HANELT, Etienne. A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary. In Nuffield Early Career Workshop in Socio-Legal Studies, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. 2023.
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Basic information
Original name A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary
Authors HANELT, Etienne (276 Germany, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Nuffield Early Career Workshop in Socio-Legal Studies, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2023.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Presentations at conferences
Field of Study 50501 Law
Country of publisher United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW Web nakladatele
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133122
Organization unit Faculty of Law
Keywords in English courts; hybrid regime; rule of law; Hungary; informal institutions
Tags rivok
Tags International impact
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. Petra Georgala, učo 32967. Changed: 2/4/2024 17:43.
Abstract
Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges, making a focus on legal characteristics insufficient to detect their actual functioning. Through an in-depth case study of Hungary’s judiciary after 2010, we show that ‘constitutional tinkering’ and informal clientelistic networks, used to control the executive and legislative branches, were also applied to the judiciary. Still, they remain underdeveloped because of the domestic and external restraints of judicial independence. Since reliable hard data is not available, we build our paper on interviews with Hungarian judges conducted in 2022. Based on these, we test the validity of existing theories and leverage thick descriptions to explain the means of control over judges.
Links
101002660, interní kód MUName: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Acronym: INFINITY)
Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)
PrintDisplayed: 19/7/2024 15:20