The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators
duringintergroup conflict

J 2024

The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators duringintergroup conflict

LANG, Martin, Radim CHVAJA and Benjamin G PURZYCKI

Basic information

Original name

The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators duringintergroup conflict

Authors

LANG, Martin (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Radim CHVAJA (203 Czech Republic) and Benjamin G PURZYCKI (840 United States of America)

Edition

Evolution and Human Behavior, 2024, 1090-5138

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

60304 Religious studies

Country of publisher

United States of America

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

URL

Impact factor

Impact factor: 5.100 in 2022

Organization unit

Faculty of Arts

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2024.01.003

UT WoS

001218275600001

Keywords in English

Costly signaling theory Evolution of cooperation Intergroup conflict Sacrifice

Abstract

V originále

A reliable assortment of committed individuals is crucial for success in intergroup conflict due to the danger of shirking. Theory predicts that reliable communication of commitment is afforded by costly signals that track cooperative intent. Across four pre-registered studies (total N = 1440, general US population), we used the public goods game where groups competed for resources to investigate whether and how costly signals function to assort cooperators. We found that costly signals assorted more cooperative participants, creating groups that would win most of the between-group clashes. The same effects were not observed when participants were assigned to signal, implying that signaling tracks but does not create cooperative intent. However, contrary to costly signaling theory, we found that low cost signals were more effective in cooperator assortment compared to high cost signals and suggest that future studies need to focus on signaler perception of cost/benefit trade-off of signaling.

Links

CZ.02.2.69/0.0/0.0/19_074/0012727, interní kód MU
(CEP code: EF19_074/0012727)

Name: MSCAfellow3@MUNI

Investor: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the CR, Priority axis 2: Development of universities and human resources for research and development

Files attached

Lang_et_al_CostlyCommitmentSignals_V2.pdf

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Citovat

LANG, Martin, Radim CHVAJA and Benjamin G PURZYCKI. The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators duringintergroup conflict. Evolution and Human Behavior. 2024, vol. 45, No 2, p. 131-143. ISSN 1090-5138. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2024.01.003.

@article{2366499,
   author = {Lang, Martin and Chvaja, Radim and Purzycki, Benjamin G},
   article_number = {2},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2024.01.003},
   keywords = {Costly signaling theory Evolution of cooperation Intergroup conflict Sacrifice},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1090-5138},
   journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
   title = {The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators duringintergroup conflict},
   url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513824000035/},
   volume = {45},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - JOUR
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AU  - Lang, Martin - Chvaja, Radim - Purzycki, Benjamin G
PY  - 2024
TI  - The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators duringintergroup conflict
JF  - Evolution and Human Behavior
VL  - 45
IS  - 2
SP  - 131-143
EP  - 131-143
SN  - 10905138
KW  - Costly signaling theory Evolution of cooperation Intergroup conflict Sacrifice
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513824000035/
N2  - A reliable assortment of committed individuals is crucial for success in intergroup conflict due to the danger of shirking. Theory predicts that reliable communication of commitment is afforded by costly signals that track cooperative intent. Across four pre-registered studies (total N = 1440, general US population), we used the public goods game where groups competed for resources to investigate whether and how costly signals function to assort cooperators. We found that costly signals assorted more cooperative participants, creating groups that would win most of the between-group clashes. The same effects were not observed when participants were assigned to signal, implying that signaling tracks but does not create cooperative intent. However, contrary to costly signaling theory, we found that low cost signals were more effective in cooperator assortment compared to high cost signals and suggest that future studies need to focus on signaler perception of cost/benefit trade-off of signaling.
ER  -

LANG, Martin, Radim CHVAJA and Benjamin G PURZYCKI. The role of costly commitment signals in assorting cooperators duringintergroup conflict. \textit{Evolution and Human Behavior}. 2024, vol.~45, No~2, p.~131-143. ISSN~1090-5138. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2024.01.003.

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