Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover

J 2024

Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover

LEISURE, Patrick Casey a David KOSAŘ

Základní údaje

Originální název

Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover

Autoři

LEISURE, Patrick Casey (203 Česká republika, domácí) a David KOSAŘ (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

Law & Policy, John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, 0265-8240

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50501 Law

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

Open access článku

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 1.200 v roce 2023

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14220/24:00135736

Organizační jednotka

Právnická fakulta

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238

UT WoS

001189748900001

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85189515075

Klíčová slova anglicky

judicial overstay; judicial tenure; conceptual utility; performance of functions

Štítky

Justin, rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 5. 12. 2024 19:27, Patrick Casey Leisure, J.D., LL.M.

Anotace

V originále

While a slew of recent scholarship has examined the phenomenon of executive overstay, there is little talk about the more complex and equally vexing phenomena of judicial overstay. This article begins to examine the many layers and complexities of judicial overstay by exploring whether the political branches ever seek to prolong abusively the time in office of loyal judges, and if so, by what mechanisms. Illustrating this is not merely a theoretical practice, we label such a phenomenon court-hoarding, and consider it a subset of the broader category of judicial overstay. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we argue that while court-hoarding is a somewhat risky and less-known governance tactic that is likely to occur only when certain conditions are fulfilled, the potential benefits of court-hoarding for power consolidation and institutional monopoly power are profound. Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on judicial tenure. More specifically, we add conceptual utility to thinking about judicial tenure— and its abuse—by describing a three-layer model of court-hoarding, consisting of a core, a mid-layer, and a periphery, which correspond to three broad categor of influencing judicial tenure across time and space.

Návaznosti

101002660, interní kód MU

Název: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Akronym: INFINITY)

Investor: Evropská unie, Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay, ERC (Excellent Science)

Přiložené soubory

Law_Policy_-_2024_-_Leisure_-_Court_hoarding_Another_method_of_gaming_judicial_turnover.pdf

Citovat

LEISURE, Patrick Casey a David KOSAŘ. Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover. Law & Policy. John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, roč. 46, č. 4, s. 328-348. ISSN 0265-8240. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238.

@article{2387937,
   author = {Leisure, Patrick Casey and Kosař, David},
   article_number = {4},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238},
   keywords = {judicial overstay; judicial tenure; conceptual utility; performance of functions},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0265-8240},
   journal = {Law & Policy},
   title = {Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover},
   url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lapo.12238},
   volume = {46},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2387937
AU  - Leisure, Patrick Casey - Kosař, David
PY  - 2024
TI  - Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover
JF  - Law & Policy
VL  - 46
IS  - 4
SP  - 328-348
EP  - 328-348
PB  - John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver
SN  - 02658240
KW  - judicial overstay
KW  - judicial tenure
KW  - conceptual utility
KW  - performance of functions
UR  - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lapo.12238
N2  - While a slew of recent scholarship has examined the phenomenon of executive overstay, there is little talk about the more complex and equally vexing phenomena of judicial overstay. This article begins to examine the many layers and complexities of judicial overstay by exploring whether the political branches ever seek to prolong abusively the time in office of loyal judges, and if so, by what mechanisms. Illustrating this is not merely a theoretical practice, we label such a phenomenon court-hoarding, and consider it a subset of the broader category of judicial overstay. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we argue that while court-hoarding is a somewhat risky and less-known governance tactic that is likely to occur only when certain conditions are fulfilled, the potential benefits of court-hoarding for power consolidation and institutional monopoly power are profound. Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on judicial tenure. More specifically, we add conceptual utility to thinking about judicial tenure— and its abuse—by describing a three-layer model of court-hoarding, consisting of a core, a mid-layer, and a periphery, which correspond to three broad categor of influencing judicial tenure across time and space.
ER  -

LEISURE, Patrick Casey a David KOSAŘ. Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover. \textit{Law \&{} Policy}. John Wiley \&{} Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, roč.~46, č.~4, s.~328-348. ISSN~0265-8240. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238.

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