A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

u 2023

A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

HANELT, Etienne and Attila VINCZE

Basic information

Original name

A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

Authors

HANELT, Etienne (276 Germany, guarantor, belonging to the institution) and Attila VINCZE (348 Hungary, belonging to the institution)

Edition

1. vyd. Brno, 20 pp. 2023

Publisher

JUSTIN Working Paper Series

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Účelové publikace

Field of Study

50501 Law

Country of publisher

Czech Republic

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

Open access časopisu

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133124

Organization unit

Faculty of Law

ISSN

Keywords in English

judiciary; judicial independence; hybrid regime; Hungary; rule of law; patronage

Abstract

V originále

Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. This is paradigmatically shown in Hungary, a case tightly integrated into international organisations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges. Building on interviews with Hungarian judges, we propose that the influence over the judiciary is divided among three institutions: the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. The institutions and their leaders are incentivised to compete for resources and influence, checking each other at the expense of a de facto independent judiciary. The institutions are constantly redesigned based on their efficacy and reliability and due to external constraints, resulting in an ebb and flow of their power and influence. We conclude that hybrid regimes can maintain the appearance of the rule of law by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.

Links

101002660, interní kód MU

Name: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Acronym: INFINITY)

Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)

Citovat

HANELT, Etienne and Attila VINCZE. A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary. 1st ed. Brno: JUSTIN Working Paper Series, 2023, 20 pp. ISSN 2336-4785.

@misc{2364038,
   author = {Hanelt, Etienne and Vincze, Attila},
   address = {Brno},
   edition = {1},
   keywords = {judiciary; judicial independence; hybrid regime; Hungary; rule of law; patronage},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Brno},
   publisher = {JUSTIN Working Paper Series},
   title = {A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary},
   url = {https://justin.law.muni.cz/media/3574710/hanelt-vincze_a-hybrid-judiciary-in-a-hybrid-regime-2023.pdf},
   year = {2023}
}

TY  - GEN
ID  - 2364038
AU  - Hanelt, Etienne - Vincze, Attila
PY  - 2023
TI  - A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary
VL  - Neuveden
PB  - JUSTIN Working Paper Series
CY  - Brno
KW  - judiciary
KW  - judicial independence
KW  - hybrid regime
KW  - Hungary
KW  - rule of law
KW  - patronage
UR  - https://justin.law.muni.cz/media/3574710/hanelt-vincze_a-hybrid-judiciary-in-a-hybrid-regime-2023.pdf
N2  - Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. This is paradigmatically shown in Hungary, a case tightly integrated into international organisations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges. Building on interviews with Hungarian judges, we propose that the influence over the judiciary is divided among three institutions: the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. The institutions and their leaders are incentivised to compete for resources and influence, checking each other at the expense of a de facto independent judiciary. The institutions are constantly redesigned based on their efficacy and reliability and due to external constraints, resulting in an ebb and flow of their power and influence. We conclude that hybrid regimes can maintain the appearance of the rule of law by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.
ER  -

HANELT, Etienne and Attila VINCZE. \textit{A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary}. 1st ed. Brno: JUSTIN Working Paper Series, 2023, 20 pp. ISSN~2336-4785.

Detailed Information on Publication Record