Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of
entitlement and self-selection effects

J 2024

Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína and Rostislav STANĚK

Basic information

Original name

Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

Authors

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína and Rostislav STANĚK

Edition

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, NEW YORK, ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2024, 0176-2680

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Country of publisher

Netherlands

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Impact factor

Impact factor: 2.000 in 2022

Organization unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526

UT WoS

001220212100001

Keywords in English

Entitlement effect; Self-selection; Contest; Experiment

Abstract

V originále

Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

Links

GA21-25331S, research and development project

Name: Konflikty jako nedorozumění: tři experimentální studie

Investor: Czech Science Foundation

Citovat

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína and Rostislav STANĚK. Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. NEW YORK: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2024, vol. 82, March, p. 1-10. ISSN 0176-2680. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526.

@article{2390659,
   author = {Čellárová, Katarína and Staněk, Rostislav},
   article_location = {NEW YORK},
   article_number = {March},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526},
   keywords = {Entitlement effect; Self-selection; Contest; Experiment},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0176-2680},
   journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY},
   title = {Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects},
   volume = {82},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2390659
AU  - Čellárová, Katarína - Staněk, Rostislav
PY  - 2024
TI  - Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects
JF  - EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
VL  - 82
IS  - March
SP  - 1-10
EP  - 1-10
PB  - ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
SN  - 01762680
KW  - Entitlement effect
KW  - Self-selection
KW  - Contest
KW  - Experiment
N2  - Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.
ER  -

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína and Rostislav STANĚK. Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects. \textit{EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY}. NEW YORK: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2024, vol.~82, March, p.~1-10. ISSN~0176-2680. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526.

Detailed Information on Publication Record