



Attack Surface Management: State of the Art and Operational Challenges

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
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- **Attack Surface Management (ASM)**
 - **IBM:** "... is a continuous discovery, analysis, prioritization, remediation and monitoring of the cybersecurity vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors that make up an organization's attack surface."
 - **Splunk:** "... is continuous monitoring and analysis of an organization's attack surface for potential vulnerabilities and attack vectors, taking remedial measures to address them."
- **Attack surface**
 - Internet-facing assets: devices, network services, endpoints, ...
 - Software versions and configurations of the assets
 - but also organization structure and peoples' names (for social engineering)
- **External x Internal Attack Surface**
 - External - what is visible to external attacker / everybody
 - Internal - what is visible within the organization, e.g., to the insiders (or attackers moving laterally)



Four phases of ASM (by Splunk)

- **Asset Discovery**
 - Enumerating all the assets
 - Various approaches, tools, and toolsets
- **Vulnerability Analysis**
 - How could the assets be exploited?
 - Plethora of tools and approaches
- **Risk Prioritization**
 - Which vulnerabilities pose the greatest risk?
 - Which vulnerabilities are easiest to exploit?
 - Are there vulnerable assets exploited before?
- **Remediation**
 - Attack surface reduction
 - Not discussed in this talk - situation dependent



https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/learn/what-is-attack-surface-management.html




- **Resilmesh project**
 - Situation aware enabled cyber resilience for dispersed, heterogeneous cyber systems
 - Explores the concept of **cybersecurity mesh** - collaborative ekosystem of tools securing modern, distributed enterprises (Gartner)
- **ASM-related components**
 - **CASM – Cyber Attack Surface Management**
 - Attack surface management toolset – network scanners, vulnerability scanners, vulnerability database connectors
 - Orchestration via Temporal.io allows for checking all tasks are done and repeating failed ones
 - **ISIM – Infrastructure and Service Information Model**
 - Data model (ontology) defines entities and relationships in computer networks and their cybersecurity posture, from cyber assets (networks, devices, services, software, data, users) to vulnerabilities (CVEs, impacts)
 - Database – Neo4j graph database, effectively a knowledge graph of local network, clean-up routines
 - REST API and GraphQL API allows access to the data from other components, consistency checks
 - **SACD – Situation Awareness Consolidated Dashboard**
 - Dashboard visualizes the content of ISIM database, e.g., details of a particular asset or vulnerability or overview of how does a vulnerability affects the whole network



- **Research background** is nearly non-existent
 - Primarily innovated by practitioners – and evolving very fast
 - Lack of ground truth, datasets, and metrics – hard to set up an experiment
- **Tools and toolsets**
 - Plethora of tools available (e.g., Project Discovery)
 - Complex toolset, both commercial and open-source, available
 - Limited to external ASM and generic IT
- **Procedures**
 - Well known and generally understood and adopted by practitioners
 - The implementation of individual steps is an open issue
 - There are much more steps to consider and go through than expected
- **Technical limitations**
 - **Low visibility** and lack of tools for ASM outside of generic IT, e.g., in **IoT and OT**
 - **Scalability** is often not addressed and worth investigating in large network
 - **Orchestration** is a vital issue in operations, especially in large networks



Enhanced ASM concept



- **Define scope**


- The initial step forgotten in the existing definitions and concepts
- Should cover the constituency (as understood by CSIRTs), e.g., IP range, domain
- Exceptions may arise:
 - External assets, e.g., cloud services
 - Some parts of the network may be hard to reach and assess
- Only external or also internal? How many private networks are there?

- **Use existing data**

- Does your organization use asset inventory or configuration database?
- Use as many existing databases, and services as possible
- Facilitates the discovery of new and unknown assets



Enhanced ASM concept




- **Asset discovery via network scanning**
 - Plethora of tools available for every task and use case – Nmap, MASSCAN, web scanners...
 - Advantageous to combine the tools – scan fast for active hosts with MASSCAN, then scan open ports with Nmap to get fingerprints
 - Beware of network congestion in low-throughput parts of the network
 - Not all assets can be found by active scanning (firewall rules, scan taking too long and missing working hours, etc.)
 - Highly dynamic environments (e.g., virtual machines) are an issue
 - Fingerprinting IoTs discloses only the OS, not the purpose of the device
- **Asset discovery via network traffic monitoring (e.g., NetFlow, IPFIX)**
 - A highly viable alternative, if present in an organization (costly)
 - Higher chance of discovering an active asset, but lower quality of fingerprinting
 - Long-term behavior analysis may identify IoT device types (e.g., CCTV camera, smart TVs, various sensors)



- **Vulnerability discovery and confirmation**
 - Simplest solution – get fingerprint in CPE format, look up CVEs by CPE in NVD
 - Highly error-prone, but gives you a rough idea, even in large scale
 - Dedicated vulnerability scanners are slightly better
 - Possible financial issues – high costs for running scans of large networks
 - Still a high false positive rate
 - Confirmation of discovered vulnerability to minimize false positives
 - Nuclei by Project Discovery with community-driven library of detection scripts
 - How to discover vulnerabilities like Log4j?



Enhanced ASM concept



- **Persistent storage**

- Vital for continuous ASM, persistent scanning, and recognizing new assets
- Traditional relational DBs will serve well
- ELK or similar will serve well in large scale
- Graph databases as an emerging technology with promising future research

- **Orchestration**

- Not addressed by most of the solutions – primary use case if one-time pentest
- Existing toolsets have one or few hard-coded workflows or require user inputs
- Orchestrating a toolset is rather not worth it (often no configurability)
- Define custom workflow and orchestrate with, e.g., Temporal



- **Attack Surface Management (ASM)**
 - Asset discovery, Vulnerability analysis, Risk prioritization, and Remediation (as defined by Splunk)
 - Common practice of cybersecurity teams, constantly evolving
 - Plethora of tools and toolsets available (e.g., Project Discovery)
- **Implementation of ASM in Resilmesh project**
 - Open-source tools cover most of the tasks of external ASM
 - Heterogeneity of data and tools makes it difficult to create one-size-fits-all solution
 - Proposed an orchestration framework and a “knowledge graph” of local network
- **Future work and research gap**
 - A need to find a solution for highly dynamic environments (virtualization, microservices)
 - Improving the **visibility** in IoT and OT realms via dedicated scanners
 - Improving vulnerability detection and confirmation
 - **Scalability** and **orchestration** in large networks
 - Improving **internal ASM** and scans from multiple vantage points



THANK YOU for your attention

Questions?

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