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@article{2387839,
author = {Kosař, David and Šipulová, Katarína and Kadlec, Ondřej},
article_location = {Cambridge},
article_number = {1},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019624000038},
keywords = {Judicial councils; separation of powers; fourth-branch institutions; judicial independence; four ideal types of judicial councils; a judge-controlled},
language = {eng},
issn = {1574-0196},
journal = {European constitutional law review},
title = {The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/case-for-judicial-councils-as-fourthbranch-institutions/9C1A6DBEC87D90D64546EB133BFF6F73},
volume = {20},
year = {2024}
}
TY - JOUR
ID - 2387839
AU - Kosař, David - Šipulová, Katarína - Kadlec, Ondřej
PY - 2024
TI - The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions
JF - European constitutional law review
VL - 20
IS - 1
SP - 82-119
EP - 82-119
PB - Cambridge Univ. Press
SN - 15740196
KW - Judicial councils
KW - separation of powers
KW - fourth-branch institutions
KW - judicial independence
KW - four ideal types of judicial councils
KW - a judge-controlled
UR - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/case-for-judicial-councils-as-fourthbranch-institutions/9C1A6DBEC87D90D64546EB133BFF6F73
N2 - Many European countries have transferred powers concerning judicial careers and court administration to judicial councils. These independent bodies were intended to depoliticise the judiciary, maintain a balance between judicial independence and accountability, and ideally increase the quality and efficiency of the judicial branch. Supranational organisations, judges, policymakers, lawyers and political scientists argue vehemently whether judicial councils delivered the goods they promised. Constitutional theorists lag behind. They either skipped the debate on where to place judicial councils within the separation of powers, assuming that they belonged to the judicial branch, or lament that judicial councils violate the classical tripartite separation of powers without addressing new advancement in the separation of powers scholarship. This article aims to fill this gap and theorises about the place and role of judicial councils in the separation of powers. It argues that all judicial councils gravitate towards one of four ideal types – judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch – each placing the judicial council in a different position vis-à-vis the three classical branches. Based on the experience with judicial councils so far, we argue that conceptualising judicial councils as fourth-branch institutions provides the best protection against the two greatest dangers judicial councils face – corporativism and politicisation.
ER -
KOSAŘ, David, Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ and Ondřej KADLEC. The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions. \textit{European constitutional law review}. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2024, vol.~20, No~1, p.~82-119. ISSN~1574-0196. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019624000038.
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