Social Policy and Society (2024), page 1 of 15
doi:10.1017/S1474746424000010
ARTICLE
Does Performance Matter? The Influence of Attitudes
Towards Welfare State Performance on Voting for
Rightwing and Leftwing Populist Parties
Steven Saxonberg1
'2
, Tomas Sirovatka2
and Martin G u z i 2
'Sodertorn University, Stockholm, Sweden and 2
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Corresponding author: Steven Saxonberg; Email: saxonberg90@gmail.com
(Received 9 February 2023; revised 17 August 2023; accepted 24 October 2023)
Abstract
In recent decades, populist parties and leaders have obtained great political success. Since populism plays
on voter dissatisfaction with the political elite, we might expect that dissatisfaction with the welfare state
should also play a role. In this study, we suggest measures to assess welfare state performance (WSP), and
we examine how assessment of WSP helps to explain support for the populist political parties - both
rightwing and leftwing. Our findings are based on the sixth round of European Social Survey data that has a
special module on democracy, which includes questions that enables us to measure WSP. This article
shows that WSP is a significant predictor in explaining support for populist parties, but the dynamics differ
between how WSP influences support for leftwing populist (IWP) and rightwing populist (RWP) parties.
Keywords: Welfare state performance; welfare attitudes; voting; populism; leftwing populism; rightwing populism
Introduction
A central theme i n the populism literature has been the lack of trust i n the political elite. Yet, even
if people do not trust the political elite, they might have faith i n the social welfare institutions and
the ability of these institutions to solve the country's social problems if only the 'right' people were
in government. Even though there have been ample studies o n welfare attitudes and voting for
populist parties (see below), the issue of W S P remains rather unexplored. Since populism plays o n
voter dissatisfaction with the political elite, we might expect dissatisfaction with the welfare state to
play a role as well.
A recent study shows a strong link between subjective perceptions of W S P and satisfaction with
democracy (Sirovatka et al, 2019). It turns out that those who perceive that the welfare state is
performing well are also more likely to be satisfied with the way the democratic system is
functioning i n their country. Meanwhile, other studies have shown a connection between
dissatisfaction with democracy and support for populist parties (Lubbers et al, 2002; Belanger and
Aarts, 2006; McLaren, 2012a, 2012b; Rooduijn, 2018). Logically, because of transitivity, we would
also expect those who have negative views toward W S P to be more likely to vote for populist
parties. Yet, so far, we have not found any studies that have actually tested this link. Moreover,
even though rightwing populism has dominated the studies of populism, there is a growing
recognition that welfare attitudes among voters of leftwing populist ( L W P ) parties might differ
from voters of rightwing populist ( R W P ) parties (e.g., Visser, et al, 2014; Rooduijn and
Akkerman, 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon, 2018; van Hauwaert and van Kessel, 2018; Burgoon,
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
2 Steven Saxonberg et al.
et al, 2019; Busemeyer et al, 2021). If this is true, we might expect W S P to influence L W P voters
differently than R W P voters. This differentiation is important given the increasing prominence of
L W P i n Europe. For example, i n the previous decade, L W P parties came to power i n Greece and
Slovakia, they also joined a government coalition i n Spain and have participated i n local coalition
governments i n Germany. Consequently, this article not only examines the link between W S P and
voting for populist parties, it also examines whether W S P influences voting for L W P and R W P
parties differently.
The research question thus becomes: what kind of influence do subjective perceptions of WSP
have on voting for LWP and RWP parties and do they influence LWP and RWP voting
differently?
This article proceeds with a theory section, which is broken into three parts: one presents the
most c o m m o n current theories that explain the differences between welfare attitudes among L W P
and R W P voters; the second discusses the discourse o n W S P ; the third presents our hypotheses.
A method section follows, after which we present our results and analysis, to be followed b y our
conclusion.
Theoretical discussion
Below we discuss the difference between L W P and R W P regarding welfare issues before discussing
the discourse o n W S P and then presenting our hypotheses.
Welfare differences between LWP and RWP
The literature o n welfare attitudes and support for p o p u l i s m initially linked support for R W P
with welfare chauvinism. That is, supporters of R W P believe that 'natives' should get more
welfare, while outgroups (such as immigrants a n d m i n o r i t y ethnic groups) should get less
(e.g., V a n Oorschot, 2006; de Koster et al, 2013; Emmenegger and K l e m m e n s e n , 2013; V a n der
W a a l et al, 2013). Their anti-immigrant views present an example of h o w the socio-cultural
dimension is more important for them than the socio-economic dimension (Rooduijn et al,
2017; van Hauwaert and van Kessel, 2018; Harteveld et al, 2021). R W P is also becoming more
supportive of generous but selective welfare policies (e.g., Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016;
Schumacher a n d v a n Keersbergen, 2016; Busemeyer et al, 2022), although this support is
typically combined with authoritarian attitudes. This means that moral judgements o n the
deservingness of welfare state provisions represent the core of R W P support for the welfare state
(Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016, 2018; Busemeyer, 2022; de Blok and K u m l i n , 2022). Consequently, R W P
supporters want to preserve welfare state provisions for the natives and 'hard-working' people
(Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Schumacher and van Keersbergen, 2016). R W P supporters also oppose
social investment policies (e.g. Busemeyer et al, 2022; Rathgeb and Busemeyer, 2022). In other
words, R W P supporters want a generous welfare state, but one that is only generous toward those
w h o m they deem to be 'deserving'. Therefore, they argue for cuts i n welfare programmes for groups
w h o m they perceive to be undeserving, like the unemployed. They want to coerce social assistance
recipients into joining activation/workfare programmes. In addition, they want to allocate taxpayer
money to the 'hard-working producers', typically through pensions and healthcare (van Hootegem
et al, 2021; Busemeyer et al, 2022; Rathgeb and Busemeyer, 2022).
Thus, studies show that R W P voters support policies promoting equity principle, but not
equality, because equity benefits are based o n contributions and thus linked to 'deservedness'
(Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018).
Studies o n L W P generally conclude that, i n contrast to R W P , L W P parties claim to have
socialistic or social democratic principles. Their supporters share egalitarian and altruistic values
and rely o n the role of the state (e.g., Rooduijn et al, 2017). They also oppose the European
Union's (EU) austerity policies and engage i n some amount of economic nationalism. A s Kriesi
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Does Performance Matter? 3
(2014: 370) notes, rather than emphasise the nation, L W P emphasises the defense of the national
welfare state against Europe (we would add against globalisation) and aims to defend 'the
economic privileges of domestic sectors of the economy and of domestic production sites'.
Even though most studies conclude that L W P does not share the anti-immigrant, welfare
chauvinist stances of R W P , Busemeyer et al. (2022) find that L W P supporters often share the
welfare chauvinist views of R W P . This contrasts the majority of studies, such as Jessoula et al.
(2022), M u d d e and Rowira Kaltwasser (2013) who write about exclusionary populism for the right
and inclusionary populism of the left.
Thus, L W P social policies are generally based on defending the national welfare state,
egalitarianism (in contrast to R W P ) , and anti-globalisation (similar to R W P ) (e.g., M a r c h , 2007).
Recently, the window of opportunity for L W P has increased because social democratic
governments have often supported some amount of welfare state retrenchment ( M a r c h and
Rommerskirchen, 2015). In terms of social policy objectives, L W P voters strive for equal
opportunities, as well as for income redistribution. They also want to protect the rights of the
socially excluded like migrants and jobless (e.g., Visser, et al, 2014: 542; Rooduijn, et al, 2017;
Burgoon, et al, 2019), marginalised gender groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015; Salmela and v o n
Scheve, 2018; Kantola and Lombardo, 2019) and the disabled (March, 2017; Tekdemir; 2019).
In summary, while both R W P and L W P populist voters desire well-functioning welfare states,
their views on deservingness greatly diverge. L W P voters are more traditionally social democratic
in wanting universalist, inclusive, egalitarian, and redistributive policies and therefore, deem all
residents of the country to be 'deserving'. R W P voters, by contrast, believe that certain groups,
such as immigrants, certain minority groups, and people who are unemployed out of 'laziness' are
not deserving. Therefore, R W P voters are not so concerned with reducing inequality or poverty,
but rather with the principle of procedural fairness understood as deservingness.
Perceptions of welfare state performance and populist voting
Previous studies show that L W P and R W P parties follow different social policy strategies, but do
differences i n perceptions of W S P among L W P and R W P voters help explain differences i n their
electoral choices? So far, no studies have investigated this issue.
W e recently published a study showing that those who perceive that W S P is doing poorly i n
their country are also likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning i n their
country. Thus, they consider welfare performance to be a sign of good governance (Sirovatka et al,
2019). Meanwhile, other recent studies show that those who are dissatisfied with the functioning
of their country's democracy are more likely to vote for populist parties (Lubbers et al, 2002;
Belanger and Aarts, 2006; McLaren, 2012a, 2012b; Rooduijn, 2018). Even though such studies
tend to focus on R W P , some studies have compared them and concluded that dissatisfaction with
democracy is only important for R W P parties but not L W P ones (e.g., A k k e r m a n et al, 2017).
However, so far, we are not aware of any studies that investigate the relationship between W S P
and support for populism. M o s t studies of W S P examine the policy feedback, and its influence on
support for social policies focusing on mutual reinforcement mechanism between W S P and trust
into welfare institutions (e.g., Busemeyer et al, 2021; Busemeyer, 2022; de Blok and K u m l i n , 2022;
Laenen and Gugushvili, 2022). Studies also explain that citizen's dissatisfaction with welfare
policies can imply their support for a stronger welfare state or alternatively support for leaner
welfare state, depending on the level of trust i n welfare institutions (e.g., Busemeyer et al, 2021).
Consequently, our contribution will be to investigate whether W S P also influences support for
different types of populist parties.
Even though we have not found any studies that directly link W S P to support for populism, van
Hootegem et al (2021) come close i n their discussion of resentment coming from welfare state
design. They argue that R W P voters feel resentment toward the welfare state, because they believe
it is behaving unfairly by giving benefits to people w h o m they do not think deserve it. This implies
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
4 Steven Saxonberg et al.
that voters choose R W P parties because they think that the welfare state is performing poorly,
although they do not use the term W S P .
Despite the growing literature on W S P , operationalisations and measurements of W S P are
not uniform. Studies tend to either focus on ex-ante assessments of social policies (preferred
policy objectives and measures) or ex-post assessments (satisfaction with the actual policies).
The latter is generally considered to be a subjective measure of welfare state performance (e.g.,
V a n Oorschot et al., 2022). However, depending on data availability, a variety of indications
may be used as measurements. General assessments of the economic, m o r a l and social outcomes
of social policies deal with the issue of whether the welfare state is doing well i n 'preventing
poverty' and 'creating a more equal society' (e.g., V a n Oorschot et al, 2012). Often studies
employ more specific measures of W S P like satisfaction with the standard of living of the
unemployed, the pensioners, satisfaction with the state of healthcare and education i n the
country (e.g., Roosma et al, 2013; Baute and M e u l e m a n , 2020), or whether it provides highquality
social services (Baute, 2022). W h i l e ex-post assessment of W S P focusing m a i n l y o n
outcomes are c o m m o n l y used, some studies pay attention to design of policies indicated as
procedural fairness/deservingness, target groups, and generosity and/or quality of the concrete
measures (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik 2016, 2018).
In this study, we follow such scholars as Ringen (1987) and Polavieja (2013) i n c o m b i n i n g the
ex-ante assessments and ex-post assessments i n defining W S P as the difference between citizens'
expectations for social policies and their assessment of government performance. In other
words, the subjective evaluations of welfare state performance are indicated by a discrepancy
between what citizens expect f r o m the government and what they perceive is provided by the
government. This definition allows us to measure W S P independently of the voters' ideological
beliefs.
O u r study investigates whether the policy deficit influences support for populist parties.
Unfortunately, as is often the case, we do not have perfect data to fully test our assumptions,
because of the complexity of the issues, which we discuss below. Thus, we only test the hypotheses
about W S P for which we have data, which means we are limited to using two measurements of
W S P as independent variables: (1) the state's efficiency i n reducing social inequalities, and (2) its
efficiency i n reducing poverty. These measures capture the influence of social policies on social
stratification, which scholars, such as Esping-Andersen (1990), consider to be a central task of the
welfare state. For this reason, they are c o m m o n l y used i n measuring W S P . Although these two
variables are not truly independent even at the conceptual level (since poverty represents a
particular k i n d of inequality), we prefer to use both measurements since they correspond to two
different objectives of W S P : protection of the m i n i m u m living standard, and horizontal and
vertical equity (Barr and Whynes, 1993). W e must omit the equity and deservingness dimension
of W S P , which we would expect to be important for R W P , because the survey does not include
questions about policy expectations for these issues.
Interestingly, although the European Social Survey (ESS) does not ask questions about
expectations toward equity policies, it does ask a question about satisfaction with the
healthcare system. O n e can consider this to be an equity issue, as receiving healthcare is not
based o n everyone being equal, but rather o n the equity principle of if y o u are sick, y o u need
care. Furthermore, i n most countries healthcare benefits for being sick are based o n the
insurance principle, w h i c h also belongs to the equity category. Since there are no questions
about expectations toward healthcare, we can only look at one part of the equation satisfaction
w i t h healthcare. It turns out that w h e n r u n n i n g our full regressions, satisfaction
w i t h healthcare is actually positively correlated w i t h supporting R W P ! That means that voters
do not turn to R W P because they are dissatisfied with equity policies like healthcare. Since we
are not able to design a policy deficit variable for this, we have not included the table with these
results i n our article.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Does Performance Matter? 5
Hypotheses on WSP and support for populist parties
Based o n the discussion above, we formulate our m a i n hypotheses as follows:
1) Solidarity of the left: Since leftist voters want a more generous, egalitarian, and solidaristic
welfare state, deficits i n income inequality reduction a n d i n poverty reduction are
important. Thus, both types of deficits i n W S P will be positively correlated with support for
L W P parties (Rooduijn, et al, 2017; Burgoon et al, 2019).
2) Anti-egalitarianism of the right: R W P voters want an effective, selectively generous welfare
state underpinned with deservingness principles but fear that undeserving people are
getting benefits (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Busemeyer et al, 2021; Busemeyer, 2022; Rathgeb
and Busemeyer, 2022). Since they favour programmes that are based o n equity a n d
reciprocity rather than those that support equality (Ennser-Jeddenastik, 2018), the poverty
reduction and inequality reduction deficits are not an important problem for them and
therefore, will not be statistically significant.
3) Anti-immigration attitudes and welfare chauvinism: Since L W P is more inclusive and R W P
more exclusive, we assume that negative attitudes toward immigrants will matter more than
W S P for R W P voters but not for L W P voters (see theory section). However, we cannot raise
a hypothesis on how anti-immigrant attitudes are affected by welfare chauvinism since we
don't have appropriate data o n this.
Methodology
This article follows the mainstream definitions of populism that emphasise that populist parties
claim to represent 'the people' against a 'corrupt elite' (e.g., Canovan, 1981). In classifying parties
as either L W P or R W P , we use the PopuList databases i n Rooduijn et al. (2019), which have a
reputation as being among the most reliable and widely used lists of populist parties i n Europe.
Then we use Krause and Wagner (2019) to differentiate between L W P and R W P . Although
Krause and Wagner agree with Rooduijn et al. (2019) o n which parties are populist, they also
differentiate between L W P and R W P , while Rooduijn et al. (2019) only note if a party is a leftwing
or rightwing extremist. Thus, we agree, for example, with Krause and Wagner (2019) that the
Slovak party Smer is L W P since it is a member of the socialist international and sits with the
socialist group i n the E U , but it is not an extremist party, and therefore, i n Rooduijn et al. (2019) it
is only listed as being populist. T h e advantage of using well-respected databases that are
commonly accepted within the field is that it minimises the risk of using subjective criteria that
differ f r o m other scholars i n our judgements. T o check on whether a populist party is leftist or
rightist, we also looked at which political group they sit with, i n the E U parliament.
Our empirical data comes f r o m the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2012),
which was collected between September 2012 and August 2013 and the tenth round (ESS, 2020),
which was collected between September 2020 and September 2022. W e chose them because they
contain a special module o n democracy with questions o n welfare state performance. The final
dataset covers twenty-two countries, i n which we identify populist voters for our analysis. Thus,
we drop Cyprus, Czechia, Great Britain, Iceland, Portugal, and Spain i n 2012, and Croatia and
Iceland i n 2020 ESS round since they had no populist voters when the survey was conducted. W e
also drop Albania, Israel, Kosovo, Russia, and Ukraine because relevant country-level data are not
available.
Following such studies o n populist voting as Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018), we estimate the
logistic multilevel random intercept models i n which individuals (level 1) are nested i n their
country (level 2). The dependent variable indicates whether the respondent voted for a L W P or
R W P party i n the last election. W e do not see it as a problem that some of the countries do not
have both an L W P and an R W P party i n the database, because we are interested i n the demand
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6 Steven Saxonberg et dl.
side rather than the supply side. W e assume that every country with democratic elections has a
large number of parties, including both L W P and R W P parties. Therefore, if the demand were
high enough then these parties would make it to the ballot. So, the fact that one country might
'only' have a L W P party on the ballot but not a R W P (or it might have a R W P but not a L W P
party) implies that the demand for one k i n d of populist party was higher than for the other kind.
Consequently, we follow the most important previous studies on populist and extremist
voting such as G i d r o n and H a l l (2017) i n including countries that do not have both types of
parties i n the survey. W e feel confident of our results because they remained robust when we
replicated the estimations on the subsample of countries that have both L W P and R W P parties
(see Appendix A2).
T o assess subjective measures of W S P , we take the difference between citizens' preferences
regarding social policy and their assessment of government efforts i n carrying it out. W e construct
two key variables to capture the difference between citizens' expectations for government policy
and their assessment of it: one i n connection with attempts to reduce poverty, the other i n
connection with efforts to reduce inequality. The poverty-reduction policy deficit variable is
constructed by taking the difference between two survey questions, as measured on an elevenpoint
scale: (1) 'Thinking generally rather than about [country], how important do y o u think it is
for democracy i n general that the government protects all citizens against poverty?'; and (2) 'To
what extent do you think the following statement applies i n [country]: the government i n
[country] protects all citizens against poverty?' Thus, a high score implies a large gap between
expectations and assessments; i n other words, the respondents perceive that the welfare state is
performing poorly.
W e calculate the inequality-reduction policy deficit variable based on the difference i n
responses to two survey questions, as measured on an eleven-point scale: (1) 'Thinking generally
rather than about [country], how important do y o u think it is for democracy i n general that the
government takes measures to reduce differences i n income levels?'; and (2) 'To what extent do
you think the following statement applies i n [country]: the government i n [country] takes
measures to reduce differences i n income levels?'
Since these two W S P variables are highly correlated (correlation = .77) we run separate
regressions for each of them to avoid problems of collinearity.
T o measure a n t i - i m m i g r a n t attitudes, we follow R o o d u i j n a n d B u r g o o n (2018) i n
constructing an index of a n t i - i m m i g r a t i o n attitude (measured f r o m zero to ten) by
c o m b i n i n g three questions: (1) ' W o u l d y o u say it is generally b a d or g o o d for [country]'s
e c o n o m y that people come to live here f r o m other countries?'; (2) ' W o u l d y o u say that
[country]'s cultural life is generally u n d e r m i n e d or enriched by people c o m i n g to live here
f r o m other countries?'; a n d (3) 'Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people
c o m i n g to live here f r o m other countries?' (the C r o n b a c h alpha reliability score is zero point
eight seven i n the p o o l e d sample). Thus, the greater the a n t i - i m m i g r a t i o n attitude of
respondents, the higher their total score w i l l be.
For controls at the individual level, we use gender; four age groups (fifteen to twenty-nine years,
thirty to forty-four years, forty-five to fifty-nine years, and older than sixty); four education levels
(lower secondary, upper/post-secondary vocational, upper-secondary general, and tertiary);
household total net income decile (we checked that using subjective household-income
assessment i n four categories lead to the same findings), and the set of d u m m y variables
(the experience of unemployment within the last five years; and self-employment).
A t the country level, we include national unemployment levels as a control variable. According
to some studies, a high unemployment rate leads to increased support for populist parties
(e.g., Golder, 2003; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers et al, 2002).
By contrast, Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) suggest the dampening hypothesis: because of risk
aversion, if the risk of hardship is greater, voters are less willing to take risks and vote for parties
outside of the mainstream.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Does Performance Matter? 7
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of estimation sample
LWP RWP Other
Poverty reduction policy deficit 5.54 4.83 4.02
Inequality policy deficit 5.01 4.39 3.48
Anti-migrant attitude index 4.60 5.69 4.12
Female 0.46 0.48 0.51
Age 15-29 0.15 0.10 0.09
Age 30-44 0.24 0.23 0.22
Age 45-59 0.34 0.30 0.31
Age 60+ 0.27 0.38 0.37
Education: primary + lower sec 0.25 0.29 0.18
Education: upper sec - vocational 0.36 0.44 0.39
Education: upper sec - general 0.17 0.12 0.11
Education: tertiary 0.22 0.15 0.32
Household's total net income decile 4.99 5.16 5.99
Unemployed in last 5 years 0.19 0.13 0.10
Unemployment rate 10.74 9.06 7.90
Observations 2259 4680 29069
Source: European Social Survey (2012, 2020), Eurostat, own calculations.
Results
The descriptive statistics i n Table 1 show that when pooling the data for the 2012 a n d
2020 surveys, both the poverty reduction a n d inequality policy deficits are higher among
L W P than R W P voters. N o t surprisingly, R W P voters have stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than
do L W P voters. Demographic characteristics (including age, gender, a n d education) seem very
well balanced among the pool of L W P and R W P voters i n our sample. In comparison to other
groups L W P voters seem to have the lowest household income, a n d the highest incidence of
unemployment.
O u r multilevel logit regressions provide support for Hypothesis 1 about the solidarity of the left:
both W S P variables are significantly correlated with voting for L W P parties, as the odds ratios are
greater than one for both the 2012 and 2020 surveys as well as the pooled sample. This is true for
both the poverty reduction policy deficit and the income inequality reduction deficit. Meanwhile,
both variables are insignificant for voting for R W P parties i n the pooled sample and 2012 sample,
which indicates that general dissatisfaction with W S P is not a motivating factor for choosing a
R W P party, although for the 2020 survey both deficits were indeed significant, but negatively
correlated as the odds ratios were less than one. In other words, according to the 2020 survey,
those who perceive the welfare state to be performing poorly are even less likely to vote for R W P
(see Tables 2 and 3).
Figures 1 and 2 show this clearly. The predicted probability based o n the pooled sample shows
that voting for L W P parties greatly increases the greater the perceived policy deficit. That is, the
greater the gap between voters' preferences regarding social policies to decrease poverty a n d
inequality and their assessment of government results i n achieving these goals, the more likely
people are to vote for L W P parties. T h e contrast between the steeply rising curves for policy
deficits and voting for L W P parties and the flat but very slightly sinking curves for voting for R W P
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Table 2. Multilevel logistic model on voting for leftwing and rightwing populist parties with poverty reduction deficit
Sample
ESS (2012) ESS (2020) ESS (2012 + 2020)
Sample
LWP RWP LWP RWP LWP RWP
Sample
OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty reduction policy deficit 1.04*** 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.06*** 0.01 0.96*** 0.01 1.05*** 0.01 1 0.01
Anti-migrant attitude index 1 0.02 1.64*** 0.03 0.96* 0.02 1,47*** 0.03 0.95*** 0.01 1.53*** 0.02
Female 0.91 0.07 0.77*** 0.04 0.94 0.06 0.73*** 0.04 0.93 0.05 0.75*** 0.03
Age 15-29 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Age 30-44 0.77* 0.1 0.98 0.09 1.01 0.14 1.02 0.11 0.89 0.08 1.01 0.07
Age 45-59 0.92 0.12 0.88 0.08 0.96 0.12 0.93 0.1 0.96 0.09 0.94 0.06
Age 60+ 0.62*** 0.08 0.63*** 0.06 0.73* 0.1 0.71** 0.07 0.71*** 0.07 0.74*** 0.05
Education: primary + lower sec ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Education: upper sec - vocational 0.95 0.1 0.97 0.07 0.79* 0.08 1.02 0.09 0.83* 0.06 0.99 0.05
Education: upper sec - general 1.06 0.14 0.76** 0.07 0.92 0.1 0.79* 0.08 0.95 0.08 0.76*** 0.05
Education: tertiary 0.72** 0.09 0.56*** 0.05 0.66*** 0.07 0.55*** 0.05 0.65*** 0.05 0.57*** 0.04
Household's total net inc. decile 0.90*** 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.92*** 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.92*** 0.01 1 0.01
Unemployed in last 5 years 1.64*** 0.16 1.09 0.08 1.45*** 0.15 0.98 0.1 1.49*** 0.1 1.14* 0.06
Unemployment rate 0.91* 0.04 0.67** 0.1 1.90*** 0.12 0.98 0.13 1.03* 0.01 0.81*** 0.01
Post-communist country 0.35* 0.17 199.35*** 184.76 2.05 1.31 6.71 6.85 1.82*** 0.3 48.78*** 40.57
Post-comm. x anti-migrant index 1.04 0.04 0.63*** 0.02 1.12** 0.04 0.76*** 0.02 1.09*** 0.03 0.68*** 0.01
ESS (2020) 0.97 0.1 0.47*** 0.02
Constant 0.00*** 0 0.13 0.17 0.00*** 0 0.02*** 0.02 0.00*** 0 0.04*** 0.02
Interclass correlation 0.93 0.46 0.89 0.55 0.92 0.51
Num. obs 18414 18414 17594 17594 36008 36008
Num. groups: country 18 18 18 18 22 22
Source: European Social Survey (2012, 2020), Eurostat, own calculations.
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent voted for a LWP or RWP party in the last election. Odds ratios (OR) and standard errors (SE) are published.
Table 3. Multilevel logistic model on voting for leftwing and rightwing populist parties with inequality reduction deficit
Sample
ESS (2012) ESS (2020) ESS (2012 + 2020)
Sample
LWP RWP LWP RWP LWP RWP
Sample
OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality policy deficit 1.05*** 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.07*** 0.01 0.95*** 0.01 1.06*** 0.01 0.99 0.01
Anti-migrant attitude index 1.01 0.02 1.64*** 0.03 0.96* 0.02 1,47*** 0.03 0.95*** 0.01 1.53*** 0.02
Female 0.91 0.07 0.77*** 0.04 0.93 0.06 0.73*** 0.04 0.93 0.05 0.75*** 0.03
Age 15-29 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Age 30-44 0.76* 0.1 0.98 0.09 1.01 0.14 1.03 0.11 0.89 0.08 1.01 0.07
Age 45-59 0.91 0.12 0.88 0.08 0.96 0.13 0.94 0.1 0.95 0.08 0.94 0.06
Age 60+ 0.61*** 0.08 0.63*** 0.06 0.73* 0.1 0.72** 0.08 0.71*** 0.07 0.74*** 0.05
Education: primary + lower sec ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Education: upper sec - vocational 0.95 0.1 0.97 0.07 0.79* 0.08 1.02 0.09 0.83** 0.06 0.99 0.05
Education: upper sec - general 1.06 0.14 0.76** 0.07 0.92 0.1 0.78* 0.08 0.95 0.08 0.75*** 0.05
Education: tertiary 0.72** 0.09 0.56*** 0.05 0.67*** 0.08 0.54*** 0.05 0.65*** 0.05 0.56*** 0.04
Household's total net inc. decile 0.90*** 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.92*** 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.93*** 0.01 1 0.01
Unemployed in last 5 years 1.65*** 0.16 1.09 0.08 144*** 0.15 0.98 0.1 1.49*** 0.1 1.14* 0.06
Unemployment rate 0.94 0.04 0.67** 0.1 1.93* 0.57 0.99 0.13 1.03 0.01 0.82*** 0.01
Post-communist country 0.33* 0.16 200.07*** 185.51 1.43 1.01 6.71 6.85 0.61 0.23 49.17*** 40.92
Post-comm. x anti-migrant index 1.04 0.04 0.63*** 0.02 1.11** 0.04 0.77*** 0.02 1.09*** 0.03 0.68*** 0.01
ESS (2020) 0.97 0.1 0.47*** 0.02
Constant 0.00*** 0 0.13 0.17 0.00*** 0 0.02*** 0.02 0.00*** 0 0.05*** 0.02
Interclass correlation 0.932 0.461 0.89 0.545 0.916 0.508
Num. obs 18414 18414 17594 17594 36008 36008
Num. groups: country 18 18 18 18 22 22
Source: European Social Survey (2012, 2020), Eurostat, own calculations.
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent voted for a LWP or RWP party in the last election. Odds ratios (OR) and standard errors (SE) are published.
10 Steven Saxonberg et al.
LWP; Predictive margin RWP: Predictive margin
.25
.15
.05
.28
.15
.05
-10 - 7 - 4 - 1 2 5
Inequality policy deficit
-10 - 7 - 4 - 1 2 5
Inequality policy deficit
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for the values of inequality policy deficit.
LWP; Predictive margin RWP: Predictive margin
.25
.15
.25
.05
-10 - 7 - 4 - 1 2 5
Poverty reduction policy deficit
-10 - 7 - 4 - 1 2 5
Poverty reduction policy deficit
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for the values of poverty reduction policy deficit.
parties is striking. The great difference i n the standard errors also stand out, which can be seen by
the m u c h longer vertical lines for each point o n the curve for R W P compared to L W P .
Since neither policy deficit is positively correlated with R W P , we find some support for the
anti-egalitarism of the right hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that resentment that
the 'underserving' receive benefits would lead to disinterest both i n fighting inequality (as the
undeserving groups are not 'equal') and removing poverty, as they support a welfare state o n
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Does Performance Matter? 11
equity principles rather than egalitarian ones. This is consistent with descriptive evidence that the
policy deficit is larger for L W P voters than R W P voters. Nonetheless, i n 2020, both the inequality
deficit and poverty deficit are actually negatively correlated with voting for R W P as the odds-ratio
is less than one. In other words, if one is dissatisfied with the states performance on reducing
inequality, one is less likely to vote for a R W P party, but more likely to vote for a L W P party. This
still basically supports the anti-egalitarism hypothesis but implies even greater resentment: not
only is fighting poverty not a priority for R W P parties, but if the state is good at it, they are even
less likely to vote for a R W P party.
Since people with anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for R W P parties than other
parties, while neither W S P variable is correlated with voting for R W P parties, our results suggest that
welfare chauvinism remains the most important welfare issue for these voters, as they are anywhere
from one point four seven times to one point six four times more likely to harbour anti-immigrant
views than other voters.
The importance of welfare chauvinism for R W P voters is strengthened by the fact that social
economic variables such as having been unemployed i n the last five years are more important for
L W P voters. Having been unemployed i n the last five years makes somebody almost one point five
times more likely to vote for a L W P party i n the pooled data set for both types of policy deficits, but
only a little over one point one times more likely to vote for a R W P party. In addition, having been
unemployed i n the last five years is not statistically significant for R W P voting i n either survey,
despite being significant for the pooled data. Meanwhile, having a high family income is negatively
correlated with voting for L W P parties and not significant for R W P parties, while educational level is
negatively correlated for both types of populist voting as the odds ratios are less than one. Thus,
L W P voters, having low incomes and having experienced unemployment, are more likely than R W P
voters to follow their material interests, while R W P voters are more concerned about social issues
such as immigration.
W e noticed that i n the 2020 survey there was a sharp rise i n anti-immigrant attitudes among
those L W P supporters living i n post-communist countries, so we tested for this by adding the
country-level variable 'post-communist' country and the interaction variable post-communist
country and L W P voter. W h e n doing so, anti-immigrant attitudes as a whole are negatively
correlated with voting for L W P as the odds-ration is less than one for each regression (2012, 2020,
and the pooled data). However, the interaction term of post-communism and anti-immigrant
attitudes actually becomes positive for 2020 as L W P voters i n post-communist countries are
one point two times more likely to hold anti-immigrant views i n the regression for the poverty
reduction policy deficit and one point one one times more likely to hold anti-immigrant views i n
the regression for the inequality reduction policy deficit i n 2020.
H o w can we account for this change f r o m 2012 to 2020 and the difference between L W P voters
in post-communist countries and those living i n other European countries? W e do not have the
data to be able to answer this question and one of the reasons could be that i n 2020 more countries
have L W P parties i n parliament. W e distrust the latter reasoning, though, because if there had
been a demand for L W P parties i n 2012, then more of them would have been i n parliament, so we
think the demand for L W P parties has increased over time. A more probable explanation has to do
with two important factors:
a) In contrast to most other European countries, the post-communist countries lack a stable
party system and strong traditional socialist or social democratic parties, which makes it
easier for L W P to emerge, especially as i n many of the post-communist more mainstream
leftist parties have imploded.
b) Because of the war i n Syria, the civil war i n Iraq, a n d other international developments,
a great increase i n refugees c o m i n g to Europe took place. E v e n though very few of them
m o v e d to p o s t - c o m m u n i s t countries, the public discourse i n these countries has
become h i g h l y securitised and L W P populist parties have tried to capitalise o n this,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
12 Steven Saxonberg et al.
such as Smer i n Slovakia and Die Linke i n G e r m a n y (see Saxonberg, et al., 2023 for the
Slovak case).
In other words, it seems that L W P voters differ f r o m both R W P and mainstream voters i n several
ways. The rise of L W P parties combined with the decline of mainstream socialist a n d social
democratic parties implies that people with socialist or social democratic values might be turning
to L W P parties out of dissatisfaction with the mainstream leftist parties. M a n y reasons have been
given i n the past for this, such as globalisation limiting the possibilities of socialist a n d social
democratic governments to carry out generous welfare policies. However, our study shows that
dissatisfaction with the manner i n which the welfare states are performing is also a driving factor.
This also separates L W P voters f r o m R W P voters, as the latter is not interested i n the policy
deficits for policies dealing with the equality dimension. A s previous studies show, they support
policies that are based o n equity rather than equality and the ESS data only allows us to measure
policy deficits dealing with two equality issues: fighting poverty and inequality.
A s expected, R W P voters are driven b y anti-immigrant attitudes. Even though n o questions i n
the ESS survey deal directly with welfare chauvinism, we can assume that i f respondents do not
like immigrants, then they do not want immigrants to receive welfare benefits. T h e surprising
result here is that i n the 2020 survey anti-immigrant attitudes also became positively correlated
with voting for L W P among those living i n post-communist countries, which indicates that L W P
has a slightly different dynamic i n these countries than i n other European countries.
Since not all countries i n the survey have both L W P parties and R W P parties, as a robust test,
we ran separate multilevel logistic regressions for L W P that only include countries with L W P
parties i n parliament and multilevel logistic regressions for R W P that only include countries with
R W P i n parliament (see Appendix A 2 ) . A t the individual level, the results are almost the same i n
terms of odds ratios, and there are n o differences as to which variables are significant or not. Thus,
even when we restrict ourselves to running regressions only for the countries where there were
L W P parties i n parliament or for the cases where there were R W P i n parliament, the substantive
results are the same.
Conclusion
Previous studies have shown that W S P influences satisfaction with democracies, which would lead
to the logical assumption that W S P should also influence support for populism, since populist
voters usually are dissatisfied with the function of democracy i n their country. Yet, so far, nobody
has tested this proposition. O u r study shows that there is indeed a link, but only for L W P voters.
If voters with leftist values perceive that the welfare state is performing m u c h more poorly than
their expectations, they are likely to turn to L W P parties. In other words, i f socialist and social
democratic politicians want to stay popular and prevent their supporters f r o m turning to L W P
alternatives, they need to find a way to get the welfare state to perform better when they are i n
power. Thus, this study provides an important lesson for mainstream, left-leaning political parties
(see Tables 2 a n d 3).
O n the other hand, i f voters have below average educational levels, are not interested i n W S P
on equality issues, and hold anti-immigrant attitudes, then they are more likely to support R W P
parties.
It is not surprising that the welfare chauvinist thesis holds up i n our study as well, since it has
been tested m a n y times, but n o w we see that it matters m u c h more than welfare state performance
for R W P voters, while welfare state performance is what matters for L W P voters. Another
important finding is that although L W P voters i n general do not display anti-immigrant attitudes,
those i n post-communist countries do i n fact hold such views. This implies that L W P has a
different dynamic among voters living i n post-communist countries than those living i n other
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Does Performance Matter? 13
European countries. Even though we offered some plausible explanations for this, we have little
evidence to support our claims, which shows a definite need for more research o n special
dynamics of post-communist populism and how it differs from other countries.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article, visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010
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Cite this article: Saxonberg S, Sirovatka T, and Guzi M . Does Performance Matter? The Influence of Attitudes Towards
Welfare State Performance on Voting for Rightwing and Leftwing Populist Parties. Social Policy and Society, https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1474746424000010
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746424000010 Published online by Cambridge University Press