Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover

LEISURE, Patrick Casey and David KOSAŘ. Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover. Law & Policy. John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, Neuveden, 24 March, p. 1-21. ISSN 0265-8240. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238.

Basic information

• Original name: Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover
• Authors: LEISURE, Patrick Casey (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and David KOSAŘ (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution).
• Edition: Law & Policy, John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, 0265-8240.

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Article in a journal
• Field of Study: 50501 Law
• Country of publisher: United States of America
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• WWW: Open access článku
• Impact factor: Impact factor: 1.300 in 2022
• Organization unit: Faculty of Law
• Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238
• UT WoS: 999
• Keywords in English: judicial overstay; judicial tenure; conceptual utility; performance of functions
• Tags: rivok
• Tags: International impact, Reviewed

Abstract

While a slew of recent scholarship has examined the phenomenon of executive overstay, there is little talk about the more complex and equally vexing phenomena of judicial overstay. This article begins to examine the many layers and complexities of judicial overstay by exploring whether the political branches ever seek to prolong abusively the time in office of loyal judges, and if so, by what mechanisms. Illustrating this is not merely a theoretical practice, we label such a phenomenon court-hoarding, and consider it a subset of the broader category of judicial overstay. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we argue that while court-hoarding is a somewhat risky and less-known governance tactic that is likely to occur only when certain conditions are fulfilled, the potential benefits of court-hoarding for power consolidation and institutional monopoly power are profound. Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on judicial tenure. More specifically, we add conceptual utility to thinking about judicial tenure— and its abuse—by describing a three-layer model of court-hoarding, consisting of a core, a mid-layer, and a periphery, which correspond to three broad categor of influencing judicial tenure across time and space.

Links

• 101002660, interní kód MU: Name: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Acronym: INFINITY)

Investor: European Union, ERC (Excellent Science)