A RESILIENT SOLDIER, A RESILIENT STATE

A Tool for Measuring Czech Armed Forces´ Resilience Against Hybrid Interference

ODOLNÝ VOJÁK – ODOLNÝ STÁT

Nástroj pro měření odolnosti ozbrojených sil ČR vůči hybridnímu působení

Vendula Divišová[a], *Libor Frank*[b], *Vladimír Bízik*[c], *Antonín Novotný*[d]

Abstrakt

Text představuje dotazník jako nástroj měření, který napomůže zhodnotit odolnost ozbrojených sil vůči hybridnímu působení. Vychází z předem vytvořené konceptualizace odolnosti jako sestávající z národní, sociální, institucionální a psychologické dimenze a provází čtenáře operacionalizací příslušných proměnných v podobě dotazníku, který bude následně distribuován různým skupinám v rámci Armády České republiky.

Abstract

This paper introduces a questionnaire as a measurement tool that will help evaluate the armed forces' resilience to hybrid interference. It is based on the previously developed conceptualisation of resilience as consisting of the national, social, institutional, and psychological dimensions and guides the reader through the operationalisation of the corresponding variables in the form of a questionnaire to be distributed within different groups of the Czech Armed Forces.

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[a] Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence. Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: vendula.divisova@unob.cz. ORCID: 0000-0003-2038-8375.
[b] Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence. Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: libor.frank@unob.cz. ORCID: 0000-0002-2905-2563.
[c] Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence. Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: vladimir.bizik@unob.cz. ORCID: 0000-0002-5845-9012.
[d] Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence. Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: antonin.novotny@unob.cz. ORCID: 0000-0002-6574-2940.

Keywords

Resilience; hybrid interference; military personnel; Czech Armed Forces; survey.

Klíčová slova

Odolnost; hybridní působení; příslušníci ozbrojených sil; Armáda České republiky; dotazník.

Introduction

The ongoing war in Ukraine has underlined the utmost importance of building resilience of the state and society. A whole-of-society resilience has proven to be an essential condition to sustain resistance to external aggression against a militarily stronger adversary. In 2021, Ukraine adopted a defence policy that was largely built on resilience, including its military security strategy or a specific policy titled "National Resilience Concept". The latter document adopted the NATO baseline requirements on resilience[1] but on top of that also included resilience to information influence operations and financial and economic resilience – key areas of protection against hybrid interference.[2] The effort to increase societal resilience to crises through an array of measures stemming from building a national identity to sensitising Ukrainians to different forms of adversarial influencing goes even further - back to 2014. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have also been praised for their surprisingly high resilience, as described by Bowen:

> *"Despite having a smaller military than Russia, and a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in equipment and resources, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have proven resilient and adaptive. The UAF has demonstrated greater flexibility than the Russian military and a willingness to adapt to changing conditions to exploit Russian missteps and weaknesses. The UAF also has benefited from high levels of motivation and recruitment, as well as significant Western security assistance and training."*[3]

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also in the preceding seven years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been under enormous pressure from military operations of Russia and psychological warfare employing different instruments from disinformation campaigns to intimidation of the military servicemembers. While the actual level of the armed forces' resilience is rather obvious under a crisis scenario, it is much more challenging to accurately measure and predict their resilience in peacetime – before the crisis hits. Nevertheless, resilience must be built continuously and proactively and thus it is pertinent to develop an approach to estimate its level based on an understanding of the armed forces' vulnerabilities towards hybrid interference as well as protective factors increasing their resilience to these subversive acts. Importantly, evaluating how the resilience level changes over time enables risk analysis and early intervention. At the same time, it still needs to be acknowledged that the real level of resilience can only be revealed by the armed forces and its servicemembers being actually exposed to an adversary situation, including acts of hybrid interference.

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[1] NATO. Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3 [online]. 20.9.2022 [cit. 2023-01-118]. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm

[2] SHELEST, Hanna. *Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine's lessons for European defence*. In: ECFR. [online]. 9. 11. 2022. [cit. 18.01.2023]. Available from: https://ecfr.eu/publication/defend-resist-repeat-ukraines-lessons-for-european-defence/

[3] BOWEN. S. Andrew. *Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects*. In: Congressional Research Service. [online]. 14. 9. 2022. [cit. 18.01.2023]. Available from: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068

In this methodological paper, we present a tool for measuring armed forces' resilience to hybrid interference. It elaborates on a previous work published by Divišová et al.,[4] in which an initial conceptualisation of this topic has been developed as part of the research project "Armed and security forces resilience towards hybrid threats". In the paper, we have proposed the following working definition of armed forces' resilience to hybrid interference: "*the capacity of the military to fulfil its core mission enabled by physical and moral components of the fighting power and to continually transform and adapt in face of external hostile influence targeting perception and decision-making of the armed forces members and leadership*".[5] We summarise its main findings below. In the next phase of the project, we will apply the tool to assess the actual level of resilience of the Czech Armed Forces to hybrid interference while selecting those areas of resilience that cannot be measured by this tool and for which the data need to be accessed differently. This measurement tool has wider applicability beyond this project, which is specifically focused on the Czech military. Nevertheless, any future application of the survey requires its questions to be tailored to local specifics while keeping the same set of variables.

Armed Forces as a Target of Hybrid Interference

We define hybrid interference in line with the Czech "National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference" as "covert and overt actions by state as well as non-state actors (perpetrators of hybrid interference), which target vulnerable elements of democratic states and societies." The policy identifies the aim of hybrid interference as disrupting "the working of democratic institutions, the rule of law processes, and internal security" through "political, diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and other tools".[6] These traits indicate a subversive character of hybrid interference aimed not only at disrupting the decision-making, cohesion and stability of the targeted state and society but also at influencing attitudes and behaviour in the desired direction. Even though the terms influencing and interference are often used interchangeably, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats reserves the term hybrid influencing to **tolerable** hostile activities that are differentiated from hybrid interference as intolerable hostile activities and hybrid warfare as activities already triggering a conventional response.[7]

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[4] DIVIŠOVÁ, Vendula, Libor FRANK, Jan HANZELKA, Antonin NOVOTNÝ, and Jan BŘEŇ. The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts: Towards Developing a Multidimensional Concept of Armed Forces' Resilience Towards Hybrid Interference. *Obrana a strategie*, 2021, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 03-20. ISSN 12146463. Available from: doi:10.3849/1802-7199.21.2021.02.003-020
[5] You can find more information on the project here: https://starfos.tacr.cz/en/project/VJ01010122#project-main
[6] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. *National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference*. 2021. Available from: https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/national-strategy---aj-final.pdf; See also MAREŠ, Miroslav, Josef KRAUS, and Jakub DRMOLA. Conceptualisation of Hybrid Interference in the Czech Republic: How to Make it a Practically Researchable Phenomenon? *Politics in Central Europe. De Gruyter Open*, 2022, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 343-354. ISSN 1801-3422. Available from: doi:10.2478/pce-2022-0015.
[7] Hybrid COE. *COI Hybrid Influence*. 2022. [online]. [cit. 2022-12-20]. Available from: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/coi-hybrid-influencing/

As Bay, Batrla, and Twetman point out: *"[h]igh-ranking military personnel, decision makers, and their families should expect to be targeted by highly personalized influence campaigns"*.[8] Nevertheless, rank and file soldiers are not exempt from this pressure. These campaigns can take on many different forms. Based on the review of literature and case studies of activities targeting armed forces and its members as part of hybrid interference by state and non-state actors,[9] we identified a set of activities that must be considered when developing a resilience measurement tool. In line with the focus of the research, we pay attention only to those activities that target the cognitive domain through attempts to influence the perception, attitudes and behaviour of the target audience.

We identified the following influence activities that might target armed forces:

- disinformation;

- propaganda;

- corruption, an offer of counter-service;

- social engineering – sending a fraudulent offer of friendship or relationship via email/social networks;

- impersonation;

- extortion;

- doxing, mal-information.

Each of these activities directly targets cognition and thus aims to influence attitudes or behaviour either of the targeted personnel or other target audiences such as the military command, the public or politicians, depending on the campaign. However, besides the cognitive layer, adversaries can also influence armed forces through acts seeking targets in the physical – assets and infrastructure – and informational layers of the information environment.[10] They comprise infiltration, different forms of espionage, sabotage, and data manipulation – including cyber-attacks. These acts significantly overlap with the concept of information operations, while the list given earlier only represents a minor part of them, and in military terminology, it could be best summarised by the term deception.

Apart from the above-mentioned activities, soldiers may be exposed to various forms of harmful behaviour within their units, such as intimidation, extortion, bossing, racial hatred and xenophobia, discrimination, or sexual harassment (for the complete list go to the Questionnaire in the Annex – Question no. 30). Even though these activities can and have already been misused for adversarial propaganda, as such, they are not directly part of influence activities as an intentional adversarial campaign. Instead, they are a reflection of

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[8] BAY, Sebastian, Michael BATRLA, and Henrik TWETMAN. *Camouflage for the digital domain: a force protection framework for armed forces.* NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence: Riga. 2020. 46 p.

[9] See BÍZIK, Vladimír, Dominika KOSÁROVÁ, Adam POTOČŇÁK, and Richard STOJAR. Hybrid Interference: From the Particular to a Continuum. *Obrana a strategie,* 2022, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 075-088. ISSN 12146463. doi:10.3849/1802-7199.22.2022.01.075-088

[10] You can find the definition of information environment in NATO. *Draft MC 0422/6 NATO Military Policy for Information Operations.* 2018. Available from: https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2018/upcoming%20events/MC%20Draft_Info%20Ops.pdf

the moral failure of individuals within the military units with potentially negative implications for group cohesion.

Armed Forces' Resilience to Hybrid Interference: What to Measure

In the previous research, we have adopted a working definition of armed forces resilience to hybrid interference as *"the capacity of the military to fulfil its core mission enabled by physical and moral components of the fighting power and to continually transform and adapt in the face of external hostile influence targeting perception and decision-making of the armed forces' members and leadership."*[11] It embodies a complex understanding of resilience that comprises four dimensions: psychological, social, institutional, and national. Below we briefly explain the four dimensions in the context of armed forces as a target of hybrid interference. For further details, we refer the readers to our previous work (see footnote 11).

Soldiers are psychologically resilient if they have a set of personal qualities and competencies at their disposal that help them to overcome adversities. These protective factors typically include a sense of belonging, social support, self-efficacy, sense of humour as well as positive relationships providing them with social support. We will only work with the variable of personal satisfaction measured as a subjective perception of one's socioeconomic situation and overall happiness. There is a partial overlap between psychological and social resilience, with the latter being grounded in social relations within different groups. The individual's integration and belonging are the key variables. Military service members derive their social resilience from their ties with friends and family as well as from their integration into military units. Soldiers also act as citizens in their societies, and as such, they relate to the political and public institutions, towards which they develop trust or mistrust. Apart from trust in institutions, Ben-Dor identified patriotism, optimism, and social integration as the key components of national resilience.[12] While some of these components are also significant for the psychological or social dimensions of resilience, political attitudes are the distinguishing feature of national resilience together with the concept of patriotism that, unlike attitudes, expresses how a person relates to the state on an emotional level. Finally, threat perception and the related level of fear can also predict one's resilience. Alternatively, this component helps assess resilience ex-post, if the focus is on the persisting level of fear after the crisis situation has subsided.

The institutional level of resilience is the most under-researched among the four dimensions. In theory, the resilience of an institution corresponds to the extent to which it is able to fulfil its core mission under changing circumstances.[13] Therefore, in line with military doctrines, we have equalled the armed forces' resilience with the concept of the fighting power broken down into moral, physical, and conceptual dimensions. We assume that it is

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[11] DIVIŠOVÁ, Vendula, Libor FRANK, Jan HANZELKA, Antonin NOVOTNÝ, and Jan BŘEŇ 2021, ref. 4.

[12] BEN-DOR, Gabriel, PEDAHZUR, Ami, CANETTI, Daphna, and Zaidise, Eran. *The role of public opinion in Israel's national security.* American Jewish Congress: Congress Monthly. 2002, vol. 69. Pp. 13-15.

[13] STEINBERG, Paul. Institutional Resilience Amid Political Change: The Case of Biodiversity Conservation. *Global Environmental Politics.* 2009, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 61-81. doi: 10.1162/glep.2009.9.3.61

mostly the moral dimension of the fighting power that will determine the actual resilience of armed forces towards hybrid interference. In our research project, we limit our focus to soft resilience that works with communities and individuals, unlike the hard or technical resilience of infrastructure and assets. This necessarily equates hybrid interference with those tools and campaigns that target people through their cognition. Therefore, the assessment of the moral component of the armed forces fighting power should have the greatest predictive power in terms of evaluating its resilience to hybrid interference. The moral dimension comprises three functions – moral cohesion, motivation, and leadership.[14] A set of soldiers' values also forms an essential part of the moral element of fighting power. These traditionally include moral and physical courage, discipline/duty, respect for others, integrity, loyalty, selfless commitment, and honour.[15] In Table 1, we identify key variables across the four dimensions of resilience that were preselected for the questionnaire. We discuss the final selection of these variables and their operationalisation in the form of questions/statements in the questionnaire in the next chapter.

Table 1: Components of armed forces resilience to hybrid interference

Resilience dimension	Key variables
National	Political attitudes (Trust in political and public institutions) – Patriotism – Optimism – Threat perception
Institutional	Fighting power-Morale (Motivation / Leadership), Fighting power-Readiness, Fighting power-Conceptual innovation
Social	Social integration – Social cohesion – Camaraderie – Sense of belonging – Fighting power-Morale (Cohesion) - Military values (Physical courage / Discipline / Respect / Integrity / Loyalty / Selfless commitment / Honour)
*Psychological (*Cognitive)*	Personal satisfaction - Self-efficacy – Optimism – Sense of humour – Social support – Well-being – Emotional stability – *Critical thinking – *Mental agility – *Creativity

(Source: authors)

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[14] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: UK Defence Doctrine: Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (5th Edition)*. 2014. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP_0_01_Ed_5_UK_Defence_Doctrine.pdf

[15] See THE BRITISH ARMY. *Values and Standards of the British Army*, 2020 [cit. 2021-10-7]. Available from: https://www.army.mod.uk/media/5219/20180910-values_standards_2018_final.pdf
U.S. Army. *Values*, 2020 [cit. 2021-10-7]. Available from: https://www.army.mil/values/index.html

Introducing a Survey to Measure the Armed Forces' Resilience to Hybrid Interference

In the introduction, we suggested that it is not entirely feasible to evaluate the resilience of an entity before the crisis event occurs. In this regard, a differentiation is made between resilience *indicators* and *predictors* of resilience. Kimhi et al. defined the former as *"measures taken after the occurrence of potentially traumatic event"*, while the latter refers to *"measures of resilience taken before the harsh event took place in order to predict people's ability to withstand PTE [potentially traumatic event] in the future, or to create baseline data"*.[16] Our measurement tool is based on predictors of resilience identified through the literature review and listed above.[17] They comprise factors for which there is empirical evidence proving they are generally helpful for an entity to better cope and overcome adversity or crisis. Beyond hybrid interference, we assume broader applicability of these factors in terms of the type of crisis the armed forces could be subject to. Nevertheless, several protective factors that can be subsumed under the concept of cognitive resilience seem to have particular importance for reducing vulnerability towards hybrid interference. Splidsboel defined cognitive resilience as *"the ability to withstand pressure from various ideas spread"*,[18] and it is increased with elements such as critical thinking or tolerance to ambiguity.

In our measurement tool, we were not able to work with the concept of cognitive resilience directly as the survey is not apt to measure its level in soldiers, while other research techniques, preferably experiments, would need to be employed to explore how people process information, develop attitudes, and make decisions. Moreover, factors increasing psychological resilience have only limited presence in the questionnaire for two reasons. First, factors such as self-efficacy or optimism are multi-dimensional concepts, the measurement of which would require decomposing them into multiple indirect questions/statements, which was not an option in order to keep the length of the questionnaire within acceptable limits. Second, questions probing into the respondents' mental state could be perceived as too intrusive and reduce their willingness to fill in the whole questionnaire. Nevertheless, some of these psychological factors permeate through other dimensions of resilience and the related variables, which will allow at least a partial assessment of the soldiers' psychological resilience. For instance, people who feel that they are not doing well in life tend to be more negative in how they trust political institutions or how they perceive justice in society – and vice versa.[19]

[16] KIMHI, Shaul, Yohanan ESHEL, Mooli LAHAD, Dimitry LEYKIN, and Serge LHOMME. National Resilience: A New Self-Report Assessment Scale. *Community Mental Health Journal*. 2019, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 721-731. ISSN 0010-3853. doi: 10.1007/s10597-018-0362-5

[17] For a complete review, see DIVIŠOVÁ, Vendula et al. 2021, ref. 4.

[18] SPLIDSBOEL, Hansen, Flemming. *Russian hybrid warfare: A study of disinformation*. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 2017, DIS report No. 2017:06, ISBN 978-87-7605-880. Available from: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/197644/1/896622703.pdf

[19] BRÜLISAUER, Daniel, Valentin PAUREVIC, and Ruben R. SEIBERLICH. Life Satisfaction and Trust in Political Institutions. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. 2022. ISSN 1556-5068. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4062434

Below, we guide the reader through the questionnaire, we discuss what variables were selected and how we operationalised them for measurement. Most of the questions are answered using a Likert scale, but different approaches were used to measure other variables. We either discuss these approaches throughout the text or comment on them in a summarising table in the Annex. The wording of some questions/statements [in the table in the annex marked with an asterisk] was taken from public opinion polls conducted regularly in the Czech Republic by the CVVM (Public Opinion Research Centre) agency and the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. In particular, we used questions from the following surveys conducted by the CVVM: "*Czech Citizens about Defense of the Czech Republic*",[20] "*Opinions on the Functioning of Democracy and Undemocratic Alternatives of Political System*",[21] "*Trust to Some Public Institutions and Interpersonal Trust*",[22] and "*Public on Concerns of Various Threats and on Expectations for the Future*", as well as the annual survey "*Armed Forces and the Society*" conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.[23] To a lesser extent, we used surveys by other Czech agencies, such as STEM, Focus, IBRS, or Inboox CZ. Despite some of these questions not being ideally formulated, this overlay will allow us to compare the attitudes of the soldiers against the general population and thus identify sources of resilience that are specific to, or more pronounced in, the armed forces' members. For areas specific to the military, apart from the survey published by the Czech MoD, we also used some questions from the "*Armed Forces continuous attitude survey*" conducted annually by the UK Ministry of Defence.[24]

While the conceptual framework and the variables we work with can be adopted for research on armed forces' resilience in other countries, too, the questions we used to measure these variables should be tailored to the local context. It is advisable to use questions from existing national surveys that will allow comparing soldiers with the general population. As we explained above, in our case, the wording of some of these questions is not optimal, hence a balance needs to be sought between the comprehensibility of the questions and the possibility of interpreting the results in view of the data collected for the entire population.

The bulk of the questionnaire measures variables related to the national dimension of resilience, such as political attitudes, patriotism, optimism, or threat perception. Since hybrid interference often aims at disrupting the legitimacy of the state, trust in institutions, political representatives and democracy, this area was particularly pertinent for our project.

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[20] CVVM. *Czech Citizens about Defense of the Czech Republic – Spring 2022* [online]. 2022 [cit. 2023-01-29]. Available from: https://tinyurl.com/2p8s3kx3
[21] CVVM. *Opinions on the Functioning of Democracy and Undemocratic Alternatives of Political System - August/September 2021* [online]. 2022 [cit. 2023-01-29]. Available from: https://tinyurl.com/mpkcpncv
[22] CVVM. *Trust to Some Public Institutions and Interpersonal Trust – Spring 2022* [online]. 2022 [cit. 2023-01-29]. Available from: https://tinyurl.com/ysm8jd2r
[23] CVVM. *Public on Concerns of Various Threats And on Expectations for the Future - November/December 2021* [online]. 2022 [cit. 2023-01-29]. Available from: https://tinyurl.com/36s2443t
[24] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE UNITED Kingdom. *Armed Forces continuous attitude survey: 2022 Results from the 2022 armed forces continuous attitude survey* (AFCAS). 19.5 2022. [online]. [cit. 2023-01-18]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/armed-forces-continuous-attitude-survey-2022

Patriotism is traditionally defined as a "*special affection for one's own country*" or "*a sense of personal identification with the country*".[25] We measure this variable directly by asking the soldiers whether they are proud to be citizens of the Czech Republic (Question 8) and whether patriotism has been among their main motivations for choosing and pursuing a military career (Q22). Or else, patriotism could also be measured less directly by expressing belief in the capabilities of the armed forces of the state.[26] This is captured in Question 21, and partially in Question 26, nevertheless, this one has lesser indicative value for soldiers who are – unlike ordinary citizens – familiar with the actual state of the military, or at least the military branch they belong to, and are more likely to reply to this question based on facts rather than an emotional relationship towards the state and its institutions. As yet another element of patriotism, Nathanson lists the "*willingness to sacrifice to promote the country's good*".[27] Soldiers are required to declare their willingness to risk their lives for the defence of their homeland as part of the military oath, and we can expect that for some of them, a higher level of patriotism has led them to choose and pursue the military profession in the first place. However, in real life, their willingness to sacrifice their own life is subject to different motivations, as reflected in Question 29 investigating the reasons that would compel them to obey an order whose fulfilment could endanger their life, health, or personal freedom. Finally, we ask the respondents about their opinion on the necessity of incorporating topics on patriotism and armed forces into the educational programs in primary and secondary schools (Q25).

As for the political attitudes of soldiers, we inquired about their overall satisfaction with the current political situation (Q9) and the preferred foreign policy orientation of the country (set of statements under Q10). In the context of hybrid interference, we were particularly interested in attitudes on membership of the country in NATO and the EU and the preferred foreign policy orientation towards the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. Another set of questions probed into the soldiers' view of the democratic regime and support for non-democratic alternatives to the political system. The first question asks the respondents to express their general satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country (Q11) using the Likert scale. The attitude towards the democratic regime is measured through three statements (Q12) that help us assess how resolute and unconditional the respondent's support towards democracy is, instead of a more direct question that could be less effective in obtaining valid answers. Question 13 examines support towards non-democratic, authoritarian forms of government represented by a communist regime, an authoritarian regime led by a strong leader, and a military dictatorship.

Extreme or polarised political attitudes within the military can lead to disputes and eventually undermine the social cohesion of the unit. In Question 14, we investigate the impact of political discussions among soldiers on their mutual relationships. We first assess the respondents' interest and engagement in politics before asking about the occurrence of political discussions within their units and how these affect the atmosphere and mutual relationships at the workplace. This question already moves to evaluating the social

[25] NATHANSON, Stephen. *Patriotism*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1993, pp. 34–35, Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/patriotism/
[26] KIMHI, Shaul et al. 2019, ref. 16.
[27] NATHANSON, Stephen, 1993, ref. 25.

resilience of armed forces, with cohesion being one of the key determinants of the moral component of the fighting power.

In Question 15, we ask soldiers to express their level of trust or distrust in different institutions and persons. Apart from the political representatives and political institutions, we included security forces (armed forces, police) and different types of media but also representatives of the General staff, Ministry of Defence and commanders at different levels. Trust in the military command is an essential part of institutional resilience, with leadership being among the key components of the moral dimension of fighting power. Trust in commanders at the unit level is essential to building and maintaining cohesion.

Perceived injustice can lead to frustration, distrust or even radicalisation and, as such, is a vulnerability that could be exploited through the influence activities of the adversary. We measure this variable in Questions 16 and 17 through the respondents' assessment of human rights compliance in general and perception of equal treatment of their own reference group. Apart from the perception of justice as part of the national dimension of resilience, we also use this question to measure personal satisfaction as an important variable under the psychological dimension. Questions 18, 19, and 20 indicate a person's optimism and the related threat perception. On a Likert scale, they are asked to express the extent to which they are afraid of different security threats enumerated in a list. Threat assessment can reflect the current security situation but also a person's personality and his/her optimistic or pessimistic view of the world and more generally, personal satisfaction. How soldiers agree or diverge in threat assessment can also affect the cohesion of their units or their willingness to perform certain tasks, including participating in military missions. In another question, we assess less directly a person's optimism and personal satisfaction by their positive or negative view of the future with regard to themselves, their loved ones, the Czech society, and also the future of Europe and humanity as a whole. In Question 21, soldiers express their views on defence policy by indicating their degree of agreement with a set of statements on the perspectives of defending the sovereignty of the Czech Republic either by its own forces or with the help of allies and the acceptable cost of defending state sovereignty. The wording of these questions is taken from a public opinion poll carried out periodically in the Czech Republic, which will allow us to compare the attitudes of armed forces' members with those of the general population.

Belonging to the armed forces can represent a significant source of social resilience but also a vulnerability in the case of a member's dissatisfaction with the functioning of this organisation or his position in it. Exploring motivation for choosing and pursuing a military career (Q22) can help us to understand the relationship that binds an individual to the armed forces and the degree of his loyalty. Respondents choose their motivation from a list of items ranging from pragmatic reasons, such as an attractive salary, through the appreciation of the military hierarchy and discipline towards different benefits and opportunities the military profession offers, such as the adoption of unique skills or the development of physical fitness.

In terms of institutional resilience, the loyalty of soldiers to the armed forces is crucial both in terms of maintaining a sufficient number of military professionals to carry out the tasks entrusted to the organisation as well as in terms of their motivation to carry out these tasks. Loyalty is another concept that cannot be measured directly but needs to be investigated through other variables. In business, several popular tools help to evaluate customers' loyalty

such as the Customer Loyalty Index[28] or the Net Promoter Score (NPS).[29] We used the latter tool, which allows for estimating loyalty through two questions (Q23 and Q24). In the first one, the respondents express how likely they would be to recommend military service to other people. In the second question, they express with what likelihood they would choose military service as their profession again. Moreover, through Question 32, as part of the "personal satisfaction" variable, we try to establish the degree to which the soldiers are satisfied with the military as an employer, including how their career affects their status and socioeconomic position. An individual's dissatisfaction with their service in the armed forces might decrease psychological resilience in terms of the overall level of satisfaction/happiness. This represents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by an adversary.

We consider morale as one of the essential predictors of the armed forces' institutional resilience since it relates directly to the military's fighting power, and it has been a frequent target of adversarial influencing activities. It consists of 1) moral cohesion and moral integrity, 2) motivation, and 3) leadership. We mostly derived our understanding of these variables from the UK Defence Doctrine.[30] In Question 27, we directly asked the respondents to evaluate the level of morale at the level of themselves, their closest colleagues and immediate subordinates, their immediate superiors and commanders, members of their unit/facility and the military as a whole. Aware of the problematic validity of this question due to the multidimensionality of the concept, we explored the morale also through other indirect questions.

Cohesion, another element of the moral dimension of fighting power, applies to a state under which *"individuals work together, share tasks and rewards, and provide mutual support to achieve a common aim",* it is cemented through shared identity and experiences, and it is sustained by shared values and genuine comradeship that endures *"even as the experience of violence and fear of death and injury begin to pervade an individual's conscious and subconscious."*[31] Question 31 helped us assess the sense of collective identity by asking the soldiers about their personal relationships with the military. We included statements such as *"I feel a strong sense of belonging to my unit"* or *"I feel a strong personal attachment to the military as a whole"* to account for their sense of belonging and shared identity.

Collective identity is also built through adherence to values, such as courage, loyalty, selfless commitment, discipline, moral integrity, honour, and respect. Asking soldiers directly about how they personally live up to those values in connection with their military profession would most probably lead to results with questionable validity. Instead, in Question 28, they are asked to position their nearest commander on a 5-point scale of which one pole represents traditional military values (see Table 1) and the other their opposites (e.g., courage vs cowardice, loyalty vs disloyalty). We assumed that the extent to which the leaders live up to those values affects how these would be embodied by their subordinates. In this regard, the UK Defence Doctrine characterises leadership as *"projecting personality and purpose to*

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[28] BEST, Roger J. *Market-Based Management*. Essex: Pearson, 2014. ISBN 978-1-292-02039-6. p 29.
[29] What is NPS? Your ultimate guide to Net Promoter Score. In: *Qualtrics* [online]. 2023 [cit. 2023-01-26]. Available from: https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-management/customer/net-promoter-score/
[30] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2014, ref. 14.
[31] Ibid.

influence subordinates and other key stakeholders (such as contractors) to prevail in demanding circumstances". This approach helps solve the validity problem of this measurement while contributing to the assessment of leadership as one of the essential components of morale.

As already mentioned in connection to Question 15, the soldiers are asked to express their level of trust or mistrust in the military command at different levels, from their immediate superior to the Chief of the General Staff. Confidence in leadership – as well as colleagues from the unit – is also closely related to the individual's motivation to pursue a military career and execute tasks. Motivation is also subject to external influences, most importantly public opinion. In this regard, the UK Defence Doctrine perceives the will to fight as "*substantially reinforced and sustained by the belief that the nation supports us*". The social and political support of the military as perceived by the military servicemembers is explored in Question 33. Interestingly, the above-mentioned doctrine goes on to say that motivation is "*also underpinned by the knowledge that we enjoy a reputation that is built on an honest assessment of what is deliverable.*" We probe into this issue in Question 26, in which we ask the soldiers to assess the capabilities of the army in terms of its readiness, morale, and the resulting ability to fulfil its tasks.

Finally, we investigated the respondents' experiences with a number of negative phenomena in the armed forces. Part of them represented different activities used as part of hybrid interference, such as corruption, identity theft, hacker attack, a fraudulent offer of friendship or relationship via email/social networks, or espionage. Other phenomena that can negatively affect camaraderie and social cohesion within the units represent vulnerabilities to be potentially exploited by the adversary. The display of such behaviour also contradicts one or more of the military values, such as respect or moral integrity. These include behaviour such as bossing, mobbing, intimidation, manifestations of racial hatred and xenophobia, discrimination, or political agitation in the military. We explore whether soldiers encountered these phenomena personally – once or several times - or only heard of them from another source.

We also included a few demographic questions (Questions 1-7) at the beginning of the questionnaire. We asked the soldiers about their gender, age, the highest level of education completed, military rank, the length of career in that rank, and the overall length of military career (active duty).

Data Analysis and Interpretation

The survey is only apt to measure predictors of resilience at the level of individual soldiers. Even though the results can be aggregated for the different units, we will only use these aggregated data to compare the groups with each other rather than to draw conclusions about resilience at the unit level. That would require the collection of different data that would give more importance to the level of institutional resilience. It is through the lenses of individual soldiers that the survey allows us to evaluate each of the resilience dimensions, while we keep in mind the limitations this brings to the interpretation of results.

In the annex, we provide detailed information on data analysis. Next to each question, the reader can find what variable it enabled to measure or evaluate and the corresponding dimension of resilience (psychological, social, institutional, or national). For each question,

we also indicate whether it is subject to quantitative or qualitative data analysis, with the latter supporting the former. In the first case, it means the results are to be converted into a numerical scale with negative values indicating lower resilience and positive values expressing higher resilience. Since there are different methods of collecting responses and a different number of response options throughout the questionnaire, we will convert the data from each question to a 100-point scale to allow their further aggregation. In the second case, we will only interpret the data qualitatively to give more depth to the data evaluated through numerical values. An important criterion for the selection of the questions to be evaluated quantitatively was its value neutrality. In other words, if, for instance, we ask the soldiers about their political attitudes, we refrained from deciding on which are the desirable attitudes in terms of increased resilience.

In the next step, we will construct an index for all resilience dimensions by aggregating data in the form of a 0-100 points scale for variables corresponding to each of the four dimensions. Following these steps, we will end up with four values of the index – each representing one dimension (psychological, social, institutional, national). These values will not be further aggregated to get a single umbrella index for the armed forces' resilience, since each of the four dimensions operates at different levels of analysis and it only makes sense to evaluate them separately. Also, it needs to be emphasised that the resulting index values will only give us a very crude indication of the resilience predictors. We set no boundaries for different levels of resilience depending on the index value. Instead, the first round of measurements for different cohorts in the military will function as a baseline measure that will allow either tracking development in the index value in time or comparison across different groups in the military. Moreover, we urge potential users of this survey to always interpret the index value with extreme caution and use qualitative data to gain a deeper understanding of the resilience predictors.

Pilot Testing of the Questionnaire

To create and distribute the questionnaire, we used an online survey tool "Survio", which also allows data analysis by filtering the answers according to the specified criteria as well as identifying correlations between questions. We conducted a pilot survey to evaluate our measurement tool – most importantly, we tested whether the formulations and concepts were comprehensible for the respondents, the time needed to fill in the survey, and the willingness to complete the questionnaire. For the pilot testing, we used several groups. In the first round, we approached several members of the academic staff – both civilian and military employees - at the University of Defence in Brno (where the authors of this paper are also based). Their comments helped refine the wording of several questions/statements in the survey and thus increase its overall validity. In the second round, we distributed the adjusted questionnaire among a group of first-year students based at the Faculty of Military Leadership at the University of Defence and among the students from the Senior Officer Course holding ranks of captains, majors, or lieutenant colonels. The second round of the pilot testing did not result in the need for further refinement of the measuring tool. We found that it took 20 to 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Moreover, by actively communicating the distribution of the questionnaire and assuring the respondents about the confidentiality of the survey - which was to a great extent facilitated by the authors' role as lecturers at the institution - a very high response rate has been secured.

Conclusion and Discussion

In the article, we presented a questionnaire as a tool for measuring the resilience of the Czech armed forces to hybrid interference. The development of the questionnaire elaborated on the previous conceptualisation of this concept that underlined the need to perceive the concept as multi-dimensional consisting of psychological, social, institutional, and national components. This complexity represented a relatively big challenge in terms of subsequent operationalisation and, therefore, the selection of suitable variables for the questionnaire. Moreover, we had to balance the need to assess the resilience of members of the armed forces as comprehensively as possible while keeping the questionnaire at a reasonable length.

We explained the impossibility of measuring resilience as such, given that its true extent will only become apparent during a crisis, and therefore the necessity to limit our research to the evaluation of predictors of resilience. Based on the previous conceptualisation of armed forces' resilience, we identified a set of variables that, in theory, affect the resilience of the military as a specific institution as well as that of their individual members. While it was possible to measure some variables, such as patriotism, political attitudes, or threat perception, in a rather straightforward manner, other variables were much more complex or too sensitive for direct inquiry. That is why we had to decompose them into multiple variables (e.g., moral cohesion, leadership) or ask about them in a less direct way to obtain valid responses (e.g., optimism, personal satisfaction).

As we pointed out above, to a greater extent, we were unable to include variables from the psychological dimension of resilience due to their excessive complexity and sensitivity. There are several ways how to compensate for this gap in our measurement tool. The required data can be obtained through surveys conducted regularly in the armed forces that tend to be quite comprehensive. Alternatively, some of these variables – especially in the realm of cognitive resilience – could be verified experimentally. There are also limits to the assessment of the institutional resilience of the armed forces, especially at the level of its leadership. The highest command is not easily accessible to researchers, even though the impact it has on the subordinate levels, as well as the military leaders' knowledge of the inner workings of this institution is of fundamental importance.

In the next phase of the project, the survey will be distributed to different cohorts in the armed forces whose selection is tailored to the need to collect data across different ranks, generations as well as military specialisations, while collecting a representative sample will not be aimed for in this case. The survey will be accompanied by interviews conducted with respondents from the Ministry of Defence and the Czech Armed Forces to access data, which will help us to evaluate the variables that the questionnaire cannot grasp for the reasons mentioned above.

Even though the questionnaire was tailor-made for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in terms of the final questions' selection and wording, the variables it measures are more generally applicable to other cases. This means that any potential user of this tool will need to adapt the questions to the specifics of their country and armed forces to ensure its relevance and validity.

Annex 1 – Operationalisation of the Armed Forces' Resilience to Hybrid Interference

No.	Questions / statements used in the survey	Type of response	Variable	Resilience dimension	Data analysis	Scale / Values
1-7	Demographic questions (belonging to a group of respondents, gender, age, education, rank, military career)					
8	Are you proud to be a citizen of the Czech Republic?*	Likert scale	Patriotism	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
9	Are you personally satisfied with the current political situation in the Czech Republic?*	Likert scale	Political attitudes	N	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
10	How would you evaluate the foreign policy orientation of the Czech Republic?*		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- Is it good that we are a member of NATO?		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- Is it good that we are a member of the European Union?		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- We should be a militarily neutral state.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- We should seek closer friendly relations with Russia.	Likert scale	Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- We should strengthen our bond with the US.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- I am worried about a strong Germany.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- Relations with the Visegrad countries (V4) should take precedence over the EU and NATO.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- We should seek closer friendly relations with the People's Republic of China.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
11	Are you generally satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the Czech Republic?*	Likert scale	Political attitudes	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
12	What is your attitude towards the democratic regime?*	A sum of 10 points were allocated within all three responses.	Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
	- For people like me, it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.		Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
	- Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian form of government may be better than a democratic one.		Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
	- Democracy is better than any other form of government.		Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
13	What is your attitude towards non-democratic alternatives to the political system?*		Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
	- We should go back to the communist way of government.	Likert scale	Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
	- It would be best to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader who would decide everything quickly.		Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
	- The armed forces should rule this country.		Political attitudes / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QL	N/A
14	Politics and relations in the unit	Expression of the frequency of behaviour (continuum from very frequently to never)	Political attitudes / Morale-Cohesion	N / S	QL	N/A
	- Are you going to the polls?		Political attitudes / Morale-Cohesion	N / S	QL	N/A
	- Are you interested in political affairs in the country?		Political attitudes / Morale-Cohesion	N / S	QL	N/A
	- Do you follow political news and journalism?		Political attitudes / Morale-Cohesion	N / S	QL	N/A
	- Do you discuss politics within your unit/workplace?		Political attitudes / Morale-Cohesion	N / S	QL	N/A
	- Do these political discussions disrupt the atmosphere and relationships within your unit/workplace?		Political attitudes / Morale-Cohesion	N / S	QL	N/A
15	Please express your level of trust or distrust in the following institutions and persons:*		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- President of the Republic		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Government		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Parliament of the Czech Republic		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Regional Council and the Regional Council President		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Municipal Council and the mayor		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Courts		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Police of the Czech Republic		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Armed Forces of the Czech Republic		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Intelligence services		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Non-profit organisations	Likert scale	Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Public opinion polls		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Political parties and movements		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Private radios and televisions		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Public media		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Printed and electronic journals and newspapers		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Personal blogs and profiles on social networks		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Independent alternative sites		Political attitudes*Trust in institutions	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Chief of the General Staff		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Commander of your unit or facility		Morale-Leadership / Morale-Cohesion	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2

#	Item	Scale	Category			
	- Your immediate superior		Morale-Leadership / Morale-Cohesion	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Your colleagues and subordinates		Morale-Leadership / Morale-Cohesion	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
16	In your opinion, are human rights respected in the Czech Republic?*	Likert scale	Perception of justice / Personal satisfaction	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
17	Do you think that people like you are treated equally and fairly in our current political system?*	Likert scale	Perception of justice / Personal satisfaction	N	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
18	Think about the current security situation. Do you feel safe or threatened?*	Likert scale	Threat perception / Personal satisfaction	N	QN	-2, -1, +1, +2
19	Which threats do you think threaten the Czech Republic? Please indicate to what extent you are afraid of them or not.*		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Terrorist attack		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Economic crisis		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Natural disasters		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Organised crime		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Corruption	Likert scale	Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Illegal migration		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Cyber attacks		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Social unrest		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- A military attack by a state		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Subversive acts of a state		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Political extremism		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Religious radicalism		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
	- Climate change		Threat perception	N	QL	N/A
20	How do you see the future with regard to:*		Optimism / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- You and your loved ones	Likert scale (expression of a level of optimism or pessimism)	Optimism / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Czech society		Optimism / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- Europe		Optimism / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- The future of humanity as a whole		Optimism / Personal satisfaction	N / P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
21	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about defence?*		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- State sovereignty must be defended at all costs.		Political attitudes / Patriotism	N	QL	N/A
	- It is useless to think about the defence of the state, because such a small country as ours is still decided by the great powers.	Likert scale	Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- Allies in the NATO would help us in the event of a military threat.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- If something were to happen, we wouldn't be able to defend ourselves anyway.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- The costs of defence of the state unnecessarily burden the state budget.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
	- Our armed forces are at the level of the armies of developed western countries.		Political attitudes	N	QL	N/A
22	What motivated you to choose and pursue a military career?		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Attractive salary and job security		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Non-financial social benefits		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Family tradition, personal or historical role model		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Work with equipment and technologies that are not usual in civilian life		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Patriotism and awareness of civic duty		Morale-Motivation / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- Order, hierarchy, and discipline	Selection of 5 items from a list and their hierarchisation.	Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Prestige of the profession and social appreciation		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Community and camaraderie of like-minded people		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- The possibility of academic education		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Adoption of unique skills		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Adventure		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- The opportunity to travel and see the world		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Access to weapons		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Combining work and personal hobbies		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Sports and the development of physical fitness		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
23	How likely would you be to recommend military service to your family members, friends, or acquaintances?	Net Promoter Score (NPS)	Loyalty	I	QN	N/A
24	How likely would you be to choose military service as your profession again?	Net Promoter Score (NPS)	Loyalty	I	QN	N/A

#	Question	Scale	Dimension			
25	Is it right that the issues of civil defence, basic military preparedness, patriotic education and explaining the importance of armed forces in a democratic society should be included in the educational programmes of primary and secondary schools?*	Likert scale	Patriotism	N	QL	N/A
26	Try to assess in more detail the capabilities of our armed forces. Do you think our military is capable of:*		Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- Helping citizens during natural disasters		Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- Fulfil our international obligations abroad		Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- It is well trained	Likert scale	Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- It has high morals and discipline		Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- It is ready to combat international terrorism		Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
	- It is able to defend the territory of our state		Fighting power-different components / Patriotism	I / N	QL	N/A
27	In your opinion, what is the level of morale of:		Morale-General	I / S	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Your person		Morale-General	I / S	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Your closest colleagues and immediate subordinates	A continuum from very high to very low.	Morale-General	I / S	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Your immediate superiors		Morale-General	I / S	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Generally, members of your unit or facility		Morale-General	I / S	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- The military as a whole		Morale-General	I / S	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	Which qualities and values do you think best describe your nearest commander?		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
28	- Cowardice vs Courage		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
	- Disloyalty vs Loyalty	5-point scale (expressing inclination towards one of the opposing values)	Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
	- Selfishness vs Selfless commitment		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
	- Indiscipline vs Discipline		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
	- Unscrupulousness x Moral integrity		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
	- Dishonesty x Honour		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
	- Intolerance x Respect		Morale-Leadership	I	QN	-2, -1, 0, +1, +2
29	If you were to receive an order, the fulfilment of which could endanger your life, health or freedom, what would compel you to obey the order?		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Fear of disciplinary action in case of refusal or failure to comply with the order		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- The assurance that my loved ones will be taken care of in the event of my capture, injury, or death		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Confidence that my superior will support me even in case of failure		Morale-Motivation / Morale-Leadership	I	QL	N/A
	- The opportunity to convince myself and others of my qualities		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Personal conviction about the correctness and inevitability of the order's fulfilment		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- The conviction that to fulfil the order I will receive the maximum possible support from my superior and my unit		Morale-Motivation / Morale-Leadership	I	QL	N/A
	- In case of trouble, others will do their best to save me	Likert scale	Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Knowing that I am adequately trained and equipped to carry out the order		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- The prospect of an award, reward, or promotion		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Awareness of military oath and duty		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- The ability to overcome fear and the instinct of self-preservation		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Fear of shame, humiliation, and distrust in case of refusal or failure to comply with an order		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- Striving to live up to the honour and positive reputation of my unit/workplace		Morale-Motivation / Morale-Cohesion	I	QL	N/A
	- Legality of the order and its compliance with the law		Morale-Motivation	I	QL	N/A
	- A chance to save (the life of) someone in my unit		Morale-Motivation / Morale-Cohesion	I	QL	N/A
30	Have you encountered the following phenomena in connection with the exercise of your military profession in the Czech Armed Forces?	Personally, several times.	Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Offer of money		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Corrupt offer of counter-service		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Extortion	Personally, once; In the circle of closest colleagues; In the wider circle of my acquaintances; From second hand; Only from media; Never.	Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Bossing (bullying from a superior)		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Mobbing (bullying by the collective)		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Identity theft		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Hacker attack		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Fraudulent offer of friendship or relationship via email/social networks		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Fraudulent commercial offer via email/social networks		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Intimidation		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Manipulation of people		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A

	- Espionage		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Discreditation and defamation		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Dissemination of disinformation		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Manifestations of racial hatred and xenophobia		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Political agitation in the military		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Data and information falsification		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Discrimination		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
	- Sexual harassment		Morale-Cohesion / Moral integrity (S)	S	QL	N/A
31	**Personal relationship to the military - to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**		**Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty**	**I**	**QN**	**+2, +1, -1, -2**
	- I am proud of my military profession.		Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- I am ashamed to wear the uniform in public (e.g., in public transport).		Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	-2, -1, +1, +2
	- I see military service not only as a profession, but as a mission.		Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- My family is proud that I serve in the military.	Likert scale	Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- I feel a strong sense of belonging to my unit/workplace.		Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- I feel a strong personal attachment to my unit/facility.		Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- I feel a strong personal attachment to the military as a whole.		Morale-Cohesion / Loyalty	I / S	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
32	**Satisfaction with the armed forces as an employer - are you satisfied with:***		**Personal satisfaction**	**P**	**QN**	**+2, +1, -1, -2**
	- Satisfaction with the armed forces as an employer		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With your life in the military		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With your social situation, or the financial security provided by the military		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With your household's standard of living		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With the perspective of your social advancement during your military career	Likert scale	Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With the possibilities of self-realisation in personal and professional life		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With the possibilities of education, increasing qualifications		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With the work team and its values		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
	- With your work-life balance		Personal satisfaction	P	QN	+2, +1, -1, -2
33	**Social and political perception of the military - what do you think it is:**		**Morale-Motivation**	**I**	**QN**	**+2, +1, 0, -1, -2**
	- The prestige of the military profession in the eyes of the public	*Continuum* from very high to very low	Morale-Motivation	I	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Support of the military from the Czech society as a whole		Morale-Motivation	I	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Support of the military by the political representation of the state		Morale-Motivation	I	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2
	- Degree of political neutrality of the armed forces		Morale-Motivation	I	QN	+2, +1, 0, -1, -2

Note 1: Resilience dimensions: N = National, I = Institutional, S = Social, P = Psychological

Note 2: Data analysis: QN = Quantitative, QL = Qualitative

Note 3: Questions marked with asterisk were taken from public opinion polls conducted regularly in the Czech Republic.