ŠIPULOVÁ, Katarína and Alžbeta KRÁLOVÁ. The Czech Constitutional Court: The inconspicuous constrainer. In Kálmán Pócza. Constitutional Review in Central and Eastern Europe Judicial-Legislative Relations in Comparative Perspective. Abingdon: Routledge, 2024, p. 58-85. ISBN 978-1-032-50660-9.
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Basic information
Original name The Czech Constitutional Court: The inconspicuous constrainer
Authors ŠIPULOVÁ, Katarína (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Alžbeta KRÁLOVÁ (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Abingdon, Constitutional Review in Central and Eastern Europe Judicial-Legislative Relations in Comparative Perspective, p. 58-85, 28 pp. 2024.
Publisher Routledge
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Chapter(s) of a specialized book
Field of Study 50500 5.5 Law
Country of publisher United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
Publication form printed version "print"
Organization unit Faculty of Law
ISBN 978-1-032-50660-9
Keywords in English Czech Constitutional Court; judicial constraints; constitutional review; judicial network
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. Bc. Alžbeta Králová, Ph.D., učo 219733. Changed: 26/3/2024 10:18.
Abstract
Compared to its Central European counterparts, the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) represents an interesting example of a court spared from the executive capture by a (populist) government. This chapter argues that part of this resilience comes down to selective, self-constrained behaviour of the Constitutional Court. While being a crucial actor of the democratic transition in the early 1990s, the CCC typically left a wide margin for compliance to the political sovereign. Drawing on the JUDICON-EU data, the chapter explains how the combination of procedural constraints (high voting quorum and supermajority in constitutional review) made frequent heavily constraining rulings in politically and socially salient topics unlikely. Instead, activist judges started relying on a less direct method of constitutional requirement (binding constitutionally conform interpretation of reviewed legislation) both in constitutional review and individual petition cases. In hindsight, this technique might have helped to shield the CCC from strong political backlash.
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