gender 1 Male
2 Female
Education 1 Elementary school
2 Vocational school
3 High school
4 University
Immigration 1 Immigration makes our country a worse place t o live
2 Immigration has no impact on the quality of life in our country
3 Immigration makes our country a better place t o live
Values 1 Behaving properly, avoiding doing anything that people would say is wrong
2 Living in secure surroundings, avoiding anything that might be dangerous
3 Likes surprises and always looks for new things t o do
4 Thinking up new ideas and being creative
Talks about politics 1 Often
2 Sometimes
3 Almost never
Party choice 1 A N O
2 ČSSD
3 Piráti
4 O D S
5 KSČM
6 KDU-ČSL
7 SPD
8 S T A N
9 T O P 09
10 N o party
Data and methods
The hypotheses were tested in a conjoint and a trust game
experiment. In the conjoint experiment, we tested subjects'
willingness to interact with others in a conversation. The
conjoint design enabled us to compare the relative effects of
multiple independent variables when presented together
during an experimental task. In the trust game experiment
we examined whether political preferences affect people's
interaction with others in the form of allocation of resources
and trust that the others will reciprocate. For the purpose of
the trust game study, the independent variables were presented
separately. In the second study, we focused only on
party and immigration preferences, the main drivers of
interaction in the first study.
The conjoint experiment was conducted via an online
survey. Subjects were presented with profiles of two strangers
and asked to evaluate them on feeling thermometers. Subsequently,
they had to choose the one they would prefer to
talk to. The task was repeated five times per subject. The
conjoint design enabled us to assess the effects of multiple
independent variables on the subjects' affective evaluations
of others and willingness/reluctance to speak to them. The
profile of each potential communication partner contained six
basic attributes: preferred political party, opinion whether
immigration is beneficial or harmful to the country, frequency
of political talk, values, education, and gender (Table 1).
The attributes and attribute values describing the profiles
mirrored the pre-treatment questionnaire (question wording
in SI). This procedure was intended to increase the sense
that the partners being evaluated had filled in the same
questionnaire. In the analysis, we coded whether the subject's
response matched the partner's preferences or characteristics.
To assess the subjects' most and least preferred
political parties, the survey included questions about the
party they would most likely vote for in an election and the
party for which they would never vote. The conjoint design
was unrestricted, and the attribute values were generated
randomly. The order of attributes was kept constant for each
respondent.
The conjoint experiment was fielded by the Focus
Marketing and Social Research company between 22 M a y
and 3 June 2019, on a sample of 1,032 adult Czech respondents
(a non-probability sample using quotas on
gender, education, age, region, and the size of municipality).
Each respondent evaluated five pairs of fictional communication
partners' profiles; the total number of cases used in
the analysis was 10,250.
To validate the findings of the conjoint study, we also
implemented a trust game using an online survey in which
6 Party Politics 0(0)
Table 2. Experimental conditions of the trust game.
Condition Information about player 2
Control 1 N o information
Votes for party 2 The same party as the subject
3 The party the subject would never vote for
4 Any other party than information 2 and 3 (randomly generated)
Immigration attitude 5 Immigration is good for the country
6 Immigration is neither good o r bad for the country
7 Immigration is bad for the country
Minimal group 8 Same colour as the subject
9 Different colour from the subject
subjects filled in basic socio-demographic information and
answered a set of questions about their party preferences.
Their positive and negative party preferences were ascertained
using the same methods as in the conjoint experiment.
Subjects also indicated their likes and dislikes for each
parliamentary party on a 10-point party sympathy scale.
In our modified repeated trust game experiment, all
subjects played the role o f Player 1 and allocated money
(0-100 C Z K ) to pre-programmed Player 2. In the partisanship
experimental conditions, the partisanship of
Player 2 was individually adjusted to match the party
preference o f each subject (see SI for more details on the
trust game procedure).1
Each subject played nine rounds
of the game. In the first round, the subject interacted with
an anonymous Player 2. In the subsequent rounds the
subject was given one piece o f information about Player
2. The nature of the information varied in a random order.
In this way, each subject interacted with a Player 2 with a
shared party preference and a Player 2 whose party
preference matched the subject's least preferred party.
The subject also interacted with a Player 2 whose preferred
party was randomly assigned from among all those
not the subject's most or least preferred parties. In other
rounds, Player 2 immigration attitudes also varied. We
also included a minimal group condition in which the
subject was informed that all players were assigned a
specific colour. During the game, each subject faced a
Player 2 sharing the same colour and a Player 2 with a
different colour. The experimental conditions are listed
in Table 2. After the experimental task, the subjects were
debriefed and informed that none o f the Player 2 profiles
had been a real person.
The trust game study was conducted between 4 and
17 December 2019, on a sample of 946 adult respondents.
The data were collected by the same company as in the
previous study, based on the same quota measures, provided
that the respondents participating in the conjoint experiment
were excluded from the pool of respondents.2
Each subject
played nine rounds of the game, with resulted in a total of
8,461 cases.3
The data were recoded to a structure appropriate for
testing our hypotheses. Since our hypotheses focus on
biases regarding congruence and incongruence of subjects'
political dispositions with the attributes of the experimental
treatments (Knudsen and Johannesson, 2019; Shafranek,
2021), we recoded the conjoint attribute variables and
Player 2 characteristics to indicate a match or lack of a
match between the features of each subject and the experimentally
generated profiles. For example, a subjectprofile
match for party preference is coded as a positive
party match when both the subject and the experimentally
generated profile prefer voting for the same party. A negative
party match was coded when the least preferred party
of the subject matches the party the experimentally generated
profile would vote for. To separate the effects of
subjects without any reported positive party preference
(non-voters), we created a category capturing a match between
a non-voter subject and a non-voter partner. The
reference category is the situation when neither the subject's
most nor least preferred parties match the experimentally
generated profile's positive or negative preferences. The
recoding of all the other variables is described in the
supplementary information.
For the purpose of the conjoint analysis, we used the
average marginal component effects ( A M C E s ) (cjoint
package). We used two different outcome variables - the
rating of each personality profile on a feeling thermometer
(0-100) and a discrete choice (coded 0 for unselected
profiles and 1 for the selected profiles). We used the same
linear regression estimator for the continuous and binary
variables, as proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2014). To
estimate treatment effects in a within-subject design of the
trust game study, we employed a multilevel tobit regression
model for a dependent variable with its range limited from
0 to 100 C Z K . 4
Results
We present only the results of the A C M E model using the
discrete choice in the conjoint experiment and the results of
Hrbkova et al. 7
party
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
party
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
party
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
—0~
party
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
i
l
X
—#—
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
w
1
immigration
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
immigration
negative positive
-
nonvoter match no
match neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch -
immigration
neuirai—proimmigraiion mismaicn
proimmigration-neutral mismatch-
1
1
immigration
neuirai—proimmigraiion mismaicn
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immigration
aniiimmigraTion—neuirai mismaicn 1
1
immigration
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1
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proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
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1
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
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never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
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sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
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politicaLtalk
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
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matchproimmigration
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never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
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1
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politicaLtalk
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
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education match -
1
1
politicaLtalk
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
politicaLtalk
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
politicaLtalk
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
#
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
values
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1
values
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
•
1
values
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1 w
1
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1
genck
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
T
genck
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
w
1
c
o
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1
ucati
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
i
T3
(1)
proimmigraiion—aniiimmigraTion mismaicn
antiimmigration-proimmigration mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match mismatch
never-often mismatch
often-nevermatch
nevermatch
often match
sometimesmismatch
neutral with others authoritarian
match libertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender match education
match no
education match -
1
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
difference in probability of talking
Figure I. Effects of congruence between subjects and experimentally generated profiles on the communication partner choice.
Note: A M C E s of subject-profile attribute in/congruence on the choice of the communication partner. The variables indicate a match o r
a mismatch of the attributes between subjects and the experimental communication partners. For attitudes on immigration and political
talk, the first characteristics refers to the attitude and the frequency of political talk of the subject and the second characteristics refers to
the experimental communication partner attribute. Therefore, proimmigration—antiimmigration mismatch means a mismatch between
the subject w h o holds a positive attitude on immigration and a communication partner with a negative attitude on immigration. For
partisanship, negative indicates congruence of the communication partner's vote choice with subject's negative partisanship, positive
indicates congruence of positive party preference, nonvoter match indicates a match between a subject nonvoter and an experimental
nonvoter profile.
8 Party Politics 0(0)
immigration wr\ r"/~\ i r'YI r~Y^i l /"l Kofi /-\ r~\ r~Y^i '""l4" r~\ -
l
limmigration
proimmigranon maicn
proimmigration-neutral mismatchproimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch neutral
match -
l
l
l
!
immigration
proimmigranon maicn
proimmigration-neutral mismatchproimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch neutral
match -
i
i
i
i
immigration
proimmigranon maicn
proimmigration-neutral mismatchproimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch neutral
match -
i
i
i
L
immigration
proimmigranon maicn
proimmigration-neutral mismatchproimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch neutral
match - f
i
i
immigration
neuirai—proiirirTiigraiion rnisiTiaicn l
immigration
neuirai—aniNirirTiigraiion misiriaicn
antiimmigration match-
immigration
neuirai—aniNirirTiigraiion misiriaicn
antiimmigration match- i
i
i
i
•
immigration
aniiimmigraiion—proirnrnigraiion mismaxcn i
i
i
1
aninmmigraiion—neuirai mismaicn
positive party match partyrandom
-
i
i
i
aninmmigraiion—neuirai mismaicn
positive party match partyrandom
-
i
i
i
party
aninmmigraiion—neuirai mismaicn
positive party match partyrandom
-
party
aninmmigraiion—neuirai mismaicn
positive party match partyrandom
-
party
nonvoternegative
party match -
outgroup-
ingroup-
party
nonvoternegative
party match -
outgroup-
ingroup-
placebo
nonvoternegative
party match -
outgroup-
ingroup-
i
i
i
placebo
nonvoternegative
party match -
outgroup-
ingroup-
i
i
!.
placebo
nonvoternegative
party match -
outgroup-
ingroup-
[•
i
i
-60 -40 -20 0 20
difference in probability of talking
Figure 2. Effects of partisanship, immigration attitudes, and minimal group membership on allocations t o Player 2.
Note: Multilevel tobit model. Attitudes about immigration were coded as a subject-Player 2 match (e.g. immigration: proimmigration
match when the Player 2's attitude matched the subject's attitude) o r mismatch (immigration: pro-anti mismatch when the subject held a
pro-immigration attitude while the Player 2 held anti-immigration attitude). Party preference is coded as the subject's vote choice
matching Player 2 choice (positive match), the subjects' negative partisanship matching Player 2 vote choice (negative match), interaction
with a nonvoter (nonvoter match) o r interaction with a voter of a random party (random). Control indicates allocations to members of an
ingroup and an outgroup in the minimal group condition.
Hrbkovä et al. 9
S
o
c *
0
y
S o j
01 T
nj
CJ
c
d o
c
01
n
2
Predictive Margins of partyrandom with 95% CIs
o
Cm
Ar
A A A A
— I — I — I — I — i — i — I — I — I —
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
sympathy
Figure 3. Effect of the like-dislike score for a randomly assigned party on the amount of allocations.
the tobit regression model for the trust game. Additional
analyses are reported in the supplementary information. The
results based on the conjoint and the trust game support HI a
and Hlb. Party preferences significantly influence interpersonal
interactions. The conjoint results (Figure 1) show
that individuals prefer talking to others who vote for their
preferred political party and are disinclined to talk to people
who vote for the party they would never vote for. O n average,
congruent voting produces a 0.18 increase in the
probability that the subject chooses to talk to the person,
while voting for the party which the subject would never
vote for leads to a 0.18 decrease in the probability of
choosing to talk to the person.
The trust game produced similar results. Figure 2 indicates
that the allocation of money to another voter increases
by 24.70 C Z K when the subject and Player 2 support the
same party compared to the amount given to an anonymous
player. When the partner is a voter for the subject's least
favourite party, the allocation decreases by 57 C Z K . The
gap in allocations to co-partisans compared supporters of
the subject's least preferred party is notable. The amount of
money allocated also decreases when Player 2 votes for any
other randomly selected party, even though this average
decrease of 24 C Z K indicates a weaker negative bias
compared to that for the subject's least preferred party. The
effect of the subject's least preferred party is the largest
effect in the model and substantially determines the pattern
of interpersonal trust gaps.5
The conditional effect of party sympathy is tested only
in the trust game. Inclusion o f the like-dislike score for a
randomly assigned party into the model reveals that the
amount o f money allocated to Player 2 who prefers any
party other than the subject's most and least preferred
parties is conditional on the like-dislike score for that
party (Figure 3). There is a clear effect of party sympathy
for the randomly chosen party.6
A s sympathy for the
party increases, the amount of money sent to the fictitious
supporter o f that party increases. Therefore, the results
support H 2 .
Our data also support H3a and H3b on the effects of
immigration attitudes. A s for the conjoint data, the effects of
congruent attitudes on immigration are not as large as the
effects of partisan congruence, but the effects of disagreement
over immigration are even larger than the effect
of partisan incongruence (Figure 1). For those who think
that immigration is bad for the country, the probability of
speaking to someone who thinks immigration is good for
the country decreases by 0.27 compared to talking to
someone with an ambivalent attitude. Subjects who hold
positive attitudes towards immigration are less biased. The
probability that a subject who thinks immigration makes the
country a better place would talk to somebody who thinks
immigration is harmful for the country is 0.19 lower than for
talking to someone with an ambivalent opinion. A positive
effect of congruence of attitudes about immigration between
the subject and the experimental profile was identified only
for anti-immigration attitudes, but the association was
weaker compared to the positive effect of congruent par-
tisanship.7
Interestingly, the probability of the willingness
of someone with a neutral opinion to talk to a person with a
more decided attitude (either pro- or anti-immigration) attitude
also decreases.
10 Party Politics 0(0)
immigration neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot immigration
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot immigration
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot immigration
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot immigration
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot ft
1
immigration neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
1
immigration neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot immigration
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
L
ft
immigration neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
•
values neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
l
l .
values neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot l
-
^
l
I
values neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
l
l
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
t
i
gender neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot gender
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot gender
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot education
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
1
i .
education neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
I
education neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
t
i
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -
I
party_talk_interaction neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot party_talk_interaction
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot party_talk_interaction
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot party_talk_interaction
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot party_talk_interaction
neutral-antiimmigration mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot neutral-antiimmigration
mismatch neutral-proimmigration
mismatchproimmigration-neutral
mismatchantiimmigration-neutral
mismatch proimmigration-antiimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration-proimmigration
mismatch antiimmigration
matchproimmigration
matchneutral
match authoritarian
matchlibertarian
match value
mismatchgender
match no
gender matcheducation
match no
education match no
party and talk a lotpositive
and not talk a lot positive
and talk a lotnegative
and not talk a lotnegative
and talk a lotno
party and not talk a lot -C
.3 -0.2 -0.1 0
difference in probat
0 0.1 0.2
ility of talking
Figure 4. Effects of congruence between subjects and experimentally generated profiles on profile choice, including the interaction
term of party preference and frequency of talking about politics.
Note: A M C E s of subject-profile attribute in/congruence on the choice of the communication partner. The variables indicate a match o r a
mismatch of the attributes between subjects and the experimental communication partners. For attitudes on immigration and political
talk, the first characteristics refers to the attitude and the frequency of political talk of the subject and the second characteristics refers
to the experimental communication partner attribute. Therefore, proimmigration—antiimmigration mismatch means a mismatch between
the subject who holds a positive attitude on immigration and a communication partner with a negative attitude on immigration. For
partisanship, negative indicates congruence of the communication partner's vote choice with subject's negative partisanship, positive
indicates congruence of positive party preference, nonvoter match indicates a match between a subject nonvoter and an experimental
nonvoter profile.
Hrbkova et al.
The same structure of results is identified in the trust
game data (Table 2). Subjects with either pro- or antiimmigration
attitudes are willing to send more money to
people with the same attitude about immigration and are not
willing to send as much money to those with the opposite
attitude. For people with a negative attitude towards immigration,
it does not matter whether Player 2 is neutral or
positive towards immigration, the amount sent to such
players decreases by 29.50 C Z K and 31.10 C Z K , respectively.
Facing a Player 2 with negative opinions about
immigration decreases the allocation by 55 C Z K for subjects
who perceive immigration positively, compared to the
allocation to an anonymous Player 2. However, the gaps in
trust between the ingroup and outgroup characteristics of
Player 2 are smaller for immigration attitudes than for
partisanship.
We can also test the effects o f the alternative variables
using the conjoint data (Table 1). The frequency of
political talk and values are included among the conjoint
attributes. The results are mixed. Individuals who never
talk about politics tend to choose communication partners
who also don't talk about politics, and they tend to
avoid those who talk about politics often. Therefore, the
habit o f talking often about politics may negatively i n fluence
one's attractiveness to other people. The effects
of this variable are smaller than the effects o f partisanship
and immigration attitudes. We find weak support
for H5 since people prefer speaking with those who hold
the same values. The strength o f the effect is small
compared to the effects o f party preferences and i m migration
attitudes.
We tested H4a and H4b using an additional set of analyses
with the interaction between frequency of talking
about politics and political preferences. The hypotheses
suggest that the effects of party preferences and attitudes
towards immigration are conditional on the frequency of
political talk of the communication partner. We identify a
significant interaction for the discrete choice variable for
H4a (Figure 4). When the subject and the partner share the
same party preference, the frequency of the partner's political
talk does not influence the probability of their selection
as the preferred partner. But there is a significant
decrease in the average probability of choosing a person
who votes for one's least favourite party and likes to talk
about politics often compared to an out-partisan who does
not talk about politics often. The prospect of a supporter of a
disliked party talking about politics decreases one's propensity
to talk to such a person. However, there is still a
substantial negative effect for out-party supporters who do
not talk about politics often. There is a similar effect related
to H4b about the interaction between the frequency of
political talk and immigration attitudes. This effect is significant
only at a 0.1 level of statistical significance (details
in SI).
Both the conjoint and trust game experiments inform us
that partisanship is a major polarizing factor even in a
country with multiple parties and an unstable party system.
People tend to avoid those who vote for their least liked
parties. Instead, they prefer to interact with others who vote
for the same party. The trust game data also indicate the
phenomena of in-party trust and out-party distrust. The
major trust gap is driven mainly by distrust of those who
vote for one's least favourite parties. The level of trust in
voters for other parties is driven by one's varying sympathy
for the other parties. Our data reveal that issue-based attitudes
may also be affectively polarizing. Data from the
conjoint experiment demonstrate that subjects avoid those
who hold dissimilar and especially opposing opinions on
immigration. Moreover, those who perceive immigration
negatively tend to prefer communication with people who
hold the same opinion. The trust game data reveal a reversed
pattern in the asymmetry of interaction preferences for
subjects with pro-immigration and anti-immigration attitudes
compared to the conjoint. In the trust game, larger
trust gaps driven by opposing immigration attitudes were
evidenced by the different allocations made by subjects with
pro-immigration attitudes. In the conjoint experiment, larger
negative effects were identified for people who perceive
immigration negatively.
Conclusion
Our findings reveal that partisanship divides citizens even in
an unstable party system in which voters do not often stick
to their party choices across elections. Party-driven interpersonal
biases depend on the levels of sympathy and
antipathy they hold towards political parties. A t the same
time, we find that political biases are a complex phenomenon
and may be driven by multiple factors and not solely
by either partisanship or policy preferences, as suggested
previously (Iyengar et al., 2012; Lelkes, 2021). While this
study does not tackle the issue of the relationship between
policy preferences and party preferences, it offers evidence
that when the two variables are presented together (conjoint)
and separately (trust game), their effects on interpersonal
relations are comparable.
A major difference in the polarizing effects of partisanship
and immigration attitudes stems from the more
substantive ingroup bias resulting from a shared party
preference. The impact of party preferences on the lack of
willingness to interact with others is especially profound
when they vote for one's disliked parties and talk about
politics often. The frequency of political talk seems to interact
with immigration attitudes less than with party
preference, revealing that it is mainly partisan politics that
people avoid discussing in everyday life. Even though Klar
et al. (2018) suggest that people are willing to spend time
with those they disagree with as long as they do not talk
12 Party Politics 0(0)
about politics, according to our study people generally do
not want to interact with others who hold different political
preferences and discussing politics only strengthens the
tendency to avoid out-partisans.
What needs to be researched in the next step, is the exact
role of identity in politically motivated hostility and polarization.
While our finding about the impact of partisanship
on social interactions is in line with the notion of
expressive partisanship anchored in social identity (Huddy
et al., 2015), the operationalization of partisanship in our
experiments does not capture identity-based expressive
partisanship but simply vote choice. Together with the
structure of the Czech party system, this makes our findings
about the impact of partisanship on social interactions
notable. A s we assume the nature of partisanship in the
Czech Republic to be instrumental and we operationalize it
through vote choice, political conflicts driving party choice
seem to also be driving broader social conflicts. A t the same
time, this conflict cannot be explained by disagreement
about immigration.
Our analysis on affective polarization thus offers new insights
both geographically and methodologically. We present
evidence that affective polarization in C E E occurs not only on
the level of electoral party politics (Knudsen, 2021; Reiljan,
2019; Wagner, 2021), but that these biases influence how
people relate to each other. We shed light on politically driven
divisions in a traditionally understudied context. Even though
previous research discovered that political parties in C E E can
work as political heuristics (Brader et al., 2013; Hrbkova
2016), we know very little about the nature of political partisanship
in the region. We use a dynamic approach assigning
political parties to individual subjects' preferences, which
extends the applicability of these experimental methods to the
study of intergroup relations and society-wide hostilities in
complex party systems. Future research should focus on what
happens when the dispositions are contradictory. The mismatch
between partisan identity and issue positions sheds
more light on the relative importance of these dispositions in
different contexts (Lelkes, 2021; Mummolo et al., 2019). We
did not address this topic in our studies in order to keep the
experimental designs simple and the surveys short. Future
research should also focus on more policy dimensions.
D e c l a r a t i o n o f conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
F u n d i n g
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
output was supported by the NPO "Systemic Risk Institute"
number LX22NPO5101, funded by European Union - Next
Generation E U (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, NPO:
EXCELES).
O R C I D i D
Lenka Hrbkova © https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3755-3322
S u p p l e m e n t a l M a t e r i a l
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
N o t e s
1. Even though the modified version of this repeated trust game, in
which subjects play only as first movers, resembles a dictator
game, Iyengar and Westwood (2015) demonstrate that subj ects'
behaviour in a dictator game differs from the modified repeated
trust game and that the repeated first mover trust game measures
trust, not altruism.
2. The study was preregistered for n = 1,000. Due to technical
problems with the quota setting, a total of 1,346 participants
entered the survey; however, 400 participants were screened
out, not allowed to launch the experimental game and were
dismissed from the survey.
3. Subjects who indicated a voting preference for 'other party' in
the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis (n = 50)
4. For a robustness check, the analysis was also conducted using
negative binomial regression, which is presented in the SI.
5. We ran the analyses for supporters of individual parties to
determine whether the effect of partisanship holds across parties
or whether the effects are driven by supporters of a particular
party or group of parties. The effects are similar across different
partisan subgroups. The results are presented in the SI.
6. Subjects who indicated 'no party' and 'other party' as their
party preference in the pre-treatment survey were excluded
from the analysis.
7. These effects apply only to the model with the discrete choice
outcome variable. For the thermometer evaluations, neither proimmigration
attitude congruence nor anti-immigration attitude
congruence are statistically significant.
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A u t h o r b i o g r a p h i e s
Lenka Hrbková is assistant professor of political science at
Masaryk University. Her research focuses on political attitudes
and behaviour. She studies issues related to politically
driven polarization and she is also interested in topics
of gender and politics.
Petr Voda is assistant professor of political science at Masaryk
University. His research interests are voting behaviour, local
politics, populism, representation, and quality of democracy.
Vlastimil Havlík works as associate professor of political
science at Masaryk University. His research interests are
political parties, electoral behaviour, populism, and Czech
politics in comparative perspective. He is Editor-in-Chief of
the Czech Journal of Political Science.