Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the
aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine

J 2024

Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine

CHYONG, Chi Kong and James HENDERSON

Basic information

Original name

Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine

Authors

CHYONG, Chi Kong and James HENDERSON

Edition

Energy, Elsevier, 2024, 0360-5442

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Country of publisher

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

References:

URL

Impact factor

Impact factor: 9.000 in 2022

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2024.130604

UT WoS

001179210700001

Keywords in English

Ukraine war; Gas security of supply; European gas market; LNG; Gazprom; Russia; Global gas market model; Long-term contracts; Nord stream; Yamal-europe; TurkStream

Abstract

V originále

This paper examines Russian gas export scenarios to Europe, considering infrastructure, long-term contracts (LTC), and the new geopolitical landscape in Europe. Short-term expectations preclude export growth, while Ukraine transit risks stem from military actions, sanctions, or termination of the transit contract. Export volume may recover in a benign post-conflict resolution, though not to pre-war levels. Available export infrastructure options include the Ukraine transit and the TurkStream pipeline, with a combined capacity of 75 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma), about 50% of Russia's exports in 2021. Gazprom's LTC position will also dictate possible export volume to Europe. Pre-Ukraine war, Gazprom held 135bcma of LTCs with EU buyers. Currently, only 25bcma is active, with the rest terminated or under legal review. Of the remaining LTC, 12bcma faces risk if the Ukraine transit ends in 2025. Considering these issues, we model baseline and counterfactual scenarios with flows from Russia from 0 to 75bcma. Results suggest gas price differences are prominent until 2026 due to a tight global gas market. Beyond 2026, LNG expansion and Europe's decarbonisation commitments lessen the price impact, making Russian gas economically irrelevant. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the divisive issue of Russian gas becomes economically insignificant by mid-decade.

Citovat

CHYONG, Chi Kong and James HENDERSON. Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine. Energy. Elsevier, 2024, vol. 292, April, p. 1-14. ISSN 0360-5442. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2024.130604.

@article{2387798,
   author = {Chyong, Chi Kong and Henderson, James},
   article_number = {April},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2024.130604},
   keywords = {Ukraine war; Gas security of supply; European gas market; LNG; Gazprom; Russia; Global gas market model; Long-term contracts; Nord stream; Yamal-europe; TurkStream},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0360-5442},
   journal = {Energy},
   title = {Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine},
   url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544224003761},
   volume = {292},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2387798
AU  - Chyong, Chi Kong - Henderson, James
PY  - 2024
TI  - Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine
JF  - Energy
VL  - 292
IS  - April
SP  - 1-14
EP  - 1-14
PB  - Elsevier
SN  - 03605442
KW  - Ukraine war
KW  - Gas security of supply
KW  - European gas market
KW  - LNG
KW  - Gazprom
KW  - Russia
KW  - Global gas market model
KW  - Long-term contracts
KW  - Nord stream
KW  - Yamal-europe
KW  - TurkStream
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544224003761
N2  - This paper examines Russian gas export scenarios to Europe, considering infrastructure, long-term contracts (LTC), and the new geopolitical landscape in Europe. Short-term expectations preclude export growth, while Ukraine transit risks stem from military actions, sanctions, or termination of the transit contract. Export volume may recover in a benign post-conflict resolution, though not to pre-war levels. Available export infrastructure options include the Ukraine transit and the TurkStream pipeline, with a combined capacity of 75 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma), about 50% of Russia's exports in 2021. Gazprom's LTC position will also dictate possible export volume to Europe. Pre-Ukraine war, Gazprom held 135bcma of LTCs with EU buyers. Currently, only 25bcma is active, with the rest terminated or under legal review. Of the remaining LTC, 12bcma faces risk if the Ukraine transit ends in 2025. Considering these issues, we model baseline and counterfactual scenarios with flows from Russia from 0 to 75bcma. Results suggest gas price differences are prominent until 2026 due to a tight global gas market. Beyond 2026, LNG expansion and Europe's decarbonisation commitments lessen the price impact, making Russian gas economically irrelevant. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the divisive issue of Russian gas becomes economically insignificant by mid-decade.
ER  -

CHYONG, Chi Kong and James HENDERSON. Quantifying the economic value of Russian gas in Europe in the aftermath of the 2022 war in Ukraine. \textit{Energy}. Elsevier, 2024, vol.~292, April, p.~1-14. ISSN~0360-5442. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2024.130604.

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