Opportunities and Limits of Presidential
Activism: Czech presidents compared1
LUBOMÍR KOPEČEK
^ sciendo
Politics in Central Europe (ISSN 1801-3422)
Vol. 19, No. 4
DOI: 10.2478/pce-2023-0032
Abstract: This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel
0993-2003), Václav Klaus (2003-2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013-2023). The text is
based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions
with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important
incentives for presidential activism are non-cohesive coalition governments, minority
governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments
and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government
acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his
powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than
Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative
powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low
success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president's political proximity to the
government wasfound to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely
been passive. A specific factor that affected activism, albeit only to a limited extent,
was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks
in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and
dismissing a government and individual ministers.
Key words: presidential activism; direct elections; governments; legislative powers;
Czechia; systemic risks
1 This output was supported by the N P O 'Systemic Risk Institute' no. LX22NPO5101, funded by the European
Union - Next Generation EU (Ministry o f Education, Youth a n d Sports, NPO: EXCELES). I w o u l d like t o
thank Vít Hloušek and a n o n y m o u s reviewers for their useful comments. I a m also grateful t o Štěpán
Kaňa for the proofreading o f the text and Jakub Š e d o for help with some mathematical calculations.
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 695
I. Introduction
Research on heads of state in Central and Eastern Europe has undergone dynamic
development in recent decades. Most interest has been shown in presidents
of the semi-presidential regimes that have sprung up in this region since
1989. The tradition of research that began with the classic work of Maurice
Duverger (1980) followed by Matthew S. Shugart & John M . Carey (1992),
Robert Elgie (1999) and many other authors, has thus produced rich material
that allows for extensive comparative studies and in-depth analyses into
the leadership of countries such as Poland, Romania and Ukraine (e.g. Taras
1997; Protsyk 2004, 2005; Elgie - Moestrup 2008; Sedelius - Mashtaler 2013;
Sedelius-Áberg2018).
Less interest has been shown in the region's democracies, such as Czechia,
which developed a parliamentary regime and established its most important
principle - executive dependence on the confidence of parliament (e.g. Lijphart
1992: 2; Miiller - Bergman - Strom 2003:10-11) - and had no popularly
elected president. The Czech case was included in some broader studies (e.g.
Baylis 1996; Brunclík - Kubát 2019); its specific aspects have been examined
(e.g. Kysela - Kiihn 2007; Havlík - Hrubeš - Pecina 2014; Kopeček - Brunclík
2019); and attention was eventually paid to the personality of the internationally
well-known first Czech and last Czechoslovak president, Václav Havel, often in
the broader context of the democratic transition (e.g. Skalnik Leff 1996; Keane
2001; Duberstein 2006; Zantovsky 2015; Williams 2016). But a comprehensive
discussion of presidential activities over three decades has remained lacking.
Of these, one interesting example is provided by the use of the presidential veto
of laws, where Czech presidents have been more agile than their Romanian or
Polish counterparts (Kóker 2017: 59).
The importance of the Czech case for the broader audience increased when
the method of choosing a president transitioned from the previous indirect
parliamentary process to popular (direct) election in 2012. This makes Czechia
a kind of'natural experiment', which is rare in modern democracies (exceptions
include neighbouring Slovakia) and offers the opportunity of evaluating the
performance of the first popularly elected president, Miloš Zeman (2013-2023),
whose presidency stirred up a turbulent public debate about his exceeding presidential
powers and behaving unconstitutionally. Prime ministers threatened
to file complaints against the president with the Constitutional Court, and the
upper chamber of parliament launched an impeachment procedure for gross
violation of the constitution, but the lower chamber failed to support the move.
However, a look into the past suggests a somewhat more complicated story.
Many Czechs traditionally perceived the president as a monarch who would provide
good governance and solutions to burning problems, a perception derived
from the tenure of Tomáš G. Masaryk, architect of Czechoslovakia and its first
696 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
president. Masaryk founded a strong presidency associated with great informal
influence and a specific aura (Mlejnek 2014; Cabada 2018). A small, but telling,
fact for understanding this perception is that presidents since Masaryk's time
have resided at Prague Castle, the ancient seat of kings. Despite changes of political
regime and historical upheavals, the importance of the president survived
and was strongly revived by Havel in the short, but very intense, democratic
period in the last years of Czechoslovakia. Havel as Czech president (1993-2003)
and his successor Vaclav Klaus (2003-2013) were certainly not merely ceremonial
presidents; they were involved from time to time in intra-executive conflicts
with prime ministers and governments. The fertile ground for such disputes
was created by the brief and often vague constitutional text that gave no precise
guidance on how the president should behave. The Czech institutional set-up
thus became the scene of clashes between the two branches of executive power
(Brunclik 2014). As with Zeman, the excessive agility of both Havel and Klaus
was repeatedly debated. Even before the introduction of the popular election
and Zeman's presidency, Czech scholars discussed the extraordinary status of
the head of the state and efforts to strengthen his influence (e.g. Klima 2004;
Kysela 2006; Kysela - Kühn 2007; Brunclik 2008; Pavlicek 2008).
This history allows for an interesting comparison of the performance of
three Czech presidents and especially the opportunities and constraints that
determined their ability to be active. The comparison raises two main questions:
What created opportunities for activist behaviour by presidents and,
contrariwise, what limited them? How did the activism of the directly elected
president differ from his indirectly elected predecessors? Being directly elected
by the people is believed to provide a president with greater legitimacy for independent
behaviour than being chosen by parliament (e.g. Duverger 1980; Linz
1994; Metcalf 2000); this point will be addressed in the article. Unfortunately,
the fact that there has been only one directly elected president so far precludes
any forward-looking conclusions about the impact of this change. This caution
is justified by the case of the fourth president, elected in 2023, Petr Pavel, who
differs from his predecessors in his lack of domestic political experience.
The article applies the concept of presidential activism reflecting the strength
or weakness of other political institutions and the party configuration. Changing
the type of election was not accompanied by any substantial modification of
presidential powers, and this makes analysis easier. The concept of presidential
activism has some limits, in that it cannot perfectly reflect the cultural and historical
legacy, the economic, ethnic and other specificities, or the personality of
presidents (Frye 1997; Hlousek 2013). However, it is worth noting that Czechia
is one of the most culturally and ethnically homogeneous countries in Europe,
which has not been affected by catastrophic economic slumps; the studied period
is continuous and begins after the end of the most turbulent transitional
changes at the turn of the 1990s. Havel, Klaus and Zeman had similarly strong
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 697
personalities and rich political pasts, although the men were different in some
respects (e.g. Havel was one of the most famous dissident figures of the Eastern
Bloc, Klaus and Zeman had previously been party leaders and prime ministers).
The article sets out a theoretical section on presidential activism, the research
design and the powers of the Czech president in important areas, and three
empirical sections on Havel, Klaus and Zeman.
II. Theoretical framework: Presidents, governments and
presidential activism
The position of president varies across democratic regimes. In semi-presidential
regimes it is commonly assumed that the head of state plays an active role, while
in parliamentary regimes the president's role is supposed to be merely symbolic
and representative. However, practice shows a diversity of presidential behaviour
that makes the establishment of clear and unquestionable boundaries difficult
and sometimes even leads to the rejection of semi-presidentialism as a specific
category (Siaroff 2003). There is simply a lack of consensus among scholars on
the distinction between semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. The most
widely used definition of semi-presidential regimes today, Robert Elgie's (1999:
13), includes 'a popularly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and
cabinet who are collectively accountable to the legislature'. However, this definition
is sometimes criticised because it covers too many different countries (e.g.
Brunclík - Kubát 2019). Applying Elgie's definition, it would follow that since
Zeman's presidency, the Czech Republic has automatically and permanently
had a semi-presidential regime - a claim which most Czech political scientists
and constitutional lawyers question or reject outright (for a summary of the
debate, see Cabada 2018).
It is worth remembering in this context the long-debated topic of executive
dualism, i.e. when presidents share executive power with prime ministers and
governments. This creates a 'dual-authority structure' with the potential for
tension and conflict between the two leaders of the executive branch. Analyses
of this issue in the academic literature are mainly of regimes with popularly
elected heads of state and semi-presidential regimes (e.g. Sartori 1994; Protsyk
2005). Yet executive dualism has also been discussed with respect to countries
without a directly elected head of state, including the Czech Republic before
Zeman's presidency (Brunclík 2014).
These initial theoretical remarks allow for a better understanding of the main
conceptual tool of this article, presidential activism. The term is often used to
describe the extensive use, or even abuse, of presidential powers, which are discussed
with reference to traditional presidential democracies such as the USA,
new democracies in Central Europe and autocracies such as Russia (Schlesinger
1997; Protsyk 2004; Hloušek 2013). However, the specialised literature deploys
698 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
a less normative attitude. Margit Tavits (2009: 30) defines presidential activism
as the 'intense use of presidential discretionary powers', complemented
by an 'informal capacity to affect politics and policy'. Philipp Koker (2017: 5),
in his extensive comparative study, offers a narrower definition that includes
'the discretionary use of formal powers'. The concept is supposed to separate
presidential action from ceremonial duties such as receiving foreign visitors,
opening sessions of parliament and representing the state at conferences. Other
authors build on these definitions; for example, Tapio Raunio and Thomas
Sedelius (2020: 24) mention the 'presidents' use of their formal powers and
their attempts to influence politics through informal channels'. It makes sense
to stick to a broader notion that combines the formal powers of the president
with informal action that is sensitive to the context and to political interaction.
Tavits states that presidents operate within constraints, determined in particular
by the 'partisan constellation and the strength of other political institutions
especially the parliament and the government' (Tavits 2009: 35). Together,
they create the political opportunity framework for presidential activism. Concerning
the partisan constellation, Tavits (2009: 36), drawing on earlier studies
by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Amorim Neto and Strom (2006), notes that
incentives for presidential agility are greater in a situation of cohabitation or
divided government, 'in which the president and the prime minister represent
different parties or coalitions'. The term 'cohabitation', originally associated
with the French semi-presidential system, is thus more broadly applied to
situations of ideological or political opposition between the two crucial men
or women of the executive, and therefore its use in the Czech case is rational,
at least for Zeman's presidency, which was decided by direct election. It is the
mutual opposition that provides ideal conditions for conflict, and hence also
for the growth of presidential activism. This line of reasoning of intra-executive
tension has been empirically confirmed by Protsyk (2006) and Koker (2017).
By contrast, political harmony between president and government coalition
limits the space for mutual disputes, as there is no reason for them to arise.
For instance, Koker (2017: 246) notes that the presidents used their legislative
veto power more often during cohabitation than when president-government
relations were unified.
There is some difference between cohabitation and divided government.
The second term has its origin in the US situation, in which the president faces
opposition in Congress. As used by Tavits, however, it is really a non-cohesive
coalition that includes several parties representing different political stances.
The parties are not necessarily ideologically distant, but may clash politically
for various reasons. In other words, the non-coherence of the governing coalition
is key, creating a basis for political conflict between the governing parties,
which, as with cohabitation, increases presidential agility. The president may
try to split the coalition and seek 'support for his or her own policy proposals
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 699
from some of the parties in government' (Anckar 2020: 138). Non-cohesive
government (as the opposite of cohesive) can be considered a more accurate
term than divided government.2
It is also worth noting that in Tavits's view, supported by other authors
(Amorim Neto - Strom 2006; Baylis 1996), the potential for activism is increased
by the desire of some presidents to place themselves 'above parties' or by their
non-partisan status, both of which may lead to their identification with broader
social disapproval of the government (Tavits 2009: 38). This phenomenon can be
observed, at least rhetorically, in all three Czech presidents, and in Havel's case
in non-partisan form.
Furthermore, the minority or majority status of government is important
for the behaviour of the head of state. The consensus in the literature is that
minority governments significantly increase presidential involvement (Protsyk
2005; Tavits 2009; Schleiter - Morgan-Jones 2009; Koker 2017). The president
simply has a good opportunity to test how successful he can be. Interestingly,
this tendency is evident whether the president's party is in opposition or represented
in government. The opposite occurs with single-party cabinets that rely
on a majority in the assembly, against which the president finds it much more
difficult to assert himself, as the institutions exhibit substantial cohesiveness.
Koker's findings about legislative vetoes are interesting: he notes that the
president used this tool more often when the government commanded a very
small majority in parliament. But again, internal cohesiveness plays a role. The
author notes that divisions between and also within government parties (i.e.
non-cohesive government) often weakened the government more than its small
majority in parliament. Disagreement within a coalition government decreased
the voting discipline of MPs and offered the president the chance to veto successfully
(Koker 2017: 230-231).
Tavits (2009: 39) sees a link between the strength of the government and
parliament. As she says, 'fragmented and minority governments usually stem
from weak and polarised assemblies'. Strife in split institutions opens major
opportunities for the president, as mentioned in the example of the success of
presidential vetoes. However, contrary to the academic consensus on the correlation
between minority governments and growing activism, the situation is
somewhat different here. Unlike Tavits, Koker (2017: 228) argues that a major
fragmentation of parliament does not necessarily have a significant effect.
The Czech experience may also be an interesting example for evaluating these
divergent views.
2 T h e literature on coalition governance c o m m o n l y uses the terms 'connected' and 'unconnected' (minimal
winning) coalition, which is based on the ideological closeness o r distance of the parties in t h e
g o v e r n m e n t (Axelrod 1970). But t h e problem is that in Czechia some governments were created by
parties ideologically close formally, which nevertheless behaved in very inconsistent ways (and vice
versa: some governments were ideologically heterogeneous, yet they acted consistently).
700 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
III. Research design, method and data
Tavits (2009) and Koker (2017) examine presidential activism in several areas,
two in particular. The first is concerned with appointment and dismissal powers,
especially of the prime minister and cabinet members, but also of senior
civil servants and ambassadors.3
The formation of a government, the need to
change members of the government during its term and a government crisis are
sensitive moments in political life. Moreover, these are key aspects underlying
the functioning of the executive branch. Of course, the formal rules matter, but
as will be outlined in the following section on the Czech constitution, it is not
only the explicit powers but also the fact that the constitutional articles do not
say much that offer opportunities for the head of state. The second area is that
of legislative powers, i.e. the president's ability to veto laws, to challenge them
before the Constitutional Court, to issue his own decrees and to initiate laws
(the last two of which are missing in Czechia). Here again, the president can
either promote his political ideas or seriously damage or hinder the government's
efforts to advance its agenda.
The method of this article is a comparative case study based on a chronological
tracking of the behaviour of each of the presidents towards the other
institutions in a given partisan constellation. The key is an in-depth qualitative
insight into the approach of each president to appointment and dismissal,
which is set in a broader political context - the circumstances of presidential
election, his attitude to governments, etc. Furthermore, the use of vetoes and
constitutional reviews by the presidents is discussed, highlighting both the
quantitative and qualitative (the importance of the laws) aspects. This approach
allows for an accurate identification of similarities and differences not
only among Havel, Klaus and Zeman, but also within the performance of each
of them, and makes it possible to show the development trend of activism in
a comparative perspective.
Figure 1: Presidents' behaviour and the intensity of their activism
Low activism Medium activism High activism Hyperactivism
Source: Author, based o n Tavits 2 0 0 9 and Köker 2017.
3 Tavits also reflects foreign policy activities which partly belong t o the appointment powers but outside
of domestic politics. This article includes foreign policy only marginally f o r reasons of scope.
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 701
The approximate categorisation provided in Figure 1 serves to specify the intensity
of presidential activism. The operationalisation of each category adapted
to Czech conditions is as follows. Low activism means prevailing passivity of the
president, who supports government and does not complicate the changes of
ministers. He rarely - in less than around 3% of legislation4
- uses the power to
veto laws or invoke a constitutional review, and when he does, it is over politically
insignificant legislation. In sum, the president plays the role of a 'passive team-mate'
and could be described as an 'observer' or, at most, a monitoring 'notary'.5
Medium activism is associated with more agile behaviour; the president is
a kind of 'regulator' who participates in the formation of the government and
in the replacement of ministers. In particular, he supports or opposes a certain
political option, expresses reservations about certain ministers, puts forward his
own ideas about what they should do, or delays the appointment and removal
process. However, he does not promote his own government. The president
can be critical of the intentions of government and quantitatively challenges
between 3% and 6% of legislation including some important laws.
High activism manifests itself when the president tries openly and directly
to promote his ideas about the composition of the government, including the
position of prime minister. But the head of state is ready to coordinate and
agree with at least some parliamentary parties and acts as a 'co-designer' of
the cabinet. The president challenges 6% to 9% of legislation, often involving
important laws.
Hyperactivity is when the president installs his own government and promotes
his own ideas about filling ministerial posts; such a president could be described
as a 'creator'. Unlike the previous category, the president does not take into account
the views of parliamentary (or government) parties - unless it is his own
party. The president has become an extremely agile blocking player, routinely
using vetoes and constitutional reviews, frequently on important pieces of
legislation, and this activism exceeds the 9% threshold of all new legislation.
Data on the structure of governments and the fragmentation of the crucial
lower house of parliament (Chamber of Deputies) is listed in Tables 1 and
2. Parliamentary fragmentation is measured using one of the most common
metrics, the effective number of political parties (Laakso - Taagepera 1979),
based on the number of seats held by parliamentary parties after the elections.
The rule is simple: the greater the effective number of parties, the more parliamentary
fragmentation (and vice-versa). The total number of laws is based
on parliamentary data and their description (Kolář et al. 2013; PSP 2023). The
percentage of vetoes has been calculated by the author.
4 T h e threshold is based o n the long-term average of the number of vetoes that Koker (2017: 59) puts at
4 . 5 % f o r t h e Czech case, which is in t h e middle of the category of m e d i u m activism.
5 T h e terminology is based on Kopecek and Brunclfk (2019).
702 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
Table 1: Governments and the use of presidential powers
Presi­
dent
Dates and prime minister
Government (prime minister's party
listed first)
Vetoes
(those
success­
ful)
Petitions
to the
Constitutional
Court
(those suc­
cessful)
7/1992-7/1996: Václav Klaus I
Coalition right-wing majority cohesive
(ODS, KDU-ČSL, ODA, KDS)
7(3) 3(2)
Václav
Havel
(1/1993
-1/2003)
7/1996-1/1998: Václav Klaus II
Coalition right-wing minority (ODS, KDUČSL,
ODA)
2(1) KDVáclav
Havel
(1/1993
-1/2003)
1/1998-7/1998: Josef Tošovský
Semi-technocratic presidential and minority
(non-partisans, KDU-ČSL, ODA US)
3(0) 0
Václav
Havel
(1/1993
-1/2003)
7/1998-7/2002: Miloš Zeman Single-party left-wing minority (ČSSD) 16 (0/1*) 5(5)
7/2002-8/2004: Vladimír Špidla
0 0
7/2002-8/2004: Vladimír Špidla
Coalition rather left-wing and non-cohesive
with slim majority (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL,
US-DEU)
9(0)
8/2004-4/2005: Stanislav Gross
Coalition rather left-wing and non-cohesive
with slim majority (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL,
US-DEU)
4(1)
Václav
4/2005-8/2006: Jiří Paroubek
Coalition rather left-wing and non-cohesive
with slim majority (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL,
US-DEU)
20 (2/4*)
Klaus
(3/2003 -
9/2006-1/2007: Mirek Topolánek I Single-party minority (ODS) 0
3/2013)
1/2007-5/2009: Mirek Topolánek II
Coalition (unclear) right-wing and minority
(ODS, KDU-ČSL, SZ)
4(1) 1**
5/2009-6/2010: Jan Fischer
Technocratic, but not presidential (formally
supported by ODS, ČSSD and SZ)
13 (0/3*)
Coalition right-wing with declining major­ 13(0)
7/2010-7/2013: Petr Nečas ity and increasingly non-cohesive (ODS,
TOP 09, W * * * ) KD 0
7/2013-1/2014 Jiří Rusnok Technocratic presidential 0 0
Miloš
Zeman
(3/2013-
3/2023)
1/2014-12/2017: Bohuslav Sobotka
Coalition majority, originally cohesive
later non-cohesive (ČSSD, ANO, KDU-ČSL)
6(0) 2(0)Miloš
Zeman
(3/2013-
3/2023)
12/2017-6/2018: Andrej Babiš I. Single-party minority (ANO) 0 0
Miloš
Zeman
(3/2013-
3/2023)
6/2018-12/2021: Andrej Babiš II.
Coalition minority rather non-cohesive
(ANO, ČSSD)
0 0
Since 12/2021: Petr Fiala
Coalition majority, cohesive despite
ideological differences (ODS, KDU-ČSL,
TOP 09, STAN, Pirates)
3 0
Notes: ODS: Civic Democratic Party; Č S S D : Czech Social Democratic Party; KDU-ČSL: Christian and Democratic
Union - Czechoslovak People's Party; ODA: Civic Democratic Alliance; KDS: Christian Democratic
Party; US: Freedom Union; US-DEU: Freedom Union - Democratic Union; SZ: Green Party; W : Public Affairs,
STAN: Mayors and Independent; T O P 09 and A N O use abbreviations as party names. In some cases,
presidents concurrently vetoed t w o connected laws, but these are separately counted in the table.
Sources: Based on author's o w n calculations and Chrastilová - Mikeš 2013, Havlík 2011, Jakl 2017, Kolář et
al. 2013.
* The last n u m b e r indicates absolute vetoes, i.e. a veto at a time w h e n the Chamber of Deputies was no
longer in session and could not override the president.
* * Parliament quickly amended the relevant law and hence the Constitutional Court did not deliberate
on this case.
* * * Towards the end of the term, W was formally replaced by a new, secessionist party.
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 703
Table 2: Fragmentation of Czech parliament
Parliamentary
elections
1992 1996 1998 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 6 2010 2013 2017 2021
N u m b e r o f
p a r l i a m e n t a r y
parties
9 6 5 5 5 5 7 9 7
Effective n u m b e r o f
p a r l i a m e n t a r y
parties
6.8 4.2 3.7 3.7 3 4.5 5.6 4.8 4.7
Source: author's o w n calculations based on t h e seats of political parties in the parliament according to
Kolář et al. 2013 and the website of the C h a m b e r of Deputies.
IV. Appointment, dismissal and legislative powers of the Czech
president
The Czech constitution offers the president a lot of room for manoeuvre during
the formation of the government due to its terseness. Article 62 simply notes
that the president 'appoints and recalls the prime minister and other members
of the government and accepts their resignations, recalls the government and
accepts its resignation'. Further, Article 68 briefly states, concerning appointments:
'The president shall appoint the prime minister and, on the basis of the
prime minister's proposal, the other members of the government.' The president
is not obliged to appoint the leader of the largest parliamentary party, nor
does the constitution specify any time period within which the president has
to appoint a new prime minister and government members. The constitution
simply demands that within 30 days of appointment the government is to ask
parliament for confidence. Should the government fail to win this, the period
within which it may continue to exercise office is nowhere specified. The constitution
assumes that this would take place 'temporarily until a new government
is appointed'. In selecting the new (second) prime minister, the president again
has free choice with no formal constraints and it is only if the second government
appointed by him should fail that the power to appoint the (third) prime
minister would pass to the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (Simicek 2003;
Antos 2019). This 'third attempt' has never occurred in practice.
Similarly, the constitution does not stipulate for the president any time period
for recalling government members if they resign or if the prime minister
proposes that they be removed; nor is there any established procedure for situations
where the Chamber of Deputies passes a motion of no confidence in the
government or it resigns. The assumption simply is that the president accepts
the government's resignation. Thus, the president enjoys a large degree of discretion
in appointing and removing the cabinet and its members. Constitutional
704 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
conventions, such as have formed concerning this over time, have not been
fixed (Wintr - Antoš - Kysela 2016:157-161; Brunclík - Kubát 2019: 62-63).
Presidential powers of appointment are also concerned with other institutions
(e.g. the members of the board of the Czech National Bank, the constitutional
judges, etc.). The most conflictual field in relation to the government
probably concerns the appointment of ambassadors because of the need for
agreement between the head of state and the foreign affairs minister concerning
particular people.
The second area analysed in this article is concerned with legislative powers.
The president cannot initiate legislation but can veto laws (with the
exception of constitutional laws). This power is relatively weak, because the
president's veto can be overridden by an absolute majority of all members
of the Chamber of Deputies and is therefore not as strong as in Poland, for
example, where a much larger three-fifths majority is required to override the
president's veto (Wintr 2015: 85-86). Situations at the end of the electoral
term, when the Chamber of Deputies is no longer in session and so cannot
override the president's veto, form an exception to this, making the president's
veto absolute (this is in fact the equivalent of the pocket veto in the
US). The president may also send a law that has been adopted by parliament
to the Constitutional Court, if he or she considers it unconstitutional, and
propose that the Court annul the law or its parts (Schorm 2004). In practice,
this power allows the head of state to circumvent parliament and draw another
veto player into the game (Tsebelis 2002).
4.3. Václav Havel
Václav Havel's international credit and massive popularity throughout his
Czechoslovak presidency in 1989-1992 made him the only serious candidate for
the office of Czech president. All parties of the right-centre government coalition,
including the most important, Václav Klaus's Civic Democrats (ODS), as
well as some of the opposition, supported his candidacy. However, there were
noticeable differences, which reflected how close the various government parties
were to Havel. The ODS was less enthusiastic than smaller parties and its
support was tempered by earlier tensions between Havel and Klaus. But in the
reality of 1993-1996, the interrelationships between the president and the prime
minister were relatively peaceful. Havel focused most of his energies on improving
the international reputation of the new Czech state. His engagement in the
new republic's accession to NATO and the EU chimed in with government and
ODS policy. Any clashes were rather indirect, and of mostly a prestigious and
intellectual nature. Havel rarely commented on everyday politics, conceived his
speeches largely as moral reflections and emphasised the importance of civic
participation, tending to disdain political parties. Klaus, by contrast, made refPOLITICS
IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 705
erences to the virtues of partisanship and to classical liberal economics (Myant
1995; Wolchik 1997:185-187, Cirhan - Kopecký 2020: 96-97).
Klaus's dominance was not significantly weakened by the fact that his government
was made up of four parties, or that the parliament was also highly
fragmented (Table 1 and 2). Enjoying the aura of the father of a successful economic
transformation and a capable manager during the process of dissolving
Czechoslovakia, the prime minister dominated the government and politics
and overshadowed Havel (Kysela 2007: 102; Kaiser 2014: 136-146). The level
of presidential activism remained low.
Havel proceeded similarly in the legislative area, where he vetoed seven laws
over a period of 3.5 years, i.e. slightly less than 3% of legislation. Vetoed acts
were mostly of little political importance, with the exception of amendments
to two lustration laws, which would have prevented some people linked with
the communist regime from holding public office. Havel argued that a more
generic regulation to protect such offices was needed (Chrastilová - Mikeš 2003:
139-140; Suk 2011:181). The president also rarely asked the Constitutional Court
to review legislation (Table 1). However, it was in this period that he first tried
a procedure that would often be deployed later: once the parliament overturned
his veto, he turned to the Constitutional Court (this was concerned with a politically
insignificant act on authorised architects).
The 1996 elections provided Havel with a greater opportunity. The government
parties hitherto lost their majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In the
post-election consultations, the president played an important role as regulator
of the new government formation, including by involving the leader of
the opposition Social Democrats (ČSSD) Miloš Zeman in the negotiations.
Zeman's party then allowed Klaus's new minority government to win the confidence
of the Chamber. Several months later Havel increased his criticism of
Klaus for the country's growing economic problems, and was supported in this
by both small junior parties in government and by the opposition. The decline
of Klaus's popularity and the breakdown of his authority in government created
fertile ground for this. Thus, Havel exploited the disputes within the government
to undermine the prime minister's position. Evidence of Havel's pressure
includes his October 1997 response to the resignation of the foreign affairs
minister of the ODS party. Havel demanded that the prime minister submit the
name of a new minister acceptable to the two small government parties that very
afternoon (Kaiser 2014: 217). The president thus contributed to Klaus's resignation
a month later. In 1997, the President's poor health slightly hampered some
of his actions, but it was not a major obstacle for him.
The shift into the category of medium presidential activism in 1996-1997 was
obviously related to the minority and divided nature of the government (Table
1). The assumption of Tavits, that the decline of parliamentary fragmentation
(Table 2) decreases activism, was not confirmed here.
706 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
After the fall of Klaus's government, Havel showed his preference for a government
made up of non-political experts and appointed a technocrat and non-partisan
- the governor of the central bank Josef Tošovský - as prime minister.
However, to win confidence, Tosovsky's government needed parliamentary backing,
so he appointed as ministers a mixture of non-partisans and politicians of
the government parties to date, including an ODS faction that opposed Klaus
and later founded the Freedom Union. Havel was not involved in the selection
of ministers and this role fell to Tošovský and his communications with party
politicians. Nonetheless, the president's affiliation with the semi-technocratic
government was evident and manifested in, for instance, the pressure he exerted
on the opposition ČSSD to support the government. He ensured their
willingness by promising, together with the prime minister, that the cabinet
would only serve temporarily, until the early elections (Brunclik 2016:16-17).
Havel's 'co-designer' role in the construction of the new government can be
taken as evidence of high activism.
The noticeable increase in Havel's non-legislative activism after 1996 was
not so radical in the legislative area. Over the short two-year period before the
early elections of 1998, the president vetoed five laws, representing about 5% of
the legislation passed by parliament. (Three vetoes of laws during the period of
Tosovsky's episodic government must be seen in the context that they were first
read in parliament when the Klaus-led government was in office.) Havel's objections
to laws were most often concerned with unacceptable infringements
of the principles of the rule of law due to procedural ambiguities and errors.
These were not mostly crucial pieces of legislation although they were not
insignificant (Chrastilová - Mikeš 2003: 141-153; Linek - Mansfeldová 2009:
57; Havlík - Hrubeš - Pecina 2014). Quantitatively and qualitatively, it can be
considered medium activism.
Despite fierce debates about the president's inappropriate interventions in
domestic politics, the parliament in January 1998 confirmed Havel in office for
another five years. As in 1993, he lacked a broadly acceptable political competitor,
and the other candidates were only from the right and left partisan extremes.
A radical change of the political playground was brought about by the early
parliamentary elections in 1998, after which the so-called Opposition Agreement
was created, by which Klaus's ODS pledged to tolerate a minority single-party
government of Zeman's ČSSD in exchange for political concessions. This pragmatic
agreement entered into by the two large parties was aimed against smaller
centre-right parties, which it relegated to opposition and against Havel. The crux
of the Opposition Agreement was fundamental constitutional reform that would
radically curtail the president's powers, but this failed in the parliament's upper
chamber (Šimíček 2003: 163). Havel described the Opposition Agreement as
a restriction of political pluralism and was critical of it throughout its four-year
duration; his position resonated strongly with the public (Roberts 2003).
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 707
The Opposition Agreement precluded any presidential influence over the
make-up of Zeman's government. Havel semi-publicly aired his reservations
about the foreign and interior ministers with respect to their earlier histories.
However, Zeman stated that he would allow no personal veto by the president
and Havel appointed all the ministers according to Zeman's proposal without
much further ado. When replacing government members in subsequent years,
the president occasionally expressed reservations, and sometimes was in no
hurry to remove and appoint them; but in the end he always accepted the prime
minister's proposals (e.g. Antos 2019: 87).
However, this behaviour of Havel corresponding to medium activism displayed
some characteristics of high activism. For example, with the president's
appointment of ambassadors, where he disagreed with some of the
proposed candidates (conversely the Foreign Affairs Ministry did not want to
accept Havel's own candidates) and the result was a stalemate. In 2001, over ten
Czech ambassadors were awaiting appointment by the president. Only towards
the end of the Zeman government's term was this situation partially ameliorated
when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made concessions (Kaiser 2014: 250-251).
An even more interesting picture of presidential activism is offered by the legislative
arena. Between 1998 and 2002, Havel vetoed 16 laws. This was about 4%
of the legislation, which quantitatively corresponds to medium activism. However,
the nature of the laws was significant and indicates a swing towards high activism.
The president fought the Social and Civic Democrats on issues of mega-politics 'matters
of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide
whole polities' (Hirschl 2008:94). For example, Havel opposed an attempt to limit
the president's discretion in nominating members of the central bank's board,
a major reform of the electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies, and an act on
financing political parties. Table 1 shows that the Chamber of Deputies overrode
all of the president's vetoes (with the exception of one absolute vetojust before the
elections, when the chamber was no longer in session), i.e. the alliance of the two
large parties worked well. However, in all cases where Havel subsequently turned
to the Constitutional Court - and this includes the three crucial acts mentioned he
succeeded. Again, as in the previous period, Havel suffered from a number of
health problems, but this was not a fundamental handicap for him.
Havel's presidency during the Opposition Agreement era is interesting for
his strained and often hostile relationship with a minority government, which,
thanks to an alliance with the largest party of the opposition, limited his efforts
to exercise influence on the government. However, in terms of the other
appointments, where the Opposition Agreement posed no barrier, Havel successfully
asserted his will and he was also active and successful in his resistance
to the most important laws he disliked, thanks to his use of the Constitutional
Court. The president's approach towards using his powers was determined by
the weapons he was able to deploy effectively.
708 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
The last months of Havel's presidency were linked to a new government,
again led by ČSSD, but with a different prime minister - Vladimír Špidla. While
campaigning for the parliamentary elections in spring 2002, Špidla distanced
himself from the Opposition Agreement. After the elections, Havel welcomed
the prime minister's preference for a majority coalition government, even if it
had only the minimum possible majority of one seat in the Chamber and was
ideologically divided, as it included Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union
as junior partners (ČTK 2002). Although, according to the theory, the existence
of a divided government with a narrow majority tends to be favourable for activism,
Havel's positive attitude to this political solution prevailed. The president
certainly did not behave as an opposition player as he did in the previous period
and adopted an inactive position including on legislation.
In the context of radical change of presidential behaviour, it is interesting
to note that parliamentary fragmentation after the 2002 and 1998 elections
(Table 2) was the same. This indicates that this factor was of little importance.
Table 3 provides a summary of Havel's activism.
Table 3: Activism of Václav Havel
Period 1993-1996 1996-1998 1998-2002 2002-2003
Activism in appointments
and dismissals
Low
M e d i u m with a swing t o
high at t h e end of the period
M e d i u m t o high Low
Activism in legislation Low M e d i u m M e d i u m t o high Low
4.2. Václav Klaus
The second president, Václav Klaus, had a much more complicated election
than his predecessor due to substantial competition and strong resistance to
him personally. Klaus only succeeded in the third re-run of the presidential
elections (the first two attempts to elect a president failed). Beyond ODS, Klaus
was ultimately supported by some of the government's deputies and senators
including certain Social Democrats and even some Communists. Klaus's efforts
to convince the electors before he was voted in were, therefore, understandably
accompanied by his emphasising the limited role of the president; such a role,
he said, could only be strengthened 'at complicated or fatal moments' (Klaus
2003). Klaus repeatedly adhered to this promise mainly in the first years while
resolving government crises, when he avoided clearly preferring the ODS.
Klaus's approach was first on display in summer 2004, when ČSSD Prime
Minister Špidla resigned after his party failed in European elections. Klaus responded
by showing a willingness to allow the government coalition to continue
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 709
and ignored the ODS idea to call an early election. However, after consulting
with party politicians, off the record, the head of state rejected the option of
a minority Social Democratic government supported by the Communists, which
enjoyed strong support in both left-wing parties. Klaus's negative position was
influenced by the legacy of the former communist regime, on which the Communists
looked back nostalgically (thus creating a strong public response).
For that reason, the Social Democratic prime ministerial candidate, Stanislav
Gross, together with other coalition politicians, had to meet an unusual condition
before their appointment: to bring the president at least 101 signatures of
non-Communist deputies. Though the existing government coalition of three
parties had only the slimmest of majorities (101 votes exactly), they were able
to meet the president's request (Havlík 2011: 64; Brunclík 2008: 292).
This pattern of behaviour, which could be characterised as medium-level
activism, was redeployed by Klaus during another government crisis a year
later. The ministers of a smaller centre-right government party, the Christian
KDU-ČSL, resigned over the prime minister's scandals. However, Klaus did not
accept their resignations, explaining that the Constitution did not stipulate the
time frame within which he ought to do so, and he blocked Gross's efforts to
hold on to the prime minister's office through an alliance with the Communists.
Ultimately, Gross resigned under pressure and Klaus did not seek to prevent
the emergence of a new government based on the existing coalition pattern; it
was led by another Social Democrat prime minister, Jiří Paroubek (e.g. Brunclík
- Kubát 2018: 81).
Paroubek got into a series of arguments with Klaus, not least due to the president's
intense Euroscepticism. There was also confrontation over ministerial
nominations, when in autumn 2005 Klaus refused to appoint the new health
minister until the candidate resigned his leadership of a professional medical
organisation. The dispute was resolved several weeks later when the candidate
resigned from the medical body and Klaus appointed him (Kopeček 2022: 367).
While in his relations with governments, Klaus felt somewhat restricted
because of the way he had been elected and stayed within the boundaries of
medium activism, the same was not true for his vetoing agility. The president's
hostile relationship with three ČSSD-led (and non-cohesive) governments
was accompanied by 33 vetoes of laws (Table 1) representing about 7%
of legislation. This corresponds to high activism, even when considering the
importance of the laws, although clear cases of mega-politics were absent.
Klaus, the economic liberal, most often explained his vetoes by what he saw as
the excessive role of the state, but he dedicated his longest commentary to the
Civil Partnership Act. This law probably became the most visible manifestation
of the cultural struggle in the Czech Republic and Klaus justified his veto on
conservative grounds (Klaus 2006).
710 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
Klaus used his veto power most often during the Paroubek government,
20 times in about a year, which represented 10% (!) of legislation and a swing
towards presidential hyperactivism. The growth of the presidential veto during
Paroubek's term was linked to the close parliamentary collaboration between
the government Social Democrats and the opposition Communists in promoting
a leftist economic agenda.
The president was apparently encouraged by the split of the ruling coalition
and, at least in the early years, he also tried to exploit its narrow majority in
parliament. However, the Chamber of Deputies overrode most of Klaus's vetoes,
the only major exceptions being a few absolute vetoes at the time of the 2006
parliamentary elections when the Chamber was no longer working (Table 1).
Unlike Havel, Klaus did not use reviews by the Constitutional Court, which
he pejoratively described as 'the third chamber of parliament', and he generally
viewed the judiciary with disdain (Pospíšil 2013). Characteristically, the only
petition Klaus sent to the Constitutional Court throughout his presidency was
not in response to an act freshly adopted by parliament, but in consequence of
his dispute with the president of the Supreme Court concerning the number
of its vice presidents.
The June 2006 parliamentary elections created a new situation. The winner
was ODS - close to Klaus - but it had a problem negotiating a majority government,
because the Social Democrats and Communists together won exactly half
the number of seats in the Chamber. The president first attempted to resolve the
stalemate by appointing ODS leader Mirek Topolánek as prime minister, but
his minority single-party government failed to win confidence in parliament.
During a political crisis that lasted many months, Klaus pushed ODS and the
Social Democrats towards an agreement on a majority government completed
by the Christian Democrats, but this collapsed due to resistance in ODS. Topolánek
therefore opted for a government by ODS and two smaller parties - the
Christian Democrats and the Greens - reliant on two former Social Democratic
MPs who promised to tolerate the government, thus ensuring its slim majority.
Klaus described this solution as political corruption, and expressed his major
ideological objections to the alliance between the ODS and the Greens, as well
as to the foreign affairs minister nominated by the Greens.
Yet Klaus merely delayed the appointment of Topolanek's government by
several weeks and he appointed it exactly as the prime minister had proposed.
Thus, in fact, the president's opposition to the government felt like little more
than a strong gesture; it did not present a departure from Klaus's medium
activism to date. The president's actions (he would be aided by the government's
minority status) were clearly restricted by his February 2008 re-election
bid, for which the support of ODS was indispensable. Until re-election, Klaus
occasionally showed his objections to the make-up of Topolanek's government
and its policies. After re-election, Klaus lost the motivation to maintain good
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 711
relations with ODS, and after its failure in regional elections, spoke of'historically
the greatest defeat of any political party' in Czechia and blamed the prime
minister in particular (Klaus 2008). This rhetorical hardening, however, still
did not mark a fundamental shift from medium presidential activism.
A similar, slight shift took place in the legislative area and all four of
Klaus's vetoes came after his re-election. These vetoes, such as of a law preventing
cruelty to animals, were more or less connected with the agenda of the
Greens, who, along with the Social Democrats, supported a counter-candidate
to Klaus in the 2008 presidential election. Overall, the president vetoed about
2% of the legislation during the two Topolánek governments and did not cross
the threshold between low and medium activism.
Klaus's opposition to Topolanek's government was on full display during
the government crisis in spring 2009. The government collapsed following
a vote of no confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, when the Social Democrats,
Communists and defectors from ODS and the Greens opposed it. Klaus then
rejected Topolanek's idea of his government remaining in power for a few more
months until the Czech EU presidency ran out, even though a part of the opposition
was in favour. Likewise, the president declined to entrust Topolánek
with forming a new government. This situation pushed ODS, ČSSD and the
Greens to reach a quick agreement on a new technocratic government led by
the head of the Statistical Office, Jan Fischer, which Klaus accepted. Therefore,
as in 1998, a technocratic government was created, and this time it was actually
made up exclusively of non-partisans - yet it was not initiated by the president,
but by political parties, which proposed their nominees (Brunclik 2016: 18).
The formation of a technocratic government was not something exacted by
the president; it was linked to parties' efforts before early elections to avoid
responsibility for a deteriorating economic situation and recent government
scandals. Overall, Klaus's behaviour during the spring 2009 government crisis
was one of medium-level activism, as it had been in the past.
The duration of Fischer's government was unexpectedly extended when the
Constitutional Court cancelled an early election that had already been called
(Balík 2010). During the single year this government was in office, Klaus vetoed
13 laws, which was his highest percentage (14% of legislation) for any single
government. However, the president mostly vetoed laws that were initiated not
by Fischer's government but by various groups of deputies. The government
did not enjoy solid parliamentary backing and some of the vetoed laws were
approved despite its resistance. The Chamber, historically the least fragmented
at the beginning of the parliamentary term (Table 2), had become completely
chaotic in 2009-2010 as a result of the split of most parliamentary parties and
the breakdown of party discipline. The president's vetoing hyperactivism was
therefore not primarily a conflict with the government, but with an extremely
fragmented parliament.
712 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
Klaus's justifications for his vetoes were not dramatically different from
those in the past; most often he noted that the laws contained sections that were
economically (or otherwise) nonsensical, deforming the market economy and
clear rules (Kolář e al. 2013: 300). The right-wing president evidently sought
to act as the role of a legislative brake. Yet as in the past, he had little success.
Shortly before the 2010 parliamentary elections, there was a change in leader
for the Civic Democrats, when Topolánek quit after one of many scandals and
Petr Nečas, who was much closer to Klaus, became the new chair. After the
parliamentary elections, this closeness facilitated the formation of an ODS
government with the centre-right TOP 09 and a centrist, populist formation,
Public Affairs ( W ) . Klaus entrusted the business of negotiating the government
to Nečas, even though the Social Democrats were the formal winners of
the elections. The president was able to bolster his decision, which broke with
the informal custom to date of allowing the winner of an election to try to form
a government, thanks to a quick coalition agreement between ODS, TOP 09 and
W and the fact that the Social Democrats and the Communists had a minority
of seats in the Chamber.
This approach, supporting a particular government option, remained within
the category of medium presidential activism. In the following years, Klaus did
not deviate from this category and entered into conflicts within divided government,
acting as a 'regulator'. Surprisingly, the interventions sometimes helped
the W , whose leader developed a good relationship with Klaus for a time. This
was most conspicuous during the spring 2011 government crisis, when the
prime minister decided to push W out of the government over concerns about
that party's connection with a private security agency, and proposed the removal
of most of its ministers. During this crisis, Klaus dampened the excited emotions
and contributed to a compromise among the government parties and only
partial ministerial changes (Havlík - Hloušek 2014). However, Klaus's efforts
to maintain Necas's government cohesion was short-lived; in spring 2012 there
was a rift in W , and its leader and some deputies went into opposition.
Klaus's involvement in the legislative sphere (13 vetoes, 5% of laws) from
2010 to 2013 also corresponds to medium activism. Some of these laws were very
important - for example, a pension reform, which Klaus vetoed with the argument
of the lack of a broader political consensus. However, the trend is particularly
interesting. Klaus's legislative activism increased when the originally substantial
majority commanded by Necas's government in the Chamber shrank following
the W rift and the government became dependent on a few deputies whose positions
were uncertain. Until this shrinkage of the majority, the president had
only vetoed three laws; but in the following (and last) year of his presidency, he
blocked another ten. Necas's government often found it difficult to muster the
votes to override presidential vetoes. The president's behaviour contradicted the
assumption of the theory that the president would be passive vis-á-vis a politiPOLITICS
IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 713
cally close prime minister, but fully confirmed another premise, namely that if
the government has a slim majority in the Chamber, the president will be more
eager to veto laws. Table 4 summarises Klaus's activism during his terms in office.
Table 4: Activism of Václav Klaus
Period 2003-2006 2006-2010 2010-2013
Activism in appointments
and dismissals
M e d i u m M e d i u m M e d i u m
Activism in legislation
High with a swing t o hyperactivism
at the end of the
period
Low with a swing t o
hyperactivism at the end of
the period
M e d i u m
4.3 Miloš Zeman
Unlike his two predecessors, Miloš Zeman at his election as president in January
2013 was not dependent on support from parliamentary parties. This was
due to the transition from a parliamentary to a popular election, where his
(extra-parliamentary) party, bearing his name, was sufficient to serve as an
organisational base for the campaign. The ČSSD, which Zeman once led, was
divided about him. This was connected with the (indirect) presidential election
ten years before, when some of his social-democratic colleagues opposed Zeman
and he failed. At the time of the 2013 presidential election, some Social
Democrats - including their leader Bohuslav Sobotka - feared Zeman's revenge,
but other politicians in the party advocated for him.
Zeman aimed his presidential election campaign and the first months of
his presidency against Necas's government, emphasising its inability to deal
with the economic recession, and this created a hostile cohabitation. Its most
conspicuous moment was when Zeman completely blocked the appointments
of new ambassadors after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to nominate
two of his supporters in the presidential race (Šedo - Vérteši 2018: 37). The
Zeman-Nečas cohabitation only lasted for about four months, because in summer
2013 the prime minister resigned following an enormous scandal.
Even that signal of high presidential activism subsequently moved up a level
because Zeman played the central role in forming the new government. He
rejected the request of the former government coalition that they be given
a chance to create the new administration, interpreted the relevant article of the
Constitution as giving him 'the right to appoint anyone as prime minister' and
argued that the government 'did not have to have a political mandate', because
a cabinet of experts was needed to govern the country (Právo 2013a; Právo
2013b). The president chose as prime minister a minister in his earlier government,
Jiří Rusnok, who, though formally non-partisan, was associated with
714 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
the president's party. Zeman proceeded autonomously and without agreement
with the former government coalition or the parliamentary opposition, thus
using much greater constitutional discretion than Havel had with his Tosovsky-led
semi-technocratic government of 1998. What emerged was a presidential,
technocratic cabinet. Like Prime Minister Rusnok, some ministers were close
to the president and some had stood on behalf of Zeman's party in the autumn
2013 early elections (Hlousek 2014:109-110; Brunclik 2016:19-20).
Zeman thus embarked on a path of hyperactivism, which relied on underlining
his popular legitimacy granted to him by popular elections. (He repeated
this argument later in other disputed situations.) The Chamber of Deputies
was much more fragmented than at the beginning of the term (including many
formally independent MPs), and unable to function as a strong counterweight
to the president. However, despite the president's intense efforts at persuasion,
Rusnok's government failed to win parliamentary confidence. By voting
to dissolve itself, the Chamber limited the duration of Rusnok's government,
although Zeman left this cabinet in office for a full three months after the early
elections (Hlousek 2014:113-114; Hanley - Vachudova 2018: 281).
The 2013 early elections restricted the president's leeway for activism. Zeman's
own party failed in the elections and, after the vote, a group of Social
Democrats associated with the president, who secretly discussed the deposition
of the party leader (Sobotka) with him, were publicly compromised. The president
delayed the appointment of Sobotka's new government, and objected to
some proposed ministers (some of the reasons were quaint; for example, one
nominee was found deficient by Zeman because he had not published enough).
Yet the obstructions by the head of state that lacked support in parliament were
unable to overturn a solid agreement on government entered into by three parliamentary
parties that commanded a substantial majority in the Chamber: the
Social Democrats, ANO (meaning YES in Czech), a new party created by the
businessman, Andrej Babis and the junior Christian Democrats. Ultimately, the
president appointed the government as Prime Minister Sobotka had proposed it.
The counterweight of the strong majority coalition thus pushed the hyperactivist
Zeman back to the limits of what can be identified as medium activism.
This enforced decline in activism contrasts with the relatively high fragmentation
of parliament after the 2013 elections (Table 2), making it clear that this
factor was not of greater significance.
After Sobotka's government was appointed, its relations with the president
improved. For the first time in his presidency, Zeman became less activist. However,
a change took place at the end of 2015 when the prime minister criticised
the president, who, in an effort to boost his flagging popularity, took the lead in
an anti-refugee campaign during migration crises. The fierce mutual confrontation
lasted until the 2017 parliamentary elections and was enlivened by many
presidential witticisms, such as when, during one of his tours of the country,
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 715
he answered a question from the audience as to how to get rid of the prime
minister. 'Other than in the democratic way, there is also a non-democratic way,
the Kalashnikov automatic rifle', he said (Aktuálně 2016).
During this period, Zeman became closer to the deputy prime minister and
ANO leader Babiš, who fought Sobotka's Social Democrats for the same set of
voters. Zeman defended Babiš in numerous controversies, including a police
investigation into misuse of a European subsidy during the construction of the
Stork Nest Farm resort, which was part of the deputy prime minister's business
empire. The informal pact with Babiš was crucial for Zeman's course of action
during the spring 2017 government crisis, when Sobotka sought to push Babiš
into opposition in a very unexpected way. Zeman suggested that he could accept
the planned resignation of Sobotka without this causing the resignation
of other members of the government. Sobotka therefore changed his intention
and proposed to dismiss Babiš. The president delayed and only accepted Sobotka's
demand when the ANO leader concluded that the prolongation of the
government crisis was damaging to him (Šedo - Vérteši 2018: 16-17; Cabada
2018: 66). Overall, the situation showed the president's involvement in conflicts
within a divided government and a medium-level of activism.
The disputes in Sobotka's government were correlated with the president's legislative
steps when most of his vetoes occurred during a period of intense government
disputes in 2016-2017. The most discussed of the president's vetoes
was concerned with a conflict of interest act, dubbed Lex Babiš, which directly
concerned the deputy prime minister, as it restricted the members of government
with regards to their own companies bidding for public contracts. When
the parliament rejected the president's veto of Lex Babiš, Zeman turned to the
Constitutional Court - this was exceptional, as otherwise, he virtually ignored the
institution - as Klaus had (Table 1). Zeman used six vetoes (less than 2% of laws),
more sparsely than Klaus or Havel typically did. In that respect, it was low activism.
Zeman's preferment of Babiš had a fundamental impact on politics after the
autumn 2017 parliamentary elections. Babis's ANO was the formal winner of the
contest, but no mainstream party would govern with him because of the controversies,
including his prosecution that had arisen around him in the meantime.
The president, however, insisted on Babiš as prime minister and would not allow
any other candidate, even when Babis's first single-party minority government
failed to win the Chamber's confidence in January 2018. This was a quid pro quo
for Babis's assistance with Zeman's re-election at the time, when ANO fielded
no presidential candidate of its own and supported Zeman.
Zeman's push for Babiš, despite his political isolation, was helped by the
composition of the Chamber of Deputies, where, with the exception of the dominant
ANO, numerous small parties were often politically distant from each other
(Table 2). The parties were effectively fewer than in the previous elections, but
this reduction of parliamentary fragmentation was not essential. There was no
716 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
strong and cohesive counterweight to a president who was aligned with the largest
party. After Babiš had ruled for six months without confidence, ČSSD, despite
strong resistance within the party, agreed to form a coalition government with
ANO, which would be supported in parliament by the opposition Communists.
The situation with regard to the intensity of Zeman's interference corresponds
most closely to high activism, even though ANO was not the presidential party.
This evaluation confirms the president's behaviour in personnel ministerial
appointments to this minority and divided government. Zeman's discretionary
interventions mainly targeted ČSSD; this was fuelled by his earlier aversion to
this party. Even before the appointment of Babis's coalition government in summer
2018, Zeman objected to the foreign affairs ministerial candidate, who had
opposed him recently during the presidential election, and enforced his removal
from the list of ministers. A year later, Zeman blocked for a considerable time
the removal of a Social Democrat minister of culture, then refused to appoint
his designated successor (arguing he was insufficiently educated) and forced the
prime minister and the Social Democratic leadership to propose an alternative
candidate. The dependency of the prime minister and the government on the
president was also manifest, though less conspicuously, during the selection or
removal of some other ministers, where their relations with the president were
taken into consideration (Kopeček 2022: 431-432). Contrasting with the high
level of activism in relation to Babis's government was a complete passivity in
the legislative sphere and the president did not veto any laws (Table 1).
The day after the parliamentary elections in late 2021, the president was out
of politics as he was rushed to an intensive care unit. Babiš lost a key ally, and
the opposition parties formed a government which was ideologically diverse;
but it cooperated until the end of Zeman's presidency. Before the appointment
of ministers, the president's health improved somewhat and he attempted - as
he had with Babis's previous government - to have a Pirate Party foreign affairs
ministerial candidate replaced, referring to his insufficient education and mutual
differences of opinion. The new prime minister Petr Fiala (ODS) refused to
replace the candidate. Under the threat of having action brought against him
at the Constitutional Court for overstepping his powers, the president yielded
and appointed the government without any change.
The cohabitation of Fiala's government with the outgoing president continued
to be conflicting and, for example, shortly before he left office, Zeman
refused to appoint a new environment minister, thus delaying the appointment
process (the government decided to wait for a new president). However, as
after the 2013 elections (the early days of Sobotka's government), Zeman was
again pushed back to the limits of medium activism. It became clear that the
unified and strong parliamentary support of Fiala's government put a brake on
the president's attempt to restore for himself the key political role, but that did
not mean his complete passivity.
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 717
A notable side effect was Zeman's revived interest in legislative matters, when
he vetoed three laws of the Fiala government, including an amendment to the
state budget law As a proportion of all legislation, Zeman slightly exceeded the
3% veto threshold, thus abandoning his previous legislative passivity. Table 5
offers a summary of Zeman's activism.
Table 5: Activism of Miloš Zeman
Period 2013 2014-2017 2017-2021 2021-2023
Activism in appointments
and dismissals
High t o
hyperactivism
Oscillation between
medium and low
High M e d i u m
Activism in legislation Low Low Low M e d i u m
V. Discussion and conclusions
The Czech experience shows that the perfect opportunity for presidential activism
is offered by a combination of non-cohesive governments and their minority
status. This is confirmed, for example, by President Havel and Prime Minister
Klaus's second government (1996-1997), President Zeman and Sobotka's government
towards the end of his term in 2016-2017, and most strikingly, by the
same president and Babis's second government (2018-2021). Activism is also
stimulated by the hostile relationship of an opposition-leaning president with
a politically distant government. This is best documented during the time of the
Opposition Agreement (1998-2002), or cohabitation, as shown by Zeman with
Fiala's government at the end of his presidency. These findings are consistent
with theoretical expectations about presidential activism.
Sometimes, to a certain extent, a president in such a situation may be hampered
by the need to take into account his re-election bid. This was evident with
President Klaus and his relationship with the minority Topolanek-led government
(2007-2009). However, as shown by Zeman's behaviour before his 2018
re-election, the effort to win the support of the largest party, Babis's ANO, increased
presidential activism. Thus, re-election considerations can both increase
and decrease activism, depending on the political context.
Furthermore, a large window of opportunity for presidential agility was
offered by the absence or collapse of a coalition majority, typically as a result
of a political crisis. This is best illustrated by Zeman's installation of his own
presidential technocratic government in 2013, Klaus's 'veto offensive' in 2009-
2010 and, in a somewhat weaker form, Havel's involvement in the creation of
a semi-technocratic government in 1998. The first and second examples were
especially characterised by chaos and extreme parliamentary fragmentation
at the end of a term, which facilitated or encouraged the president's activism.
718 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček
However, the practice has repeatedly shown that high parliamentary fragmentation
alone does not automatically support the growth of presidential
activism if there is a majority cohesive government (albeit with several coalition
parties). This is evidenced by Klaus's government in 1993-1996 or slightly less
distinctly by Sobotka's government in its first years after 2014. This can be taken
as a contribution to the theoretical debate outlined in the introduction between
the different views of Tavits and Kóker, where the latter questions the essential
importance of parliamentary fragmentation, which the Czech case confirms.
The Czech example supports the theoretical assumption that the internal cohesion
of the government acts as an apparent constraint on activism, especially
when combined with a majority government. Cohesion effectively decreases
activism, even if it does not eliminate it completely, despite any presidential dislike
of the government arrangements. This is vividly illustrated by, for instance,
the beginning of Sobotka's government in 2014 and Fiala's government in 2021,
when President Zeman delayed their formation and questioned ministers, but
did not dare to block them. Some limits on the president's expansiveness, thanks
to the relative cohesion of the government and the ability to ensure external support
in parliament, were manifest even during the creation of minority governments
(of the Social Democrats in 1998 and Topolanek's second government at
the turn of 2007). A specific factor in Havel's and Zeman's cases was their poor
health. However, it did not act as a major constraint for either of these presidents,
although a certain limitation of their agility was noticeable at some moments.
Three decades of Czech experience also show that low activism - i.e. the de
facto prevailing passivity of the head of state - is rather exceptional. In line with
theory, this is helped by the close relationship between the prime minister and
the government on the one hand, and the president on the other, as was the
case with President Havel and the government in 1993-1996 and, with some
reservations (due to its episodic nature), the government after the elections
in 2002. Other examples illustrate that even a seemingly close-to-government
president can behave actively. The directly elected Zeman, although close to
Babis's 2018-2021 coalition government, was strongly activist (except in the
legislative sphere). Another case, albeit with less activist speed', was Klaus's role
of 'regulator' of the Nečas government.
There is a clear correlation between the loss of some backing in parliament
of Necas's government and President Klaus's appetite for confounding its legislative
designs. Klaus had sought to exploit a similar legislative opportunity
afforded by a government's slim majority before, during much more conflictual
cohabitations with Social Democratic prime ministers (2003-2006). The theoretical
expectations concerned with growing activism in a situation of a slim
parliamentary majority are thus fully borne out by the Czech experience.
The transition to popular elections had a specific impact, as it manifested
itself differently in the areas of government appointments and dismissals on the
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 19 (2023) 4 719
one hand and legislation on the other. Havel and Klaus felt relatively free in their
attempts to obstruct legislation; however, they entered less than Zeman into the
heart of the political regime. For both, their indirect election by parliament placed
a certain internal limitation on their actions, and put a brake on excessive discretion
during the discharge of their presidential powers vis-a-vis the governmental
focal point of the parliamentary regime. They simply saw that there were some
boundaries set by the parliamentary parties. Havel's most radical activist step the
installation of the presidential semi-technocratic government of 1998 - still
respected his obligation to agree about the government with at least some of the
parliamentary parties. Klaus had to deal with many more governmental crises
than Havel, but his role as a 'regulator' in this area remained unchanged.
Popularly-elected Zeman was much less active throughout his presidency
than both his predecessors in the matter of laws. There are multiple factors,
one of which is that Zeman learned lessons from his predecessors, who were
not particularly successful in their legislative activities (with the exceptions
of the absolute vetoes at the end of the term of the Chamber of Deputies and
Havel's use of the Constitutional Court). Another factor, probably still more
important, was that Zeman concentrated his efforts on directly influencing
governments, which seemed to offer him much better prospects, and this was
a more attractive strategy than the not very promising legislative vetoes. This
was accompanied by his attempt at a breakthrough into the political regime
when he installed and sustained Rusnok's technocratic government without
the agreement of parliamentary parties. Later, Zeman followed this up by
promoting Babis as prime minister and then co-determining the character of
Babis's government, including choosing some of the ministers. Here Zeman
conspicuously overstepped the boundaries laid out by Havel and Klaus and his
popular election played a role in this.
The new mode of presidential election thus has increased the systemic risks
of destabilising Czech democracy. Of course, Zeman's border-crossing may not
be repeated by the second popularly elected president, Petr Pavel. However, the
risk remains that a future president will try to usurp more powers by claiming
the legitimacy of direct election. Therefore, it would be beneficial to clarify the
constitutional procedure and rules for the appointment and removal of governments,
as well as individual members of the government, including setting time
limits for the president's actions.
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Lubomír Kopeček is a professor of Political Science at the Department of Political
Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic.
He specializes mainly in comparative politics and Czech politics. He is an author
of a number of articles in journals and monographs, for example "The Rise of Entrepreneurial
Parties in European Politics" (with Vít Hloušek and Petra Vodová,
Pálgrave Macmillan 2020), "Czech Politics: From West to East and Back Again"
(with Stanislav Balík et al, Verlag Barbara Budrich 2017), and "Origin, Ideology
and Transformation of Political Parties. East-Central and Western Europe Compared"
(with Vít Hloušek, Ashgate 2010). ORCID 0000-0003-2987-3035; E-mail:
kopecek@fss.muni,cz
724 Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism Lubomír Kopeček