A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

HANELT, Etienne and Attila VINCZE. A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary. 1st ed. Brno: JUSTIN Working Paper Series, 2023, 20 pp. ISSN 2336-4785.

Basic information

• Original name: A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary
• Authors: HANELT, Etienne (276 Germany, guarantor, belonging to the institution) and Attila VINCZE (348 Hungary, belonging to the institution).
• Edition: 1. vyd. Brno, 20 pp. 2023.
• Publisher: JUSTIN Working Paper Series

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Special-purpose publication
• Field of Study: 50501 Law
• Country of publisher: Czech Republic
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• WWW: Open access časopisu
• RIV identification code: RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133124
• Organization unit: Faculty of Law
• ISSN: 2336-4785
• Keywords in English: judiciary; judicial independence; hybrid regime; Hungary; rule of law; patronage
• Tags: rivok
• Tags: International impact

Abstract

Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. This is paradigmatically shown in Hungary, a case tightly integrated into international organisations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges. Building on interviews with Hungarian judges, we propose that the influence over the judiciary is divided among three institutions: the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. The institutions and their leaders are incentivised to compete for resources and influence, checking each other at the expense of a de facto independent judiciary. The institutions are constantly redesigned based on their efficacy and reliability and due to external constraints, resulting in an ebb and flow of their power and influence. We conclude that hybrid regimes can maintain the appearance of the rule of law by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.

Links

• 101002660, interní kód MU: Name: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Acronym: INFINITY)

Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)